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ABSTRACT 
Sub-Saharan Africa faces severe infrastructure deficits including in power 
generation, water facilities, transportation, and telecommunications. These 
deficits compound the socio-economic challenges of the most 
impoverished region in the world. It is estimated that funding of US$ 90 
billion per annum is required to address infrastructure deficiencies. Other 
developing regions including Asia, the Middle East, and South America, 
have with varying degrees of success utilised the project finance 
framework to address similar infrastructure deficiencies, and also develop 
other commercial ventures. Africa has lagged behind in this respect, and 
still accounts for less than 3% of international project finance flows. The 
ability to attract and access international and domestic project finance 
capital, and execute the underlying ventures is an important opportunity to 
address the challenges noted above. 
The study contributes to knowledge by deepening our understanding of 
project finance in South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe in the 
following ways. Firstly, it offers a model through which to monitor key 
contextual factors that influence the success, failure, and shaping of 
project and infrastructure ventures. Secondly, it interrogates the main 
capital structure theories including the static trade off and pecking order 
theories, and their applicability and relevance for project and infrastructure 
finance in the selected jurisdictions. It then compares capital structure 
theory with actual practice of capital structure formulation in the 7 cases 
studies investigated. This yields important insights as to the most 
important factors influencing capital structure in project finance in the three 
selected countries. In particular the constrained supply of capital is 
observed as the top factor determining capital structure. It further 
enhances our understanding of why ventures using project finance in 
these countries may have significantly lower leverage than other similar 
ventures in developed regions of the world. Thirdly, the study extracts key 
insights into how stakeholder interactions evolve in the projects by 
applying stakeholder agency theory to project sponsors, managers, 
contractors, state institutions, and community organisations. Collectively 
these insights should contribute to attracting increased capital to project 
finance in Sub-Saharan Africa, and arranging projects with greater 
prospects of operational success.  
Key Words: Project Finance, Capital Structure, Leverage, Public Private 
Partnerships, Infrastructure, Risk Management, Contracting and 
Stakeholders.  
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1 
1 Introduction and Overview 
1.1 Introduction 
South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are medium to small countries 
located in Southern Africa, and with populations of 54.5 million, 27.9 
million and 15.6 million respectively (United Nations World Population 
Report, 2015). Each of these three countries has a relatively recent 
apartheid or post-colonial history, with independence having being 
achieved in 1994 in South Africa, in 1980 in Zimbabwe, and in 1974 in 
Mozambique. Shortly after its independence from Portuguese rule, 
Mozambique succumbed to a debilitating civil war that was finally resolved 
in 1990. As a result of the turbulence in their contemporary histories, each 
of these countries have inherited a particular socio-economic construct 
characterised by extreme inequality, complexity and uncertainty, and rapid 
changes with exposure and integration into the international economy. The 
United Nations Human Development Report (2015) ranks countries in 
terms of a Human Development Index (HDI) compiled on the basis of 
longevity, education, and income. According to this report South Africa 
ranks 116, Mozambique 180, and Zimbabwe 155, out of a total of 188 
countries. The three countries are also characterised by high levels of 
poverty with the population living below the income poverty line being 
53.8%, 54.7%, and 72.3% for South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe 
respectively. The high levels of poverty are exacerbated by extreme 
income inequality with South Africa having a Gini-coefficient of 65.0, 
Mozambique of 45.7, and an undetermined factor for Zimbabwe.  
Post-independence, all three countries have embarked on what can be 
broadly described as transformation projects. These transformation 
initiatives have been specific interventions led by the state to rearrange 
their societies, and address the adverse structural remnants of the 
apartheid and colonial era. While these transformation projects have 
enjoyed varied degrees of success, considerable challenges remain. 
Economic output continues to be biased towards primary sectors including 
mining and agriculture, with inadequate expansion of the secondary and 
tertiary sectors. This phenomenon is particularly acute in Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe. In addition, significant deficiencies in infrastructure detailed in 
the literature review, create formidable hurdles to socio-economic 
development by increasing the cost of doing business, and discouraging 
domestic and international investment prospects. Notably, many of these 
symptoms are prevalent in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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In order to address these socio economic challenges, and to support and 
add impetus to the transformation projects underway infrastructure deficits 
will need to be addressed, and countries will of necessity have to attract 
domestic and international investment capital to execute commercial 
projects of scale. A failure to address these infrastructure deficits, and to 
attract investment capital that executes commercial ventures at scale, will 
render it extremely difficult if not impossible to address the socio-economic 
challenges raised above. This may jeopardise the possibility to make a 
meaningful contribution to the socio-economic well-being of the residents 
of these three countries, and the approximately 962 million people living in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (United Nations World Population Report, 2015). 
Other developing regions in the world have managed to effectively 
supplement their infrastructure funding gap by making use of the unique 
characteristics specific to the project finance framework. From 1986 to 
1996 infrastructure investment was the fastest growing component of 
capital flows to developing markets, increasing from US$1.3 billion to 
US$27 billion over the period (Dailami and Leipziger, 1998). The bulk of 
this funding was packaged in the form of project finance. Yet as of 2008, 
Africa still accounts for less than three per cent of international project 
finance loans (Hainz and Kleimeier, 2012). The ability to attract and 
access international and domestic project finance therefore represents an 
important potential source of capital for the African continent in general, 
and the three selected nations of South Africa, Mozambique, and 
Zimbabwe that are the focus of this research endeavour. Project finance 
has been successfully applied in energy, sanitation, education, healthcare, 
transport, agriculture, and other sectors. It has the potential to have a 
meaningful impact in improving the socio- economic environment in the 
three countries above. 
The limited deployment of project finance in the Sub-Saharan region in 
general and the three countries that are the focus of this thesis in 
particular, has contributed to a situation where project and infrastructure 
finance in these geographic locations appear to be inadequately 
researched. Therefore, the general purpose of this study is to extend our 
knowledge of how organisations using the project finance framework 
arrive at their capital structure and to what extent the financing behaviour 
of South African, Mozambican, and Zimbabwean projects are consistent 
with the theoretical explanations of the static trade-off and pecking order 
theories of capital structure. In addition, the thesis investigates how 
stakeholders in such projects interact with the project company and each 
other, how project companies prioritise engagement with stakeholders, 
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and how stakeholder interactions can be enhanced to strengthen the 
entire project, by applying stakeholder agency theory. 
1.2 Motivations and contribution of the study 
There are five major motivations for the current study: 
 
The first motivation is to investigate important contextual considerations 
that are important to and influence the execution of project and 
infrastructure finance in the three countries of focus, and implicitly other 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Contextual considerations are important 
due to the very different social, economic, and political environment in the 
three countries in which the case studies are located. These conditions 
differ markedly from Western Europe and North America where much of 
the existing academic research has been conducted, and are important in 
pursuing and executing successful project finance transactions. 
 
Secondly, the capital structure decision has been at the forefront of 
financial research ever since Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggested 
capital structure has no effect on firm performance. Subsequently 
extensive academic research has been conducted and resulted in 
theories, explanations and a voluminous body of academic research. 
Despite this expansion in knowledge these theories have failed to fully 
explain the capital structure decision (Graham and Leary, 2011). 
Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of studies on capital structure 
have been focused on developed markets with particular emphasis on 
North America and Western Europe. Whilst the number is growing rapidly, 
the number of studies in developing markets on capital structure are still 
limited. Studies on capital structure in Sub-Saharan Africa appear to be 
even fewer than those in other developing markets. To the best of the 
researcher’s efforts no study has been performed on qualitative factors 
that influence the capital structure of project finance ventures in Sub-
Saharan Africa. This scarcity in research on capital structure in project 
finance in Sub-Saharan Africa can partially be attributed to the region 
being a marginal participant in terms of the number and value of project 
finance transactions executed. In addition, the mainstream capital 
structure theories are largely premised on developed market conditions 
and assumptions, and their applicability to very different conditions in Sub-
Saharan Africa is an important consideration. The questions that arise 
from this gap in the academic literature include:  
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 What are the main determinants of capital structure and financing 
behaviour for project finance ventures in South Africa, Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe?  
 
 To what degree are the assumptions in the mainstream static trade-off 
and pecking order theories applicable to project finance ventures in 
South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe?  
 
 Are the explanatory powers of the static trade-off, pecking order 
theories, and limited academic literature on project finance applicable 
to project finance ventures in the three countries? 
 
The third motivation is to establish what the main determinants of capital 
structure and financing behaviour from the perspective of practitioners, in 
the 7 project and infrastructure case studies on which the thesis is 
premised. Extracting the practitioner perspective should facilitate a 
comparison between academic theory and practice. Where divergence 
between these is found, this has the potential to contribute to a fuller 
understanding of capital structure formulation.  
 
The fourth motivation is to understand the interactions between important 
stakeholders that participate in project finance transactions. Questions 
regarding these stakeholders include how interactions are managed, how 
disputes are resolved, how power is distributed and exercised, and a 
holistic enquiry on projects within the broader societies in which they are 
undertaken.  
 
The fifth and final motivation to this study is to add understanding and 
knowledge regarding the execution of project finance in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. An achievement of this motivation can assist in attracting greater 
investment capital to these projects and the region as a whole, and 
contribute to addressing the socio-economic deficits suffered by a region 
that endures the highest regional poverty rate in the world (United Nations 
Human Development Report, 2015).  
 
This study seeks to fill these gaps in the literature and satisfy the five 
motivations above by completing 7 case studies on project and 
infrastructure transactions located in South Africa, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe that address these matters. A contribution that gives insight as 
to how to better arrange and more effectively structure project and 
infrastructure transactions, and therefore attract greater investment 
capital, will make a significant contribution to improving the economic 
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vibrancy and the lives of residence in the most impoverished and least 
developed region of the world. This could make a valuable contribution in 
alleviating the economic and social challenges expressed in the 
development statistics detailed above. These motivations constitute the 
main contributions of the study. 
1.3 Objectives of the study 
The focus of this study is on contextual factors that impact on project 
finance transactions in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In 
addition, the study explores the financing behaviour of 7 project finance 
transactions executed in these countries by way of the case study method. 
Finally, the study examines stakeholder interactions in the case studies, 
through the lens of stakeholder agency theory. More specifically the study 
aims at: 
1 Examining the key contextual factors that influence the execution of 
project finance ventures in the three focus countries specifically, with 
an intent to make these observations implicitly relevant to Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
 
2 To investigate evidence on the applicability of the static-trade off and 
pecking order theories on the selected 7 project finance transactions, 
and examine reasons for consistency with these theories or deviations 
from them. 
 
3 To investigate the reasons offered by practitioners in arriving at the 
capital structure of a project and to compare and contrast academic 
theory with actual practice.  
 
4 Based on the above points, to integrate the insights obtained into a 
coherent advisory theory on capital structure formulation on project 
and infrastructure ventures in Sub-Sharan Africa. 
 
5 To investigate how different stakeholders, interact with the project 
company, and how the project company chooses to prioritise 
engagement with important stakeholders including sponsors, 
management, contractors, state institutions, and community 
organisations. 
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1.4 The organisation of the thesis 
Introduction 
The thesis commences with a literature review and an analysis of the 
seminal studies on capital structure formulation and the major theories that 
have emerged. This is followed by a review of the empirical studies on 
these major theories including those in the developed world, developing 
world, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The second part of the literature review 
considers the role of agency theory in decision-making within a firm and 
broadens the analysis from the traditional owner/manager principal agent 
relationship, towards stakeholder agency theory that includes other actors 
who affect or are affected by the firm’s activities. This is followed by a 
review of the studies performed on interest alignment mechanisms and 
performance based contracting, that are particularly pertinent to project 
and infrastructure finance. The third part of the literature review analyses 
and distils the limited academic literature performed on project finance 
(including Private Public Partnerships) as a field of study. The final part of 
the literature review summarises the Africa infrastructure deficits, the 
causes of these deficits, their impact in terms of social and economic 
development, and the potential to accelerate socio-economic development 
and all round human welfare on the continent if these deficits are 
significantly addressed. The potential role of project and infrastructure 
finance in addressing these deficits is considered. The literature review 
concludes with a summary of the gaps in the academic literature regarding 
the applicability of the major capital structure theories, stakeholder agency 
theory, and on project and infrastructure ventures in South Africa, 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe.  
Methodology of data collection 
Chapter 3 introduces the methodology section that begins by explaining 
the suitability of the qualitative research approach and introduces the case 
study method. This is followed by an explanation of how the seven case 
studies were selected and how the cases were constructed and the data 
analysed. A discussion on measures taken to ensure the validity and 
reliability of data and the limitations of the study conclude the section on 
methodology. 
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Capturing and analysis of collected Data 
Chapter 4 captures details pertaining to the 7 case studies that are the 
basis of the thesis. Four of the cases are located in South Africa, two in 
Mozambique, and one in Zimbabwe. The cases are clustered according to 
their countries of origin. Each case is introduced by way of a ‘Fact Sheet’ 
that captures the key details of the project. This includes the project 
description and details of the developers, EPC and related contractors, 
source of capital, key shareholders, and the project objective. Each case is 
then documented utilising information obtained from interviewees, financial 
statements, corporate documentation, and related reports as explained in 
the methodology in chapter 2. The information is organised in the following 
format to enable a coherent collation. A brief background of each case is 
given, followed by an examination of the financial structure, including 
ownership and how the financing for the project was arranged. A 
consideration is made of the key risks relating to the project and how these 
were mitigated in the project arrangements. The governance, institutional, 
and legal arrangements pertaining to the project are identified and 
considered in enabling the project to proceed. Each case then concludes 
with a summary of the lessons learned. 
In Chapter 5 a cross case analysis is performed and key assertions 
derived from each individual case study are distilled, discussed, and cross-
referenced across all the cases to determine each assertion’s 
generalizability and limitations. The implications of the assertions on 
project and infrastructure finance are considered insofar as they contribute 
to project failure or success. As a result of the cross case analysis the 
thesis begins to distil actual management practice in the execution of 
project and infrastructure finance, and best practices begin to emerge 
together with proposals that have the potential to enhance project success 
if implemented. 
 In Chapter 6 a model that distils the key contextual factors that influence 
project finance arrangements in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe 
is advanced. The chapter summarises the key findings form the case 
studies and cross case analysis and proposes a model through which to 
more fully understand project finance transactions called Normative 
Project and Infrastructure Finance (NPIF). 
In Chapter 7 an enquiry as to how capital structure is arrived at in the 7 
cases. This includes a consideration of the applicability of the main capital 
structure theories, including the static trade-off and pecking order theories, 
and an examination of reasons for consistency or deviation with these 
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theories. The analysis of the applicability of the existing theory and 
observations made, are contrasted and compared with the actual 
decisions and reasons offered by project sponsors and managers in 
arriving at the capital structure choices of their respective ventures. This 
facilitates a comparison between theory and practice. 
Chapter applies stakeholder agency theory to the 7 case studies in order 
to investigate how different stakeholders interact with the project company, 
and how the project company through its management chooses to 
prioritise engagement with stakeholders. The role of state institutions in 
project finance given the challenging contemporary history of South Africa, 
Mozambique, and Zimbabwe is investigated, analysed and explained. 
Contribution to body of knowledge 
Chapter 9 concludes with the research findings and details the significant 
contribution made to knowledge. It considers the implications of this 
contribution to knowledge to the theory of capital structure and project 
finance, policy formulation, and methodology. The chapter concludes by 
stating the limitations of the study and making recommendations for further 
research. 
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2 Literature Review 
The literature review commences with an analysis of the seminal studies 
on capital structure formulation and the major theories that have emerged. 
This is followed by a review of the empirical studies on these major 
theories including those in the developed world, developing world, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The first part concludes with a consideration of 
financial contracting factors affecting capital structure. The second part of 
the literature review elaborates on the role of agency theory in decision-
making beyond capital structure determination. It broadens the analysis 
from the traditional owner/manager principal agent relationship, towards 
stakeholder agency theory that includes other actors who affect or are 
affected by the firm’s activities. The empirical studies on agency theory 
and stakeholder agency theory offer compelling reasons as to why this 
paradigm may enable deeper insight and understanding regarding 
stakeholders in firms, and a complementary and valuable perspective 
relative to the main capital structure theories. This is followed by a review 
of the studies performed on interest alignment mechanisms and 
performance based contracting, that are particularly pertinent to project 
and infrastructure finance. The third part of the literature review analyses 
and distils the limited academic literature performed on project finance 
(including Private Public Partnerships) as a specific discipline. It highlights 
how project and infrastructure finance differ from other financing 
arrangements, the advantages and disadvantages of this model of the 
firm, and its practice across the globe with specific comparisons between 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world. It introduces the potential of 
an eclectic approach to exploring project and infrastructure finance 
ventures by blending established capital structure theories and stakeholder 
agency theory. This is elaborated on in the methodology section in chapter 
2. The final part of the literature review summarises the Africa 
infrastructure deficits, the causes of these deficits, their impact in terms of 
social and economic development, and the potential to accelerate socio-
economic development and all round human welfare on the continent if 
these deficits are significantly addressed. The potential role of project and 
infrastructure finance in addressing these deficits is considered. The 
literature review concludes with a summary of the gaps in the academic 
literature regarding the applicability of the major capital structure theories, 
stakeholder agency theory, and on project and infrastructure ventures in 
South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.  
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2.1 Introduction 
The capital structure decision and competing theories on the formulation of 
capital structure continue to be important features of financial research. 
The seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) was ground breaking in 
formulating a theoretical framework on the implications of capital structure 
on a company’s profitability and performance. The first proposition in this 
theory hypothesised that the capital structure of a firm did not determine its 
value, cost of capital, and performance. The theory suggested the value of 
a firm was determined by its ability to generate profits and the risks related 
to its underlying assets, and as such the value of a firm is independent of 
its capital structure. This theory was premised on a number of key 
assumptions including perfect capital markets, no taxes, no transaction 
costs, no bankruptcy costs, identical borrowing costs for companies and 
investors, symmetry of market information, and no effect of debt on a 
company’s earnings before interest and tax.  
The second proposition incorporated the implications of tax and concluded 
that higher leverage and the concomitant tax shield resulting due to the 
deductibility of interest payments, would largely be offset by a higher cost 
of equity, resulting in the cost of capital remaining unchanged. Modigliani 
and Miller (1963) issued a correction to this second proposition, 
acknowledging that marginally greater benefits do accrue to a company on 
account of the tax shield that is derived as a result of the tax deductibility 
of interest expense, compared to the incremental costs that concomitantly 
arise due to the higher cost of equity. In addition to this Miller (1977) 
observed that for mature and stable companies the tax benefits that 
accrue as a result of interest deductibility outweigh bankruptcy costs, and 
this observation would indicate that capital structure influences the value of 
a firm.  
While the assumptions incorporated in this theory of investment allowed 
for the development of an overarching theory, they have drawn criticism for 
the degree to which the theory is disconnected from the empirical 
determination of capital structure in practise (Glickman, 1986). Substituting 
the assumptions in the theory and applying real world conditions highlights 
the importance of capital structure to a firm, whilst simultaneously 
rendering the propositions and implications prompted by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958; 1963) important considerations in capital structure 
deliberations. The contribution by Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1963) has 
been instrumental in prompting further research in capital structure, 
including the development of new and competing theories, and the 
formulation of theoretical frameworks that are more nuanced and with a 
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firmer grounding in the actual practice and implementation of capital 
structure decisions. There are four main theories that have emerged 
attempting to explain how managers make capital structure decisions and 
actual financing behaviour. These are the static trade off theory, the 
pecking order theory, the market timing theory, and agency theory. With 
the exception of the market timing theory, the hypotheses articulated in 
these theories are relevant in the investigation as to how capital structure 
is formulated and agency costs managed in project and infrastructure 
arrangements in the selected case studies that are the focus of this thesis.  
The market timing theory posits that firms are generally not concerned 
whether they raise capital via debt or equity and that market timing is the 
most important determinant Baker and Wurgler, 2002). The choice 
between debt and equity issuance is therefore a function of which of the 
two are more highly valued by financial markets at a point in time. High 
share valuations are more likely to result in equity issuances, while 
comparatively higher bond valuations are likely to result debt issuances. 
The market timing theory is excluded for five main reasons. Firstly, the 7 
cases have been established as special purpose vehicles (SPV) and 
standalone entities with a defined business objective or project. Project 
sponsors and managers are contractually curtailed and limited in their 
authority deviate from this business or project objective, and 
opportunistically raise new capital for the prescribed project, or anticipated 
future opportunities. This prescription and limitation renders the market 
timing theory largely irrelevant to the 7 cases under consideration. 
Secondly, it is extremely difficult, and of limited value to establish the 
degree to which capital structure in the 7 cases and SPVs has been 
influenced by any opportunistic capital raising initiatives espoused in the 
market timing theory by any listed sponsors. This is because the capital 
structure of the listed sponsors incorporates multiple project considerations 
spanning extended periods of time. Identifying a direct link between 
opportunistic capital raising based on the market timing theory by listed 
sponsors, and the underlying project, would at best be tenuous and at 
worst entirely unrelated. Thirdly, a consideration of how the market timing 
theory influenced the sponsor capital structure and how this was possibly 
transmitted to the applicable underlying project would contaminate a 
discrete analysis of the determinants of capital structure in each case. 
Fourthly due to all projects having multiple capital providers, the influence 
of any one capital provider is significantly diluted in the capital structure of 
each project muting any impact of market timing theory activities being 
transmitted into the capital structure of the underlying project. Finally, the 
high leverage and bespoke capital structure arrangements in project and 
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infrastructure finance detailed in section 2.6 negate the relevance of the 
market timing theory for the purpose of this thesis. 
2.2 Static Trade off Theory 
The static trade off theory proposes that the capital structure of a company 
is determined by the trade-off of the costs and benefits of borrowing, 
assuming the firm’s assets and investment plans remain unchanged. The 
benefits of debt manifest in the form of the tax shield that is enjoyed on 
account of the interest expense being tax deductible and the reduction of 
the problems associated with free cash flow. The costs of debt occur in the 
form of higher bankruptcy risks (legal and administrative) and agency 
conflicts between shareholders and debt providers (Modigliani and Miller, 
1963). 
This theory hypothesises that the value of the firm will be maximised 
where debt is deployed in preference to equity until a point is reached 
where the present value of the interest tax shields are maximised, after 
taking into account potential bankruptcy costs. In this regard, beyond a 
certain level of debt the value of a firm will begin to diminish as the present 
value of financial distress will begin to marginally exceed the present value 
of the tax shield accrued as a result of an additional unit of debt. The 
theory implies that there is an optimal debt to equity ratio in a company, at 
which point an additional unit of debt results in value destruction, and this 
is exacerbated the more leveraged the company becomes. This negative 
effect of incremental debt occurs as a result of the present value of 
financial distress exceeding the benefit to be derived from the interest tax 
shield of the additional debt unit. 
Flowing from this logic, companies would seek to determine what the 
optimal debt to equity ratio is in order to maximise their firm’s value. While 
the precise and specific optimal ratio may fluctuate marginally due to 
changes in some of the underlying drivers e.g. interest and tax rates, the 
optimal capital structure should be observable through the listed share 
price or other valuation process within a clearly defined range. Significant 
deviations from this range are likely attributable to adjustments costs 
incurred in rebalancing funding sources towards the derived optimal capital 
structure. 
Myers (2001) begins by acknowledging a number of admirable aspects of 
the static trade off theory. Firstly, the theory has intuitive appeal to financial 
practitioners who appreciate the value of the tax shield derived from the 
deductibility of interest expenses, and who display caution towards 
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excessive debt levels. Secondly the static trade off theory is supported by 
observations to the effect that mature companies that hold tangible assets 
would be expected to borrow more than mature companies that 
predominantly hold intangible assets or are asset light. This would be the 
case for instance in a manufacturing company compared to a 
pharmaceutical research company. This relationship of higher leverage in 
fixed asset rich companies in comparison to fixed asset light companies 
has been confirmed in the academic literature, and support the proposition 
in the static trade off theory that the costs of bankruptcy and related 
financial distress would be higher for asset light companies. Thirdly, the 
static trade off theory appears to be supported by listed stock price 
movements. Specifically, stock prices tend to increase when a company 
increases leverage and decrease when leverage declines. Similarly, stock 
issuances have the effect of driving down share prices, whilst share 
buybacks are inclined to increase share prices (Smith, 1986). This ‘event 
studies’ phenomenon implies that investors have an appreciation of the 
value of the tax shield and respond accordingly in terms of their valuation 
of the related equity.  
The criticisms of the static trade off theory are multi-pronged. Firstly, the 
theory does not predict the outcomes of the ‘event studies’ phenomenon 
detailed above. A more robust and comprehensive static trade off theory 
would be expected to forecast that managers would routinely intervene to 
update their capital structure to approach optimality and therefore 
maximise the value of the firm. In seeking to maximise value these 
managers would seek to avoid and control value-destroying adjustments to 
the capital structure. The ‘event studies’ appear to indicate two clear 
aspects. The first is that financial practitioners make decisions related to 
the capital structure, such as the issuance of new stock, that are likely to 
compromise the value of the firm’s stock. As such the managers are not 
consistently managing the capital structure with a view to maximising the 
firm’s value. The latter point may therefore indicate that managers are not 
specifically focused on managing the capital structure to maximise the 
value of the firm, undermining a central tenet of the theory.  
Another criticism of the static trade off theory relates to evidence in the 
academic literature that shows negative correlations between firm 
profitability and debt levels i.e. high profit firms display lower levels 
leverage, and low profit firms display higher levels of leverage (Baskin, 
1989). These studies appear to contradict the static trade off theory as 
high profit firms would be expected to be more highly leveraged as they 
are in a more favourable position to take advantage of the tax shield that 
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would accrue, and due to the reduced likelihood of bankruptcy and 
financial distress. Conversely low profit firms would be expected to aim for 
lower debt levels as the scope for enjoying a tax shield is limited due to 
lower profitability, and elevated levels significantly increase bankruptcy 
risk. The static trade off theory fails to adequately account for this 
observation in the practice of capital structure formulation, and is 
inadequate in clarifying any given firm’s choices and decisions. 
2.2.1  The tax advantages of debt and agency benefits of 
debt 
2.2.1.1 The tax advantages of debt 
The benefits of debt over equity in capital structure arrangements is 
premised on the argument put forward by Modigliani and Miller (1963) on 
the tax efficiency that arises from debt. Taxation laws and regulations 
allow for the interest expense incurred on debt to be offset against profit 
generated by a firm. This allowance has the effect of reducing the firm’s 
taxable income and culminating in a tax shield or an effective lower rate of 
tax.  Such a tax benefit does not generally accrue to dividend declarations 
on equity stakes. It is argued that firms would take advantage of this 
favourable attribute of debt, implying greater leverage.  
Two sets of complementary arguments are put forward by Taggart (1985) 
regarding the tax advantages of debt. The first of these contends that firms 
will enjoy a net tax advantage from debt where corporate tax rates exceed 
personal tax rates. This advantage is partly attributable to the fact that 
while the tax is deductible as an expense at a firm level, it will be limited in 
terms of its deductibility at a personal tax level. This contention challenges 
the Modigliani and Miller (1963) hypothesis as the tax benefits that accrue 
to the firm will be offset in part by higher personal income taxes. As a 
result, private individuals will require a premium on debt instruments to be 
compensated for higher tax obligations, violating the proposition that 
capital structure is irrelevant (Graham, 2003). The second point argues 
that in the period post 1945 leverage has increased on account of two key 
factors, namely, the tax system and elevated inflation (Taggart, 1985). 
Fama and French (1998) also challenge the irrelevancy of the capital 
structure argument contending that there is a positive correlation between 
the profitability of a firm and its level of leverage, and that the level of 
profitability is the main determining factor for leverage. While this argument 
positions capital structure arrangement as an outcome as opposed to an 
originator, the premise made is that capital structure and debt levels in 
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particular are relevant in determining a firm’s value. DeAnglo and Masulis 
(1980) observed non-debt tax shields such as tax allowances on research 
and development, capital investment, and tax holidays, as significant 
contributors to capital structure, in effect arguing that the capital structure 
does matter and contradicting the debt/equity irrelevancy theory of Miller 
(1977). 
Due to the fact that different national jurisdictions have different tax codes, 
the impact of interest deductibility and other tax concessions in influencing 
the tax shield and potentially the firm capital structure, is expected to differ 
from one country to another. Corporate tax rates for the 2015 fiscal year 
were South Africa (28%), Zimbabwe (25.75%) and Mozambique (32%), 
and the sophistication and tax environment in each of these jurisdictions is 
diverse. It is expected that South African based firms will have a greater 
use of debt in their capital structure on account of more sophisticated and 
deeper debt markets, while firms in Zimbabwe and Mozambique will have 
lower leverage in part as a result of shallow and less developed debt 
markets. 
2.2.1.2 Agency benefits of debt 
While the use of debt has the benefit of accruing tax benefits, this is not 
the only advantage from greater leverage. In a significant number of large 
modern companies there is a separation of the owners of the firm and the 
management of the firm. Frequently differences occur between the owners 
and the managers regarding the application of free cash flows that are 
generated. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) suggest the 
usage of debt as a measure to reduce agency conflicts between 
shareholders and managers within a firm. Debt has the benefit of reducing 
agency conflicts by prescribing that a certain and potentially significant 
proportion of the free cash flows must be directed towards the repayment 
of interest arising from debt obligations. This has the effect of reducing the 
scope of discretion management may enjoy regarding free cash flows, and 
as a result also reducing potential agency conflicts between the owners 
and management of the firm. Without the restraining effect of debt the 
management of a firm has greater scope to extract as much value and 
wealth from the firm for themselves and to the detriment of shareholders. 
In addition, managers may engage in commercial activities that may 
destroy or compromise shareholder wealth such as overinvestment in 
assets, investment in activities that do not yield a sufficient return or are 
unprofitable, or simply be complacent with an idle balance sheet of capital 
that is not deployed. The agency conflicts that arise due to the separation 
of the ownership and management of the firm are exacerbated by the 
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diffusion of ownership in larger companies. Diffuse ownership may result in 
smaller shareholders being less willing to bear the cost and make the 
investment to monitor the management team. This may have the overall 
effect of reducing the oversight that owners conduct over management 
(Gillan and Starts, 2003). 
In summary debt works as a disciplinary tool on the activities of the 
management team because debt providers can initiate bankruptcy 
proceedings in the event of a default (Harris and Raviv, 1990). Debt may 
also motivate managers to work harder and create an environment where 
managers are compelled and motivated to make more rigorous investment 
appraisals and decisions (Lasfer, 1995). The disciplinary benefits of debt 
on management will be particularly beneficial in those firms that are highly 
free cash flow generative and have very limited options in terms of where 
excess cash can be further invested (Jensen, 1986). Conversely for firms 
with very little free cash flow the potential benefits derived from debt in 
reducing shareholder-manager agency conflicts will be very limited, and 
may actually exacerbate agency conflicts between the shareholders and 
the providers of debt capital. As debt increases and owner-management 
agency costs are curtailed, agency costs between the owner and providers 
of debt capital will rise. As a result, the optimal capital structure of the firm 
will be arrived at by a consideration of the trade-off between the agency 
costs pertaining to owners, management, and debt capital providers 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
2.2.2  The costs of debt 
Miller and Modigliani (1963) hypothesised that a firm could maximise its 
value by maximising its debt levels as described in section 2.2.1 above. 
One of the key assumptions underpinning this hypothesis was the 
existence of perfect capital markets. In reality, firms must contend with the 
real possibility of bankruptcy and the agency costs that arise on taking on 
debt. A company therefore needs to weigh these costs and arrive at a 
conclusion as to optimal debt levels where the benefits that accrue from 
taking on debt are balanced with the costs of bankruptcy and debt related 
agency conflicts. This section considers the contribution of debt to the 
costs of financial distress and agency conflicts. 
2.2.2.1 The costs of bankruptcy 
The potential costs of bankruptcy that arise from the utilisation of debt are 
the real risk that if a firm fails to service its debt obligations, providers of 
debt capital can initiate liquidation proceedings potentially resulting in the 
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dissolution and discontinuance of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
As a result stakeholders including management, owners, and debt capital 
providers may suffer financial losses. Bankruptcy costs can be divided into 
two broad categories, namely direct costs and indirect costs. Direct costs 
of bankruptcy relate to the legal and administrative costs incurred in the 
shutting down and liquidation of a bankrupt company.  
Direct costs may be compounded by the fact that management may have 
poor incentives to run efficiently a company that is in the process of 
liquidation. In addition shareholders may be perversely incentivised to 
undertake excessively risky projects in the hope of avoiding or reducing 
bankruptcy costs, which may impact adversely on the potential losses 
suffered by providers of debt (Cornelli and Felli, 1997). Vander Wijist and 
Thurik (1993) define bankruptcy costs as the difference between a firm’s 
operating value and its liquidation value. This would imply that firms facing 
an elevated risk of bankruptcy would seek to mitigate this by having lower 
debt levels. Conversely firms facing lower risks of bankruptcy would use 
this advantageous situation to take on a greater degree of debt (Fischer et 
al, 1989). This observation is corroborated by DeAnglo and Masulis 
(1980), who argue that firms with marginally higher bankruptcy employ 
less debt as a result. Smaller firms however face higher bankruptcy costs 
than larger firms resulting in the larger firms taking on greater levels of 
debt as it is cheaper (Warner, 1977). 
The indirect costs of bankruptcy are twofold. In the first instance a firm in 
financial distress signals a very negative message to the commercial 
community. This may result in third parties being reluctant to engage in 
business activities with the distressed company (Brealey and Myers, 
2002). The ostracised company may lose customers, suffer employee 
resignations, incur reputational harm and brand erosion, and lose credit 
lines from important suppliers. A firm in financial distress and with large 
existing debt obligations may trigger the ‘debt overhang’ problem (Myers, 
1977). The debt overhang problem relates to the domino effect that may 
be unleashed where a firm finds itself in financial distress, resulting in debt 
capital providers seeking to mitigate any losses by enforcing priority 
repayment of the debt at the expense of investment and operational 
expenditure. While these actions may reduce the exposure of debt 
providers, they result in a cost to shareholders as a result of the 
investment opportunities that are forfeited as a result of prioritising capital 
towards debt settlement Consequently firms with stable and consistent 
earnings will enjoy lower bankruptcy costs, whilst firms with more volatile 
earnings will suffer higher bankruptcy costs (Bradley et al, 1984).  
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In the context of project and infrastructure finance ventures the costs of 
bankruptcy would be expected to be extremely high. This is in part due to 
the fact that the liquidation value derived from assets would be relatively 
low as frequently assets are bespoke to a particular venture with very 
limited alternative uses. The high bankruptcy costs may be ameliorated in 
part by the consistency of earnings on established and operational 
infrastructure projects such as toll roads and power plants with stable 
usage patterns and binding power purchase agreements (Lasfer, 1995). 
2.2.2.2 Agency costs of debt 
As highlighted in 2.2.2.1 above the incurrence of debt results in a conflict 
between shareholders and debt capital providers due to the incentive the 
shareholder has to invest sub-optimally. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
observe how agency conflicts arise due to shareholders being incentivised 
to extract benefits at the expense of debt capital providers. This perverse 
incentive occurs because shareholders may overinvest in risky projects. In 
the event that the riskier projects succeed the shareholders are likely to 
enjoy a disproportionate portion of the profits that result. This scenario 
results in potential overinvestment in risky projects driven by the 
shareholders. In the event that the riskier projects fail, losses are shared 
between shareholders and debt capital providers, with the latter sharing a 
disproportionate portion of these losses. Because debt capital providers 
expect such expropriation behaviour on the part of the shareholders, they 
respond by demanding a premium on the debt capital provided in 
compensation. This interaction between shareholders and debt capital 
providers and its impact on debt pricing is known as the agency cost of 
asset substitution, and will be more acute for firms in financial distress. 
Where the debt capital providers capture a disproportionate share of 
proceeds from a firm relative to shareholders, this results in a perverse 
situation where shareholders are dis-incentivised from investing in new 
projects even where these enjoy a positive net present value. This 
scenario culminates in a potential underinvestment problem. The agency 
conflict between shareholders and debt capital providers arises out of the 
fact that shareholders enjoy limited liability in the firm. This means that 
their equity capital investment exposure remains fixed even where debt 
levels are increased. Shareholders therefore have the potential to enjoy 
returns from riskier projects initiated that are funded by debt, while their 
equity exposure remains unchanged. Conversely, debt capital providers 
become liable to a higher risk of financial distress in the firm, and higher 
debt exposure. 
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The substitution problem and underinvestment problem are acute in highly 
leveraged firms with a higher probability of financial distress and 
bankruptcy. Myers (1977) argues that the underinvestment problem can be 
monitored by paying attention to the firm’s debt capacity reserve, 
particularly for high growth firms. In this regard high growth firms should 
ideally finance investment projects using equity as this allows them the 
flexibility and opportunity to undertake desirable positive net present value 
projects in the future, without the constraint of excessive debt. Myers 
(1977) also proposes the mitigation of the asset substitution problem 
through the issuance of short-term debt as opposed to long-term debt. 
Shorter-term debt has the effect of reducing the asset substitution 
incentive for management and discouraging sub-optimal investment. Asset 
substitution may also be curtailed by the issuance of debt secured by 
underlying project assets. This will limit the firm’s application of the debt 
funding to prescribed assets and ventures, reduce the agency costs of 
asset substitution, and potentially negate the debt pricing premium applied 
as a result of agency cost fears by debt capital providers. Companies with 
large fixed asset stock and stable and predictable profits may implicitly be 
able to raise debt capital at more competitive rates, as bankruptcy costs 
are reduced by the possibility of liquidating the fixed assets at reasonably 
attractive commercial terms. Equally, companies whose asset value 
resides predominantly in intangible assets may incur higher costs on debt 
funding as the value of intangible assets would be significantly eroded in 
the event of a liquidation, and the monetary value that would be realised 
would likely be severely discounted (Titman and Wessels, 1988). The 
effect of this observation on firms with a high intangible asset stock would 
be to shift them towards a preference for equity financing. 
In summary the static trade off theory observes the various benefits and 
costs that arise as a result of the use of debt. Initially, the uptake of debt 
results in the benefits accruing to the firm exceeding the costs incurred on 
account of higher leverage. At a certain optimal debt/equity mix the 
benefits derived from debt are exhausted and thereafter any benefits that 
accrue from an additional unit of debt are exceeded by higher marginal 
costs of debt. Similarly, if a firm has leverage below the optimal debt equity 
mix, it concedes marginal benefits of debt that would have accrued with 
higher leverage. The extremely high costs of financial distress and 
bankruptcy may in part explain why firms utilise less leverage than would 
in theory be optimal in terms of the static trade off theory.  
Myers (1977) proposes that deviation for the optimal capital structure may 
be due to the high transaction costs associated with recalibrating the firm’s 
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capital structure. Accordingly, firms may be resigned to leave sub-optimal 
capital structures unchanged to avoid these transaction costs. Some 
evidence suggests that firms may gradually move towards the optimal 
capital structure. The following three sections look at the empirical 
evidence of the static trade-off theory in both developed and developing 
markets, and then specifically at the empirical evidence from Southern 
Africa, to establish what factors contribute to the determination of an 
optimal capital structure and how this evolves over time. 
2.2.3  Empirical evidence on determinants of capital 
structure based on the static trade off theory 
2.2.3.1 Empirical evidence from developed markets 
The existing research on the static trade-off model in developed markets 
has yielded results that are relatively similar and consistent. This appears 
to indicate that the variables and determinants of capital structure in 
developing markets are largely the same. 
In a study based on industrial companies in the USA Titman and Wessels 
(1988) extended the work on capital structure in developed markets 
measuring short-term, long-term and convertible debt. Their study 
compared these debt levels to the collateral value of assets, non-debt tax 
shields, growth, uniqueness of business, industry classification, firm size, 
and volatility of earnings. The results of this study suggest firms with 
unique/specialised products have low debt rates and smaller firms are 
inclined to use more short- term debt than larger ones. Smaller firms may 
exhibit lower debt levels and shorter dated debt durations due to the 
transactions costs associated with longer term and higher debt levels. The 
study found no evidence to support theories that predict debt rates are 
related to firms expected growth, non-tax shields, volatility of profitability, 
or collateral value of assets. The authors also confirmed that more 
profitable firms have less debt, and conclude that transaction costs are an 
important determinant of capital structure particularly for smaller firms. 
Rajan and Zingales (1985) conduct a comparative study of the Titman and 
Wessels (1998) paper focusing on G-7 countries. The former authors 
enquire as to whether the capital structure in other developed countries is 
driven by the same factors influencing capital structure in the USA. The 
study analysed the relationship between leverage and tangible assets, 
market to book ratio, firm size and profitability. It found that firms with more 
collateralised assets were not highly levered. In addition, profitability and 
market to book ratio were negatively correlated to leverage, and the size of 
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the firm did not appear to have an effect on leverage. Rajan and Zingales 
(1985) conclude that in the G-7 countries the determinants of capital 
structure are similar to those determinants in the USA. 
The work of Rajan and Zingales (1985) was extended by Bevan and 
Danbolt (2002) who tested the capital structure determinants in non-
financial UK companies. Bevan and Danbolt (2002) focus on four 
measures of leverage namely, non-equity liabilities to total assets, total 
debt to total assets, total debt to capital, and adjusted debt to adjusted 
capital. The four measures are regressed on market to book value, firm 
size, profitability, and tangibility of assets. The study found that the 
determinants of gearing differed significantly depending on which debt 
measures were used. The authors also highlight that the definitions 
applied to the debt measures may influence the results of the determinants 
of leverage. This observation is further highlighted in a later study by the 
same authors that submits that the methodology used to analyse sample 
data can significantly influence findings on leverage and its determinants. 
This is particularly the case where different studies are inconsistent in 
sample data compilation regarding controls for firm and time-specific 
heterogeneity (Bevan and Danbolt, 2004). Using the same measures of 
market to book value, firm size, profitability, and tangibility of assets the 
later study finds larger firms have higher leverage and mobilise both long 
and short term debt more than smaller firms. Furthermore, leverage is 
positively correlated to the tangibility of assets, while profitability is 
negatively correlated to leverage, and profitable firms have a greater 
propensity towards short-term debt than less profitable firms. 
A different study of the determinants of capital structure the UK found that 
the explanatory variables of earnings volatility, tangibility of assets, firm 
size, profitability, non-debt-tax shield, uniqueness and industry 
classification account for the level of leverage. The study found that growth 
as a determinant in the UK found limited support in contributing to higher 
leverage implying limited debt to fund growth in the UK (Banerjee et al, 
2000).  
The current studies on determinants of capital structure in the developed 
world suggest leverage can be explained by profitability, asset structure, 
firm size, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities, and earnings 
volatility. Despite some variations, there appears to be a general 
consistency across the studies regarding the drivers and determinants of 
capital structure. This may in part be due to similar institutional 
arrangements in the legal frameworks, sophistication of capital markets 
(and related financial and institutional infrastructure), and level of socio-
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economic and political development. The following section assesses a 
number of the empirical studies in developing markets where the 
contextual environment differs markedly from developed countries. 
2.2.3.2 Empirical evidence from developing markets 
The capital structure dynamics in developing countries are investigated in 
a study on a sample of large listed companies developing countries by 
Kunt and Maksimovic (1994). The study covers 10 countries namely, 
Brazil, India, Jordan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, 
Turkey and Zimbabwe. The authors find that despite large disparities in the 
depth and sophistication of capital markets between the developing 
countries selected and the United States, the variables that determine the 
degree of leverage are the same. In the developing countries, leverage 
appeared to be more forcefully influenced by agency theory than tax based 
theory. The industry, nature of firm assets, and firm liquidity offered better 
explanations of both short and long term debt levels than the tax 
implications of debt, the size of the company and the company’s growth 
rate. High net fixed asset firms were observed as having lower levels of 
leverage implying that other more influential factors drove decisions 
related to gearing, and that debt capital markets in developing countries 
function differently from those in developed markets. 
Booth et al (2001) conduct a similar study to Kunt and Maksimovic (1994) 
and consider whether the theories relating to capital structure in developed 
countries are applicable in developing countries. The study includes a 
sample of companies from Brazil, India, Jordan, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey and Zimbabwe. The authors analyse 
the total debt ratio, long-term book debt ratio, and long-term market debt 
ratio relative to the average tax rate, assets tangibility, business risk, size, 
profitability, and market to book ratio as explanatory variables. The 
findings of the study showed that the profitability of the firm was negatively 
correlated to the debt levels. Firms with more tangible assets also had 
higher long term debt ratios and lower total debt ratios. The conclusions of 
Booth et al (2001) were that the debt ratio in developing countries was 
influenced by the same variables as those in developed countries.  In 
addition, developing country firms have significantly lower long-term debt 
ratios. Finally, the longer-term debt levels in developing countries are 
probably attributable to significantly higher agency costs in these markets.  
In a study focused on countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Delcoure 
(2007) finds a positive correlation between firm leverage ratios, asset 
tangibility, tax rates and tax shields. It also identifies negative leverage 
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between leverage and profitability in the selected countries (Czech 
Republic, Poland, Russia, and Slovakia). The results of the study also 
reveal baffling findings regarding leverage ratios, firm size and earnings 
volatility between on account of different legal, economic, social and 
business contexts. The conclusion of the study is that the mainstream 
capital structure theories of static trade-off theory, pecking order theory 
and agency theory do not fully explain the capital structure in the sampled 
countries. 
Huang and Song (2005) conduct a study in which they enquire as to the 
determinants of capital structure in China. Their findings reveal that the 
long- term debt ratio, the total debt ratio, and total liability ratio decrease 
with higher profitability, managerial ownership, and non-debt tax shields. 
Conversely leverage increases with the size of the firm and the tangibility 
of the firm’s assets. The authors also observe that the tax rate positively 
impacts on the total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio, whilst finding high 
growth firms to exhibit lower leverage. These findings confirm an earlier 
study in China by Chen (2004) that argues for a “new pecking order” 
theory on account of the characteristically different institutional 
environment in China. 
Bhaduri (2002) identifies key determinants of capital structure in India. 
Larger firms have a greater propensity towards long-term debt whilst 
smaller firms are more inclined towards shorter-term debt. For both large 
and small forms, capital structure is strongly influenced by the tangibility of 
assets, growth, the firm’s size, uniqueness, and cash flows. High cash flow 
firms exhibiting market uniqueness displayed lower leverage, while firms 
with a rapidly growing asset base exhibited higher leverage. 
In summary, the studies in developing countries appear to show that the 
determinants of capital structure in developing markets are similar to those 
in developed markets. The socio-economic, legal, political, and business 
context however has a strong influence in how these determinants 
manifest in the capital structure. Agency theory variables appear to play a 
greater influence in shaping the capital structure in developing countries.  
The following section assesses empirical studies performed in Sub-
Saharan Africa specifically. Sub-Saharan Africa is characterised by nation 
states that frequently have economies in transition and characterised by 
high degrees of uncertainty and complexity, inequality, and rudimentary, 
narrow and shallow capital markets.  
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2.2.3.3 Empirical evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa 
In their study of listed firms from the stock exchanges of South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana, Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) 
investigate corporate capital structure in Sub-Saharan Africa 
demonstrating how firm characteristics and cross-country institutional 
differences influence capital structure. The study finds firms in African 
countries to be as leveraged as other emerging markets such as Mexico, 
Thailand, Brazil, South Korea, Malaysia and Turkey. African firms were 
inclined to place reliance on internally generated finance, and where 
external finance is used it is inclined towards shorter term funding. This 
may indicate support for the pecking order theory (see section 2.3 below) 
in African markets and the use of short-term finance may be strongly 
influenced by higher agency costs. A positive correlation is noted between 
the firm’s profitability, size, asset tangibility and age (maturity), and its 
leverage. The authors submit that firm specific factors may also act as 
private market remedies for inadequate institutional infrastructure in the 
countries analysed, with South Africa a possible exception. As a result, the 
capital structure of firms in Africa is strongly influenced by reputation, 
collateral, and the availability of in internally generated profits. The 
influence of a number of country factor determinants on leverage were 
also observed by the authors. Kenyan and Nigerian firms have lower debt 
levels in comparison to South African firms possibly due to less developed 
debt markets. The results for Ghana were inconclusive while Zimbabwe 
was excluded from this comparison due to insufficient data. A negative 
correlation was observed between profitability and both short term and 
long-term debt perhaps indicating African firm’s preference for preferring 
internally generated capital. Asset tangibility was positively related to total 
and long term debt but negatively related to short-term debt. Overall 
Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) conclude that Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, and 
Zimbabwe firms have lower leverage on account of inadequate institutional 
infrastructure in debt markets. As such improvement in the institutional 
infrastructures in Africa has the potential to enhance the capital structure 
decisions of firms. 
Adesola (2009) investigates the determinants of capital structure in 27 
Nigerian listed companies over a period spanning 1996 to 2006. The 
findings of the research are inconclusive with both the static order theory 
and pecking order theory appearing to play a significant role in corporate 
financing choice. The pecking order theory seems to exert marginally more 
influence. Net asset tangibility does not determine leverage in this study, 
which is inconsistent with Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009), Booth et al (2001), 
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and Delcoure (2007). Adesola (2009) confirms the strong and significant 
influence of agency theory in capital structure consistent with the 
observations of Chen (2004) and Booth et al (2001). 
In a recent study De Wet and Gossel (2016) explore the factors influencing 
capital structure in South African firms by way of a survey of 33 chief 
financial officers of Johannesburg Stock and Securities Exchange listed 
firms. They conclude that the pecking order and static trade off theories 
are both equally regarded. Smaller companies are inclined towards the 
pecking order theory while larger firms appear more likely to follow the 
static trade off theory. South Africa is more inclined towards the static 
trade off theory than other developing markets perhaps due to enjoying 
deeper and more sophisticated capital markets, and banking and financial 
system. Importantly the study was able to rank the most important factors 
influencing debt decisions into three categories. The first category of the 
three most significant factors was made up of the level of forecasted cash 
flows from investment projects that the debt would be used to fund, the 
volatility of earnings and cash flow, and financial flexibility. The second 
category included the tax advantage of interest deductibility, the potential 
costs of bankruptcy, and the firm’s credit rating. The final category 
included factors that were not considered important by firms such as 
supplier concern that the firm would go out of business, and using debt to 
ensure management worked hard and remained disciplined. Smaller firms 
also limited their debt relative to larger peers to enable profits to be 
captured by shareholders as opposed to transfers to debt providers. The 
observations in the final category imply the disproval of agency theory but 
this may not be the case as survey participants my be reluctant to use debt 
despite its disciplinary effect on management and they may be an aversion 
to candidly admit to the use of debt to control managers. In conclusion the 
De Wet and Gossel (2016) study observed that a large number of chief 
financial officers indicated a target ratio that is flexible, which can support 
both the static trade off and pecking order theories. 
In summary the empirical studies on the static trade off theory and capital 
structure in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa explained above, highlight the 
three key determinants of capital structure that differ with the developed 
world, and even other developing countries. The first is institutional and 
infrastructure deficiencies in the form the banking and financial system, 
capital markets, and legal systems. Secondly is the shallowness and lack 
of sophistication in capital markets. Thirdly are the higher agency costs 
that arise in part as a result of the first two points. As a result of these 
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three significant contextual differences African capital structure decisions 
are comparatively more reliant on firm specific attributes. 
2.3 Pecking Order Theory 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that in a perfect market investors 
receive perfect information regarding all issues affecting capital issuances. 
In reality however this assumption is fallacious. This is because the 
managers of the firm will have more and better information regarding its 
activities and prospects than external investors. As a result of this 
differential information asymmetry begins to play an important role in the 
capital structure formulation as capital is raised from external equity and 
debt providers, as well as being generated internally in the firm by way of 
retained earnings. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that there is in inherent 
mispricing in new shares issued by the firm on account of information 
asymmetry. Investors are likely to be prepared to pay less for fresh equity 
issues because management will be unable to credibly communicate the 
full upside prospects of the firm in a manner that is fully captured into the 
price of the share issue. Consequently, investors will demand a premium 
to invest or the firm will only be able to successfully raise capital if it 
furnishes a discount to the equity price. Due to information asymmetry 
outsiders will have difficulty in differentiating between good and bad 
investments, and will interpret a firm’s decision to issue fresh equity 
negatively and price the shares accordingly. The effect of the anticipated 
behaviour of potential investors above may result in a firm not issuing 
equity even where the cost of this capital is exceeded by the return it has 
the potential to generate culminating in an underinvestment problem. In 
order to circumvent this dilution of ownership and value that arises fur to 
information asymmetry, a firm will opt to raise debt as opposed to issue 
equity.  
Consistent with the argument Myers (2001) contends that a firm will only 
issue equity where the costs of debt are excessively burdensome. Such a 
scenario may arise where the firm is already highly leveraged and 
incurring greater debt would result in a significant increase in potential 
financial distress and bankruptcy costs. The author demonstrates how 
fairly priced debt is preferred to equity issuances by firms, concluding that 
debt is the preferred and default leading option of capital sourcing. Firms 
are as a result expected to issue equities when the share price is higher as 
this reduces the asymmetry costs, and are more inclined towards debt if 
the share price is subdued as this scenario magnifies asymmetry costs.  
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The Myers (1984) and Myers and Maljuf (1984) rationale for the pecking 
order proceeds as follows. A firm obtains capital from three sources, 
namely, internally generated profits, debt, and fresh equity issues. 
Companies are compelled to prioritise their sources of funding, and in so 
doing there is a preference for internally generated profits, then debt, and 
finally equity. In order to conform to this ideal the firm needs to ensure that 
the size of the dividend declaration is aligned to its forecast investment 
initiatives. This exercise is made more difficult on account of the fact that 
the distribution of dividends as a proportion of after tax profits may be 
sticky and relatively inflexible. As a result of sticky dividends and 
fluctuating profitability, internally generated profits may exceed investment 
requirements, or be insufficient. Where internally generated profits are 
insufficient the firm will resort to debt funding followed by equity issuance, 
in that order of preference. In pecking order theory no optimal capital 
structure exists and the firm’s capital structure reflects the firm’s reliance 
on debt levels compared with equity (internally generated and externally 
raised). The capital structure at a point in time is therefore an aggregation 
of historical decisions on the firm’s funding arrangements (Myers 1984). A 
firm will not have a target capital structure but will follow a pecking order of 
incremental financing choices in the order of internally generated profits, 
debt, and finally equity. 
A study by Fazzari et al. (1988) submitted that it is not only information 
costs but also transaction costs and agency costs that induce the 
preference for capital sources sequenced in the pecking order theory. The 
following section will consider transaction and agency costs in the 
construction of the pecking order theory. 
2.3.1  Transaction costs 
The first proponent of the pecking order theory ascribed the preference 
hierarchy for capital to transaction costs (Donaldson, 1961). Transaction 
costs are generally incurred in two components being, the expenses of the 
agent enabling an issue, and related administration expenses (accounting, 
tax, legal etc. (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992). Transaction costs may also 
be higher for smaller capital raisings and implicitly smaller firms, due to the 
erosion of economies of scale. This implies that smaller firms will be more 
inclined to follow the pecking order theory. 
2.3.2  Agency costs 
Agency costs are incurred in the pecking order theory on account of the 
separation of the management and ownership of the firm (Jensen and 
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Meckling, 1976). These costs manifest themselves in the form of 
monitoring costs by shareholders, bonding costs by the manager to give 
assurance that he will not act in a manner that compromises the 
shareholder’s interests, and residual costs that capture how the cost to the 
shareholder if the manager had acted as a shareholder would have. The 
effect of agency costs is to increase the cost of funding from external 
sources and result in internally generated funding becoming the cheapest 
funding source, or comparatively more competitive. The impact of these 
agency costs will be to exacerbate the asset substitution problem and 
underinvestment problem introduced in the static trade-off model. In 
addition, firms with comparatively higher agency costs, will be more 
inclined towards sourcing capital from internally generated profits. 
2.3.3  Criticisms of the pecking order theory 
The pecking order theory has been criticised as being too narrow and 
prescriptive to capture the capital structure decisions of firms. Adedeji 
(1998) argues that the pecking order theory fails to consider other 
significant factors and influences on a firm’s funding choices including 
interest rates, the availability of external funding sources, and government 
intervention in capital markets. This critique is supported by Cull and Xu 
(2005) who posit that large investments are lumpy and occur intermittently. 
Internally generated capital for such investments may therefore be 
insufficient and compel a blend of internal funding and external funding to 
execute a project. These criticisms appear particularly relevant in 2016 
where interest rates in a number of developed countries are at decade 
lows (and in some cases actually negative), on account of monetary policy 
and public policy interventions. This situation may actually render debt 
funding cheaper than internally generated profits. 
Myers and Majulf (1984) and Myers (1984) argue that internally generated 
profits enjoy a preference as a source of funding because they reduce 
agency costs and the adverse selection problem is challenged by Adedeji 
(1998), Baskin (1989), and Allen (1993). The latter argue that the 
preference for internally generated profits is more attributable to a desire to 
maintain the existing control structure by avoiding equity issues, and to 
circumvent the conditions and capital market discipline inherent in debt 
funding. This observation is supported by others including Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Fazzari et al (1988). 
Fama and French (2005) argue that the shareholding and control 
structures motivations posited by Adedeji (1998), Baskin (1989), and Allen 
(1993) in critiquing the pecking order theory may in fact be moot. This is 
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because these concerns can be ameliorated, by issuing new equity capital 
via methods that substantially maintain the existing shareholding such as 
rights issues. Issuing shares to management may also reduce the costs of 
information asymmetry, as management is likely to have better information 
of the firm compared to external investors. Graham et al (2004) further 
argue that where managers own shares in the firm, the interests of the 
shareholders and the managers will be better aligned and likely reduce 
agency costs. These factors contribute significantly to the reduced need to 
raise debt capital by firms, and also act as a useful method in mitigating 
agency conflict (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
2.3.4  Empirical evidence on the pecking order theory 
There are a number of studies that have sought to establish the veracity of 
the pecking order theory. The models applied in this regard can be broadly 
categorised into two groups. The first group study the applicability of the 
pecking order theory by investigating the degree to which internal funds 
are a determinant of changes in the debt level and includes Shyman-
Sunders and Myers (1999), and Frank and Goyal (2003). The second 
group examines the veracity of the pecking order theory in terms of its 
ability to predict explanatory variables including tangibility, profitability, 
size, and growth, and includes Tong and Green (2005), Allen (1993), 
Baskin (1989), and Adedeji (1998). These studies argue that a negative 
correlation between profitability and leverage support the pecking order 
theory and are consistent with most studies performed over the past half-
century in the regard (Baskin 1989).  
Countering the above studies and conclusions are contributors including 
Hovakiman et al. (2004) who argue that the negative correlation between 
profitability and leverage is not due to the level of profitability. These 
protagonists argue that profitability may initially cause leverage to diverge 
from its targeted level. This divergence may persist because firms have no 
incentive to revert back to the targeted capital structure, in part due to the 
transaction costs that may arise. This section presents the views of both 
groups beginning with the group that tests the veracity of the pecking order 
in terms of its ability to predict explanatory variables including tangibility, 
profitability, size, and growth. 
In a study using data from public companies in the USA Taggart (1985) 
enquires as to the determination of capital structure in these firms. The 
enquiry reveals that capital structure and debt levels are strongly related to 
capital investment, and debt is implicitly incurred where internally 
generated funds are insufficient. The study concludes by asserting that 
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transaction costs induce an order of preference firstly for internally 
generated funds, followed by debt funding where retained earnings are 
exhausted or insufficient, and finally equity issues. Taggart (1985) explains 
this preference on the basis of the attempt to mitigate transaction costs 
that are highest where funds are raised from external sources on account 
of asymmetric information. This study supports the pecking order theory. 
Support for the pecking order theory is given by Baskin (1989) win another 
study of USA firms that revealed despite the incremental risks and 
potential costs of financial distress and bankruptcy that accrue with 
leverage, debt remains a more elastic and accessible source of capital 
than equity. This preference for debt over equity can be ascribed to 
transaction costs, control considerations, and the costs of asymmetric 
information, supporting the pecking order theory. 
Using data from the Australian market, Allen (1993) replicated the Baskin 
(1989) study and concluded that there was a significant and negatively 
correlated relationship between profitability and leverage.  Allen ascribes 
this occurrence to firms seeking to preserve the flexibility to deploy 
external funding by in the first instance not resorting to debt. Firms use 
equity issuances only as a third preference after retained earnings and 
debt on account of higher transaction costs due to asymmetric information. 
As a result, the degree of leverage will largely be determined by the gap 
between retained earnings and capital required to fund identified 
investment opportunities. These findings are consistent with and support 
the conclusions of Baskin (1989). 
Adedji (1998) builds on the earlier studies of Allen (1993) and Baskin 
(1989) applying the analysis to the UK market, and considering the 
possible interaction between investment, leverage, and the dividend pay-
out ratio. The study concludes that the dividend pay-out ratio is negatively 
correlated to investment levels whilst being positively correlated with 
leverage. In addition, no significant relationship is found between leverage 
and investment. This supports the findings of Allen (1993) and Baskin 
(1989) in the USA and Australia respectively that debt funding is a 
secondary choice to internal funding, and is resorted to when retained 
earnings are fully utilised. 
In a similar study to the above using a sample of 42 Chinese firms Tong 
and Green (2005) observe a negative correlation between profitability and 
leverage, whilst acknowledging a positive relationship between leverage 
and dividend pay-out ratios. These findings support the pecking order 
theory, and despite the small sample size, support the applicability of the 
31 
theory in the Chinese market. This concludes the second group of 
academic contributors to the pecking order theory.  
This section reviews the second group of contributors to the pecking order 
theory beginning with Frank and Goyal (2003). The authors argue that the 
studies of Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999) are biased due to the fact 
that the sample is disproportionately represented by larger firms. In this 
respect the Goyal study posits that the pecking order theory is less 
applicable and resonant to explain the capital structure decisions of 
smaller firms, and that universal application of results obtained 
predominantly from large firms inflate the theory’s applicability. This 
criticism of the Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999) study is affirmed by 
Adjedeji (2002) who warns of a potential bias in support of the pecking 
order hypothesis. These criticisms are dismissed by Sunders and Myers 
(1999) in the original study, on the basis that any bias in this regard would 
be insignificant to the results outcome. 
Other critics of Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999) argue that the pecking 
order theory either ignores or places insufficient emphasis on a number of 
other key determinants of capital structure. These include that the leverage 
in a firm may be distorted by other considerations e.g. in project and 
infrastructure finance sponsors/shareholders may impose high leverage on 
a very profitable project to curtail management discretion. As a result, the 
negative correlation between profitability and leverage in the Sunders and 
Myers (1999) argument will be rendered redundant. Equally, leverage may 
also be constrained by the non-availability of debt funding, and a 
consideration of potential bankruptcy and financial distress costs. In 2016, 
decade low interest rates may result in debt being cheaper than retained 
profits as mentioned earlier. Finally, companies may take advantage of 
elevated equity prices to issue shares in accordance with the market 
timing theory, altering their capital structure opportunistically. The major 
criticism of the Sunders and Myers (1999) model is that it does not capture 
these important determinants. 
Using data from the UK market and Spanish markets (Benito 2003) 
examined the inclination of firms to issue debt and equity relative to its 
financial characteristics such as cash flow and investment. The author 
finds that firms with higher cash flows have lower leverage, and those with 
higher investment levels have higher leverage. In addition, profitability was 
found to be positively correlated with leverage and the results supported 
the underlying hypothesis in the pecking order theory as a superior 
explanatory model than the static trade-off theory. 
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Mayer and Sussman (2004) use data from a combination of large and 
small firms in the USA and find evidence consistent with both the pecking 
order theory and the static trade-off theory. The study revealed that small 
firms were more inclined to use new equity, while large firms had a 
preference for debt when making significant new investments. New equity 
issues are generally associated with loss making firms but where firms 
suffered losses and already had high leverage, potential bankruptcy and 
financial distress costs inclined them towards equity. In line with Myers 
(2001) who argued firms revert to equity where costs of debt are high, 
Mayer and Sussman (2004) conclude that in the long run firms revert to 
pearlier levels of leverage. The conclusion of this study is that both the 
pecking order and static trade-off theories are valid. Used concurrently the 
pecking order theory helps to explain short to medium term capital 
structure arrangements, while the static trade-off theory explains long-term 
capital structure equilibrium. 
In a survey conducted by Beattie et al. (2006) based on financial 
executives of listed commercial and industrial companies in the UK, the 
pecking order theory is supported. The financial executives express a 
preference for funding from internally generated profits, followed by debt, 
and finally fresh equity issuances. This preference is informed to a 
significant degree by the transaction costs associated with raising debt and 
fresh equity, and what new equity issuances would signal to the market. 
The study also showed how dividend payout ratios and investment 
opportunities determined the amount of debt funding required. 
More recent studies include Flannery and Rangan (2006), Huang and 
Ritter (2007), and Atiyet (2012). The authors build on the models of Frank 
and Goyal (2003) and Shyam- Sunder and Myers (1999) covering multiple 
jurisdictions including the USA and France. The findings are consistent 
with those of Frank and Goyal (2003), and in addition observe firm’s 
opportunistically issue equity when share prices are over valued. This 
latter observation supports the findings of Myers and Majluf (1984). In Sub-
Saharan Africa Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) observe a preference for the 
pecking order theory versus the static trade off theory in analysing the 
capital structure of listed firms in Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe. 
The conclusiveness of this study is to some degree challenged by later 
studies wherein Adesola (2009) analyses the capital structure of 27 listed 
Nigerian firms and concludes that both the pecking order theory and static 
trade-off theory are equally applicable. In a survey of 33 chief financial 
officers of listed companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, De Wet 
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and Gossel (2016) also find both the pecking order theory and static trade-
off theory are equally applicable, confirming the Adesola (2009) results. 
2.4 Financial contracting factors 
In Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) proposition capital supply is perfectly 
elastic due to the existence of efficient capital markets. A number of 
American studies challenge this assumption arguing that the supply of 
capital significantly influences capital structure. Faulkender and Petersen 
(2006) use investment grade credit ratings as a proxy reflecting access to 
capital markets between 1986 and 2000. The authors find that firms with a 
credit rating have significantly higher debt ratios than those without. This 
study suggests firms with a credit rating enjoy a more favourable supply of 
capital. While the existence of the credit rating may reflect unobservable 
differences in demand between firms, Faulkender and Petersen (2006) 
neutralise these effects through applying instrumental variables and 
employing proxies for firm visibility and uniqueness, as substitutes for 
having a credit rating. Other studies have supported the significance of 
capital supply on capital structure including Sufi (2009) where credit 
ratings on syndicated loans were observed to attract riskier borrowers and 
increase leverage in 1995. Similarly Tang (2009) observes that firms that 
received an improved credit rating due to Moody’s refinement of their 
credit rating methodology in 1982, added more long term debt and had 
higher leverage than firms whose credit rating deteriorated. 
Leary (2009) observes how the introduction of negotiable certificates of 
deposit in the 1960s and interest rate ceilings in 1966 had the effect of 
reducing capital supply, and had different leverage effects on smaller firms 
relative to larger firms. In the convertible bond markets, Choi et al. (2010) 
demonstrate how supply shocks were experienced in the issuance of 
convertible bonds as a direct result of the short sale ban on convertible 
bonds during the 2008 international financial crisis. Rice and Strachan 
(2010) find that decreased bank competition may have the effect of 
restricting debt supply to firms even though the loan quantities remain 
relatively unchanged, impacting on the underlying firms leverage. Finally, 
Lemon and Roberts (2010) observe that both debt issuance and 
investment in sub-investment grade bonds are affected by the supply of 
sub-investment grade bonds. However because the sub-investment grade 
rated firms are unable to substitute debt for equity, leverage levels remain 
largely unchanged. These studies demonstrate how capital supply may 
have a different impact on leverage depending on the type of market 
involved. Another issue observed to potentially influence leverage is 
financial contracting factors.  Financial contracting theory may be useful in 
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widening our understanding of capital structure beyond the mainstream 
theories. Specifically, the friction that arises between owners/managers 
and debt capital providers can generally affect the types of financing 
contracts such as covenants, maturity terms, leasing arrangements, and 
the potential for negotiations. Financial contracting theory posits where 
features in debt contracts mitigate agency conflicts, leverage may play a 
more limited role in reducing agency and information problems. Nini et al. 
(2009) argue that covenants may be more effective in addressing agency 
conflicts than increased leverage. This supports Smith and Warner’s 
(1979) observation that dividend and financing policy restrictions are 
significant in controlling bondholder/stakeholder conflicts, and therefore 
strongly influence firm leverage. Rampini and Viswanathan (2010) add to 
these observations by proposing that the debt capacity of a firm may be 
influenced not only by collateralizable assets, but also incentive conflicts. 
This helps to explain the lower leverage exhibited by some firms due to 
extensive use of off balance sheet financing in the form of leases. Chava 
and Roberts (2008) also highlight how covenants may be used to limit 
managerial discretion, also impacting on firm leverage. In a survey of 
private and public firms spanning the financial crisis period of 2007 – 
2009, Campello et al. (2011) find that of the firms that breached 
covenants, 9% had their credit facilities cancelled, whilst others had 
unfavourable changes to their terms. The adverse changes included 
higher fees, collateral requirements, and borrowing limits. In summary, 
financial contracting factors may demonstrably impact on the leverage of 
firms in a manner that the mainstream models may not capture. 
2.5 Capital structure summary 
This above section of the literature reviewed the two main contending 
theories of capital structure, namely the pecking order theory and the 
static trade-off theory, and concluded with a consideration of financial 
contracting factors. The literature review compared the explanatory power 
of each theory and its applicability in developed and developing markets. 
The explanatory variables that informed the capital structure 
considerations in both theories included profitability, asset tangibility, the 
firm’s size, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities, and earnings 
volatility. The implications of the two capital structure theories and 
explanatory variable on leverage are captured in Table 2.1 below: 
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Table 2.1:  Theoretical implications on leverage of the explanatory variables 
Variables Trade-Off Theory Pecking Order Theory 
Profitability Ïleverage Ðleverage 
Tangibility Ïleverage Ïleverage 
Size Ïleverage Ðleverage 
Non-Debt tax 
shields Ðleverage n/a 
Growth 
opportunity Ðleverage Ïleverage 
Volatility Ðleverage Ðleverage 
2.6 Agency Theory 
The origins of agency theory can be traced back to the 1960s and 1970s 
wherein economists explored risk sharing among individuals or groups 
(Arrow, 1971; Wilson, 1968). These studies framed the risk sharing 
challenge as one where co-operating parties have a different appetite and 
attitude towards risk. Initially the focus of agency theory was on the 
relationship between shareholders and owners. Subsequently, the 
application of this theory has been broadened to other fields in 
organisational theory and strategic management where co-operating 
parties have different goals and there is a division of labour (Eisenhardt, 
1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross,1973). The crux of agency theory 
is to explore agency relationships where one party (the principal) 
delegates work to another party (the agent) and the interests of principles 
and agents diverge. In addition, a broader application of agency theory 
explores how stakeholders of an organisation seek to ensure that their 
interests are recognised and satisfied.  The theory attempts to describe 
these relationships, and offer a hypothesis on the motivations of each 
participant and how they are likely to behave.  
Agency theory tries to address two key problems that occur in agency 
relationships. The first problem arises where the objectives of the principal 
and agent conflict, and it is costly or difficult for the principal to verify what 
the agent is actually doing in part due to information asymmetry. The 
second problem arises due to the principal and the agent having differing 
appetite for risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). Because the relationship between the 
principal and the agent is captured in a contractual arrangement, this 
becomes the unit of analysis in agency theory. The focus of the theory is 
therefore on the most efficient and effective contracts governing the 
principal-agent relationship, given assumptions about the people or 
organisations that are the contracting parties (Eisenhardt, 1989). Despite 
36 
the existence of contracts, problems arise in agency relationships due to 
the difficulty of perfectly contracting for every possible action of an agent 
whose decisions affect both his own welfare and the welfare of the 
principal (Brennan, 1995). This results in the problem of how to induce the 
agent to act in the best interests of the principal. In the 
shareholder/manager context, agency costs can be seen as the value lost 
by shareholders due to a divergence of interests with the managers of the 
firm, summarily stated as monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual 
loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
In order to be able to influence the agent’s behaviour the principal incurs 
monitoring costs or expenditures to measure, observe and control and 
agent’s behaviour. This is necessitated by information asymmetry between 
managers and owners, with managers having more and superior 
information on the firm. Examples of monitoring costs include audits, due 
diligence exercises, and mandatory reporting prescriptions. While these 
costs are initially paid by the principal, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that 
they will ultimately be borne by the agent, as their compensation will be 
adjusted to cover these costs. Bonding costs may also be incurred when 
structures are set up by management to induce/enable them to act in the 
principal’s interest, or compensate the principal accordingly if they fail to 
do so. Management is motivated to set up bonding cost structures due to 
the fact that it ultimately bears the costs of monitoring. Bonding costs may 
involve both financial and non-financial costs, the latter including additional 
information and disclosure that management may also utilise in the 
activities of the firm. Management are likely to cease incurring bonding 
costs when marginal reduction in monitoring costs equals the marginal 
increase in bonding costs (Hill and Jones, 1992). Despite monitoring and 
bonding mechanisms, the interests of managers and owners are still 
unlikely to be perfectly aligned, resulting in agency losses from conflicts of 
interest. These losses are called residual losses. Residual losses occur 
because the costs of fully enforcing principal-agent contracts through 
monitoring and bonding far outweigh the benefits enjoyed from doing so. 
This culminates in a level of residual loss that represents a trade-off 
between overly constraining management and enforcing contractual 
mechanisms designed to reduce agency problems (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). 
Agency costs in the owner/manager relationship can be attributed to four 
main categories, namely moral hazard, earnings retention conflicts, time 
horizon conflicts, and managerial risk aversion. Moral hazard agency 
conflicts occur where managers seek to maximise compensation and 
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benefits from the firm, but this occurs at the expense of shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Moral hazard problems are likely to be more 
acute in larger companies because the complexity of the nexus of 
contracts increases exponentially with the size of the firm, making larger 
firms more difficult to monitor and increasing related costs (Jensen, 1993). 
Earnings retention conflicts may also occur where managers seek to apply 
retained earnings to grandiose managerial visions as opposed to 
distributing dividends to shareholders (Brennan, 1995). The third category 
of agency costs may occur as a result of time horizon agency conflicts. 
These occur because shareholders are likely to be attentive to the cash 
flows of the firm indefinitely into the future. Alternatively, management is 
likely to have a shorter-term horizon aligned to their term of employment 
and related compensation. This may also lead to manipulation of the 
financial results to reflect a picture more favourable to enhancing 
management compensation (Weisbach, 1998). Finally, managerial risk 
aversion may result in agency conflicts due to managers being less 
inclined to take risks, as the firm is their most important source of income. 
Shareholders on the other hand are able to diversify their holdings, and 
may have a higher risk appetite. Brennan (1995) submits that risk averse 
managers will prefer equity financing to reduce the risks of bankruptcy 
associated with incremental debt. 
Agency theory has emerged as an important paradigm in the financial 
economics literature (Jensen and Meckling 1986; Ross 1973). It is 
applicable in a number of fields and variety of settings from macro-level 
issues such as laws and regulatory policies, and micro-level issues such 
as subcontracting arrangements. Predominantly agency theory has been 
employed in organisational phenomena including compensation, 
acquisition and diversification strategies, board relationships, ownership 
and financing structures, vertical integration and innovation (Eisenhardt, 
1989). The section below explores the main branches of agency theory 
and the academic literature and empirical results. It then introduces a sub-
category of agency theory referred to as stakeholder agency theory that is 
particularly useful as a lens through which to explore contractual 
arrangements in co-operative schemes. 
2.6.1  Positivist and Principal-agent agency theory 
Agency theory has from its formation developed into two major lines, 
namely positivist and principal-agent agency theory (Jensen, 1983). Both 
lines have the same underlying assumptions and focus on the contract as 
common unit of analysis between principal and agent. Positivist agency 
theory is primarily concerned with scenarios where the principal and agent 
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have conflicting goals, and the mechanisms put in place to curb the 
agent’s self-serving behaviour. A typical approach is to identify a scenario 
where stockholder and management interests diverge, and address this by 
way of information systems (monitoring) or outcomes based incentives. It 
is generally less mathematical and more qualitative than principal-agent 
agency theory, and the primary area of focus of positivist researchers has 
been on the owner/manager dynamic in large listed corporations (Berle 
and Means, 1932). Arguably the three most influential articles by positivists 
include Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) exploration of the ownership 
structure of the firm, and how the alignment of owners and managers may 
be better aligned where managers have equity stakes in the firm. Fama 
(1980) explored how capital and labour markets can be used as a 
signalling and information system to control self-serving management. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) examined the role of the board of directors in 
collating and disseminating information for all shareholders, and in so 
doing conducting effective monitoring and moderating managerial 
discretion. The key contribution of the positivist agency approach has been 
to advance and propose governance principles that address the agency 
problem (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Principal-agent research is the second and more generalised line of 
agency theory encompassing all agency relationships such as lawyer and 
client, auditor and client, buyer and supplier, and other agency 
relationships (Harris and Raviv, 1978). This more formal theory is 
characterised by a considered application and expression of underlying 
assumptions, followed by logical deduction, testability, and mathematical 
proof. Its focus is on determining the optimal contract, and behaviour 
versus outcome, between the principal and the agent. Due to its 
mathematical and abstract nature principal-agent research has been less 
accessible to organisational theorists and business practitioners. Principal-
agent theory has tended to have a broader area of application than 
positivist agency theory with the latter being largely limited to the 
owner/manager dynamic. 
2.6.2  Empirical results of agency theory  
The following section on the empirical results of agency theory will initially 
deal with the results from positivist agency theory followed by the principal-
agent agency theory line. The positivist agency theory academic literature 
is dominated by studies of large listed firms where ownership and 
management are distinct, and a significant amount of secondary data is 
available in the public domain. 
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Amihud and Lev (1981) explore why firms pursue conglomerate structures 
and mergers. These actions appear counter intuitive as shareholders can 
on their own diversify their shareholdings. The investigation corroborated 
that managers are incentivised to diversify their own personal risks as 
employees by constructing conglomerate structures. The study supported 
the hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that owner managed firms 
are more likely to engage in conglomerate mergers than firms with a single 
significant shareholder. In a study covering 105 large corporations in the 
USA, Walking and Long (1984) concluded that managers would resist 
takeover bids that may be beneficial to shareholders, so as to secure jobs 
and benefits. This study is consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
that observed where managers have an equity stake in the business and 
would participate in equity upside in the event of a takeover, such 
managers were less likely to resist such corporate action. 
Wolfson (1985) observed the effective constraining influence of market 
discipline on the principal/agent relationship in oil and gas shelter 
programs. Despite the divergent goals of multiple participants, and the 
principal’s extensive information advantages, the programs were 
successfully executed because all participants were subject to disciplining 
market forces. This confirmed Fama’s (1980) study that long term 
reputational issues influenced short-term principal and agent behaviour. 
Kosnik (1987) studied 110 large US corporations and found that 
managerial opportunism was more likely to succeed where the proportion 
of independent board members was lower. This study is consistent with 
Fama and French’s (1983) study of company Boards. Argawal and 
Mandelker (1987) studied 209 firms that participated in acquisitions and 
disposals between 1974 and 1982. Their study found that where 
executives owned equity in the company, they were inclined to lower risk 
transactions and financing decisions, aligning their interests more 
effectively with those of shareholders. Singh and Horianto (1989) analysed 
84 Fortune 500 companies and also concluded that golden parachutes for 
executives align them to shareholder interests and act as an effective 
substitute for equity ownership in a takeover situation. This study is 
consistent with the agency theory findings of Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
and Fama and Jensen (1983). Barney (1988) explored whether giving 
employee share options would better align their interests with those of 
shareholders, and culminate in a lower cost of capital. The results were 
positive and in agreement with the agency theory hypothesis of alignment 
of interests. In summary positivist agency theory supports the proposition 
that owner and manager interests diverge in takeover attempts, debt 
versus equity funding, executive management compensation levels, and 
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acquisitions and disposals. This lack of goal congruence can be 
substantially ameliorated by way of outcome based contracts such as 
golden parachutes, market disciplinary forces, executive stock ownership, 
and through effective monitoring by way of comprehensive information 
systems including boards and market signals. 
The principal-agent literature broadly categorises inducement 
arrangements into contracts that are either behaviour or outcome based. 
Principals and agents are then likely to select the most efficient contract. 
Anderson (1985) probed the transaction costs of outcome based 
(manufacturer representative) and behaviour based (sales force) sales 
efforts in a sample of electronics firm. The author’s findings were 
consistent with agency theory in terms of what the most efficient and 
effective contractual approaches were. Eisenhardt (1985 and 1988) 
examined the choice between salary and commission compensation for 
salespeople in retailing. The results supported agency theory in being able 
to predict the most efficient and effective choice between these two 
contract forms despite the presence of significant institutional variables. 
This study was extended and replicated by Conlon and Parks (1988) who 
found that a principal’s access to information systems to monitor the agent 
was positively correlated to the agent’s performance of contractual 
obligations, and vice versa. Finally, Eccles (1985) conducted interviews of 
150 executives to determine the most optimal contractual arrangements 
for transfer pricing. This culminated in the development of a framework 
premised on agency theory and fairness principals. In summary the 
principal-agent agency theory line supports the hypotheses of selecting the 
most efficient and effective contract form, linking this with comprehensive 
information systems that enable monitoring, discriminating between tasks 
that are highly programmable and those that are less so, and determining 
outcome uncertainty and measurement in predicting participant choices 
and actions. 
2.6.3  Contribution of agency theory  
Agency theory has made an important contribution to re-establish the 
importance of incentives and self interest in organisational thinking 
(Perrow, 1986). Agency theory also makes an important contribution 
towards the treatment of information. It assumes information is a 
commodity that has a cost and can be bought. This highlights the value of 
information and how it can be used via information systems to control 
agent opportunism. Agency theory also expands the risk paradigm for 
organisations by assuming them to have uncertain futures that 
organisational participants may not be able to fully control. This enables 
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contextual changes such as government regulations, new competitors, 
technical innovation, political disruption etc. to be incorporated in a holistic 
framework. This broader and deeper perspective has the potential to 
improve organisational thinking, planning, and ultimately, risk management 
and contracting. 
2.6.4  Criticism of agency theory  
Williamson (1983) is sceptical of the merits of agency theory arguing that 
its creators and proponents had not succeeded in demonstrating that there 
was a reason to be concerned where ownership and management are 
separated. Donaldson (1990) criticised agency theory on the basis that its 
methodology disregards other ideological frameworks, organisational 
economics and corporate governance. This is consistent with other 
academic contributors including Klein et al. (2008) and Lubatkin et 
al.(2007). Donaldson (1990) contended that agency theory is narrow 
minded in its view of individualism, myopically defined motivation, and over 
simplification, compromising central tenets of its model. Williamson (1985) 
argued that opportunistic behaviour did not necessarily occur in the 
majority of individuals, but in the minority. Accordingly, agency theory that 
is premised on wholesale opportunistic behaviour by actors may be 
structurally flawed. Hill (1990) implicitly supports this criticism asserting 
that there are individuals who prioritise trust and co-operation and will not 
participate in opportunistic behaviour. Podrug (2010) criticises agency 
theory on the basis that the controls put in place to reduce opportunism 
can exacerbate individualistic behaviour, erode trustworthiness, and 
reduce pro-activeness. The limited normative dimensions of agency theory 
also raise concerns regarding ethical and moral conduct.  The dyadic 
conceptualisation of the principal agent problem has been a key criticism 
of agency theory because in many cases agents are in fact serving 
multiple masters (Shapiro, 2005). It has further been proposed that agency 
theory is an American construct premised on ultra individualistic instincts 
that may not be appropriate in relationship driven or communal cultures 
(Johnson and Droege, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2005). 
A final criticism of agency theory is that it is premised on a divergence of 
attitudes towards risk and information asymmetry. Where these two factors 
are addressed, agency theory has little to offer and is scientifically limited, 
because the principal can define and control the agent’s behaviour and 
offer appropriate compensation. In summary agency theory may fail to fully 
account for alternate stances and important considerations when analysing 
interactions between the principal and the agent. These include ignoring 
the principal’s responsibilities towards the agent (Donaldson, 2012), 
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fostering distrust amongst participants, disrespect for the agent, 
overlooking moral and ethical considerations, and inadequately pursuing 
solutions that have a sound ethical basis. 
2.7 Stakeholder theory  
Stakeholder theory is rooted in stakeholder theory that began to develop 
after the publication of Freeman’s 1984 seminal book entitled ‘Strategic 
Management: A Stakeholder Approach’. Freeman (1984) submitted that 
organisations that are aware of the stakeholders that impact on their 
business, and take a pro-active approach to managing these stakeholders 
and addressing potential conflicts, are more likely to achieve superior 
performance. Accordingly, strategically managed organisations should be 
managed in the interests of stakeholders as a whole, and not only based 
on the narrow interests of managers and owners. This latter proposition is 
justified by two overarching observations. Firstly, formal organizations and 
firms having become the dominant institutions of the 20th and 21st 
centuries, increasing reports of ethical misconduct within them, and the 
harmful impact of corporate negligence with regard to the natural 
environment attributable to formal organisations (Laplume et al 2008). 
Secondly, existing management theories fail to take into account the 
quantum of change occurring in the business environment. This has 
shifted from a focus on suppliers, employees, managers, and owners, to 
include other external stakeholders such as governments, consumer 
advocates, environmentalists, special interest groups, the media, and even 
competitors. Stakeholder agency theory provides a prism by which a more 
holistic, demanding, and inclusive assessment can be made of the factors 
influencing and intermingling, to determine decision making by an 
organisation and its various stakeholders. 
A significant part of the controversy associated with stakeholder theory is 
that it challenges the assumption that management should primarily seek 
to maximise the profits of the firm (Jensen, 2002). Yet it has enthusiastic 
proponents on account of its attempt to address how organisations affect 
society (Hinings and Greenwood, 2003). Three branches of stakeholder 
theory have emerged: the descriptive (how firms behave), the normative 
(how firms should behave) and the instrumental (how behaviour affects 
performance) (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Within these branches are 
five themes that frame the interaction of stakeholders, how decisions or 
positions are arrived at, and the impact this has on a firm, and vice versa. 
These five themes are stakeholder identification and salience 
(importance), stakeholder actions and responses, firm actions and 
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responses, firm performance, and theory and debates on the stakeholder 
philosophy. 
Freeman (1984; page 46) defined a stakeholder as “any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organisation’s objectives”. Whilst there is greater emphasis on the “is 
affected” category the author suggested that firms engage and deal with 
groups that affect them, and be responsive to groups that the firm can 
affect. Subsequent contributors to the definition of a stakeholder have 
offered both narrow and expansive views. Frooman (1999) and Pajunenen 
(2006) restrict their view of stakeholders to those who wield power over a 
firm, while Clarkson (1995) and Cragg and Greenbaum (2002) posit that 
stakeholders are only those who take on some element of risk in the 
commercial venture. The more expansive definers of stakeholders include 
Argandona (1988) and Phillips (1997) who incorporate powerless parties 
that are directly or indirectly connected to the firm’s activities, and even 
non-human entities such as trees and spiritual deities as proposed by 
Starik (1985) and Schwartz (2006). Regarding the importance of 
stakeholders, studies appear to conclude that managers pay attention to 
stakeholders that have power in relation to the firm, are deemed legitimate, 
and can muster a sense of urgency (Mitchel, Agle, and Wood, 1997). 
These observations on stakeholder salience are confirmed in a number of 
subsequent empirical studies including Eesley and Lennox (2006) and 
Winn (2001). Others have however argued that stakeholder salience is a 
function of the organisational culture and the political framework and 
industry within which the firm operates (Jones, Felps, and Bigley, 2007; 
Henriques and Sardosky, 1999; Fineman and Clarke, 1996). In summary 
the identification, categorisation, and prioritisation of stakeholders 
continues to be a hotly contested aspect of stakeholder theory. 
The second theme of stakeholder actions and responses imputes that 
managers need to go beyond understanding stakeholder interests, and 
need to be able to anticipate and predict the influence strategies that 
stakeholders may deploy. These predictions will include resolving 
questions as to how do stakeholders influence firms, when will stakeholder 
groups mobilise and when will stakeholders support firms? Frooman 
(1999) argues that stakeholders use direct strategies to influence a firm 
when the firm depends on them for resources and indirect strategies when 
it does not. Stakeholders are likely to withhold resources to the firm where 
they have full control over these, and attach conditions to the firm’s 
utilisation of such resources (Sharma and Henriques, 2005). The influence 
of stakeholders is determined by the power and legitimacy of the 
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stakeholder (Eesley and Lennox, 2006; Welcomer, 2002), and the level of 
influence may also be prescribed by contractual forms, relationship 
structures, and institutional arrangements (Friedman and Miles, 2002). 
Stakeholder groups are most likely to mobilise when they are aware, 
willing and capable, when the target organisation is perceived as being 
responsive to stakeholder advocacy, and where there is a desire to protect 
interests and to express a group identity (Rowley and Berman, 2000; 
Butterfield, Reed, and Lemak, 2004; Wolfe and Putler, 2002). Following on 
form this the academic literature shows that stakeholders are inclined to 
support firms where there is no significant adverse environmental impact, 
and where stakeholders believe they have been equitably rewarded, 
considered and treated (Hendry, 2006; Hosmer and Kiewitz, 2005). Firms 
are also more likely to enjoy stakeholder support where they are older and 
more established, legitimate in the eyes of stakeholders, reliable, 
accountable and strategically flexible (Choi and Shepard, 2005). 
The third theme of firm actions and responses seeks to address questions 
as to how firms gain stakeholder support, how firms should manage 
stakeholders, and how firms should balance stakeholder interests. 
Regarding gaining stakeholder support the academic literature proposes a 
number of interrelated initiatives. These include building stakeholder trust 
and avoiding opportunistic relationships (Husted, 1998; Jones, 1995) and 
the deployment of charitable contributions (Adams and Hardwick, 1998; 
Brammer and Millington, 2004). Reputation management and active 
impression management through rhetoric and images are another way of 
gaining stakeholder support (Carter, 2006; Ulmer and Sellnow, 2000) while 
Marens and Wicks (1999) advocate for the use of employee stock option 
programs to gain support from the labour force, and Louma and Goldstein 
(1999) propose board representation. The efficacy of the strategies above 
remains inconclusive. Regarding the management of stakeholders 
Freeman (1984) proposed a system whereby the firm sought win-win 
settlements but engaged in a combination of exploit, defend, swing and 
reinforce interventions to avoid conceding to all stakeholder demands. 
Flowing from this observation Rowley (1997) argues that a firm is better 
positioned to resist stakeholders when it is a central player in its 
stakeholder networks, and the stakeholders are less densely 
interconnected. This beneficial network positioning enhances 
management’s ability to deploy specific tactics against stakeholders 
namely, movement (ignoring legal obstacles in the belief that they would 
change), multimatum (requesting approval after the point of no return), and 
manipulation (playing one party off against another) (Huse and Eide, 
1996). While these tactics may effectively circumvent stakeholders and be 
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ethically questionable, they are in certain situations, highly effective. The 
organisational culture of a firm will also influence how stakeholders are 
managed. Individualistic firms tend to maintain weak ties with stakeholders 
while relational firms are inclined to maintain strong trust based ties 
(Brickson, 2007). With respect to how firms balance stakeholder interests 
Jensen (2002) argues that the primary objective of the managers is to 
maximize the long-run value of the firm with explicit view that the 
shareholder is the primary and most important stakeholder. In stark 
contrast Schwartz (2006) and Beekun and Badawi (2005) propose that 
practitioners can look to sacred texts such as the Koran and the Bible that 
give guidance on the balancing of stakeholder interests. Other contributors 
have suggested the use of analytical techniques to consistently and 
scientifically balance the needs of competing stakeholders (Schwarzkopf 
2006), whereas Bendheim, Waddock, and Graves (1998) find that best 
practices differ form one industry to another. Burton and Dunn (1996) 
argue that stakeholder input should be integrated into management 
decision making to achieve consensus, or where conflicts arise, should be 
resolved through a mediation process (Lampe, 2001). In all these 
considerations managers work under the constraints that stakeholders 
have different levels of importance, many decisions cannot be perfectly 
resolved to incorporate all stakeholder interests to their full satisfaction, 
and interests must be balanced ethically between decisions (Reynolds, 
Schultz, and Hekman, 2006). 
The fourth theme of firm performance seeks to establish how stakeholder 
management impacts on the operational and financial performance, 
corporate social performance, other organisational outcomes affected by 
stakeholder management. Out of 12 empirical studies that directly tested 
instrumental stakeholder theory between 1984 and 2007, Laplume et al 
(2008) found 9 of these studies to show a positive relationship, 1 is 
negative, and 2 reflect mixed results regarding between stakeholder 
management and firm performance. The most prevalent approach of 
stakeholder operationalization  was a multi-faceted index incorporating 
community relations, workplace diversity, labour relations, environmental 
impact, and product safety (Berman et al, 1999; Hillman and Keim, 2001; 
Waddock and Graves, 1977). This approach has been criticised because it 
places equal weighting on each of the indicators and implicitly pre-
supposes that there are no trade-offs between stakeholder interests 
(Barnett, 2007). Margolis and Walsh (2003) review 127 empirical studies 
on the relationship between firm financial performance and social 
initiatives concluding that there is a positive association between the two 
and very limited evidence of a negative association. The positive 
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association between stakeholder management and financial performance 
may be moderated by environmental and contextual factors that may differ 
widely from one country and industry to another (Greenley and Foxall, 
1997). Regarding how stakeholder management impacts on corporate 
social performance a number of academic papers argue that stakeholder 
action provides the fabric and logic by which social and financial 
performance objectives can be negotiated and aligned (Barnett, 2007; 
Caroll, 1999; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Active stakeholder participation 
is also important in moderating the financial objectives of the firm relative 
to other ethical considerations (Berrone et al., 2007). Regarding 
environmental performance, Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) argue that 
stakeholder pressures are a weak and ineffective deterrent to firms. 
Concerning what other organisational outcomes are impacted by 
stakeholder management Heugens et al. (2002) posit that stakeholder 
management enhances societal legitimacy and organisational learning. 
Harting et al. (2006) observe how innovation is nurtured die to stakeholder 
input while Schneper and Guillen (2004) associate effective stakeholder 
engagement with a probability of hostile takeover bids. Finally, Coombs 
and Gilley (2005) argue that stakeholder management reduces CEO 
salaries and helps in curbing excessive compensation schemes. 
Stakeholder theory has been justified in the academic literature through 
three approaches to the theory that have become widely accepted. The 
descriptive approach seeks to explain and show how the concepts and 
ideas articulated in stakeholder theory are observed in reality. The 
instrumental approach attempts to demonstrate a linkage between 
stakeholder management and corporate performance. And the normative 
approach appeals to issues of social justice including respect for group 
rights, social contracts, and environmental considerations. These 
approaches of stakeholder theory appear to be complementary and 
interrelated as the descriptive approach explains relationships observed in 
the world, and is supported by instrumental predictive value approach. If 
certain practices are carried out then particular results or outcomes are 
likely to occur which is the normative conception that addresses moral and 
ethical values (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
2.7.1  Criticism of stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory has been robustly criticised on three major fronts. 
These are the normative foundations upon which the theory is based, 
problems and challenges of the stakeholder theory itself, and stakeholder 
theory’s competition with other theories, some of which are more 
established. Regarding the normative foundations of stakeholder theory, it 
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has been applied using a number of varying and potentially conflicting 
normative frameworks including property rights (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995), feminist ethics (Lampe, 2001), the “common good” (Gibson, 2000), 
Aristotelian ethics (Wijnberg, 2000), Kanian ethics (Lea, 2004), and Islam 
(Beekun and Badawi, 2005). This diversity and plurality in normative 
foundations dilutes the robustness and universal applicability of 
stakeholder theory. 
Stakeholder theory has also been criticised on the grounds that 
exacerbates agency problems by increasing the number of parties 
informing how decisions are made, and the plurality of interests that arise 
(Jensen, 2002). Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) argue that stakeholder 
theory is under theorised and under researched, while Kline (2006) argues 
that the remit of stakeholder theory may be too broad to allow rigour in 
practitioner application and academic theorising. Stakeholder theory’s non-
recognition of incentives is a major criticism of Elms, Berman, and Wicks 
(2002) and Kaler (2006) criticises the theory on the basis that it extremely 
difficult to implement. The applicability of stakeholder theory to small or 
medium sized enterprises is challenged by Perrini (2006), whilst Balmer, 
Fukukawa, and Gray (2007) submit that stakeholder theory is based on 
false assumptions. 
The final criticism of stakeholder theory relates to how it competes with 
other theories. Notably stakeholder theory competes directly with 
stockholder theory as detailed by Wagner-Tsukumato (2006). The agency 
theory of (1992) also appears to be in direct competition with stakeholder 
theory together with integrated social contract theory, corporate social 
performance, corporate citizenship and institutional theory (Bishop, 2000; 
Rowley and Berman, 2000; Scherer, Palzzo, and Baumann, 2006; Luoma 
and Goodstein, 1999). These other theories are sometimes better 
researched, have been more exhaustively empirically tested, and are 
seemingly more robust and focused in their propositions. 
2.7.2  Stakeholder agency theory  
Stakeholder agency theory takes agency theory and stakeholder theory as 
points of departure and proposes a new paradigm that is a generalised 
theory of agency and stakeholder interactions. Specifically, stakeholder 
agency theory explores the nature of explicit and implicit contracts that 
exist between managers, owners, and other stakeholders in relation to the 
organisation. Regarding these interactions, stakeholder agency theory 
posits that other stakeholders beyond managers and owners place claims 
on the firm that reduce resources available for reinvestment and 
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distribution to shareholders. These claims may include employee demands 
for higher wages, customer demands for better quality and lower prices, 
supplier demands for more certain order patterns, claims of local 
communities, and environmental preservation demands by the broader 
public. While these divergent interests may in certain instances converge, 
there will also be areas of divergence that will necessitate management to 
make decisions as to how resources are allocated, and some stakeholders 
suffering utility loss as a result. Stakeholder agency theory submits that 
this paradigm results in predictions on stakeholder interactions that are not 
always consistent with agency theory, and has better explanatory power 
(Hill and Jones, 1992). 
In contrast with agency theory that assumes markets are efficient and 
adjust rapidly to equilibrium, stakeholder agency theory is more pessimistic 
and recognises that markets may be characterised by inefficiencies in the 
short to medium term (Perrow, 1986; Putterman, 1984). By way of 
example, agency theory views principals and agents as having the 
freedom to enter into and exit from contractual relationships fluidly and 
seamlessly. However if the markets surrounding the organisation are 
inefficient, this will result in the introduction of power differentials in the 
stakeholder agent equation as contracts are not seamlessly commenced 
or terminated. The recognition of these market inefficiencies and frictions, 
and how they influence principal-agent relationships, and governance 
mechanisms policing contracts increase the explanatory and predictive 
power of stakeholder agency theory relative to agency theory alone. Porter 
(1980) argues that friction in markets may occur as a result of barriers to 
entry or exit, or purposeful management interventions such as actions to 
keep out new entrants, collusion, and predatory pricing. Disequilibrium in 
markets may also persist when as a result of organisational inertia, 
incentive, monitoring, and enforcement structures fail to respond quickly to 
new circumstances such as changes in the political environment, macro-
economic trajectory, demographic changes etc. These contextual factors 
are likely to be in continual flux, which may mean that there is an almost 
permanent disequilibrium in the power differentials between stakeholders 
(Williamson, 1985). 
Within the stakeholder agency theory paradigm management has a unique 
and powerful role as all contracts whether explicit or implicit must be 
entered into through the management nexus. Furthermore, management is 
the only stakeholder with direct control over the decision- making 
apparatus of the firm, while other stakeholders are limited to indirect 
control or no control on decision making at all. This situation puts 
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management at the centre of making strategic decisions on resource 
allocation. Stakeholder agency theory proposes that the essential role of 
management then is to address the claims of stakeholders in a manner 
that best reconciles divergent interests (Hill and Jones, 1992). Stakeholder 
agency theory proposes that stakeholders will act in a manner that 
maximises the utility that accrues to them. A simplistic example of this is 
where an organisation generates 100 units of utility and management 
decisions result in stakeholders receiving 60 units of the utility generated. 
Stakeholders are likely to put in place incentive, monitoring, and 
enforcement mechanisms that result in them enjoying 90 units of utility. 10 
units of utility will be foregone in the process as a residual cost of the 
incentive, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms put in place. This 
contestation between stakeholders necessitates the implementation of 
interest alignment mechanisms and monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms to manage the divergent interests, and enable the 
commencement or continuance of the venture. These interventions are 
elaborated upon below. 
2.8 Interest alignment mechanisms  
The underlying goal of interest alignment mechanisms is to form shared 
dependency amongst managers and other stakeholders so that interests 
are more closely aligned. Demsetz (1983) observes the widespread use of 
stock options to align shareholder and manager interests. In other areas 
such as environmental considerations, the public claim as a stakeholder 
may be enshrined through legislation that compels an organisation to 
operate in a prescribed manner, or by way of incentives such as tax 
deductions on environmental and socially responsible expenditure. Hill and 
Jones (1992) also extol bonding costs such as warranties on durable 
products that must be fulfilled by manufacturers in the event of a 
malfunction within prescribed period. Alchain and Woodward (1988) make 
reference to a bonding mechanism that requires suppliers to post a bond 
forfeitable upon malperformance. It is anticipated that commitments to 
bond shareholders and stakeholders will be higher for investments in 
specialised assets with much lower secondary or residual values 
(Williamson, 1985). 
2.8.1  Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and 
structures  
The existence of divergent interests between stakeholders necessitates 
the establishment of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and 
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structures. The fundamental premise underlying stakeholder interactions is 
stakeholders will furnish the organisation with certain resources, and be 
compensated accordingly by way of a recognition of their claims to the 
firm. To ensure that parties adhere to the explicit and implicit agreements a 
number of institutional structures, referred to in agency theory as 
governance structures, have evolved that serve the function of monitoring 
and enforcing the terms of these contracts (Mitroff, 1983). These 
governance structures go beyond the traditional functions performed by 
the board of directors, national legal and regulatory frameworks, and other 
third party governance mechanisms, as they are purposefully and 
specifically designed to limit utility loss potential by stakeholders on a 
project specific basis. 
Hill and Jones (1992) highlight that information asymmetry between 
managers and stakeholders puts managers at a significant advantage, and 
makes it difficult for other stakeholders to determine whether managers 
are acting in their best interests. In response to this inequitable situation, 
other stakeholders justifiably seek to obtain more information on 
management activities. Where stakeholders attempt to obtain more 
information individually costs can become high and unaffordable and these 
impediments are exacerbated where the stakeholder base is large and 
diffuse. In order to overcome these costs and obtain information on 
managers more efficiently, a wide range institutional structures have 
evolved including mandatory publishing of annual results, analyst reports, 
and monitoring bodies such as environmental non-profit organisations. The 
over arching objective of these institutional structures is to more efficiently 
gain information on management decisions and actions, so as to monitor 
management more effectively, and minimise utility losses for stakeholders. 
The goal of enforcement mechanisms is to act as a deterrent to actions by 
a stakeholder that if left unchallenged would result in utility losses to other 
stakeholders. Where deterrence is a significant aspect of the enforcement 
mechanism, Schelling (1960) argues that the warning attributes must be 
credible, otherwise management will simply ignore them. This may result 
in a situation where the costs incurred to enforce compliance exceed the 
utility loss of the stakeholders. In summary, enforcement mechanisms that 
are not effective deterrents are likely to fail. Deterrent mechanisms can be 
broadly classified into three categories, namely, the law as a deterrent, exit 
as a deterrent, and voice as a deterrent.   
Laws may be an effective legal deterrent where they are perceived to be a 
credible threat by managers and stakeholders. Managers will perceive 
laws as credible where they are observed and supported by a broad range 
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of stakeholders and effectively communicated to management. This is 
exemplified in laws relating to environmental protection, anti-competitive 
and monopolistic behaviour, insider trading etc. These credible threats and 
law enforcement mechanisms can frequently effectively and efficiently 
curtail utility losses to stakeholders. In contrast, laws that are commonly 
ignored by the general population will tend to be ineffective deterrents (Hill 
and Jones, 1992). 
Exit as a deterrent is deployed where a stakeholder credibly threatens to 
withhold a certain resource from management unless its interests are 
addressed. An example of this may be a regulatory authority suspending a 
mining right to a platinum deposit, unless prescribed socio-economic 
initiatives are implemented. The stakeholder is in effect threatening to exit 
from the relationship (Hirschman, 1970). The exit of a key stakeholder may 
be a more effective than a legal deterrent because frequently a legal 
penalty will not jeopardise the continuance of the firm and managers may 
simply see it as a cost of doing business. In contrast the withholding of a 
key resource by a stakeholder can threaten the very existence of a firm 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Exits are more likely to be effective when 
stakeholders act in unison e.g. all employees withdrawing labour services 
via a union, as opposed to one employee individually going on strike. This 
co-ordination challenge becomes more acute when stakeholders are 
diffuse. To address this, stakeholders have set up institutions including 
trade unions, consumer union, community groups, environmental groups, 
and other special interest groups. The exit deterrent may be diluted where 
stakeholders are locked into an exchange relationship by specific asset 
investments. In such a situation stakeholders will only exit if they are 
prepared to incur significant exit costs that occur because the rents on the 
specialised assets will be significantly reduced in the secondary market. 
Such barriers to exit reduce the exit deterrent factor as an enforcement 
mechanism (Hirschman, 1970). 
The third and final category of deterrent as an enforcement mechanism is 
that of voice. The voice mechanism is frequently the cheapest 
enforcement mechanism, but has great potential to damage managerial 
reputations. Voice is most effective when articulated by interest groups 
with a valid claim to represent stakeholder interests including trade unions, 
community group representatives, etc. In their static equilibrium model, Hill 
and Jones (1992) submit that stakeholders are likely to increase the 
complexity of institutional structures, up to the point where the utility cost of 
maintaining the institutional and enforcement mechanisms is equivalent to 
the benefit that accrues to stakeholders. Where the utility costs of 
52 
maintaining the institutional and enforcement mechanisms exceeds the 
benefit to stakeholders, it is likely to be irrational and utility destroying for 
stakeholders to incur such costs, and therefore curtailed. 
In summary, stakeholders establish institutions to economise on the costs 
of obtaining information on management, enable co-ordination amongst 
different interest groups, and aggregate stakeholder influence where 
stakeholders are diffuse. By blending the economic rationale of efficiently 
collecting information on managers, and the power dynamic between 
stakeholders, stakeholder agency theory promises a framework that is 
more grounded in reality and an increased predictive power relative to 
other theories of the firm. In addressing and focusing on the areas of 
manager and stakeholder conflict, stakeholder agency theory potentially 
offers lessons as to how to rectify conflict and disequilibrium in stakeholder 
relations when they inevitably occur.  
2.8.2  Performance based contracting   
The trend towards performance based contracting (PBC) spans a number 
of decades and is evident in the private and public sectors over multiple 
industries ranging from construction, engineering, transport, healthcare 
and social welfare services, public administration, and information 
technology (Hypko, Tilebein, and Gleich 2008; Hooper 2008). The key 
objective in PBC is to tie a portion of the supplier payment to performance. 
The focus of these contracts is on the specification and evaluation of 
outputs, as opposed to the required inputs, activities or processes (Martin, 
2007). PBC is an integral aspect of project and infrastructure finance for 
two reasons. Firstly, PBC can be an important enabler in efficient and 
effective commissioning, procurement and supply chain co-ordination and 
collaboration, by aligning incentives among participants and contractors. 
PBC is important where these ventures are required to perform at specific 
levels and/or meet specified requirements to end users in the form of 
servitised business models (Ng, Ding and Yip, 2013). Secondly, PBC can 
provide a basis of integrating societal and environmental outcomes into 
project outcomes (Dinerstein et al 2013; Henscher and Stanely 2010). This 
is important in light of the increasing prominence of sustainability 
considerations, and in light of the fact that many project and infrastructure 
projects have the potential to have a significant societal and environmental 
impact. PBC enables attention to be focused on defining performance 
criteria and facilitates control, monitoring and rewarding of superior 
performance. 
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PBC differs markedly from traditional contracting that may be based on 
supplier costs such as fixed fee and cost-plus contracts or paying per unit 
of product/service consumed by the customer (Bonnemeier, Burianek, and 
Reichwald, 2010). It specifies customer value in terms of contractual 
outcomes, aligning goals and incentives across the supply chain (Datta 
and Roy, 2011). In addition, it entails a level of risk transfer to the supplier, 
with rewards as performance translates into financial bonuses or penalties 
(Randall et al. 2011). Finally, PBC stresses co-production or collaboration 
between the supplier and customer (Guo and Ng, 2011).  
The design and administration of performance based contracts in the 
procurement of goods and services, is primarily a governance, control, and 
accountability issue (Ring and van de Ven, 1992). The theoretical 
frameworks of agency theory and transaction cost economics detailed in 
the earlier parts of this literature review are therefore useful in informing 
how PBC manifests in project and infrastructure finance contractual 
arrangements. Selviaridis and Wynstra (2015) develop a conceptual model 
on PBC informed by three essential nodes of performance, incentives and 
risk. The performance node specifies outputs/outcomes and the design of 
related performance indicators. These performance indicators are 
monitored to evaluate supplier performance, determine and effect supplier 
payment, and implement and corrective action where required. The 
second node of incentives considers the structure of financial and non-
financial incentives, and how these impact on supplier behaviour. These 
incentives focus on the payment structure, rewards and penalties, their 
application, and intensity. These incentives can encourage the supplier to 
improve performance or result in adverse unintended consequences and 
supplier opportunism. Agency theory and transaction cost economics seek 
to alleviate incentive conflicts in the design and management of PBC. The 
third node relates to the transfer of risk, with PBC purposefully transferring 
risk to the supplier who may be risk averse especially where they are of 
the view that they are unable to control the risk. Selviaridis and Wynstra 
(2015) contend that these three nodes in Figure 2-1 interact and are 
interrelated in contract design and management. The academic literature 
on PBC is extensive and well developed. MacAfee and McMillan (1986) 
model the process of bidding for government contracts via sealed bids and 
a competitive tender process. They incorporate the presence of moral 
hazard and risk averse contractors. 
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Figure 2-1: A Stylised Model of Performance Based Contracting (Selviadris and 
Wynstra, 2015) 
The authors conclude that the bidding process has the effect of inducing 
potential contractors to reveal information including that related to 
expected costs. In arriving at an optimal incentive or performance based 
contracts, the authors argue there is a trade-off in giving the chosen agent 
an incentive to limit costs which stimulates bidding competition, and 
sharing risk. They conclude that the optimal contract is never cost plus, 
may be fixed-price, but is usually a performance based contract. 
Consistent with the authors above, Baker (1992) considers and models a 
scenario where the incentive contract entered to with the agent is not 
aligned to the principal’s objective. Baker (1992) concludes that even 
where risk transfer is discounted, such an arrangement is likely to result in 
a dilution of the contract’s incentivisation efficacy. 
Holmstram and Milgram (1991) submit that standard principal agent 
models are overly simplistic. In the business world performance objectives 
may be multiple and disparate e.g. quantity and quality, making rewards 
and penalties in performance contracts difficult. The authors model a 
scenario where the principal has different tasks for agents to perform, or a 
single task with multiple dimensions. The study concludes that in the event 
that the principal prioritises one task or dimension, this is likely to result in 
a scenario where non-prioritised tasks or dimensions are neglected by the 
agent, to the detriment of both the venture and the principal.  This 
challenge may in certain circumstances be addressed by fixed fees/wages. 
The thrust of their submission however is that incentive problems and 
related PBC must be done holistically for optimal outcomes. Myerson 
(1982) proposes the application of game design to consider how a 
principal should structure a situation that he controls to extract maximum 
value. The principal addresses the challenge of information asymmetry 
with agents by prescribing they report specified information to the principal 
(revelation principle). The principal then recommends decisions to agents 
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thus enabling incentive-compatible direct co-ordination mechanisms by the 
principal. This model supports continual in depth participation in aspects of 
a project that are being executed by third party contractors. 
The nature of PBC and how it is deployed in the private versus the public 
sector is explored by Dixit (1997). The author observes how public 
organisations differ from private enterprises because their outputs are 
frequently difficult to quantify and measure, and the goods and services 
have few close substitutes making incentives using traditional market 
forces difficult. The biggest distinction however is that public organisations 
are answerable to multiple and different constituencies with different 
objectives i.e. they are agents with multiple principals. These may include 
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, together 
with the media, lobby groups and civil society organisations etc. As a result 
of the many stakeholders in public organisations, they invariably operate in 
a framework of politics, weakening the incentive system. This decreased 
impact of incentives in public sector organisations from which this analysis 
originates is based work performed on large organisations in the private 
sector. Large private sector firms perform several tasks with output 
observable to different degrees of accuracy. Focusing on one or a limited 
number of outputs draws managerial attention to these frequently to the 
detriment of other outputs. This has the unintended consequence of 
compromising the neglected/unmonitored outputs (Dixit, 1996). Dixit 
(1996;1997) is consistent with Holmstram and Milgram (1991) in observing 
how the effect of PBC can be diluted where there are multiple outputs and 
a balanced measurement of all of the outputs is difficult. These 
observations are also consistent with Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1989) 
and Tirole (1994) who submit that because larger firms have more tasks, 
they suffer from weaker performance based incentives, and as a result 
outputs that are difficult to measure such as innovation are compromised. 
Building on the starkly different contextual environment in the public sector 
versus the private sector, Dixit (1996) reasons that political processes 
(public sector institutions) suffer higher transaction costs than private 
sector institutions. This is largely attributable to the fact that they are 
multiple principals. As a result, at face value contracts relating to public 
sector institutions may appear to be sub-optimally structured and have less 
efficient/effective performance based arrangements. The author submits 
that a great deal of caution should be applied before labelling public sector 
contracts sub-optimal, because the contracts may represent an optimal 
contract after taking into account all the principals involved, even where an 
aspect of the contract appearing grossly sub-optimal. These observations 
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are consistent with Williamson’s (1999) enquiry into transaction cost 
politics and economics in foreign affairs. The author concludes that public 
sector and political institutions are different and perform difficult 
transactions that may seem inefficient at face value but are the best 
feasible governance response. Building on academic literature on 
contracting in the public sector, Vishny et al. (1997) consider under what 
conditions government should render services in house or contract these 
to external service providers. Using prisons as an example the authors 
observe that PBC incentivises service providers to provide a better quality 
of service and cost reductions and related savings, relative to employees. 
However, the private service provider incentive to reduce costs in areas 
that are non-contractible results in service quality and outcomes being 
compromised, examples being the quality of personnel and the use of 
force in prisons. On balance the authors conclude that in house provision 
of prison services is preferable, but private sector provision may be ore 
optimal where there is contract competition, quality innovations are 
important, and when unions and patronage system severely paralyse or 
undermine government institutions. In house services are also preferable 
for conducting foreign affairs, and maintenance of the police and armed 
forces. The case for privatisation is however stronger in refuse collection, 
weapons production, and schools. A notable observation related to how 
some sectors such as healthcare were extremely complicated to arrive at a 
determination. Using the state of Oregon as an example Douthwaite 
(1996) proposes that in addition to the other PBC mechanisms, states 
should be able to procure construction projects by negotiation. Negotiation 
has specific advantages including faster project completion, lower costs in 
procurement and overall project, more discretion in contractor selection 
and partnering. These advantages are countered by disadvantages 
including the potential for public perceptions of favouritism, barriers to 
emerging contractors, less control by the owner, the potential that 
negotiation may not result in a lower project cost, and risk shifting to the 
contractor may not occur to the desired effect. Douthwaite (1996) 
proposes that negotiating construction contracts should be permissible and 
viewed as another important option in PBC. To address the disadvantages 
above, public sector entities engaging in the form of contract should be 
required to address areas of concern to demonstrate that taxpayers’ 
interests are protected. 
The auction process is another channel enabling competitive bidding and 
PBC. Milgrom and Weber (1982) look at the impact on auction prices 
based on four main auction types namely, English auction, Dutch auction, 
First Price sealed auction, and Second price sealed auction. The authors 
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conclude that the English auction generates higher prices for the seller 
than the Second auction and that the outcomes using either of these two 
methods are generally equivalent. The Second Price auction is also 
derived to be superior to the Dutch auction if bidders are risk neutral. 
Despite these findings the writers are cautious about prescribing 
programmatic solutions due to the complexity of auction environments. 
This complexity arises in part due to information asymmetry, the potential 
for collusive behaviour when bidders are limited and know each other 
through trade associations, and where multiple opportunities are being 
auctioned at the same time, resulting in bidders’ fear of winning too many 
or too few concessions. 
Laffont and Tirole (1987) investigate the bridge between auction theory 
and incentive theory. Their paper considers the auctioning of an indivisible 
project among several firms. The authors submit that the principal 
(commissioning firm) induces the bidding companies (agents) to disclose 
their future expected costs in the bidding stage. The principal then uses 
this information to reduce costs by selecting the most competitive bidder, 
and negotiating key aspects of the final contract. The winning bidder may 
be accommodated on increasing costs based on the second lowest bid, 
and the winners share of cost overruns are likely to decrease with the its 
announced expected cost. Goel (1995) argues that auctioning of incentive 
contracts is superior to one-shot bidding by enabling risks to be shared 
and ensuring the most efficient bidder is chosen. This can culminate in 
significant cost savings for the principal. Furthermore, by applying a 
sharing rate where the principal bears a fraction of the costs, the principal 
may be able to incentivise the agent to curtail costs and derive benefits 
from this. This form of risk sharing the authors conclude, is suitable for 
projects such as highway construction, defence procurement, and 
environmental clean ups. Finally Fehr et al. (2007) examine issues relating 
to fairness and contracting. They observe that issues relating to fairness 
have the potential to have a decisive impact on the optimal choice of 
contract. In this respect bonus contracts that have voluntary but 
unenforceable bonuses for satisfactory performance, provide powerful 
incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts, where players 
that are fair minded are involved. However, trust contracts that make 
significant upfront payments are less efficient incentive contracts. 
In summary, PBC is an essential part in aligning the interests of the 
principal and agents (contractors) in a wide variety of disciplines including 
in project and infrastructure finance. The precise design and management 
of optimal incentives is likely to differ based on the underlying project, and 
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dynamics between the principal and potential bidders/contractors including 
information asymmetry, the expected duration of the arrangement, risk 
appetite, the sector, and related governance and control issues. 
2.9 Project Finance and Public Private Partnerships 
2.9.1  Project Finance  
There are multiple definitions of project finance in the academic literature 
and as outlined in practitioner characterisations on the subject. Esty (2004) 
defines it as the creation of a legally independent project company 
financed with equity from one or more sponsoring firms and non-recourse 
debt for the purpose of investing in a capital asset. The non-recourse or 
limited recourse nature of the debt arrangements prescribe that debt 
providers are limited in their ability to extract compensation from the 
sponsors in the event of a default. 
A more stringent definition proposed by Weber and Alfen (2010) asserts 
that project finance is defined as the financing of a standalone, clearly 
demarcated economic unit. The key characteristics of a project financing 
are as follows: 
 Special Purpose Company – a special purpose vehicle (SPV) is 
created to house a new commercial entity. Transactions and 
related legal obligations are conducted through this stand-alone 
vehicle; 
 Cash flow based lending – the providers of capital, especially debt, 
extend facilities based on the cash flows that will be generated 
from the underlying assets in the SPV; 
 Risk sharing structures – mechanisms and contractual 
arrangements are devised to disseminate and allocate risks to 
those parties that can best manage them; 
 Limitation of liability - Lenders have no or limited recourse to 
recoup their capital from other parties in the event that the project 
is a commercial failure; (and)  
 Off balance sheet financing – equity sponsors are only required to 
consolidate the SPV into their group financial statements only to 
the extent that they have a controlling interest.  
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Project finance is apt to be utilised in large-scale capital-intensive projects 
that require significant amounts of capital in the form of debt and equity to 
execute the transaction. These include industries such as mining, 
telecommunications, oil and gas, power generation and transmission, 
building and construction, and industrial manufacturing. Projects tend to 
be highly leveraged with debt to equity ratios ranging from 70% to 80%. 
The duration of projects tend to extend over periods exceeding 10 years. 
The SPV in which the project is situated has a finite life and has the sole 
purpose of executing the project. The SPV also facilitates non-recourse 
financing by the sponsors and the lenders. The dividend policy and the 
application of cash flows and profit generated are usually prescribed in 
advance and tightly controlled and regulated. The number of stakeholders 
and participants in a project finance transaction can be very large. This is 
on account of the use of multiple contractors and service providers, and 
also due to the fact that the project finance structure seeks to distribute 
risks to multiple parties. Finally, the process of executing a project finance 
transaction tends to be more costly than generic corporate or asset based 
finance transactions due to the extensive legal and contractual 
arrangements and risk mitigation measures (Comer 1996). 
Appendix A-1.1 illustrates the stakeholders that typically are party to a 
project finance transaction and the different roles that are played. A 
composite of the major participants in a typical project finance transaction 
is detailed below:  
Host government: the host government provides the enabling regulatory 
environment for a successful project. In this respect the host state will be 
responsible for issuing operating concessions and environmental licenses, 
tax directives, regulatory frameworks, and supply/purchase/debt 
guarantees.  
Project sponsors: sponsors inject the equity capital to initiate the project 
and are de facto owners. Sponsors will typically be made up of host 
governments, multi-national and local companies, contractors, operators, 
and suppliers.  
Project company: this is the SPV whose sole objective is to undertake the 
project. The project company will have its own board of directors and 
executive management team so as to operate as a standalone entity. The 
SPV’s only source of income and cash flows is the revenue generated 
from the operations of the underlying project.  
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Project constructor: the project constructor is commissioned to build the 
physical infrastructure and fulfil pre-determined technical specifications 
contained in the contract with the project company. The constructor will 
typically bear the risk of not meeting agreed upon specifications by way of 
monetary compensation, rectification of the breach, or a combination of 
the two. 
Project operator: on completion of the project an operator will manage and 
run the project on behalf of the project company. This responsibility 
includes ensuring the operational efficiency of the project, undertaking 
required repairs and maintenance, and other daily functions.  
Product purchaser: this is often referred to as an off take agreement. The 
product purchaser issues a commitment to buy specified quantities of the 
plant’s output over stated periods. This gives assurance to the project 
company that there is a market for its product thus reducing uncertainty. 
Critical input supplier: the critical input supplier provides critical input into 
the project company. This may in the form of a tangible commodity e.g. 
coal, or merely be a form of licensing such as a mining concession or 
right-of-way for constructing a highway. 
Raw material: often referred to as feedstock the raw material supplier is 
legally contracted to deliver input of laid out specifications in order to 
facilitate the continued operations of the plant.  
Lending banks: the lending banks provide the primary debt capital. In 
project finance the arrangements may be syndicated across a number of 
banks and development finance institutions due to the size of the 
transactions (Comer 1996) and (Weber and Alfen, 2010). 
Table 2.2 below summarises the key differentiation between corporate and 
project finance arrangements. Williamson (1998) submits that debt and 
equity are a capital commodity in project finance, and their most important 
differentiation is that they represent two alternative governance structures. 
The dominance of debt funding implies a more prescriptive governance 
arrangement, while significant the dominance of equity funding allows for 
greater management discretion. 
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Table 2.2:  Corporate Finance – Project Finance Continuum (Comer, 1996) 
Dimension Corporate Finance Project Finance 
Financing vehicle Multi-purpose organization Single-purpose entity 
Type of capital Permanent - an indefinite horizon for equity 
Finite - time horizon 
matches life of project 
Dividend policy and 
investment 
decisions 
Corporate management makes 
decisions autonomous from 
investors and creditors 
Fixed dividend policy - 
immediate payout; no 
reinvestment allowed 
Capital investment 
decisions Opaque to creditors Highly transparent creditors 
Financial structures Easily duplicated; common forms 
Highly-tailored structures 
which cannot generally be 
re-used 
Transaction costs 
for financing 
Low costs due to competition 
from providers, routinized 
mechanisms and short 
turnaround time 
Relatively higher costs due 
to documentation and longer 
gestation period 
Size of financings Flexible Might require critical mass to cover high transaction costs 
Basis for credit 
evaluation 
Overall financial health of 
corporate entity; focus on 
balance sheet and cash flow 
Technical and economic 
feasibility; focus on project's 
assets, cash flow and 
contractual arrangements 
Cost of capital Relatively lower Relatively higher 
Investor/lender 
base 
Typically broader participation; 
deep secondary markets 
Typically smaller group; 
limited secondary market 
Shah and Thakor (1987) argue that the method of incorporation affects 
both the level of leverage and economic value of a commercial venture. 
Project finance in effect enables higher debt, higher interest rates, and has 
the potential to result in higher project valuations than conventional 
financing. This observation is a key consideration in companies opting for 
this funding method. This argument is consistent with the findings that 
where debt is optimally allocated between a sponsor and a new project 
SPV, the value of the venture may increase as a result of a reduction in 
agency costs and an increase in the tax shield (John and John, 1991). 
2.9.1.1 Advantages of project finance  
A key advantage of project finance is that its non-recourse character 
protects sponsors from claims beyond their original equity investment. In 
practice this may not necessarily be the case as they may be limited-
recourse to the sponsors. To varying degrees project finance may facilitate 
off balance sheet financing. The scope for off balance sheet financing 
differs due to different jurisdictions having different accounting standards. 
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The high leverage associated with project finance is attractive to sponsors 
who have a preference for funding ventures with debt as opposed to 
equity, due to limited equity capital. The SPV used in project finance also 
allows firms to circumvent restrictive covenants such as debt coverage 
and interest coverage ratios (Chen et al. 1989). Because projects are 
standalone and ring fenced, adverse political developments in a project or 
country are less likely to have a contaminating effect on other projects and 
operations that an entity may be undertaking. Extensive due diligence and 
financial modelling increases the probability of conceptualising robust 
projects, and is supported by comprehensive risk management 
mechanisms. These risk management features enable risk dispersion, and 
for risks to be allocated to the party that is best able to manage it 
(Hoffman, 2007). Kleimeier and Megginson (2001) observe that project 
finance loans have a greater propensity to have fixed as opposed to 
floating interest rates and as result may enjoy more stable interest cash 
outflows. 
Finally, project finance offers the opportunity for credit enhancement 
interventions that could decrease the interest levied by lenders. Credit 
enhancement can take many forms including guarantees, off take 
agreements, dedicated input feedstock contracts, insurance, and a 
number of other measures that reduce the risk profile of the project and 
enhance its attractiveness to lenders. The prescriptive and rigorous 
contractual and operational parameters enshrined in project finance instil a 
greater degree of discipline by limiting managerial discretion.  
2.9.1.2 Disadvantages of project finance  
The disadvantages of project finance revolve around the cost of execution, 
the complexity of this method, the amount of time required to conclude 
transactions, and some of the negative social and environmental 
occurrences that have come to be associated with the project finance 
framework. The identification and allocation of risk amongst multiple 
contractors and subcontractors results in a great deal of complexity in 
project finance arrangements. Project finance transaction costs are high 
and in the region of 5 to 10 per cent of the transaction value (Esty 2004). 
The higher costs can be also be attributed to the extensive due diligence 
performed by costly independent professionals such as engineers, 
lawyers, accountants, and related specialists that lenders demand. The 
complexity of project finance frequently results in extended periods of time 
between deal conceptualisation and financial closure. Lenders demand 
higher fees and interest on account of the increased risk they assume. 
63 
Critics of the highly leveraged nature of project finance argue that this 
method encourages potentially unacceptable risk taking.  
Due to the highly leveraged nature of these transactions, lenders are more 
active/interfering and involved to secure their interests. This typically 
manifests by way of restrictive clauses in the loan agreements requiring 
lender approval for specified operational and contractual changes deemed 
of consequence by the lender. Lenders also insist on regular site visits, 
detailed lender reporting requirements including on-going communication 
on the projects construction progress, operational, technical, financial, and 
related performance. There may also be reporting prescriptions for force 
majeure events, contract default notices, and contract revisions 
undertaken. The final criticism of project finance relates to its socio-
economic and environmental record. Many mining, pipeline, electric power 
plants, and related infrastructure enterprises in both developed and 
developing countries are being funded by way of project finance. 
Especially in the developing world, a number of these projects have been 
observed as engaging in predatory activities including contaminating the 
environment and taking advantage of indigenous populations, whilst falling 
short of the economic and commercial benefits they have promised 
(Baker, 2011).  
2.9.2  African vs. World comparison of project finance  
The successful deployment of project finance in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
the rest of the world covering the period 2003 and 2013 displays a number 
of key features. Firstly, the number of project finance transactions 
occurring on the continent are limited. In 2013, 35 projects were concluded 
in Sub-Saharan Africa compared to an international total of 584 projects. 
Concomitantly the value of deals funded by way of project finance is also 
insignificant.  In the ten-year period up to 2013 approximately 153 project 
finance deals were closed mobilising debt equivalent to US$ 59 billion 
(Dornel 2014). Figure 2-2 demonstrates how there has been steady and 
accelerating growth in the number and value of project finance 
transactions on the continent. The variation in the value of funds 
committed to project finance is attributable to the significant differences in 
deal sizes that results in a weaker correlation between the number of the 
transactions and the project values. Between 2003 and 2013 the 
international project finance market grew from US$ 70 billion peaking at 
US$ 251 billion in 2008. Despite a marked decline to US$ 139 billion in 
2009, in part attributable to the international financial crisis and the 
contraction in credit markets, international project finance transactions 
raised US$ 204 billion in 2013. 
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Figure 2-2:  Africa: Growth in Project Finance 2003-2013 (Dornel, 2014) 
The number of projects was 584 in 2013 and lower than the 615 closed in 
2010 and 2011 inferring that the size of individual transactions increased 
on average. In excess of 5000 project finance transactions were closed 
over this period with debt raised in excess of US$ 2 trillion. Sub-Saharan 
Africa accounted for a mere 3% of the overall debt raised and 153 
transactions (Dornel 2014). The leading project finance countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa are strongly driven by the resources/extractive sector 
particularly in oil, gas, and mining. Table 2.3 reflects the dominance of 
countries such as Nigeria and Ghana primarily driven by significant project 
finance investments in oil. Specifically, 20 of the 28 of the Nigerian 
transactions are in the commodities sector and 12 of the 14 transactions in 
Ghana relate to commodities.  In contrast only 15 of South Africa’s 45 
transactions are in extraction, with the remaining 30 diversified across 
other sectors of the economy. The leading country by deal size Nigeria, 
has double the number of deals relative to second placed Ghana. South 
Africa however scores the largest number of transactions at 45 reflecting 
the greater level of development of capital markets relative to Nigeria 
despite average transaction size being significantly lower than Nigeria and 
Ghana. The average deal size of US$ 410 million is distorted upwards by 
the single Madagascar transaction and excluding this would be US$ 397 
million. 
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Table 2.3:  Top 10 SSA Countries: Deal Size and Number of Projects (All Sectors) - 
(Dornel, 2014) 
Country No. of Projects Deal Size ($M) Average Deal Size ($M) 
Nigeria 28 17, 793 635 
Ghana 14 10,925 780 
South Africa 45 9,928 221 
Angola 8 4,460 558 
Madagascar 1 2,100 2,100 
Zambia 7 2,047 292 
Gabon 6 2,018 336 
Ivory Coast 8 1,399 175 
Kenya 9 1,357 151 
Mozambique 4 1,327 332 
Total 130 53,354 410 
The dominance of South African project finance by number of projects on 
total deal size in the non-extractive industries in Table 2.4 below is in part 
attributable to South Africa’s more diversified economy including its 
telecommunications, power, transport, manufacturing and services 
sectors. Despite Nigeria having a larger economy than South Africa, and a 
population in excess of triple that of the latter, the more sophisticated, 
deeper and broader capital markets support the closing of a greater 
number of transactions in the non-extractive sector. 
Implicit in this observation is that a greater proportion of debt capital for 
these projects in South Africa is sourced from domestic as opposed to 
international capital markets. The domestic setting of these transactions 
would also explain the significantly lower average deal size of South 
African transactions at US$ 301 million as opposed to the Nigerian 
transactions that had an average deal size of US$ 935 million. Non-
extractive project finance deals are relatively few numbering 59 compared 
to the 130 deals observed in total. Non-extractive projects are also 
concentrated in South Africa with 30 of the 59 projects occurring in South 
Africa.  
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Table 2.4:  Top 10 SSA Countries: Deal Size and Number of Projects (Non-
Extractive) - (Dornel, 2014) 
The comparative distribution of project finance transactions by value in 
Sub-Saharan Africa versus the global picture is instructive (See Figures 2-
3 and 2-4 below). The oil and gas sector is extremely dominant and 
absorbed 46% of project finance debt capital in the ten years up to 2013. 
This can be explained by the significant increase in production in key 
African oil producers such as Nigeria and Angola, and the incremental 
investment required. Traditional oil producers were also joined by 
emerging African oil producers such as Ghana and Uganda where 
significant new discoveries were found and developed, and players like 
Mozambique where large investments were attracted into newly confirmed 
natural gas reserves. It is noteworthy that oil and gas discoveries have not 
to date resulted in major downstream investments in refineries or liquid 
natural gas plants that would have implicitly increased project finance 
capital raised for the industrial sector form the small level of 4% at which it 
stood in 2013. This may be attributable the regulatory and business 
environments in oil and gas endowed countries not being sufficiently 
conducive to attract this investment. The mining sector at 17% attracted as 
much capital as the power sector. With electricity generation becoming a 
focal point in both national and regional development initiatives it is 
expected that the power sector will surpass mining if effective regulatory 
frameworks are established that are amenable to the deployment of 
project financed power plants.  
Country No. of Projects Deal Size ($M) Average Deal Size 
South Africa 30 9,039 301 
Nigeria 8 7,477 935 
Kenya 8 1,157 145 
Ivory Coast 3 996 332 
Uganda 1 867 867 
Mozambique 3 835 278 
Ghana 2 498 249 
Tanzania 1 340 340 
Angola 1 250 250 
Cameroon 2 203 102 
Total 59 21,662 367 
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Figure 2-3:  Africa Project Finance deal by Sector (2003-2013, US$bn) - (Dornel, 
2014) 
Despite attracting only 15% of project finance debt capital the 
telecommunications sector is having a significant impact on the economic, 
social and political life of the African continent. The period up to 2013 
heralded the wide scale availability of broadband across many parts of the 
continent facilitated by a number of project financed undersea cables 
linking the continent to other parts of the world. It is noteworthy that the 
roads and transportation sector failed to feature in the above analysis on 
account of the paucity of project finance capital it attracted. 
In contrast the global sectoral breakdown of project finance by value is 
more evenly distributed across sectors. The largest sector over the period 
related to the power sector that saw huge investments in developed 
markets including North America and Western Europe, and also in 
emerging market economies in Asia such as China. In developed 
countries power market reforms encouraged and enabled large new 
investments, while in emerging Asian markets, a blend of state led and 
private initiatives attracted project finance capital. Roads and 
transportation was the second largest sector at 22% reflecting the large 
investments in logistical infrastructure to move people and goods by many 
countries. Investment in Africa with respect to this sector is very low in 
comparison. Global mining and oil and gas projects accounted for 27% of 
project finance funding compared to 63% for Africa reflecting the 
secondary role played by the extractive sectors in most world economies 
that are dominated by secondary and tertiary activities. While this simple 
comparison offers useful insights into project finance in Africa relative to a 
global aggregation, the interpretation and analysis noted would be even 
more stark if the comparison was between Africa and developed markets 
such as North America and Western Europe alone. 
PPP, $1,1% Telecom,  $9, 15 % 
Industrials, $2, 4% Mining, $10, 17% Oil & Gas, $27, 46% 
Power, $10, 17% 
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Figure 2-4:  World Project Finance deal by Sector (2003-2013, US$bn) - (Dornel, 
2014) 
The data confirms the need for African countries to diversify their 
economies from extractive activities into other economic sectors. Such 
diversification can be enabled by appropriate investments in enabling 
infrastructure in the telecommunications, roads and transport, and power 
sectors. 
2.9.2.2 The impact of project finance ratios on capital 
structure  
This section reviews key ratios used by bankers, sponsors, and other 
capital providers in project finance transactions to determine the 
bankability and sustainability of a project. The Debt Service Cover Ratio 
(DSCR) is an assessment of the degree to which operational cash flows in 
a given year are able to service the principal. It is calculated by dividing 
net operating income with total debt. The higher the DSCR, the greater the 
comfort lenders will have of the project’s ability to service its obligations 
towards them. A DSCR of 1 or below would indicate a marginal project 
that could become unsustainable due to earnings before interest and 
taxation generated being insufficient to cover debt servicing and loan 
repayment requirements. DSCRs vary from one sector to another. Gatti’s 
(2008) collation of DSCRs across sectors from various market sources are 
illustrated below in Table 2.5. The highest DSCRs occur in power plants 
where no contractually bound buyer of the output or off take agreement is 
in place. The higher DSCR may be necessitated by the potential volatility 
of revenue on account of unstable demand in the event that there is no off 
Telecom, $74, 4% Industrials, $209, 10% 
Leisure & Property, $57, 3% 
Oil & Gas, $399, 19% Mining, $165, 8% Power, $565, 28% 
PPP, $132, 6% 
Roads & Transportation, $450, 22% 
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take agreement. The power generation sector is highly capital intensive 
and lenders may demand higher DSCRs on account of their larger 
exposures. 
Table 2.5:  Project Finance DSCRs in Various Sectors (Gatti, 2008) 
Project Sector Average DSCR 
Power:   
Merchant Plants (plants with no off take agreement) 2 - 2.25 
With a tolling agreement 1.5 -1.7 
In cases involving regulated business 1.3 - 1.5 
Transportation/shipping 1.25 - 1.5 
Telecom 1.2 -1.5 
Water 1.2 -1.3 
Waste to energy 1.35-1.4 
As soon as a tolling agreement is in place DSCRs drop significantly from 
2.25 to 1.7. This confirms the credit enhancement and risk mitigating 
virtues of tolling and off take agreements. 
The Loan Life Cover Ratio (LLCR) is an assessment of the ability of the 
project company to repay the outstanding loans based on a comparison of 
the total debt burden relative to operating cash flows forecast over the 
duration of the loan. It is computed by taking the present value of 
operational cash flows of the project over the life of the loan, adding 
existing debt reserves, and comparing this to the outstanding debt at a 
point in time. Again, the higher the LLCR, the greater the comfort lenders 
will have of the project’s ability to service its obligations towards them over 
the entire duration of the venture. An LLCR of 1 or lower indicates that the 
project is not viable and would be unable to compensate lenders of their 
principal and interest expectations. LLCs vary from one sector to another. 
Gatti’s collation of LLCRs across sectors from various market sources are 
illustrated below in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6:  Project Finance LLCRs in Various Sectors (Gatti, 2008) 
Project Sector Average LLCR 
Power:  
Merchant Plants (plants with no off take agreement) 2.25 - 2.75 
With a tolling agreement 1.5 -1.8 
In cases involving regulated business 1.3 - 1.5 
Transportation/shipping 1.4 - 1.6 
Telecom n.a 
Water 1.3 -1.4 
Waste to energy 1.45-1.5 
70 
As observed with the DSCRs, the highest LLCRs occur in power plants 
where no off take agreement is in place. There is a significant drop in the 
LLCR from 2.75 to 1.8 as soon as a tolling agreement is in place. A more 
accommodating derivative of the LLCR is the Project Life Cover Ratio 
(PLCR). The PLCR is identical in all respects except for the fact that it 
incorporates operational cash flows over the entire duration of the project, 
rather than simply cash flows to be received over the loan period. 
Project finance arrangements allow the capital structure of an entity to be 
studied with greater clarity and fewer distractions or moving variables. This 
is due to the fact that each project is ensconced in a special purpose 
vehicle and the capital structure effectively incorporates the decision 
making process of that particular project alone from conceptualisation.  
2.9.2.3 Risk management in project finance  
Shen-fa and Xiao-ping (2009) go as far as to define project finance as a 
process of risk allocation. This observation derives from the recognition of 
the many and divergent stakeholders in a project finance arrangement. 
The risks a project faces during the span of its lifecycle can be broadly 
summarised into four major stages namely, development, design, 
engineering, procurement and construction, start up, and operations 
(Gatti, 2008). In many developing markets political risk is also a major 
consideration. Political risk may manifest as expropriation, currency 
convertibility and transferability, amended regulations, and the potential for 
political violence. Frequently development finance institutions such as the 
World Bank may be included as sponsors or lenders as a way of mitigating 
political risk (Hainz and Kleimeier, 2011). In a study conducted on 900 
projects in 53 countries between 1990 – 2006, minority stakes by host 
governments were observed to mitigate against political risks of project 
finance transactions (James and Vaaler, 2013). 
Weber and Alfen (2010) summarise and group risks in project finance 
transactions into two categories, namely, general risks (Table 2.7) and 
project specific risks (Table 2.8). They identify the parties in a project 
finance arrangement based placed to manage the risk and to whom each 
risk is allocated. From a risk perspective project finance presents unique 
challenges for the providers of capital. The relative bargaining power of 
the funders and the contracting parties’ changes markedly as soon as the 
infrastructure has been sunk (Dailami and Leipziger, 1997). 
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Table 2.7:  General Risks (Weber and Alfen, 2010) 
General Risks        Risk Description Risk Allocation 
1  
Market risk 
- Sales lower than expected (demand 
risk) 
- Change in the price of the 
product/service offered (price risk) 
- Existence or supply/delivery of raw 
materials/primary products (supply risk) 
- Increase in the cost of production 
factors e.g. raw materials (price risk) 
- Operator 
- Project SPC 
 
2  
Interest rate 
risk 
- Changes in interest rates in the case of 
variable-interest rate agreements 
- Project SPC 
- Commercial banks 
3  
Exchange rate 
risk 
- Changes in the exchange rate between 
the local currency generated by the 
project and the currency in which the 
project costs/loans are denominated 
- Project SPC 
- Commercial banks 
4 
Environmental 
risk 
- Change in environmental regulations 
- Receipt of government approval 
- State 
- Project SPC 
5  
Force majeure 
- Strikes 
- War 
- Terrorism 
- Earthquakes and other natural disasters 
- State 
- Project SPC 
- Insurers 
6  
Political/ 
Country risk 
- Changes in legislation 
- (De)regulation 
- Nationalisation 
- Seizure 
- Expropriation 
- Breach of contract/concession 
- Currency transfer 
- Currency conversion 
- Changes in tax rates & tax legislation 
- Public acceptance 
- State 
- Project SPC 
- Sponsors 
- Commercial banks 
- Multilateral institutions 
- Export credit agencies 
(ECA) 
- Insurer 
7  
Legal and 
contractual 
risk 
- Failure to receive approvals, licenses 
and concessions 
- Effectiveness and enforceability of 
contracts and agreements 
- Poor functionality of the judicial system 
- State 
- Project SPC 
- Sponsors 
- Commercial banks 
- Multilateral institutions 
- Export credit agencies 
(ECA) 
- Insurer 
 
Further, the greatest risks are at the beginning of the project with a 
general decrease in operational risk as the project continues over a period 
of time. Contractors are regulated from fundamentally changing their 
agreed terms of participation in the project by way of extensive legal 
contracts, service level agreements and PBC. 
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Table 2.8:  Project Specific Risks (Weber and Alfen, 2010) 
Project Risks Risk Description Risk Allocation 
1  
Construction 
and completion 
risk 
- Planning amendments by the principal 
- Excess costs due to delays in the planning 
or construction phase 
- Construction overruns not attributable to 
planning errors 
- Existence of transport/infrastructure 
- General 
contractor 
- Project SPC 
- State (in case of 
amendments by 
the principal) 
2  
Technical and 
performance 
risk 
- Use of tried and tested technology from 
known manufacturers that is adequate for 
the operating process 
- Suitable climate or soil quality (for the 
construction of larger plants) 
- Producer 
- Operator 
- Project SPC 
3  
Financing risk 
- Changes in contractual conditions between 
the signature date and the provision of 
financing 
- Project SPC 
- Commercial 
banks 
- Sponsors 
4  
Syndication risk 
- Ability to syndicate/place loans - Commercial 
banks 
5  
Operational risk 
- Excess operating/maintenance costs 
- Interruption of operation 
- Selection of operator/partner 
- Operator 
6  
Realisation risk 
- Market value or functionality of the asset at 
the end of the term may be lower than 
previously assumed 
- Depending on the 
contract model 
either with the 
sponsors/project 
SPC or with the 
state 
7  
Counterparty/ 
credit risk 
- Ability of contractual partners to provide 
products, services or payments 
- All contractual 
parties 
Many of these risks can be eliminated or effectively managed at the 
inception of a project. The ability to identify, appraise, and mitigate risks 
throughout a projects life is therefore an essential part of project finance. 
2.9.3  Public Private Partnerships in Project and 
Infrastructure Finance  
Public-private partnerships (PPP) are an increasingly popular method for 
the procurement of public infrastructure using project finance. PPPs are 
established where a public authority commissions the design, construction, 
operation, maintenance and financing of a public infrastructure project 
from a private consortium within a single contractual and institutionalised 
framework. They have gained increasing prominence in many parts of the 
world as their governance arrangements have an unparalleled ability to 
bring together public, private, and communal resources and generate 
synergistic benefits (Bettignies and Ross, 2004). A significant portion of 
PPPs are funded using the project finance method and include toll roads, 
hospitals, power plants, airports, oil and gas facilities, and other such 
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capital intensive infrastructure. Despite the resurgence of PPP, the 
academic literature is contradictory regarding the efficacy of these 
arrangements. 
Hodge and Greve (2007) submit that the objective of establishing PPPs is 
a desire the blend the positive attributes of the private and public sectors in 
the provision of public services. This partnership is further entrenched by 
the fact that PPPs require extensive risk sharing between these key 
stakeholders and a long-term commitment to the underlying project. There 
are two key dimensions that inform PPPs, namely, how they are financed, 
and how they are governed.  In the late 20th and early 21st century 
motivations for PPPs have changed. The initial justification was driven by 
concerns about the elevated debt levels of the public sector, and that 
government should focus its financial resources on priority areas, leaving 
the private sector to fund implicitly lower priority objectives. In more recent 
times a secondary motivation has been value for money in the provision of 
public infrastructure (Edwards et al. 2004). 
2.9.3.1 Empirical results on PPPs 
The empirical results on PPPs in many regions of the world are mixed and 
contradictory, and appear to suffer many of the challenges associated with 
privatisation. Hall (1998) challenges the proposition that PPPs enable 
governments to free up capital resources, and potentially increase the 
infrastructure stock by mobilising private sector capital. Hall’s (1998) 
contention based on the funding of public infrastructure in the UK in the 
1990s concludes that private funding of infrastructure through PPPs simply 
displaced previous government funding, and did not lead to an increase in 
infrastructure investment levels. Furthermore, the study challenged the 
assertion that the government fiscal budget was relieved on account of 
private funding, as governments simply paid for the infrastructure over 
extended periods of time as opposed to significant upfront settlements.  
Exceptions were noted where users of the infrastructure paid for it via tolls 
and related fees, in which case pressure on the government budget was 
relieved. Regarding the hypothesis that PPPs result in better value for 
money, the study concluded that this was only the case where the 
efficiency gain derived from public sector participation were not 
ameliorated by the higher funding costs on projects. Pollit (2002) gave a 
cautionary approval of UK PPPs judging them to be successful for prisons 
and roads, but of questionable value for hospitals and schools. This study 
was consistent with the findings of Mott-Macdonald (2002) that reported 
UK PPPs on balance being delivered on time and on budget far more than 
with exclusively government run projects. The detractors of the merits of 
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UK PPPs include Pollock, Shaoul, and Vickers (2002) that argue that the 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has failed to fulfil its objectives in a wide 
range of services including roads, hospitals, prisons, and rail transportation 
infrastructure. 
Commentators in the USA, Bloomfield, Westerling, and Carey (1998) 
criticise PPPs in the Massachusetts prison system arguing that they were 
7.4% more expensive than conventional financing and that the purveyors 
of these arrangements understated the costs and risks to the state 
governments, whilst inflating the potential benefits. In a similar vein, Greve 
and Ejersbo (2003) observed PPPs in the Netherlands to result in higher 
taxes on citizens and higher debt levels for government institutions. In 
Australia, Walker and Walker (2000) argue that PPPs are a sleight of hand 
that impoverish the fiscus based on deceitful financial and accounting 
engineering. The authors also criticize the exorbitant profits made by 
private sector players on PPPs noting that the return on the Sydney M2 
Motorway was an exorbitant 24.4% for the private investors. 
More recent empirical research into PPPs also yields mixed results. Pollit 
(2005) established the popularity of this mode of infrastructure 
development in the UK, and notes that 15 – 20% of the UKs capital budget 
is raised through this mechanism annually. While criticisms include the 
lengthy and costly bidding process, together with the small number of 
bidders, the overall conclusion based on 5 case studies is overwhelmingly 
positive. In contrast Shaoul (2005) questions the rationale of the PFI 
contending that risks are not in fact transferred to the private sector, the 
value for money methodology appraisal is flawed and misleading, projects 
are distorted detrimentally when the PFI mechanism is applied, that the 
PPPS are exorbitantly expensive, and accountability is compromised. In 
the USA Boardman, Poschmann, and Vinning (2005) contend that PPPs 
are difficult to justify, as transaction costs relative to traditional 
infrastructure provision methods are difficult to quantify. In addition, the 
public sector lacks the management skills to administer PPPs, and there is 
an inherent bias against the discontinuance of unsuccessful projects by 
public sector officials. The authors note how private sector players are 
often more sophisticated in there arrangements to ensure they are fully 
compensated for their risk taking, including declaring bankruptcy, 
frequently resulting in losses that should have been fully borne by the 
private sector, also being shared with the state. 
Whilst the academic literature on PPPs in Sub-Saharan Africa is limited 
the benefits and challenges are consistent with those observed in other 
regions of the world, and difficulties tend to be more amplified by a poorer 
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and less equitable socio-economic setting. Farlam (2005) conducts a study 
of 8 case studies that are a representative sample of PPPs implemented in 
Sub-Saharan Africa over the decade spanning 1994 to 2004. The cases 
are extracted from South Africa, Mozambique, Uganda, Gabon, and 
Tanzania, and cover the transport, telecommunications, water and 
sanitation, power, and eco-tourism sectors. The outcome of this study 
reveals that PPPs are most successful where there is comprehensive 
planning, good communication, high levels of commitment from all parties, 
and effective monitoring, regulation, and enforcement by government. 
Because of their complexity, PPPs were observed to be more successful 
in the ports, telecommunications, transport, and eco-tourism sectors. 
Significant difficulties and challenges were noted in power and water 
projects. Advantages that were derived from successful PPPs included 
fiscal benefits, efficiency gains, increased private sector development, and 
development of local financial markets (Ogunbiyi, 2004). The failed PPPs 
owed their collapse to a combination of unscrupulous, predatory, and 
profiteering private sector participants, who were more astute in 
negotiating contractual terms that were in their favour, imbalanced and 
inequitable (Farlam, 2005).  
Miraftab (2004) makes similar findings regarding the negative aspects of 
PPPs in South Africa. The corrosive aspects of PPPs are however 
attributed to inequitable power sharing arrangements between private 
sector participants and welfare driven public sector institutions. Using the 
example of a housing subsidy PPP aimed at providing affordable housing 
for impoverished communities, Miraftab (2004) attributes a significant 
contributor to its failure (volumes and quality goals were not achieved) to 
corporate interests such as banks and construction companies shaping the 
agenda, leaving the poor and their representative organisations vulnerable 
and participating in processes already shaped by others. While technical 
planning and execution of PPPs is essential, these contracting 
arrangements are insufficient to address the power imbalance inherent in 
PPPs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Consequently particular attention must be 
paid to the social, economic, cultural, and political environment in which 
the PPP is being executed, and the state plays a critical role in mediating 
between community based groups, local authorities, and private sector 
developers. 
To conclude this section, the academic literature contains conflicting 
perspectives regarding the merits, criticisms, and cost and benefit 
implications of PPP arrangements. Whilst there is clarity on PPPs as an 
institutional and contractual arrangement leveraging the strengths of public 
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and private sector participants, the actual practice appears to result in 
outcomes that may not be equitable (Hart, 2003). More often than not this 
outcome is skewed to the benefit of private investors, and to the detriment 
of the public purse. The academic literature on PPP is limited in 
addressing the interests of the poor and power imbalances (Fiszbein and 
Lowden 1999; Bennet 1998). Its focus on forms of contracts and 
concessions misses an important determinant of successfully executed 
PPPs, specifically the incorporation of socio-economic, political and 
cultural considerations (Miraftab (2004).  
2.10 Africa's infrastructure deficit  
This section begins by highlighting the magnitude of the African 
infrastructure deficit by comparing a broad set of infrastructure 
development indicators between the continent and other regions of the 
world. This is followed by an assessment of the origins and causes of the 
infrastructure deficits. The World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report (Schwab and Martin, 2015) lists infrastructure as 
the second of twelve pillars by which countries achieve international 
competitiveness. Africa emerges as the least competitive global region, in 
significant part on account of a profound infrastructure deficit. In 
addressing the importance of the infrastructure pillar the authors of the 
report declare infrastructure to be a catalytic enabler by:  
 helping effective functioning of commerce; 
 being an important consideration in determining the location of 
economic activities; 
 reducing geographical distances and integrating, domestic, regional 
and international markets cost effectively; 
 reducing income inequalities and poverty; 
 facilitating access to those residing in marginalised and less developed 
communities; 
 supporting entrepreneurial activity by easing the provision of goods 
and services to markets; 
 allowing factories to function unimpeded by energy constraints; 
 facilitating the free flow and exchange of information; and 
 ultimately improving overall business efficiency. 
Table 2.9 shows a comparison of Africa’s infrastructure stock in low and 
middle-income countries, relative to other low and middle-income 
countries in the world. In the most regressive sectors, African low-income 
countries have only 26% of the paved roads, 7% of the equivalent internet 
density, and 12% of the generation capacity.  
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Table 2.9:  International Perspectives’ on Africa’s Infrastructure Deficit (Yepes et 
al., 2008) 
Normalised units 
African low-
income 
countries 
Other low-
income 
countries 
African 
middle-
income 
countries 
Other 
middle-
income 
countries 
Paved-road density 34 134 284 461 
Total road density 150 29 381 106 
Main-line density 9 38 142 252 
Mobile density 48 55 277 557 
Internet density 2 29 8.2 235 
Generation capacity 39 326 293 648 
Electricity coverage 14 41 37 88 
Improved water 61 72 82 91 
Improved sanitation 34 53 53 82 
Note: Road density is measured in kilometres per 100 square kilometres of arable land; telephone 
density in lines per thousand populations; generation capacity in megawatts per million populations; 
electricity, water and sanitation coverage in percentage of population. 
The picture is more favourable with African middle-income countries 
achieving proportionally 61% of paved roads, 3% Internet density (worse 
than the low income country gap), and 45% generation capacity, relative 
to the infrastructure stock of their other middle-income peers. The 
magnitude of the infrastructure gaps would have been more acute had a 
comparison been performed with developed high-income countries. The 
cost of infrastructure services depicted in Table 2.10 relative to other 
developing regions reveal the inefficiencies of the existing infrastructure 
stock. Power tariffs at their lowest are only 40% of the equivalent charged 
by other developing regions. This implies under-pricing and/or 
subsidisation of electricity in a number of African countries. At the other 
extreme, the highest power tariffs in Africa are 460% of the equivalent in 
other developing regions. This dichotomy may be partly attributable to 
inefficiencies in public sector providers of electricity, and the extensive use 
of standalone generators by retail and commercial consumers. 
Table 2.10:  Africa’s High Cost Infrastructure (Foster and Briceno-Garmendia, 2010) 
Sector Africa Other developing regions 
Power tariffs ($ per kilowatt-hour) 0.02-0.46 0.05-0.1 
Water tariffs ($ per cubic meter) 0.86-6.56 0.03-0.6 
Road freight tariffs ($ per ton-kilometre) 0.04-0.14 0.01-0.04 
Mobile telephony ($ per basket per month) 2.6-21.0 9.9 
International telephony ($ per 3-minute 
call to United States) 0.44-12.5 2.0 
Internet dial-up ($ per month) 6.7-148.0 11 
Note: Ranges reflect prices in different countries and various consumption levels. Prices for 
telephony and Internet represent all developing regions, including Africa. 
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Water tariffs are 2766% more expensive at the lower end and 993% 
dearer at the upper end of the comparison. Similarly, road freight (a proxy 
for logistic costs) is 400% more expensive on the lower end and 350% 
more costly on the upper end relative to other developing markets. These 
metrics reveal both the inadequacy of the current infrastructure stock, but 
also its relative inefficiency culminating in the brake it puts on socio-
economic development. 
The African infrastructure annual funding deficit has been estimated at 
approximately US$ 93 billion. This includes fresh capital expenditure 
together with on-going operation and maintenance requirements for both 
existing and newly commissioned infrastructure stock. Of this US$ 93 
billion, the most significant funding requirement is for investment in power 
generation and amounts to US$ 40.8 billion (43.7%). During a tour of 
Africa in June 2013, President Obama of the United States identified 
Africa’s power deficit as crippling to socio-economic development and 
pledged an amount of US$ 7 billion over a five-year period to contribute to 
remedying this deficiency (US Aid, 2013). The second largest requirement 
is in the water and sanitation space requiring 23% of the total funding 
requirements. Followed by transport (20%), ICT (10%), and irrigation (4%) 
respectively.  
Table 2.11:  Spending Needs for Sub-Saharan Africa US$ billions (Foster and 
Briceno-Garmendia, 2010) 
Infrastructure 
sector 
Capital 
expenditure 
Operation and 
maintenance Total spending 
ICT 7.0 2.0 9.0 
Irrigation 2.9 0.6 3.4 
Power 26.7 14.1 40.8 
Transport 8.8 9.4 18.2 
WSS 14.9 7.0 21.9 
Total 60.4 33.0 93.3 
While this funding gap may appear daunting, a detailed breakdown of how 
it can be resolved is more hopeful. In Table 12.12 the current capital 
expenditure by African countries already amounts to US$ 45.3 billion. 
Furthermore, significant efficiencies can be realised by targeted 
interventions in the existing infrastructure stock that could yield gains 
equivalent to US$17.4 billion per annum. The true funding gap therefore is 
a more manageable US$ 30.6 billion per annum.  
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Table 2.12:  Finding Resources: The Efficiency Gap and the Funding Gap (Foster 
and Briceno-Garmendia, 2010) 
Item Electricity ICT Irrigation Transport WSS 
Cross-
sector 
gain 
Total 
Infrastructure 
spending 
needs 
(40.8) (9.0) (3.4) (18.2) (21.9) n.a. (93.3) 
Existing 
spending 11.6 9.0 0.9 16.2 7.6 n.a. 45.3 
Efficiency gap 6.0 1.3 0.1 3.8 2.9 3.3 17.4 
Gain from 
raising capital 
execution 
0.2 0.0 0.1 1.3 0.2 n.a 1.9 
Gain from 
eliminating 
operational 
inefficiencies 
3.4 1.2 - 1.9 1.0 n.a. 7.5 
Gain from 
tariff cost 
recovery 
2.3 - - 0.6 1.8 n.a. 4.7 
Potential for 
reallocation n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.3 3.3 
Funding gap (23.2) 1.3 (2.4) 1.9 (11.4) 3.3 (30.6) 
Finally, the African continent registers stark differences across regions in 
terms of infrastructural scarcities. On a fundamental basis the SADC 
region appears to manifest a greater quantity and quality of infrastructure 
stock. The relatively low population densities in Southern Africa relative to 
East and West Africa may support this observation.  
Table 2.13:  Intraregional Perspectives’ on Africa’s Infrastructure Deficit (Foster 
and Briceno-Garmendia, 2010) 
Normalised units ECOWAS EAC SADC Central Middle Income 
Paved-road density 38 29 92 4 284 
Total road density 144 362 193 44 381 
Main-line density 28 6 80 13 142 
Mobile density 72 46 133 84 277 
Internet density 2 2 4 1 8.2 
Generation capacity 31 16 176 47 293 
Electricity coverage 18 6 24 21 37 
Improved water 63 71 68 53 82 
Improved sanitation 35 42 46 28 53 
Note: Road density is measured in kilometres per 100 square kilometres of arable land; telephone 
density in lines per thousand populations; generation capacity is megawatts per million populations; 
electricity, water and sanitation coverage in percentage of population. 
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Table 2.13 above shows the SADC region is followed comparatively by 
ECOWAS, then the EAC, and finally, the most infrastructures poor part of 
the continent appears to be Central Africa. Central Africa does reflect 
competitive infrastructure stock in the category of generation capacity, 
possibly on account of the hydroelectric capacity ensconced in mega 
developments such as the Grand Inga Project in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo. It is notable for all regions and in all infrastructure sectors, the 
level of infrastructure development is significantly below the equivalent 
stock for middle-income countries in the world. 
2.10.2  Causes of Africa’s infrastructure deficit  
There are four principal factors contributing to the infrastructure deficit in 
Africa since 1960. These are a low level of capital accumulation, the high 
price of infrastructure investments on the continent relative to other 
regions, low returns on investment, and geographical disadvantages 
(Ndulu et al 2005). Since 1960 African countries rate of capital 
accumulation has been significantly lower relative to other developing 
countries. The ratio of investment relative to gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 1985 stood at 9.5% for Africa relative to 15.6% in other 
developing countries. Using the revised and updated Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation (GFCF) as a percentage of GDP measure and comparing 
individual countries for the years 2011 and 2012, a number of 
observations can be made from Table 2.14. Firstly, GFCF appears to have 
increased significantly since 1985. However, America, Germany and 
Japan indicate GFCF equivalent to the most progressive African 
economies in spite of the fact that these countries have some of the most 
extensive and efficient infrastructure stock globally. This observation may 
indicate that the current investment levels of countries such as South 
Africa and India are insufficient to catch up with countries in the developed 
world. 
Table 2.14:  Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP) – (The World Bank, 2014) 
  2011 2012   2011 2012 
South Africa 18.97 19.16 United States 18.21 18.64 
Egypt 16.91 15.62 Japan 20.58 21.17 
Kenya 20.40 20.39 Germany 18.13 17.65 
Ethiopia 27.94 34.58 China 45.59 46.82 
Niger 34.68 38.90 India 30.63 29.59 
Mozambique 36.73 48.30 Brazil 19.28 18.14 
81 
China has the highest rate of GFCF of any of the listed countries at 
46.82% in 2012. This confirms our expectation on account of the 
infrastructure led growth that the government has purposefully driven.  
The high price of investments is the second reason for lower rates of 
GFCF. Ndulu et al (2005) estimate the price of executing an infrastructure 
projects in Africa to be 70% higher than in Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries, or in East Asia. The 
contend that if Africa had equivalent investments costs to the OECD and 
East Asia, this could have increased economic growth by 0.44 percentage 
points between 1960 and 1994. Some of the contributors to the high cost 
of investing include higher transport costs for capital goods, and that much 
of the capital equipment is imported. The third reason for comparatively 
lower GFCF is the low returns on investment. The lower returns may 
initially occur as a result of the higher investment costs explained above, 
and are further exacerbated by other factors. These include the poor 
quality and sequencing of investment choices, including pandering to 
white elephant projects. Another factor is the sub-optimal utilisation of 
existing capacity and lack of human capital such as engineering skills for 
complex capital investments (Ndulu et al 2005).  
The final reason for the lag in GFCF since 1960 relates to geographical 
disadvantages. Africa is fragmented into 54 countries, many of which are 
small, landlocked, and economically sub-scale. As a result, the continent 
as a whole and country regions within the continent do not harness the 
economies of scale that could arise from massive cross country and 
regional infrastructure investment opportunities. Compounding this 
difficulty is the fact that countries have opted to act unilaterally in the 
development of infrastructure undermining harmonising infrastructure 
standards and protocols. 40% of sub-Saharan Africa resides in landlocked 
countries where transport costs are 50% higher and trade volume 60% 
lower (Ndulu et al 2005). Population densities in Africa are relatively lower 
than other regions of the world, and the majority of the population resides 
in rural areas. The geographical isolation of many sub-Saharan African 
countries from large markets in Asia, the Americas and Europe has the 
impact of curtailing commercial opportunities (Limao and Venables 2000). 
Whilst this geographical disability can be largely compensated for by way 
of connecting infrastructure, this is exactly the challenge the continent 
faces. Africa not only faces challenges regarding external networks, but 
also internal intercountry networks. This makes it difficult for African 
countries to trade within the continent and amongst one another. 
Transport costs of intra-regional trade amount to US$ 7,600 for Sub-
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Saharan Africa whilst the equivalent for Latin America and the Caribbean 
is US$ 4,600, and East Asia is below US$ 4,000 (Ndulu et al 2005). The 
final geographical disadvantage relates to the burden of tropical diseases 
such as malaria that have a degrading effect on life expectancy and strip 
away at the rate of accumulation of human capital.  
The above observations capture the reasons for the lag in GFCF in Sub-
Saharan Africa. They are compounded by a colonial legacy where 
infrastructure was focused on an extractive and commodity driven 
economic model that neglected beneficiation of raw materials, and inter 
country connectivity. Post colonial instability in many African countries 
further compounded inadequate investment in infrastructure and the 
establishment of institutions and a regulatory framework that would foster 
GFCF. The consequence of these significant infrastructure deficits is to 
aggravate key socio-economic challenges the continent faces. These 
include the high levels of poverty, poor healthcare, inadequate water and 
sanitation, severe electricity shortages, low productivity in agriculture, sub-
standard education facilities, unemployment, and overall development. 
2.11 Conclusion  
The literature review in this chapter can be classified into three broad 
sections. The first part examined the major theories relating to the 
formulation of capital structure. The second part considered the role of 
agency theory both in the determination of capital structure, and in the 
design and management of contracts between a firm and third party 
suppliers. The third part of the literature considered the structure and 
limited theoretical underpinnings of project and infrastructure finance 
(including PPPs) as a segment of the broader financial, economic, and 
organisational literature. It concluded with summarising the key 
infrastructure gaps on the African continent, together with the funding that 
would be required to address them. 
The review has raised at least two important gaps in the literature. The first 
is the relatively limited research in the formulation of capital structure in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, including the applicability and prevalence of the static 
trade-off and pecking order theories. Implicit in this observation is the 
limited examination of what these theories predict versus the actions of 
firms and practitioners in practice. This deficit is acute in the area of project 
and infrastructure finance where very little research has been done as to 
the qualitative and quantative factors that inform the capital structure 
decisions in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. It is important to 
accrue more knowledge in this respect as project and infrastructure 
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finance is expected to play a significant role in the rectification of the 
infrastructure deficiencies on the continent.  The literature also appears to 
be lacking in regarding agency considerations within capital providers in 
project and infrastructure finance i.e. how does agency theory influence 
the capital structure and related arrangements in the interactions within 
sponsor consortiums and within lending consortiums. The existing 
literature largely treats equity providers and debt providers as two 
monolithic groups with little variation within each. Understanding how 
differences between sponsor and equity consortiums would allow useful 
insights as to optimal capital structure formulation in project finance. These 
differences and how they are addressed seem essential to successful 
capital structure formulation in project finance, and achieving financial 
closure. Importantly, it would be valuable to ascertain as to the degree to 
which capital structure may be more influenced by agency theory as 
opposed to mainstream capital structure theorems. 
The second gap in the literature relates to how different legal, economic, 
social, and business contexts in the host countries may significantly affect 
the capital structure of projects. This is particularly important because the 
assumptions that inform the main capital structure theories are 
questionable in the developed world, and potentially entirely detached from 
reality in countries such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and to a lesser 
degree South Africa.  Obtaining qualitative and deductive reasoning that 
incorporates the highly divergent business environments in these countries 
enables a deeper, authentic, and more comprehensive understanding of 
capital structure formulation. 
The third gap in the literature relates to the limited examination of the risk 
management, contracting, and governance arrangements on projects in 
South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. In this respect an enquiry into 
these issues using the lens of stakeholder theory and stakeholder agency 
theory, has the potential to yield important knowledge on the interactions 
between participants. The study will be able to assess the degree to which 
stakeholder theory is applicable, which strain of stakeholder theory has 
most resonance, and why this is the case. This is a potentially profound 
way of understanding holistically participant interactions. There is little 
analysis of these dynamics within the academic literature for projects in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. An analysis and understanding of these interactions 
would shed light as to how power is distributed across stakeholders, how 
risk is managed, the degree of corporate social responsibility, and how 
these arrangements differ from accepted project finance norms. This 
knowledge is expected to inform recommendations as to how to most 
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optimally design and manage contractual arrangements and stakeholder 
interactions, and to resolve conflicts of interests and disputes. Consistent 
with the capital structure gaps noted above, the degree to which 
stakeholder arrangements have been influenced by the different legal, 
political, economic, and contextual environment appears to be insufficiently 
researched. This research should yield important qualitative insights on 
stakeholder management. 
A thesis that addresses the gaps in the literature detailed above will make 
an important contribution to bridging the gap between theories on capital 
structure and agency, that are rendered less relevant because the 
assumptions underpinning them are divorced from the reality of the socio-
economic situations in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The 
main country specific explanatory and qualitative factors that inform the 
determination of capital structure and stakeholder arrangements in project 
and infrastructure finance will be extracted from a range of practitioners. 
This knowledge should arm academics and other project and infrastructure 
finance practitioners with better understanding, decision-making tools, and 
a clearer paradigm to view such transactions. This can enhance the 
execution of project and infrastructure finance in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
contribute towards alleviating the massive socio-economic deficiencies 
highlighted in the introduction. 
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3 Research Methodology  
3.1 Overview 
The objective of the research is to extend the existing theory on project 
and infrastructure finance by investigating qualitative aspects of successful 
and failed transactions using the case study method. Explaining 
multifaceted phenomena including capital structure, governance 
arrangements and performance based contracting, risk management, and 
sustainability requires applying multiple theories connected with a 
common framework. Current frameworks are largely inadequate in 
capturing in a holistic manner these complex phenomena and how they 
interact with one another. This study applies an eclectic approach whereby 
the case study method enables complex and wide ranging data to be 
captured, and for this information to be analysed through the prisms of 
capital structure and agency theories. This approach enables holistic 
analytical framework that captures the variation, complexity, and breadth 
of project and infrastructure transactions. 
Research types can be classified in accordance with the objective of the 
research, that is, is the research exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory in 
nature. An exploratory study is useful in seeking new insights and 
determining what is actually occurring. Descriptive research seeks to 
portray an accurate profile of persons, events or situations. Explanatory 
research attempt to establish causal relationships between variables by 
analysing a situation or problem (Saunders et al. 2009). Research can 
also be categorised into the two broad categories of quantative and 
qualitative research based on the data collection techniques and analysis 
procedures (Saunders et al. 2009). Quantative research techniques 
include methods of collecting data through questionnaires, established 
and reputable databases, or other methods that generate or use numerical 
data. This method emphasises quantification in the collation and analysis 
of data and a deductive approach in the relationship between theory and 
research. Social reality is viewed as an external and objective reality 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007). Qualitative research produces findings that are 
not arrived at using solely quantification and statistical procedures 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). This may include interviews, observation, and 
analysis of numeric data and non-numeric. The emphasis on qualitative 
research is on words rather than quantification in the analysis of data, and 
an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and research. 
The distinction between quantative and qualitative research in terms of the 
role of theory, epistemological issues and ontological concerns is not hard 
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and fast, and both categories can be effectively combined within a single 
research project (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
An important and growing criticism of academic research in economics in 
particular, but implicitly across business and finance, is a growing 
disconnect observed between theory and practice. This is particularly the 
case where theory needs to incorporate significant levels of human 
behaviour. Critics argue that whilst the theories and models espoused by 
academia offer neat, precise and predictable actions and outcomes, at 
times the unrealistic underlying assumptions that seek to make these 
theories overarching in nature, render them almost entirely detached from 
reality (Stiglitz, 2001). In a critique of the failure of academia to predict the 
international financial crisis and its impact that commenced in 2007, 
Colander et al (2009) contend that, 
"The economics profession appears to have been unaware of the long 
build-up to the current worldwide financial crisis and to have significantly 
underestimated its dimensions once it started to unfold. In our view, this 
lack of understanding is due to a misallocation of research efforts in 
economics. We trace the deeper roots of this failure to the profession's 
focus on models that, by design, disregard key elements driving outcomes 
in real-world markets. The economics profession has failed in 
communicating the limitations, weaknesses, and even dangers of its 
preferred models to the public. This state of affairs makes clear the need 
for a major reorientation of focus in the research economists undertake, as 
well as for the establishment of an ethical code that would ask economists 
to understand and communicate the limitations and potential misuses of 
their models." 
This disconnect between theory and practice has serious implications. 
Academic research that is perceived to be divorced from practice may 
continue to enjoy attention in academia, but is likely to be ignored or given 
short shrift in circles beyond. This includes an erosion of influence 
amongst practitioners in the respective fields, regulators, policy makers, 
and other important stakeholders. It is submitted that research that is more 
grounded in practice, with fewer and less exotic assumptions, my have 
lower prospects for universal applicability, but would have more resonance 
to a broader range of stakeholders on account of its more realistic 
assumptions and limitations, and authenticity and rootedness in the actual 
decisions of economic participants. The drive towards mathematical 
modelling in financial and economic research is in part motivated by a 
valid effort to instil rigor and testability to the theories, and to “prove” the 
underlying hypotheses. But a side effect of this mathematically modelled 
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approach has been to suggest financial and economic phenomena are 
binary, mechanical, and dualistic, and can be captured and expressed in 
formulas’. While this may be possible to achieve in the natural sciences 
such as physics and chemistry, mathematical congruency in the financial 
and economic sciences is arguably a more challenging proposition. 
In choosing an appropriate methodology for this thesis, the author is 
acutely aware of the valid concerns regarding the disconnect between 
practice and academia. This is amplified by the observation that many 
underlying assumptions in the existing theories are founded on American, 
European, and northern hemisphere conditions. If they are questionable in 
the markets they are founded in, how much more questionable in markets 
in Sub-Saharan Africa where the contextual issues are very different and 
arguably extremely important? 
This chapter on methodology begins by explaining the suitability of the 
qualitative research approach and introduces the case method. This is 
followed by an explanation of how the seven case studies were selected 
and how the cases were constructed and the data analysed. A discussion 
on measures taken to ensure the validity and reliability of data and the 
limitations of the study conclude the section on methodology. 
3.2 The Suitability of a Qualitative Research Approach 
According to Patton (1990): 
“There are no formulas for determining significance [in qualitative 
research]. There are no ways of perfectly replicating the researcher’s 
analytical thought processes. There are no straightforward tests for 
reliability and validity. In short, there are no absolute rules except to do the 
very best with your full intellect to fairly represent the data and 
communicate what the data reveal given the purpose of the study” (p. 
372).  
Qualitative research allows for the blending of a combination of research 
disciplines and theories encompassing a range of academic traditions 
including interpretivism, constructivism, cultural studies and critical theory 
(Chase, 2005). Bogdan and Bilken (2007) summarise the features 
associated with qualitative research as firstly exploring phenomena in a 
particular contextual setting. The emphasis on the contextual setting 
implies that human behaviour and decisions are strongly influenced by the 
context in which they are made, and this context is therefore essential in 
obtaining valid knowledge and understanding. In addition, practitioners 
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and stakeholders participating in the same phenomena may hold different 
views on the same observation or subject matter, and the importance of 
divergent and subjective views must be recognised and explored. Such a 
receptive approach to potentially conflicting perspectives allows a 
researcher to reflect and interpret the subject matter and phenomena 
based on the totality of the frequently divergent subject views collated. On 
account of the latter point qualitative research tends to be inductive in 
nature, with conclusions being arrived at after the weaving together of 
interconnected but contrasting pieces of data and evidence that contribute 
to a final conclusion. Qualitative research is also defined by its thick and 
comprehensive description of the underlying subject matter. This permits 
the utilisation of extensive forms of data to illustrate the observations 
including tables, illustrative charts, photographs, and pictures that enable 
a dense account of the phenomena (Bogdan and Bilken 2007). 
Qualitative research by way of case studies on the seven projects selected 
is appropriate on account of the fact that the projects take place in three 
distinct countries with contextually unique attributes, which have a marked 
impact on how each of the projects is arranged. Secondly, each project 
occurs at a particular point in time with a unique set of political, economic, 
and social balance of forces that strongly influence the project dynamics. 
Thirdly the variety and number of stakeholders in each project make for a 
divergent array of viewpoints regarding the qualitative arrangements in the 
project, and provide a rich source of data to analyse, understand, and 
develop theory on each individual project, and also broader theoretical 
generalisations. Finally, the fleet of projects selected allow the researcher 
to conduct an in depth study of each case and its particular circumstances 
in a real life context and over a period extending a number of years. 
3.3 An Introduction to the Case Study Method 
Eisenhardt (1989) defines the case study as a research strategy that 
centres on understanding the underlying forces present within single 
settings. Case studies as a research method move from the fundamental 
basis that new knowledge, theory, and concepts can be derived through 
an inductive process by analysing a compartmentalised occurrence or 
phenomenon. Often the case study is rich in qualitative and empirical data, 
and suitable for in depth analysis and scrutiny (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007). 
Researchers have used case studies extensively in finance and 
commerce to cover strategy, organisational change, mergers and 
acquisitions, product development, and project finance. Case studies have 
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also been used widely in other disciplines including medicine, psychology, 
sociology, anthropology and education (Rule and John, 2011). Case 
studies differ structurally from surveys and these dissimilarities are 
captured in Table 3.1 below. 
The case study research method can result in the generation of the most 
interesting academic research regarding the building of theory, and case 
studies are one of the most extensively cited papers in the Academy of 
Management Journal with impact disproportionate to their numbers 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
Table 3.1:  Comparison of case study and survey approaches (Rule and John, 
2011) 
Case Study Survey 
Intensive Extensive 
Depth Breadth 
Focuses on single instance Focuses on representative sample 
Usually qualitative but can combine 
qualitative and quantitative data and 
methods of analysis.  
Usually quantitative 
A reason why case studies are particularly effective is that unlike 
laboratory experiments where the testing is conducted in a defined control 
environment, case studies are contextualised within a unique ‘real world’ 
environment that encompasses many different aspects from one case 
study to another.  
The compartmentalised nature of a case study allows for an issue to be 
explored and examined within manageable parameters and confines 
culminating in insights that are rich and relevant in revealing the 
underlying research subject. Furthermore, because case studies utilise 
empirical data, the outcome of research using case studies allows theory 
to be developed that is both testable and valid (Eisenhardt, 1989). This 
ability to extrapolate lessons from cases to similar research subjects 
provides a good framework for generating theory that is generally 
applicable and transferable to alternate situations (Rule and John, 2011).  
The case study method also allowed the researcher to apply multiple 
theories within a single overarching framework. Specifically, the 
researcher incorporated capital structure, stakeholder and agency theories 
within each case. This was a critical part of the research formulation as it 
enabled different phenomena to be analysed discretely par case. In some 
instances where there were interconnections between phenomena, and in 
other areas where there were no or limited interconnections. The 
application of these theories under a unified case study enables the 
analysis and interpretation of multiple phenomena. Most importantly the 
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application of multiple theories within each case facilitated a pragmatic 
approach to exploring and explaining actions, events, and outcomes, in a 
manner congruent with the objective reality of the actors party to these 
projects. This helped address the critique that academic research in 
economics, finance and business, is frequently detached from reality, and 
as such of questionable relevance. 
Detractors to the case study approach site two potential disadvantages. 
The first argument posits that the case study approach is often specific to 
a particular set of circumstances i.e. the research subject itself, and the 
conclusions derived cannot be applied in other conditions. As a result, the 
theory that is generated from a case study may be idiosyncratic and 
lacking in general applicability. Secondly, some of the outcomes of case 
study research have resulted in deep and detailed observations and 
intricate theories and concepts. The complexity of the theories generated 
however mean that they lose the potency of overarching and accessible 
theoretical concepts, and the ease of general application in the respective 
field is as a result compromised (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Table 3.2 below captures the case study process adopted to ensure a 
robust research process. The only divergence from the process below 
related to the fact that there was a single researcher as compared to a 
research team.  
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Table 3.2:  Process of Building Theory from Case Study Research (Eisenhardt, 
1989) 
Step Activity Reason 
Getting Started 
Definition of research question Focuses efforts 
Possibly a priori constructs 
 
Provides better grounding of 
construct measures 
Neither theory nor hypotheses Retain theoretical flexibility 
Selecting Cases 
Specified population Constrains extraneous variation 
and sharpens external validity 
Theoretical, not random, 
sampling 
Focuses efforts on theoretically 
useful cases – i.e., those that 
replicate or extend theory by 
filling conceptual categories 
Crafting 
Instruments and 
Protocols 
Multiple data collection 
methods 
Strengthens grounding of 
theory by triangulation of 
evidence 
Qualitative and quantitative 
data combined 
Synergistic view of evidence 
Multiple investigators Fosters divergent perspectives 
and strengthens grounding 
Entering the Field 
Overlap data collection and 
analysis, including field notes 
Speeds analyses and reveals 
helpful adjustments to data 
collection 
Flexible and opportunistic data 
collection methods 
Allows investigators to take 
advantage of emerging themes 
and unique case features 
Analysing Data 
Within-case analysis Gains familiarity with data and 
preliminary theory generation 
Cross-case pattern search 
using divergent techniques 
Forces investigators to look 
beyond initial impressions and 
see evidence thru multiple 
lenses 
Shaping 
Hypotheses 
Iterative tabulation of evidence 
for each construct 
Sharpens construct definition, 
validity and measurability 
Replication, not sampling, logic 
across cases 
Confirms, extends and 
sharpens theory 
Search evidence for “why” 
behind relationships 
Builds internal validity 
Enfolding 
Literature 
Comparison with conflicting 
literature 
Builds internal validity, raises 
theoretical level and sharpens 
construct definitions 
Comparison with similar 
literature 
Sharpens generalizability, 
improves construct definition 
and raises theoretical level 
Reaching Closure 
Theoretical saturation when 
possible 
Ends process when marginal 
improvement becomes small 
 
3.4 Case Selection 
The selection of a population takes a different form when building a theory 
from cases. Due to the depth of case study research, and the variety of 
cases that may be present, conducting representative statistical sampling 
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using a database with homogenous characteristics is frequently not 
possible or appropriate. Consequently, the sampling in case study 
research is informed by the degree to which each case can replicate or 
extend the existing theory, and provide a platform to address the research 
questions posed. Eisenhardt (1989) posits that case studies can be a good 
starting point for the development of theory and recommends that a cross-
case analysis consisting of a portfolio of four to ten case studies is likely to 
provide a sound basis for analytical generalisation. The use of multiple 
case studies is also useful in mitigating researcher bias and enhancing 
external validity as one of the criticisms frequently aimed at case studies is 
that the sample sizes are frequently small and the reliability of case study 
research is questionable. 
Each case was selected based on its suitability to contribute to the 
conceptualisation of a new or enhanced qualitative project finance model. 
Each case chosen had the attributes and potential to illustrate matters 
relating to the existing and emerging theory on project and infrastructure 
finance by way of an inductive process (Siggelkow, 2007). Theoretical 
sampling was selected as the most appropriate selection method on the 
basis that it allows for cases to be chosen that are likely to replicate or 
extend the emerging theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Only projects that had been completed and were fully operational or had 
totally failed were eligible for inclusion to enable the researcher to evaluate 
subsequent performance. Geographically case studies were restricted to 
South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe representing a nesting of case 
studies in the SADC. As a result, the case studies cover the period from 
1994 to 2012. In addition, a minimum transaction threshold of US$ 130 
million was applied. This enabled a focus on those transactions that are of 
sufficient scale and impact, so as to be transformational for the 
communities and areas in which they were executed. Table 3.3 lists the 
seven case studies selected with comprehensive accounts of each project 
in chapter four.  
Table 3.3:  Case Study Listing 
 Case Name 
Primary Cases Seacom Undersea Cable 
Gautrain Rapid Rail Link 
Kalkbult Solar Park 
Pebble Bed Modular Reactor 
Mozal Aluminium Smelter 
Sasol Natural Gas Project 
Chisumbanje Ethanol Plant 
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3.5 Case Construction and Data Analysis and 
Interpretation 
A sequential and exploratory approach in the drafting of each of each case 
study was followed. This is shown in Figure 3-1 below and elaborated on 
in the descriptive text that follows. 
 
Introduces and presents the cases i.e.   
7 selected infrastructure and project 
finance transactions. 
  
 
Provides a detailed narrative and/or 
thick description of each case regarding 
their policies, practices and structures 
related to learning 
  
 
Identifies patterns and generates 
themes relevant to organisational 
learning. Engages in processes of open, 
axial and selective coding and memo-
making 
  
 
Generates concepts, models or theories 
built on the themes and patterns 
emerging from the data.  
Figure 3-1: Case Study Execution (Rule and John, 2011) 
The exploratory approach was adopted on account of the fact that the 
qualitative research questions posed included ‘why’ and ‘what’ questions 
that prompted subjective responses from respondents. It was anticipated 
from the beginning that some of the insights from the case studies would 
not be extracted from hard data and metrics, but human behavioural 
patterns and motivations, ideally suitable for an exploratory approach. In a 
number of case studies more than a decade had passed since the project 
was commissioned and the research was undertaken that allowed an 
CASE OR CASES 
DETAILED NARRATIVE 
AND/OR DESCRIPTIVE 
PRESENTATION OF CASES 
ANALYSIS OF PATTERNS 
THEORY CONSTRUCTION 
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exploration of the project dynamics at commencement, and how these 
dynamics evolved with the passage of time.  
For each case constructed a sectoral contextualisation of the project was 
performed within both an international and country specific setting. This 
background allowed each project to be analysed taking into account global 
developments in the respective sector, and the country specific factors 
that informed the project’s conceptualisation. 
The project setting was then followed by a collation of objective data 
including numerical and descriptive inputs. This data was sourced from 
multiple sources that included audited annual reports, legal and 
contractual documentation, reputable industry journals, academic papers, 
the financial press, environmental impact and management documents, 
regulatory documentation, World Bank and International Finance 
Corporation databases, websites of related companies and bodies, 
published text books, and the Bloomberg data monitor. A large portion of 
the academic literature elaborated on the public policy, international 
relations, negotiation, international trade, human rights, politics, ethical, 
technical, and moral dimensions of the cases. While not addressing the 
core focus of this thesis, these contributions were rich in extracting 
quantitative and technical data. This information collation allowed the 
researcher to gather core objective data on each transaction including the 
deal size, project specifications, key legal arrangements, and sustainability 
imperatives. By using multiple sources, the veracity of the data was 
interrogated and accurate information compiled. The data collation 
exercise further gave insight into the major issues relating to each case, 
some of the significant challenges that were encountered, and measures 
implemented to address these. It also prompted numerous project specific 
questions that were qualitative in nature and were incorporated into the 
interview process.  
An analysis of the data obtained was then conducted with interpretations 
of the decisions made by the project stakeholders, and their motivations in 
coming to these decisions. This was particularly effective where credible 
information sources such as annual financial statements and original legal 
agreements were the source, and yielded information on a case over an 
extended time frame. The interpretation was comprehensively 
documented and cross-referenced to the objective data for veracity and 
reliability. 
The next stage of the research involved selecting different and 
independent practitioners involved in the project for semi-structured 
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interviews. Practitioners were selected because of their knowledge of 
particular parts of the project, and by interviewing commercial bank 
representatives, regulators, development finance institutions, sponsors, 
legal practitioners, sustainability officers, and other stakeholders, the 
author was able to obtain a holistic view of each case, with respondents 
having different motives and imperatives on the same project. A total of 40 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with 7 of these interviews 
applicable to more than one case study. The specific identity of each 
respondent was purposefully with held in the thesis but the supervisor and 
examiner were furnished with these details.  An interview protocol was 
applied to each case as elaborated on in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4:  Case Study Execution (Davis 2003) 
 Author’s Project Finance Interview Protocol 
1. Description of project, including type, location, size and other specifications 
2. Reason for project and sponsors’ needs 
3. How project participants were assembled 
4. Legal structure of project entity, including a diagram of project structure 
5. Analysis of project risks and economic viability 
6. Most important project contracts and principal provisions 
7. Alternative sources of finance considered 
8. Structure of financing 
9. 
Pricing, maturity and other financing terms, including guarantees and other 
third-party sources of support; insurance, collateral, and other forms of 
protection; and important features of financing documentation 
10. Credit analysis from the investors’ and lenders’ perspectives 
11. Principal problems encountered with project and financing 
12. Investors’ and lenders’ concerns before and since 
13. Most innovative features of the project 
14. Most important lessons learned 
15. How the project illustrates current regional and country trends 
In a semi-structured interview process, probing questions relating to 
qualitative aspects of each case were posed, followed up on, and 
confirmed. In this respect the data collation performed earlier meant that 
there were rarely differences regarding the objective attributes of a case 
e.g. deal size, and the questions could focus on the ‘why’ regarding the 
project arrangements, and solicit insight as to the reason for arranging the 
transaction in the manner that it was. Respondents were also examined as 
to how they would alter the arrangements in each project with the benefit 
of hindsight, and how they forecast future projects evolving. 
The interviews were held in person and recorded electronically. On 
completion each recorded interview was professionally transcribed. A few 
exceptions were noted including four respondents in Cape Town, Maputo, 
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and Harare where the interviews were conducted telephonically. In 
addition, two of the interviews conducted in Zimbabwe relating to the 
Chisumbanje Ethanol plant were recorded by way of note taking on 
account of the heightened sensitivity relating to the project, and to address 
identification and privacy concerns of respondents. One interview on the 
Gautrain Rapid Rail Link had a combination of written and audio recorded 
record taking. When all the interviews for each respective case had been 
completed they were printed out and analysed. Thematic features across 
interviews were identified and drafted for each case study. The case 
studies collated responses to the semi-structured interviews, and 
integrated these insights with the data collated on each case prior to the 
interviews having taken place. To capture both the letter and spirit of the 
respondent contributions, the cases weave together in a coherent manner 
the responses of interviewees, making detailed use of their actual 
terminology in quotations and interpreting these contributions in the 
overarching project context. Each case study concludes by summarising 
the lessons, insights, and replicable considerations. 
3.6 Validity and Reliability 
The reliability and validity of data is critical in ensuring the veracity of the 
research. Internal validity in the cases and throughout the research 
assignment was achieved by the incorporation of multiple interview 
sources and perspectives. These interviews were prefaced by the 
extensive use of hard data sources such as audited annual financial 
statements detailed below.  
Construct validity was achieved by selecting the key focus of the research 
effort in advance. Specifically, the research focused on the capital 
structure, governance/legal arrangements, risk management, and 
sustainability arrangements of each case study. The construct validity was 
embedded by way of an interview protocol illustrated in Table 3.4 that 
directed and channelled the research effort into the four main 
considerations noted above. A clear chain of evidence based on pre-
interview data collated and respondent interview data was then 
constructed and drafted into individual case studies allowing the reader to 
follow how the researcher progressed from the original research questions 
to the final conclusions (Yin 1994). A multi-layered form of triangulation 
was then applied to ensure the internal validity of data and consistency on 
terms of the data collated and the conclusions arrived at.  
Figure 3.2 below illustrates a framework for achieving methodological 
rigour in case studies embedded in four primary constructs. These are the 
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internal validity, construct validity, external validity and reliability. External 
validity for inductive and exploratory case studies requires that the 
research findings can be generally applied to other similar cases. Due to 
the fact that theoretical sampling techniques are applied extensively in the 
selection of case studies, this does not allow for the statistically 
representative conclusions to be arrived at. Yin (1994) argues that case 
studies can however result in analytical generalisations that are applicable 
to other settings based on the conversion of empirical observations to 
theory. The thesis specifically differentiated between empirical 
observations that were specific to each case and those that had more 
general application. Each case study concludes with a ‘Learning 
Summary’ unique to the respective project. The thesis then extracts the 
general conclusions from all the cases and captures these into a model 
that can be applied beyond the collection of cases collated. Reliability 
concerns were addressed by a structured and detailed methodology for 
collating evidence. All external reports and documents were filed per each 
case study for easy access and retrieval. This database included 
applicable case study notes, plans, and changes in approach. In addition, 
a case study protocol was applied to ensure consistency in thematic 
approach, focus and content across the seven case studies. These 
measures allow for transparency in how the case study was compiled and 
provide a database where empirical data can be retrieved.  
Broadly speaking two sets of data were obtained. The first set relates to 
‘hard data’. This data consists of hard statistical attributes of each project 
including the deal size, sponsors, investors, debt/equity ratios and 
fundamental deal attributes. Much of this data was accessible from 
audited annual reports, legal and contractual documentation, reputable 
industry journals, academic papers, the financial press, environmental 
impact and management documents, regulatory documentation, World 
Bank and International Finance Corporation databases, websites of 
related companies and bodies, published text books, and the Bloomberg 
data monitor.  
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  Figure 3-2: Fram
ework for an Investigation of the M
ethodological Rigor of Case Studies (Gibbert et al., 2008) 
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On case studies that had been funded using public funds e.g. Gautrain 
and the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor, a rich vein of data was already in 
the public domain due to South African statutory prescriptions on access 
to public finance information. These statutory sources included audited 
annual financial statements and reports, public consultation processes, 
and funding allocations from the national treasury. The hard data was then 
corroborated by different stakeholders as part of the interview sessions.  
The qualitative data aspects were largely extracted by way of the semi-
structured interview process. A detailed process of researching and 
collating information on each case study was conducted prior to the 
interview sessions. During the interview sessions the researcher assessed 
responses to identify discrepancies and alignments where applicable 
between the preliminary research and the respondent feedback. These 
inputs were cross-referenced and analysed for consistency, and where 
required, follow up enquiries were conducted to remedy matters that were 
factually divergent. The probing interviews also prompted qualitative 
insights from respondents, and encouraged participants to identify and 
rank qualitative observations. 
This multi layered method of triangulation involving objective external data, 
and key inputs of stakeholders that were party to each transaction ensured 
the validity, accuracy and completeness of the data. Figure 3-2 illustrates 
this process of triangulation. The ‘source’ triangle addresses the multiple 
sources of objective and qualitative data gathered above in the form of 
documentary and specialist practitioner inputs. The ‘method’ triangle 
exemplifies how the interview process was complemented by the 
accessing and extraction of pertinent data, using relevant information 
repositories. 
 
Figure 3-3: Forms of Triangulation in Case Study Research (Rule and Hohn, 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source A 
Source B 
Method A 
Case study Case study 
Source C Method B Method C 
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3.7 Limitations to Study 
The biggest limitation to this study is that the cases selected represent 
only three countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. They are extremely valuable in 
the formulation of a qualitative theory for Southern Africa. However, their 
applicability in East, West, and Central Africa is by inference, and derived 
from the fact that many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa share a range of 
similar and overlapping socio-economic and development indicators. The 
second limitation is that the study covers projects that span a period from 
1994 to 2012. This limited historical record of project finance in the 
selected countries is largely attributable to political instability including civil 
wars and economic sanctions that have limited the number of legacy 
infrastructure and project finance ventures. Furthermore, the case studies 
were conducted during a specific window period in 2014/2015 and details 
of the evolution of each project from conceptualisation to date are 
potentially diluted due to the passage of time. The academic literature 
contains varied definitions of project success and failure. Practitioners 
appear to agree that key considerations of success hinge upon whether 
the project is completed within budget, once commissioned operates in 
accordance with its engineering and design specifications, and whether 
the project commissioned within the time frame set. Flyvbjerg (2014) 
highlights the challenges in large-scale projects across the globe noting 
that nine out of ten incur cost overruns in excess of 50%, projects regularly 
achieve shortfalls in promised benefits of 50%, and timely completion is a 
rare and exceptional occurrence. This definition of success by Flyvbjerg 
(2014) may be inadequate in capturing qualitative arrangements such as 
socio-economic and the environmental impact of a project. A final 
limitation for consideration is that project finance stakeholders often have 
information that they consider proprietary in nature. As a result, such 
knowledge may not be disclosed in the probing interviews, thinning some 
of the potential insights.  
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4 The Case Studies 
This chapter captures details pertaining to the 7 case studies that are the 
basis of the thesis. Four of the cases are located in South Africa, two in 
Mozambique, and one in Zimbabwe. The cases are clustered according to 
their countries of origin. Each case is introduced by way of a ‘Fact Sheet’ 
that captures the key details of the project. This includes the project 
description and details of the developers, EPC and related contractors, 
sources of capital, key shareholders, and the project objective. 
Each case is then documented utilising information obtained from 
interviewees, financial statements, corporate documentation, and related 
reports as explained in the methodology in chapter 2. The information is 
organised in the following format to enable a coherent collation. A brief 
background of each case is given, followed by an examination of the 
financial structure, including ownership and how the financing for the 
project was arranged. A consideration is made of the key risks relating to 
the project and how these were mitigated in the project arrangements. The 
governance, institutional, and legal arrangements pertaining to the project 
are identified and considered in enabling the project to proceed. Each 
case then concludes with a summary of the lessons learned. 
After each cluster of cases in South Africa and Mozambique a country 
cluster comparison is performed whereby key common attributes within 
each case are compared, highlighting in-country differences and 
similarities, and capturing key developments subsequent to project 
commissioning such as refinancing, brownfields expansions, and changes 
in the risk environment.  
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South Africa Cluster 
4.1 The Seacom Undersea Cable 
FACT SHEET (Seacom, 2014) 
Project 
Description 
 1.28 TB high capacity submarine fiber optic cable system 
 Linking Africa and Asia to Europe via the Middle East 
 Total route of 17 000 km with the undersea portion exceeding 13 
500 km 
 Majority African ownership of project 
Key 
Personnel 
 Brian Herlihy – CEO 
 Jean-Louis Parmentier – COO 
 Craig Wilson – CFO 
 Christophe Albert – Construction Manager 
 Greg Meneses – General Counsel 
Contractors  Tyco Telecommunications – construction 
 Tata Communications Transformation Services – outsource 
network administration, operations and maintenance 
Objectives  Deliver infrastructure support for the growth of the ICT sector, in 
particular Business Process Outsourcing, call centers, 
pharmaceutical research industries and education networks 
 Complement GSM and fixed line national carriers 
 Facilitate the development of high volume, low cost market 
encouraging industries to emerge, stimulating further demand 
 Enhance greater regional co-operation 
 Structured to align to the spirit of NEPAD, the Kigali protocol and 
the policy objectives of governments 
 Committed to principles of open and equitable access to 
broadband 
Funding and 
Shareholders 
 Fully funded (November 2007) – US$ 300 million (Total project 
value US$ 600 million) 
 Project debt provided by Nedbank Capital and Investec Bank 
 76.25% African owned. Remaining 23.75% is held by Herakles 
Telecom LLC (Project developers) 
 African equity portion made up as follows: 
¾ Industrial Promotion Services (26.25%), an arm of the Aga 
Khan Fund for Economic Development 
¾ Venfin Limited (subsequently Remgro) (25%) 
¾ Convergence Partners (12.5%) 
¾ Shanduka/ Sanlam Private Equity (12.5%) 
Products and 
Services 
 Open access to all service providers with capacity provided on 
protected Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH) transmission 
electronics 
 Connecting to PoPs anywhere in the world through partnership 
relationships 
 Customised solutions including internet and global onward 
connectivity for voice and private line services 
 Backhaul solutions to Nairobi, Kampala, Kigali and Johannesburg. 
Working with landlocked countries to ensure that inland networks 
are built 
 SEACOM offers two types of services: 
¾ Indefeasible Rights of Use (IRU) – Bandwidth ownership for the 
life of the cable 
¾ International Private Leased Circuit (IPLC) – Short term needs 
for bandwidth (< 5 years) 
 Number of employees: 110 (2014) 
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4.1.1  Background 
Access to international fiber optic connectivity has historically been 
characterised by entrenched developed and developing world disparities. 
In 2007, 32 of the world’s 53 poorest countries had no access to 
international fiber optic connectivity representing an unserved population 
of 461 million. This gap in connectivity was attributable to the lack of 
economic viability in setting up undersea cables to service these markets. 
As a result satellites serviced many African countries international 
telecommunications requirements. Some of the drawbacks of the satellite 
offering included the low bandwidth capacity, and extremely high unit 
costs that resulted in usage being largely restricted to voice traffic 
originating from fixed line networks (Ruddy, 2007). 
Three factors have coalesced to enable investment in economically viable 
sub-marine cables in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. The first was the 
explosive growth of mobile telephony and internet usage in Africa. As of 
the end of 2011 Africa had almost 650 million active mobile telephone 
accounts. Average mobile telephony growth rates of 41% in Africa are 
surpassed only by those of 67% in South Asia (Yonazi et al, 2012). The 
other two factors are the emergence of increased investor appetite on the 
African continent, coupled with the greater access to capital this implies. 
Investment in fiber optic cables on the continent was estimated at US$ 
953 million between 1988 and 2008. The comparative figure for the period 
spanning 2009 to 2012 is US$ 2.9 billion (Terabit Consulting, 2013). 
Challenges however still remain including connecting landlocked countries 
with a comprehensive and cost effective terrestrial back haul network. 
Seacom was the first undersea fiber optic cable connecting Southern and 
Eastern Africa to Europe and Asia. The cable has a 1.28 Tb/s capacity 
and runs for 17 000 kilometres (13 500 kilometres being the undersea 
portion) from Mtunzini in South Africa and progresses to Mozambique, 
Madagascar, Tanzania, Kenya and Djibouti linking to India, the Middle 
East and Europe. Seacom is an open access platform offering data and 
voice global connectivity solutions aimed at linking businesses, individuals 
and communities. Its independence is underlined by the fact that the 
project company and its sponsors are not telecommunications providers.  
4.1.2  Financial structure 
Ownership structure 
 
The ownership structure of Seacom is made up of 5 investors. The 
promoter, project developer, and conceptualiser of Seacom, is New York 
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based Herakles Telecom LLC (Herakles) with a 25% stake. Herakles has 
extensive expertise in the development of international infrastructure, 
technical expertise, and project finance and in emerging markets, and is 
the only non-African shareholder. A second tranche of investors is made 
up of South African private equity and investment firms, namely, 
Convergence Partners (12.5%), Remgro (25%) and Shanduka and 
Sanlam Private Equity with a joint stake of 12.5%. To varying degrees 
these companies have exposure and/or expertise in the 
telecommunications sector. The final investor is Industrial Promotion 
Services (26.25%), which is an international development agency that has 
invested in over 50 industrial project companies in Africa and Asia. One of 
the fundamental principles in the conceptualisation of Seacom was that it 
be Africa owned. In this respect more than 76% of the shares are held by 
African entities. 
A key feature of the Seacom project is its conceptualisation as an 
independently owned private initiative. This was in contrast to the 
dominant carrier led consortiums in the sector. The private initiative 
arrangement came with a number of advantages. Firstly, a consortium 
arrangement generally has more participants involved. Whilst this usually 
means the capital contribution required of each party is reduced, it also 
dilutes profit/dividend distributions. A consortium arrangement may also 
slow down the decision making process due to the number of players 
involved. Assuming 10 representatives in a consortium arrangement, “you 
get ten people sitting around a table…you’ve got to get them to make 
decisions, you’ve got to run through ten different EXCO’s and Boards to 
get a decision”. Compounding slower decision making in a consortium 
arrangement are the administrative and logistical costs to enable the 
consortium to interact and function optimally. As consortiums are often 
multi-national in their constitution “you have to fly them to that table” and 
fund all the logistical matters related to these interactions. The downside 
to the fewer participants in a private initiative is the elevated risk exposure 
due to each party contributing comparatively more capital. The benefits of 
overall coherence and enhanced capacity to effectively and efficiently co-
ordinate the project exceed the elevated risk exposure. 
How the financing was arranged 
 
The Seacom project faced a number of hurdles in raising the requisite 
capital. The immediate challenge was the ‘first dollar’ dilemma that 
describes a scenario where potential capital providers refrain from 
committing the first capita tranche as they are waiting for other investors to 
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first commit capital, and signal the viability of the project. Seacom also 
encountered investor hesitance after the bursting of the dot com bubble in 
2001, the perceived higher risks of investing in sub-Saharan Africa, and 
the complexity of the project which required the co-operation and 
participation of at least 9 African states and 5 international partner nations. 
Significantly, an important part of the business case was that Seacom 
would be first to market, and this required capital to be raised speedily.  
 
Financial closure on the project was also threatened by the escalation of 
the international financial crisis towards the end of 2007. This resulted in 
credit markets becoming progressively less liquid. A European hedge fund 
that had been envisaged to take up a significant equity stake was unable 
to make good on its commitment resulting in the African equity ownership 
increasing from 50% to 76% when a replacement investor was found. An 
interviewee confided that the Seacom project team was “lucky in that they 
managed to get this away before the crisis had really impacted lenders”. If 
the team had moved slowly and “done the deal six months later, the 
margins would have been much higher” or debt funding simply 
unavailable. The project company also managed to secure more 
competitive pre-crisis floating LIBOR rates. The unhedged interest rate 
exposure benefited from the decline in LIBOR as a result of the 
subsequent quantative easing. 
Whilst the cost of the overall project was US$ 600 million the project 
developers and sponsors were innovative in reducing the capital injection. 
Firstly, by entering into co-build arrangements on specific sections of the 
cable including the Africa to India and Middle East to Europe legs, the 
actual capital outflow from Seacom was restricted to US$ 300 million. The 
project company also made extensive use of Indefeasible Rights of Use 
(IRU) to raise capital upfront. IRUs are simply a mechanism where 
wholesale buyers of data pay an up front fee entitling them to specified 
data capacity on the cable, generally spanning a period of 15 to 20 years. 
Capital raised from IRUs to fund the project construction amounted to 
almost US$ 160 million IRU agreements. Wholesale subscribers 
contributions therefore had a significant influence on the leverage. The 
debt to equity ratio for Seacom was an unorthodox 25% debt and 75% 
equity. At the commencement of construction the IRU commitments 
amounted to more than 1.25 times the total debt funding, significantly 
reducing the credit risk exposure of South African banks Nedbank and 
Investec who were the debt capital providers. From a banker’s perspective 
the IRU’s were critical and significantly de-risked the project as “it [IRUs] 
was absolutely vital and it was I would say the single biggest factor that 
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allowed us to get the deal” done. In addition to being an important source 
of construction capital the IRU’s mitigated the naked revenue risk that 
frequently compromise capital raising in project and infrastructure finance 
ventures.  
The 25%:75% debt to equity ratio may paint a somewhat incomplete 
picture because some of the investors had back leveraged structures on 
their equity contributions. Back leveraged structures occur where a 
sponsor funds a portion of equity contributions to a project using debt. This 
debt is reflected in the sponsor’s balance sheet but not in the project 
company, where the inflow is shown as a pure equity injection. The use of 
back leveraged structures has the effect of understating the degree of debt 
used to fund a project if only the balance sheet of the project company is 
analysed. If the leverage taken by a number of investors on their own 
balance sheets is included this would likely result in a debt to equity ratio 
of 50%:50%. While this is still moderate by project finance standards it 
reveals significantly higher levels of overall gearing. The back leveraged 
structures have had a number of negative effects for Seacom. Firstly, it 
has led to a situation where distributions are “pre-coded into the 
shareholders agreement [and that] there would be significant dividend 
flows right from the start”. This has contaminated the medium to long-term 
decision making with a tension arising between dividend payments and 
reinvestment of funds in future growth strategies. 
It is also notable that Herakles as project founders and promoters received 
a proportion of shares block in the project company as a free carry as 
compensation for having shaped and conceptualised the opportunity, and 
the costs and risk of losses if the project had failed to materialise. A final 
consideration in the conservative capital structure arrangements related to 
the fact that it is not possible to insure an undersea cable. By retaining 
significant capital reserves Seacom in effect self-insured its infrastructure 
and created another layer of protection for unexpected occurrences. 
Following the completion of the construction phase and the 
operationalization of the project company, Seacom set out to restructure 
its capital structure in the period 2009/2010. The aim was to increase the 
debt levels to US$ 150 million of the total US$ 300 million capital 
requirement, thus achieving a debt to equity ratio of 50%:50%. The 
Seacom project also has a natural hedge against foreign exchange risk 
with 95% of its income streams denominated in US dollars. 
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Post construction financial overview 
 
As a private and unlisted entity Seacom is not legally compelled to 
disclose its annual financial statements. However, key profitability and 
valuation metrics have been obtained by way of a review of the financial 
statements of one of its listed sponsors, namely Remgro. Remgro 
complies with International Accounting Standards (IAS) and as such equity 
accounts for the 25% investment in Seacom in accordance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 10 on Consolidated 
Financial Statements. Key financial metrics on Seacom obtained from 
these audited accounts are as follows: 
Table 4.1:  Remgro Limited - Seacom Financial Metric Extrapolation (Remgro 
Annual Financial Statements, 2009 – 2014) 
Year Headline Earnings Dividend 
Intrinsic 
Valuation Book Value 
2014 (R 26) R 324 R 3964 R 2 276 
2013 R 0 R 400 R 4 276 R 2 468 
2012 (R 108) R 380 R 3 704 R 2 344 
2011 (R 204)2 R 0 R 4 227 R 2 308 
2010 R 0 R 0 R 4 480 R 2 884 
20093 R 0 R 0 R 4 480 R 2 884 
(All amounts have been grossed up to reflect a 100% stake as opposed to Remgro’s 25% 
ownership) 
Based on the extrapolated financial metric above the Seacom cable is yet 
to achieve accounting profitability. Operational losses in 2011 and 2012 
have been addressed resulting in the entity breaking even in the 2013 
fiscal year. Despite the accounting losses, Seacom is generating positive 
cash flows. As a result cumulative dividends distributed to equity 
shareholders amount to R 780 million from its inception till 2013 with an 
additional R324 million distributed in the 2014 financial year.  
From a reporting perspective the IRU’s have caused somewhat of a 
paradoxical reporting picture.  Profits for the project company in 
accordance with IFRS have been small and occasionally negative. This 
has been the case because cash receipts on 15 to 20 year IRU’s are 
amortised and released to the income statement over the duration of the 
leases. Cash inflows to the project company were however large and 
lumpy and were received shortly after the signing of each IRU lease 
agreement. Due to these large cash inflows enjoyed upfront the 
shareholders have distributed significant dividends amounting to 
                                            
2Fifteen months ended 30 June 2011. 
3Acquisition of Venfin and effective 25% stake in Seacom. 
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approximately R1.1 billion since 2009, despite cumulative losses 
amounting to R 338 million over the same period. 
4.1.3  Key risks 
Regulatory and environmental 
 
The key regulatory and environmental risks related to navigating the 
telecommunications, environmental, and taxation regulatory arrangements 
in 11 countries. In a number of these countries on the African continent, 
regulations and legislation explicitly governing undersea cables did not 
exist. Socio-political issues regarding the location of landing stations and 
the route that the cable would take had to be addressed.  
The role of the principal promoter Brian Herlihy in the overall success of 
the project is essential to understand. Herlihy had been actively involved in 
the conceptualisation of the Africa One undersea cable that failed to reach 
commercial fruition. His knowledge of the sector coupled with his 
relationship development amongst the multitude of stakeholders was 
critical to the project’s success. Herlihy was “able to message this project 
at the right levels, within governments of the East African countries in 
which we were looking to land”.  In addition he demonstrated an ability to 
“win over the hearts and minds of people as to what this project was going 
to do [and] how meaningful an impact it could have”.  The ability to engage 
ethically and successfully with governments and regulators in part 
stemmed from the willingness to share credit for the venture. In summing 
up the role played by Herlihy one interviewee concluded, “without him in 
fact this project would never have happened…and if he had handed over 
after the ideas phase, it would have collapsed”. Seacom’s majority African 
shareholding further enhanced its credibility and appeal to key decision 
makers in the political and regulatory space. 
The growth in volumes and ability to provide a seamless service has been 
set back by bottlenecks in the terrestrial backhaul network, particularly in 
landlocked countries. A number of countries on the continent have not yet 
fully liberalised their cable sectors, curtailing the ability of Seacom to sell 
capacity to end users. In Tanzania for example long haul fiber is limited to 
the state owned operator TTCL, whose margin results in very high costs 
for end users. In Kenya a lack of mandatory minimum standards in the 
quality of inland fiber cables has resulted in erratic performance and 
compromised the volume of sales. Seacom faces the difficult choice of 
building its own inland fiber network, collaborating with existing providers 
to improve reliability and pricing, or simply swapping undersea capacity for 
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backhaul capacity. The dominance of frequently state owned incumbent 
telephone operators in the final loop, has also constrained distribution and 
sales growth. Operators such as Telkom in South Africa and TTCL in 
Tanzania have historically owned much of the existing fiber, are favoured 
by state regulatory authorities, and actively seek to retain their dominance 
as incumbents. These players initially perceived Seacom to be a direct 
competitor and sought to curtail its access to end users. From a 
sustainability and environmental perspective, the cable had to be laid with 
minimum disruption to surrounding fauna, flora, and related commercial 
activities and in accordance with the Equator Principles. This was a 
relatively predictable process owing to the limited environmental impact of 
undersea cables. Key features included environmental impact 
assessments, plans, and engagement with stakeholders and affected 
parties to select the least disruptive options. 
Competition and incumbent operators 
While the Seacom cable would be the first to market in Southern and East 
Africa, it was not anticipated to enjoy a monopoly position for an extended 
period of time. The WACS and EASSY cables were being developed 
concurrently and expected to launch within less than 24 months after 
Seacom. An aggressive and disruptive strategy was purposefully adopted 
and on entering the market bandwidth prices fell between 80% and 90% in 
the first year. Over the life of the project company prices have declined 
approximately 50% per annum with 2013/14 deflation ranging between 
20% to 35%. Seacom has participated in vigorous price declines on the 
premise that there is still significant pent up demand. Growth in volumes 
has been more than adequate to ensure sustained revenue. Technological 
advances increasing cable capacity from 10 to 100 gigabytes per 
wavelength of light have also worked in Seacom’s favour. Seacom’s 
launch was successful in breaking the deadlock of operator owned 
infrastructure and introducing competition based on quality of service, 
price points, and the provision of value added services.  
Construction and technology 
The Seacom undersea cable was commissioned as a turnkey project and 
largely fulfilled the budgetary, timing, and performance specifications 
prescribed in the original contract. Tyco was selected via a tendering 
process to be the key service providers in the manufacture and 
deployment of the undersea cable. The technology Seacom was deploying 
was tried, tested, and successful in other parts of the world. Prior to the 
commencement of construction activities, it emerged that one of the 
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companies in the Tyco Group faced the prospect of bankruptcy. 
Concerned that this development could contaminate other parts of Tyco, 
and represent a counterparty risk in terms of Tyco’s capacity to deliver on 
its contractual obligations, the project company management undertook 
extensive research and sought legal opinion that concluded its the Tyco 
with which the project company was dealing was ring-fenced and its 
contractual obligations would be fulfilled.  
Credit 
 
As highlighted in the section on the arranging of finance credit risk was 
addressed in the main by way of a very conservative debt to equity ratio of 
25%:75%, and extensive use of IRUs with creditworthy off-takers. One 
disadvantage of the IRUs was that they obfuscated transparency 
regarding annuity income resulting in the debt providers raising the 
concern of “certainty versus longevity” of revenue. The nature of an 
undersea cable is that it has a very low secondary value as a liquidated 
asset. Seacom also did not enjoy any guarantees from participating 
countries. Seacom has responded by intentionally blending into the 
revenue stream shorter dated and renewable leases. Subsequent to 
launch revolving facilities of 3 and 5 year durations were entered into with 
Investec and Nedbank to ameliorate these working capital concerns. The 
Investec facility was never utilised, and in 2012 the total outstanding debt 
was refinanced by way of an open tender won by Nedbank. The 
refinancing revealed the different goals of debt providers. Nedbank sought 
to build a sizeable long dated infrastructure book generating steady 
interest returns, and supplemented by fees and commissions. The 
Investec approach was to earn higher interest, fees, and commission 
during the riskiest phase of the project, specifically construction. 
Subsequently Investec was content to retire its exposure and had limited 
desire to build a long dated infrastructure funding portfolio.  
 
Political and piracy 
In 2009 the proliferating piracy off the coast of Somalia resulted in a delay 
of one month in the laying of portions of the Seacom cable. The path that 
the cable was to traverse included waters where pirates had been active 
and had taken a number of vessels and their crews captive. The matter 
was resolved by commissioning a gun ship to accompany the vessel 
laying the cable with an overrun of between US$ 1 and US$ 2 million 
dollars. The Seacom project was compromised by political developments 
in North Africa and the Middle East as a result of the Arab Spring in 
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January 2011. The project company was delayed in placing its fiber routes 
across Egypt and igniting its T North Cable because the Egyptian 
government sought to curtail protestors use of social media by cutting off 
internet access. This leg of the cable was essential to Seacom as it 
connected the rest of the line to the crucial European market. In response 
Seacom rerouted traffic by buying bandwidth capacity from India to 
Europe at a cost in excess of US$ 1 million per month. This situation 
lasted for almost four years resulting in a cost overrun of US$ 60 million 
and changed the economics of the project significantly. These concerns 
were mitigated by the quality of a highly engaged and strong project 
management team and investors. A banker interviewee complemented the 
project management team noting the importance of being kept appraised 
of adverse developments and plans to resolve them. In addition, the 
project developers structured a contingency provision to draw down on in 
the event of unanticipated developments. 
4.1.4  Institutional and legal arrangements 
Principal contracts 
The shareholder agreement had to be particularly strong in part due to 
participants having different funding arrangements and the need for clarity 
and certainty on matters such as the dividend policy. All shareholders are 
represented in the governing structures in one form or another to ensure 
minority protection. These include the Board, audit and risk committee, 
and remuneration committee. The most intensive debates between 
shareholders have been centred on commercial matters such as where 
Seacom goes in terms of strategy and around reinvestment versus 
distributions of capital. The shareholder agreement also codifies an explicit 
ethical code prohibiting unacceptable business practices. The Seacom 
project company has no majority shareholder that has had the occasional 
effect of prolonging decision making. The manufacturing and laying of the 
cable was executed via a turnkey contract. The timing of this contract was 
fortuitous for Seacom as the equipment and service providers in this 
sector were suffering very low demand on account of the overinvestment 
in undersea cables in western markets during the dot com era. Capacity 
was plentiful, and rates extremely competitive. The final important set of 
contractual arrangements related to the fleet of IRU’s signed. These were 
critical a source of construction capital, enabled the derisking of the project 
for debt capital providers, and demonstrated market demand. The multi-
national and private nature of the project, and the fact that most of the 
cable is in international waters meant that no single overarching 
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concession was required and regulatory permission was sought from 
participating countries for landing points.  
4.1.5  Lessons learned 
The Seacom project provides a number of key lessons. The first is that the 
strength and the credibility of the project developer are key in getting from 
concept to financial closure. The strength, experience and continuity in the 
project team from developing the concept, raising the capital and getting 
the necessary approvals, to final launch and operational status is another 
key insight. Interviewees also highlighted the different mind-set required in 
developing and running a project. The ability for project developers to 
move quickly and decisively in taking advantage of a window of 
opportunity is demonstrated in this project. This agility can be significantly 
attributed to the private arrangements of the sponsors, as opposed to the 
more common consortium and carrier led arrangements. Having no direct 
government sponsors on the project also resulted in less political and 
related delays. A 12 to 24 month delay would likely have compromised the 
project’s financial closure and the underlying business case on account of 
other competitors who entered the same market. Despite the narrow 
window of opportunity, the Seacom project was premised on a long-term 
business case, informed by a positive outlook on economic growth 
prospects for the continent, and a concomitant increase in demand for 
data.  The ability of the project team and the principal promoter to engage 
with multiple stakeholders across many countries in a pro-active, win-win 
ethos, without engaging in corrupt or unacceptable business practices is 
exemplary. Importantly this engagement was enabled by having access to 
decision makers as a result of getting credible and effective local partners 
across the partner countries. Regarding reaching financial closure the 
project re-enforced the importance of a sound financial structure and 
business plan, early equity investment enabling subsequent debt raising, 
and ensuring project documentation is strong and comprehensive. 
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4.2 The Gautrain Rapid Rail Link 
FACT SHEET 
Project 
Description 
 80 kilometre rapid rail system 
 15 kilometres subterranean  
 Johannesburg, Tshwane (Pretoria), and Ekhuruleni 
Metropolitan Municipalities 
 Total number of stations 10 
 Province of Gauteng is owner of project 
Key 
Personnel of 
Gauteng 
Management 
Agency 
 Jack Van der Merwe – CEO 
 William Dachs - COO 
 Able Mawela – Chairman 
 Ismail Vadi – Executive Authority – Member of the Executive 
Council for Transport: Gauteng Province 
 Ian Scott – CFO 
 Warburton Attorneys – General Counsel 
Contractors   Bombela Consortium Company made up of: 
¾ Murray and Roberts – Civil works and stations 
¾ Bouygues – Civil works and stations 
¾ Bombardier Transportation – Electrical and mechanical 
systems including rolling stock 
¾ Strategic Partners Group – Black Economic Empowerment 
Group 
 Arup – Independent Certifier 
Objectives  Improve transport mobility and urban efficiency 
 Uplift Johannesburg and Tshwane business districts 
 Stimulate economic growth, investment, new development, job 
creation, and tourism 
 Environmental sustainability 
 Human capital development and capacity building in multi-
faceted infrastructure projects 
 Showcase South Africa as a progressive and modern African 
state 
 Demonstrate government’s commitment to public transport 
 Advance small and medium sized businesses 
 Promote Black Economic Empowerment 
 Facilitate the hosting of FIFA 2010 World Cup (emergent 
objective) 
Funding and 
Shareholders 
 National Government via the Department of Transport and 
Division of Revenue Act – 44.2% 
 Gauteng Provincial Government Budget Allocation- 26.1% 
 Gauteng Provincial Government Borrowing – 18.4% 
 Private Sector Equity – 1.8% 
 Private Sector Borrowing – 9.5% 
 Overall project cost circa R 30 billion 
Products and 
Services 
 Accessible, efficient and effective rapid rail transit system on 
designated routes  
 Reliability, safety and security paramount 
 Frequency of service 10 to 30 minutes 
 Operating hours 05:30 to 20:30 
 An extensive feeder and distribution bus network 
complementing the rapid rail link 
 
  
114 
4.2.1  Background 
The Gautrain Rapid Rail Link (‘Gautrain’) is South Africa’s and Africa’s first 
high-speed metropolitan rail network servicing key nodes in South Africa’s 
commercial and provincial hub of Gauteng Province. The province of 
Gauteng is the smallest of South Africa’s 9 provinces covering an area of 
17 010 square kilometres or approximately 1.4% of the country’s land 
mass. It has a population of 11.2 million people accounting for 22.4% of 
the total South African population, has a population density of 658 people 
per square kilometre. Despite its relatively small geographic size Gauteng 
Province is responsible for almost 34% of the countries gross domestic 
product, and 10% of the entire African continent’s gross domestic product 
(Gauteng Provincial Government, 2014). Within Gauteng reside the 
Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekhuruleni Metropolitan Municipalities that 
host the country’s commercial capital, political capital. Approximately 60% 
to 70% of Gauteng’s population is dependent on public transport. The 
primary mode of public transport is the privately owned and informal mini 
bus operators known locally as “taxis” (Van der Westhuizen, 2008). The 
province hosts 38% of all registered vehicles, 41% of minibus taxis, and 
enjoys more than 50% of national rail and bus subsidies (Van der Merwe 
et al, 2001). Metro rail services in the province are facilitated by the 
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (Prasa).  
Proposals on the Gautrain began in the mid-1990s after South Africa’s first 
democratic elections. The Gauteng provincial government sought to 
identify at a pre-feasibility stage a number of concepts that would act as 
an economic stimulus to the province. Ten projects were identified under a 
provincial entity called Blue IQ including the Gautrain. Gauteng province 
faced significant changes in its economic base and proponents believed 
that “the province definitely needed a redefining economic impact through 
a big infrastructure project”. The mining sector that had formed the 
foundation of the province’s economy was in rapid decline, together with 
major portions of the industrial hubs such as those in the East Rand. The 
province was also hampered by poor spatial development planning 
stemming from the apartheid legacy. In imagining a better future Gauteng 
planners premised it would be based on the services and tertiary sectors 
that required an efficient and world- class light rail system. 
The Gautrain commences in the south of the Johannesburg inner city at 
Park Station and then extends to the upmarket financial districts of 
Rosebank and Sandton. The track then splits into a northern or eastern 
vein. The eastern route leads to Marlboro, Rhodesfield and OR Tambo 
International Airport while the northern route extends to Midrand, 
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Centurion, Pretoria and Hatfield Stations. The train route is supported by a 
comprehensive feeder and distribution fleet of 125 buses. The bus service 
comprises 430 kilometres of routes with bus stops every 500 metres. 
Safety and security features on the buses include radio communication 
and satellite tracking of vehicles. The bus facilities are also complemented 
by extensive parking facilities for drivers who also utilise the train (Sieburg 
2009). A total of 96 by 4 car trains were commissioned at inception with a 
carrying load of 450 passengers. The railheads are supplied by 
Bombardier and are a customised version of the Electrostar train set 
(Gauteng Management Agency Annual Report, 2013). Despite initial cost 
estimates of R 7 billion the final cost of the project escalated to in excess 
of R 32 billion. 
4.2.2  Financial structure 
Ownership structure 
 
The Gautrain is registered as a Public Private Partnership (PPP) of the 
Gauteng provincial government. A concession agreement between the 
province and the Bombela concessionaire is the basis of all subsequent 
contracts. The concession agreement is a complex PPP with a total of 385 
contracts, subcontracts, schedules and financing agreements. The 
shareholders of Bombela consist of key equipment, service and 
construction providers that jointly executed the construction of the 
Gautrain. The shareholders and respective shareholding in the 
concessionaire company Bombela are Murray and Roberts (M&R) a 
leading engineering, contracting and construction service, Strategic 
Partners Group (SPG) a black owned company established with the 
express purpose of participating as a black economic empowerment 
partner, Bombardier which manufactures trains and signalling equipment 
and offer customised design, build, operate, and maintain transportation 
solutions, Bouygues  which provides transportation solutions, J & J Group 
a South African based investment company, and ABSA, a leading South 
African bank. A key participant in the PPP is RATP that is not part of the 
Bombela consortium but owns a 51% in the Bombela operating company.  
A schematic of key parties in the Gautrain PPP, together with each 
participant’s shareholding in the various parts of the Bombela 
concessionaire, is reflected in Figure 4-1 below. 
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Figure 4-1: Gautrain Contractual Structure (Sieburg, 2009) 
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How the financing was arranged 
The initial pre-feasibility study on the Gautrain was technical in nature and 
focused on the cost and challenges of getting a train line from Pretoria to 
Johannesburg. Because of the rudimentary nature of the study the initial 
forecast cost was “hundreds of millions…it was just ludicrously wrong”. 
The initial stage however stimulated people’s imagination about what was 
possible. At this juncture the Gautrain was a provincial venture and there 
was minimal engagement with national government, with the province 
anticipating providing all the requisite investment capital. A significant 
change came about in 2000 when National Treasury (NT) announced the 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) framework under Treasury Regulation 
16. This made it mandatory for the project to obtain approval from NT. 
This turned out to be a fortuitous development with described as “a brilliant 
move…given where the project was at the time…I think that if they hadn’t 
come through that window and got National Treasury advice…and 
ultimately funding support, the Gautrain wouldn’t have happened”. The 
engagements with NT were sometimes quite adversarial but the outcome 
was sound advice and from 2000 the project fell within a regulated 
environment and a full feasibility study became mandatory. The initial 
plans regarding capital sources were premised on a R 25.2 billion fixed 
price turnkey arrangement with contributions by National Government 
44.2%, the Gauteng provincial government 26.1%, borrowings by the 
Gauteng provincial government 18.4%, private sector equity 1.8%, and 
private sector borrowing 9.5%.  
On 25 January 2007 negotiations between Bombela and the commercial 
banks concerning the debt portion reached closure. An amount of R3.1 
billion was to be advanced with Rand Merchant Bank and Standard Bank 
acting as lead arrangers. Nedbank was appointed as the Participant 
responsible for managing the project’s financial transactions and issuing 
the project bonds. The debt component from commercial banks was made 
up of two tranches of senior debt. The first tranche had a vanilla-floating 
rate while the second had a rate linked to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
The senior debt was supplemented by mezzanine funding and standby 
facilities. The commercial banks contribution was therefore limited with 
senior debt facilities amounting to approximately 10% of the project’s 
capital expenditure. 
The national and provincial governments committed to fund R 22 billion by 
way of a grant. Bombela shareholders injected R 500 million equity 
together with a standby equity facility of R150 million. It was anticipated 
that performance guarantees and credit facilities provided by contractors 
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over the 54-month construction period would amount to R 3.3 billion. From 
these facts it is clear that capital structure was not a primary issue on the 
Gautrain as the government grant was expected to cover 88% of the 
capital expenditure. Capital availability and access was the primary 
consideration and as a result the capital structure differs substantially from 
most project finance transactions. The commercial banks applied private 
sector principles and extended credit only to the extent that the forecast 
cash flows would support and service this debt. On account of these 
factors the Gautrain ended up with a debt to equity ratio of approximately 
28:72 on completion of construction. The massive equity component 
largely from the public purse reflected the fact that this was primarily a 
government-funded project.  
The commercial bank’s enjoyed a high degree of comfort on this 
transaction as a result of the massive capital injection by the public sector. 
The PPP regulations and the rigorous process the project had to navigate 
prior to execution also added to the commercial banks sense of security 
and well-being. Bankers expressed overall satisfaction with advancing the 
facilities because they “had very good lawyers ensuring all of the EPC 
arrangements and contracting arrangements had the right risk 
allocation…and the lenders are indemnified from residual contracting 
risk…delivery was not a concern…it was more [concern] around the timing 
aspects…we were concerned that there were going to be delays to the 
implementation of the project”. The capital structure was impacted by the 
fact that the project budget commenced at R25 billion and the project was 
finally concluded for approximately R 30 billion. This excess was 
predominantly driven by changes in scope that led to variations in the 
project. As per the concession agreement the cost of scope variations was 
borne by the provincial government and not by the concessionaire. 
Possible enhancements to the capital arrangements are qualitative in 
nature as opposed to quantitative. These include an explicit exit strategy 
for certain equity investors in Bombela who may not want to be invested 
for the full 25 year PPP concession period after they have fulfilled their 
contractual requirements, and the venture is fully operational. The current 
arrangements for shareholders to exit appear to require the consent of the 
province and only under certain prescribed circumstances. The risk 
exposure of equity investors exiting prematurely could exacerbate moral 
hazard by leaving latent risks with remaining shareholders. During the 
course of 2014 discussions regarding the refinancing of the capital debt 
portion of the Gautrain took place. Whilst these interactions did not result 
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in a concrete decision, interviewees expressed the view that “it will 
definitely be refinanced, there is no question”.  
4.2.3  Key risks 
The risk exposure of executing a project such as the Gautrain is extensive. 
The core philosophy in managing risk by the Gautrain Management 
Agency was to firstly allocate it to the best party to manage it by way of 
contractual arrangements, but also to ensure that sub-contractors had the 
capability to effectively manage the risks they took on.  
Regulatory and environmental 
The South African government (Department of Transport) has indirect 
control of the national railway grid through two major parastatals, namely 
Transnet and PRASA. In order to fulfil the national treasury PPP 
requirements, an application to develop the Gautrain was submitted and 
approved by both national and provincial governments. This process was 
achieved with minimal friction on account of the fact that the development 
of the Gautrain was in line with the national and provincial transport 
development plans, and there were no other parties seeking a similar 
regulatory approval. The Gautrain project was subjected to an EIA that 
took place over 2002 – 2003 that incorporating key steps such as concept 
provisional validation, preliminary design and costing, completion of the 
feasibility report. Procurement pre-qualification was conducted in terms of 
PPP regulations. Post construction, and to ensure compliance with the 
environmental management plan (EMP) a project environmental co-
ordination committee was established until it was superseded by the 
Safety, Health, Environment and Quality management (SHEQ) department 
of the GMA. Legal challenges relating to the environmental impact 
(heritage site contamination and noise pollution were key concerns) of the 
Gautrain based on the route were brought by a number of parties. The 
legal challenges were all addressed in the Gautrain’s favour. This can be 
attributed to the fact that “the environmental process had been followed 
[and] public participation had been exhausted”.  
The methods for compulsory acquisition of land and obtaining of 
servitudes for the Gautrain are governed by the Gauteng Transport 
Infrastructure Act (GTIA). The province was therefore responsible for the 
proclamation and acquisition of applicable land tranches and the 
administrative requirements relating to these. The Provincial Roads and 
Transport department worked in conjunction with the Provincial Support 
Team to build the necessary technical, legal and administrative skills to 
120 
perform this function. In the planning stages it was forecast that 1000 
properties would need to be expropriated. This figure was in excess of 20 
times the number the department historically processed on an annual 
basis. With the completion of construction, the land acquisition function is 
primarily focused on ensuring that all administrative requirements have 
been completed, the maintenance of the land section of the fixed asset 
register, and the resolution of 24 compensation court cases that remain 
outstanding.  
Construction and technology 
 
A key pillar in the risk management process of the Gautrain is the turnkey 
nature of the concession agreement. This meant that the project was 
constructed and executed for a fixed price. This was essential in 
systematically dispersing the risks relating to the construction of the 
Gautrain from the government sponsors to Bombela. The sponsors opted 
for standard gauge rail tracks as opposed to the narrow gauge format 
used on existing rail lines in South Africa. This was to ensure that the 
project utilised proven formats that had been successfully commissioned, 
including being already aligned to rolling stock and other components that 
made up the overall rapid rail system. The emphasis was on tried, tested, 
and proven modern technology. The provincial government also made use 
of performance and retention bonds to induce the concessionaire to make 
good on its contractual obligations, or face the imposition of compensatory 
measures. Variation increases during construction were applicable in two 
specific circumstances. The first was where variations were mutually 
agreed upon by the GMA (and secondly where cost inputs escalated at a 
rate above the official consumer price index. In the case of the former, 
where variations required additional capital expenditure, the 
concessionaire was obliged to follow an open market tender process and 
obtain the approval of the GMA 
 
Credit 
 
The credit risk on the debt component of the Gautrain was limited on 
account of the conservative gearing, and the substantial government 
contributions highlighted in the financing arrangements above. It can be 
argued that the Gautrain enjoyed an implicit sovereign guarantee due to 
the massive capital contributions of the national and provincial 
governments, its significantly discounted value as a liquidated asset, and 
the political ramifications of its discontinuance. Providers of debt capital 
sign agreements directly with Bombela and disburse funds accordingly. 
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Foreign exchange 
The Gautrain had extremely large foreign exchange exposure on account 
of its high imported capital equipment component, the extended lead times 
from ordering and delivery of key parts, and the nominal size of the 
transaction both in rand and dollar terms. Mitigation of this foreign 
exchange risk occurred in two parts. The smaller exposure was in the 
Bombela consortium that hedged this risk by way of a number of hedging 
instruments procured from local banks. The consortium also went one step 
further and hedged itself against adverse movements in the interest rate to 
fix the cost of funding. The largest exposure lay with the Gauteng 
provincial government. The pricing for foreign exchange hedging 
instruments over a 5-year profile from the commercial banks was 
extremely prohibitive on account of rand exchange rate volatility. The 
authorities resolved that National Treasury would effectively take on the 
foreign exchange risk by hedging Gauteng Province’s exposure through 
the South African Reserve Bank. This courageous decision that exposed 
the national government to potentially large foreign exchange losses 
ultimately culminated in savings of approximately R 425 million.  
Patronage guarantee 
Arguably the biggest risk in the conceptualisation and shaping of the 
Gautrain related to the extent to which Gauteng residents would use the 
service. This was a risk that the private sector participants were not 
prepared to take. Through negotiations and input from legal, technical and 
financial advisors a novel solution was formulated. In its first iteration the 
solution required each bidding consortium to submit its patronage forecast. 
The higher the patronage forecast was and the closer it was to the 
provincial projection the more points the bidder was awarded on that 
particular metric. The Gauteng Provincial government then effectively 
underwrote the difference between the forecast submitted by the bidder 
and the province’s patronage projection. This underwrite came in the form 
of a patronage guarantee or MRTR. The patronage guarantee is a 
mechanism put in place to facilitate the concessionaire’s ability to cover its 
operating, maintenance, and capital costs. It is computed by taking into 
account the number of people using the system, the value of fares, 
customer points of entry and exit, the distances travelled by customers, 
usage of ancillary services such as buses and parking, and the amount of 
time taken for users to opt for public transport away from private means. 
Underpinning the patronage guarantee is the understanding that the 
provincial government would support the concessionaire for patronage 
revenue below a certain level. Above that level, no support is given. The 
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patronage guarantee amounted to R 830 million, R 1.03 billion, and R1.5 
billion in 2013, 2014, and 2015 respectively. This mechanism reduced the 
demand risk to private sector stakeholders to an acceptable level allowing 
the banks to package the debt facilities in a manner that would be 
satisfactory to their credit committees.  
Political  
The political will to proceed with the Gautrain extended to both provincial 
and national government officials and principals, and the ANC at both 
levels. This gave the project immense credibility and meant it was 
endorsed by key institutional political actors, as opposed to individuals. 
The project has retained political support despite the fact that its execution 
has spanned four different provincial Premiers and three different 
Presidents. Public perception towards the project was tainted by a 
perception of elitism implying that the project would serve middle class as 
opposed to working class clientele. Collating statistics and revealing the 
broad based user profile of the trains has largely allayed these political 
concerns. The change in the perception of the Gautrain is captured 
anecdotally by sceptical newly elected public officials who “have come in 
and said ‘Yis, this middle class commuter service that takes a few whities 
up and down from work to home’…when they find out the facts about it 
they say ‘we need more of these’…that leads to [on-going] buy in”. 
Operational 
Operationally the risk management process involved the population, 
management and control of an integrated risk management register. Risks 
are scored based on their potential impact, quality consequences, and 
financial ramifications. They are then categorised as minor, major, or 
critical risks. To ensure accountability for each risk only has one owner 
who must manage the risk through implementing mitigating measures. 
The Gautrain encountered a number of unanticipated non-mainstream 
risks. These included electricity load shedding in 2008 as a result of 
generation constraints. Cable theft on the Gautrain also caused a number 
of early disruptions and stoppages and security measures had to be put in 
place to mitigate against this. Labour stoppages and illegal strikes by the 
bus drivers had a knock on effect on train passenger volumes in 2012 and 
resulted in the suspension of the service when aggrieved strikers shot at a 
Gautrain bus in March 2012. Throughout the execution of the Gautrain 
venture, risk management has been integrated into the entire project 
management process.  
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4.2.4  Institutional and legal arrangements 
The Gautrain PPP is a Build and Operate (BO) arrangement. All members 
of the Bombela consortium with the exception of Bouygues are locked into 
both the construction and operating phases of the project. This assists in 
aligning their respective contribution in the construction phase to the 
success of the venture in the operating phase. It also allows the provincial 
government easier recourse to these parties in the event that any 
malperformance in the construction is detected after commissioning.  
The Gautrain Management Agency and Project Team 
The Gautrain Management Agency (GMA) is a provincial public entity 
established by way of a piece of national legislation, namely the Gautrain 
Management Agency Act of 2006 (GMA Act). The GMA Act directs the 
GMA to manage, co-ordinate and oversee the Gautrain. This includes 
helping the province in implementing the goals and objectives of the 
Gautrain, manage the relationship between the province and Bombela in 
accordance with the requirements of the concession agreement, ensure 
the interests of the province are protected, and look after and manage and 
maintain the assets of the Gautrain. By establishing a dedicated agency, 
the authorities institutionalised the project management of the Gautrain 
from commencement through to the expiry of the concession agreement. 
The GMA is structured into four areas to execute its responsibilities, 
namely, technical and commercial, finance, legal and marketing, and is the 
apex governance institution. The extensive contractual documents 
detailing the rights and obligations of all parties, enabled each stakeholder 
to have clarity as to what they were expected to deliver on. A 
comprehensive document management system to track correspondence 
and communication between stakeholders was implemented so an audit 
trail of decisions and commitments made by all parties was in place. 
Supporting these measures was a detailed dispute resolution mechanism. 
This made use of arbitration rather than the courts for a more rapid 
resolution of disputes. 
 Fundamental to the Gautrain’s success was the continuity in the project 
team from conception to operationalisation. Interviewees noted other 
project experiences Discontinuity in the project team has the potential to 
sabotage viable ventures. The Gautrain project team was “very strong 
from start to finish” and despite not always having the same people 
consistently “having someone like Jack van der Merwe [CEO – GMA] is a 
big factor in continuity”. In addition, the project leaders ensured that “as 
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the project changed phases, the right skills were brought in at the right 
time to keep the overall team strong”. 
Principal contracts 
The Gautrain project is underpinned by 385 legal agreements. The 
principal contracts are the concession agreement that includes the 
patronage guarantee, the turnkey contracts for civil construction 
engineering and maintenance, and the operations and management 
contract. The concession agreement had initially been crafted based on a 
standard PPP contract. Early on in the process a decision to draft a 
bespoke contract was made and initiated. The sponsors sought to ensure 
that at its core the concession contract articulated what needed to be done 
and by whom, but importantly clearly expressed what would happen when 
things went wrong comparing it to a “very strict anti-nuptial contract”. The 
concession sought to align stakeholder interests by structurally embedding 
incentives and penalties that would encourage specific outcomes. The 
motivation was premised on the view that “anyone who tells you the 
private sector performs exceptionally just because they are private sector 
is talking rubbish…the private sector performs because it is incentivised or 
dis-incentivised not to do something”. Incentives including the patronage 
agreement detailed above were conditional on meeting operational targets 
including 98.5% availability and 95% punctuality. 
The selection process for the successful bidder initially expected each to 
bear costs of bidding. This was amended due as it was believed that 
because these costs were sizeable bidders would backload much have 
the technical and design work, slowing down the pace of the project’s 
execution. Back-loading key aspects of the project design to a post 
successful bid application increased the risk that bid price would be 
premature, inaccurate and unworkable, again compromising execution. At 
the same time the sponsors sought to ensure the competitive bidding 
process retained as many credible bidders as possible and resolved that 
“the need to maintain a competitive tension was much greater than the 
cost of the element of support” on bidding costs. This assisted in speeding 
up the project as key aspects of the design work were completed a part of 
the bid process, shortening the project’s delivery time. As highlighted the 
contracts for civil construction, engineering and maintenance, and the 
operations and management contract were turnkey arrangements, 
dispersing risk from the sponsor and driven by explicit goals, performance 
metrics and related deadlines. The fulfilment of the contractual 
arrangements was verified by 3 Independent Monitoring Bodies. The 
certifier was responsible for determining completion of the works, the 
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socio-economic monitor reports on the socio economic benefits derived 
from the project throughout its various stages, and the environmental 
control person monitors and reports on the environmental impact of the 
project.  
4.2.5  Lessons learned 
A robust project plan with effective co-ordination across project streams 
and on-going evaluation was an essential feature in the development of 
the Gautrain. This ensured responsibility, accountability, and 
responsiveness was embedded into the full project life-cycle. The project 
was divided up into distinct phases and at the end of each phase critical 
decisions to reconfigure or consider discontinuing the project were made. 
This was supported by an exceptionally strong advisory team of external 
legal, technical, financial, and related consultants. The backbone behind 
the project plan was an effective project team. Project team members 
were drawn from both the public and private sectors and were 
professionally familiar with each other. The experienced project team 
assembled had a “very strong existing network of relationships” between 
themselves and within the participating metropolitan municipalities, 
PRASA, the provincial and national governments, and other key 
stakeholders which enabled them to connect, communicate and co-
ordinate activities. The project team was underpinned by “loads of liaison 
and steering committees [that were] the manifestation of the underlying 
network of relationships”. It is important to “be careful not to say by 
creating these structures you get a network. That is not true. The network 
must pre-exist for the structures that come onto it”. The structures 
institutionalised a pre-existing network and the synergies percolated to all 
project players in the project execution by embedding risk management 
into the project architecture. 
 
Due to the highly visible and disruptive nature of the Gautrain, a 
communications team was established. This function was taken seriously 
in order to manage public perception, and implicitly maintain political 
support. The key deliverables of the communications team was to ensure 
communication was always flowing to stakeholders even when things 
were at their worst and the public perception was strongly against the 
project. Qualitatively this engagement was not about advertising but was 
about “keeping in touch with stakeholders, talking to people who don’t like 
you…and getting back to people…continual engagement”. The intensity of 
the work performed by the communications team ensured there was rarely 
a void during the construction phase and their role has continued into the 
operations stage. The operations phase of the project has substantively 
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increased resources to this function to monitor public perception on a daily 
basis, including a team of people who look at social media on a real time 
basis, and proactive engagement across media platforms especially for 
potentially negative news.  
Projects such as the Gautrain may better optimise the governance 
arrangements by having a category of disinterested shareholders who are 
not party to any of the underlying sub-contracts. This may help resolve 
adverse shareholder dynamics that may occur as a result of conflicts of 
interest between equity shareholders who are also sub-contractors. The 
ability to attract equity investors to PPP via a concession company may 
also be enhanced by having an exit clause in the agreement that allows 
equity investors an exit path under prescribed conditions and with the 
consent of key stakeholders. 
The Gautrain has had a massive impact on land values around stations, 
none of that was captured for the public purse. With hindsight the PPP 
could have been structured to capture some of these gains for them to 
contribute to the project capital structure. This aspect is envisaged to be 
incorporated into the second phase of the project. A number of ways to 
capture the commercial and real estate benefits of a light railway system 
have been applied in countries including the United Kingdom and the 
United States. These range from a small levy on residents in the 
respective city or province who will reap secondary benefits from the 
infrastructure, to the route being determined by businesses prepared to 
contribute to the funding through a capital contribution.3 
The patronage levels of the Gautrain have exceeded the most optimistic 
projections. By inference this has resulted in significant benefits accruing 
to the concessionaire company in the form of much higher internal rates of 
return on the project than originally forecast. The downside of Bombela 
was also limited by the provision of massive grant funding and the 
patronage agreement. Public treasuries may possibly consider embedding 
mechanisms into the contractual arrangements where beyond certain 
specified profits or rates of return, the public purse also participates in 
super profits that may unexpectedly accrue from projects of this nature.  
One of the striking characteristics of the Gautrain stations is that they lack 
the retail and customer amenities such as restaurants and book and 
newspaper outlets synonymous with urban rail systems in developed cities 
such as London or New York. This occurred as a result of the fact that the 
                                            
3 See Becker (2001) and Becker and Patterson (2005). 
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Gautrain was the first project of its type on the continent and “the drive the 
first time round was just to design and build a [urban rail] transport system 
and operate it well”. Phase two of the project is also expected to address 
this aspect on new stations and potentially on existing ones as well. The 
feasibility studies for phase two of the Gautrain are expected to be 
completed in 2016. These studies will address a range of issues including 
the routes, where the new stations will be located, and clarity on the way 
forward. There appears to be strong appetite for phase two prospects, 
anticipated declines in the risk premium as a brownfields expansion 
project. 
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4.3 The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor 
FACT SHEET 
Project 
Description 
 Design, development, and project management of existing 
Pebble Bed Modular Reactor technology 
 Construction of prototype and demonstration of commercial 
viability 
 Develop and supply of export market for an operating and 
commercially viable PBMR 
Key Personnel 
to Pebble Bed 
Modular 
Reactor (Pty) 
Ltd 
 Jaco Kriek – CEO – 2004 - 2010 
 Alastair Ruiters – Chairman 
 Lynette Milne – CFO 
 Barbara Hogan – Executive Authority – Minister of Public 
Enterprises: Republic of South Africa 2009 – 2010 
 Alec Erwin – Executive Authority – Minister of Public 
Enterprises: Republic of South Africa 2004 - 2008 
 Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka –Minister of Minerals and Energy: 
Republic of South Africa 1999 - 2005 
Contractors  Eskom Enterprises  Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (Pty) Ltd 
Objectives 
 Develop South Africa’s Nuclear Technology and Related 
Industries 
 Address South Africa’s growing electricity requirements and 
energy mix 
 Stimulate economic growth, investment, new development, job 
creation, and electricity generation capacity on the African 
continent 
Funding and 
Shareholders 
Shareholder 
 Eskom Holdings– 100% 
Funders 
 South African Government – 80.61% 
 Eskom– 8.67% 
 Industrial Development Corporation –4.78% 
 Exelon –1.09% 
 Westinghouse –4.85% 
Products and 
Services 
 Reliable, economic and efficient nuclear power alternative 
 Enhanced reliability and safety  
 Rapid speed of construction and deployment relative to 
traditional nuclear stations 
 Suitability of “pocket nuke” for export to international market 
with geographically dispersed electricity needs 
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4.3.1  Background 
The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) is an initiative by the South 
African government through state owned electricity company Eskom to 
commercialise High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) technology 
in the construction of a fourth generation nuclear power electricity 
generating unit. The PBMR differed from the world’s existing nuclear fleet 
of Pressurised Water Reactors (PWR) and related Boiler Water Reactors 
(BWR) in the following key respects. Firstly, the unit size of the PBMR has 
a power output of 110MW – 400MW. A typical PWR has a corresponding 
output of 900MW – 1200MW. Secondly, the primary coolant in the PBMR 
is helium gas as opposed to water for the PWR. Thirdly, with the PBMR 
the coolant drives the turbine directly whilst with the PWR the coolant is 
funnelled through a heat exchanger that subsequently generates steam 
and propels a steam turbine. Fourthly, the PMBR utilises graphite as the 
moderator rather than water. Fifth, the PMBR can be refuelled whilst it is 
still operating unlike the PWR that needs to be shut down annually for 
refuelling, and finally the PBMR utilises uranium enriched to 7.5% whilst 
conventional PWR utilises 3% enriched uranium. 
The particular attraction of the technology included its higher thermal 
efficiency, more efficient use of uranium feedstock and consequently less 
radioactive waste, and superior safety features to PWR with the latter 
being a key public concern regarding nuclear power (Thomas and Heyde 
2001). The modular nature of the PBMR meant that capacity could be 
installed rapidly while scalability could be attained by adding modules 
enhancing flexibility and the ability to match supply with demand. Module 
power output was highly elastic with the ability to move from half power to 
full power and back to half power in a matter of minutes. The ability to 
deploy a “pocket nuke’ to areas not served by a conventional transmission 
grid added to the potential of the PBMR particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and other export markets where transmission infrastructure was 
underdeveloped. The forecast 2-year construction lead times for PBMR 
technology relative to 8 years for large thermal, nuclear, and hydroelectric 
projects added to its appeal. Finally, it appeared that the PBMR would be 
more economically efficient than South Africa’s coal based stations. It was 
projected that a commercial scale plant with ten modules and a capacity of 
1 200 MWe could be constructed for US$ 1000 per KWe installed. The 
equivalent cost for a new coal fired power station was US$ 900 per KWe 
installed (Nicholls 2001). 
The attempt to commercialise the PBMR from 2000 to 2009 took place in 
an era when the world was faced with exponential growth in energy 
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demand and growing awareness of the adverse environmental impact of 
fossil fuels. A number of countries have attempted to commercialise 
HTGR technology including the USA, Germany, UK and Japan. Despite 
these failures ABB and Siemens pooled their intellectual property into a 
company called HTGR Gmbh and sought to license the technology to a 
number of countries including South Africa. This licensing arrangement 
forms the foundation for the development of the PBMR in South Africa.  
In 2001 Eskom was one of the world’s largest electricity generating utilities 
with a total capacity of almost 40 000 MWe. Of this approximately 85% 
was generated by coal-fired stations, and South Africa’s sole nuclear 
power station Koeberg contributed 7%. The coal-fired power stations are 
predominantly located inland in close proximity to the fuel source. An 
increasing proportion of power consumption was taking place in coastal 
areas necessitating an extensive transmission network and significant 
capital and maintenance related expenditure. Despite excess generation 
capacity in the 1990’s and early 2000’s it was evident that even with low 
economic growth rates of 2.5% the excess generation capacity would be 
exhausted between 2005 and 2010. Alternative base-load capacity in the 
form of gas and hydro were not viable. Taking these factors into 
consideration Eskom began investigating the PBMR in 1993 followed by a 
pre-feasibility study in 1995 and a techno-economic study in 1997. By 
1998 the project had reached a stage where full scale engineering design 
was taking place (Nicholls 2001).  
4.3.2  Financial structure 
Ownership structure 
The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (Pty) Ltd is 100% owned by Eskom 
Holdings. Eskom itself is 100% owned by the South African government. 
Strategic partners were purposefully sought for technical and to a lesser 
extent financial contributions. The consortium members of the PBMR 
together with their financial contributions expressed in rand terms and as a 
percentage of their overall contribution are the South African government 
(R 7 595 million–80.61%), Eskom (R 817 million–8.67%), the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) which is a local (R 450 million – 4.78%) 
DFI, Exelon (R 102 million–1.09%), which is a USA, based utilities 
company, and Westinghouse (R 457 million–4.85%) that is a USA based 
equipment provider for the commercial nuclear electric power industry. 
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How the financing was arranged 
The PBMR was financed on a “pay as you go” basis with various 
participants making capital contributions as highlighted in Table 4.2. As 
such references to the capital structure are largely irrelevant. The FOAK 
nature of the project made prospects of raising debt capital from the 
commercial banks highly improbable. The lack of commercial lenders 
potentially exacerbated the challenges the project faced as the latter could 
have brought financial rigor and oversight on budgets, deadlines, and 
generally enhanced accountability. It is estimated that by April 2000 the 
South African government had expended R 120 million in exploratory work 
on the PBMR before making a firm decision to fund the commercialisation 
of the concept. At the time it was forecast that the venture would yield 
revenues of R18 – R20 billion per year. Table 3.2 above details how the 
South African government invested at least R8 billion in the PBMR by way 
of direct budget allocations. Indirect contributions by state owned 
companies Eskom and the IDC amounted to more than R1.2 billion. The 
total invested directly and indirectly by state institutions amounts to 
approximately R 9.4 billion. The financial contribution of the international 
stakeholders Westinghouse and Exelon is relatively modest in comparison 
amounting at under R 560 million. 
The uncertain funding model of the PBMR was further compromised when 
Eskom and the international partners stopped contributions or exited the 
venture leaving the South African government bearing the funding 
requirement, and resulting in sporadic capital injections from the fiscus. 
This precarious funding model was explained as “we get a phone 
call…Mbeki and Erwin and Manuel had a meeting and …PBMR is getting 
R 6 billion”. Representatives of the PBMR would respond “okay but we 
need 18”, and the caller would reply, “the government will give a third… 
and I will go and get the investors”. Third party investors from other 
countries were considered and almost came to fruition. A bilateral 
agreement was signed with the United States and a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Chinese government. Very little value was derived 
from these arrangements, as Minister Erwin was hesitant to work with 
other countries fearing they would take over the project and steal the 
technology.  
Key to the failure of the funding model was Eskom’s decision not to 
commit to buying the first 10 commercial modules as originally envisaged 
based on value for money considerations.  
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Table 4.2:  PBM
R Capital Contributions Per Partner (PBM
R Annual Financial Statem
ents, 2000-2010) 
Table 6.6: Capital Contributions Per Partner (PBM
R Annual Financial Statem
ents, 2000-2010) 
Source 
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2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
Total 
Contribution 
S
outh A
frican G
vt 
R
 - 
R
 - 
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R299 066 490 
Total 
R279 180 940 
R297 819 060 
R431 405 000 
R333 302 000 
R - 
R745 165 000 
R847 834 000 
R1 301 862 000 R2 194 976 000 R1 750 000 000 R1 737 750 000 R9 919 294 000 
 1. 
The BEE Partner stake was transferred to Eskom
 from
 2001 
N1- An am
endm
ent to the financial year-end from
 31 Decem
ber to 31 M
arch culm
inated in the one set of financial statem
ents for the years 2004 and 2005 covering a 15-
m
onth period. 
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Eskom benchmarked the per kilowatt costs of the PBMR with its existing 
coal powered stations and argued it was willing to pay approximately US$ 
1 000 per kilowatt. This formula may have been flawed because the coal 
powered fire stations in Eskom’s fleet were largely legacy constructs and 
did not reflect the contemporary costs of building a new coal powered fire 
station, and coal prices were depressed subduing the generation costs. 
4.3.3  Key risks 
Regulatory and environmental 
 
Legislation prescribed that the PBMR required authorisation from the 
Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (NECSA) as the apex 
regulatory authority. While Eskom argued that the PBMR technology was 
intrinsically safe, regulatory approval was needed for the engineering of 
safety barriers that arise during the construction phase, the licensing 
phase, and the regulatory regime once the plant has been commissioned. 
Eskom projected that the feasibility and licensing costs would be US$ 64 
million and US$ 5.7 million respectively. Eskom anticipated that regulatory 
approval in South Africa would be obtained within 4 years. Regulatory 
approval for completed engineering designs proved to take a lot longer 
than expected due to limited experience and capacity constraints within 
NECSA, and the need to comply with international standards and 
protocols. This significantly delayed the speed of development and the 
related costs. 
 
Despite an extensive and complex EIA including complying with 
legislation, regulations, policies and multi-lateral treaties, many of the 
environmental risks were automatically mitigated by plans to locate the 
prototype within close proximity to the existing Koeberg nuclear power 
station. Final approval was extended on account of the fact that different 
regulatory authorities had to independently verify different aspects of the 
proposed venture applying their own procedures for approval and 
governance. The PMBR EIA was performed on two broad pillars. The first 
pillar detailed the legal and regulatory requirements and the degree to 
which the PBMR company and Eskom had complied with these. It also 
highlighted the need to consider alternative energy sources. Significant 
evaluations on radiological waste management and final disposal were 
carried out, including the controls surrounding inadvertently facilitating 
nuclear weapons proliferation. The assessment also considered the risks 
relating to radiologically induced cancers and how the design, operation 
and waste disposal features of the plant would prevent these. The second 
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pillar considered the project issues and impacts namely, social impacts, 
economic aspects, biophysical or sensitivity aspects, and technical 
suitability considerations. This was supplemented by an extensive public 
participation process in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape 
provinces between 16 and 30 May 2002, and an opportunity to give input 
into the draft report between 4 June and 4 August 2002.  
Prominent environmental organisations were “in principle” entirely 
opposed to the PBMR and nuclear energy. This was informed in part by 
the view that nuclear power is inherently unsafe. The lobby argued that the 
potential incalculable consequences of a nuclear accident were not an 
appropriate risk for society to take. The large upfront investment required 
for nuclear power was also a major contention, including the societal and 
economic ramifications where these costs are borne by small businesses 
and consumers. The matter of waste disposal and South Africa’s 
incomplete plans regarding waste were another significant concern. 
Environmentalists also argued the costs of decommissioning of nuclear 
power plants are rarely factored into the project evaluation and these costs 
are significant enough alone to alter the economic and financial 
justification for a nuclear power station.  
The opportunity costs in expending large portions of capital on nuclear 
power versus other pressing socio-economic priorities was questioned, 
together with concerns regarding the integrity of the procurement process. 
In this regard environmentalists argued that the South African government 
is currently subsidising the nuclear industry to the value of the R 600 
million allocated to NECSA via the national budget. Environmentalists 
further argued that more flexible peaking power alternatives such as gas 
offer superior capital investment returns and their elasticity makes them 
more responsive to power demand in the South African economy. The 
final reason for objections to the PBMR and nuclear power include the 
challenges European countries are encountering regarding the 
decommissioning of legacy plants as they reach the end of their lives and 
the exorbitant costs involved. 
Construction and technology 
Whilst the executive management team was comprised primarily of 
commercial and legal practitioners, the core PBMR project related to 
scientific engineering and nuclear outputs. It was difficult for the 
management team to hold the engineering and nuclear personnel 
accountable as the management team had insufficient technical expertise. 
The project sponsors also failed to define what the final product was going 
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to be from the outset. The first contentious issue in this regard was the 
capacity of the reactor. The original PBMR was envisaged to have a 
capacity of 180 MW. In response to Eskom’s argument that this was not 
competitive, the designers increased the plant capacity twice until it 
reached 400 MW. The larger reactor brought with it new technical 
complications that had been resolved in the 180 MW such as temperature 
challenges and the composition of the fuel feedstock. Another key 
technical aspect that was not established from the outset was whether the 
plant should use the direct or indirect cycle for thermal heat transfer, with 
the former requiring greater technical innovation as the process was not 
technically established. The result of this dynamic landscape was massive 
delays and increased funding requirements. A change in one part 
frequently necessitated changes on significant portions of the remainder of 
the design, and all changes had to be submitted to the regulatory 
authorities for evaluation and approval. The construction of the prototype 
was originally scheduled for 2003 and was subsequently pushed out to 
beyond 2009. Management became aware of the scope and depth of the 
difficulties much later than they should have. Despite the huge technical 
challenges, and concerned that the project would be terminated, the 
technical team conveyed a sense of progress rather than explicitly laying 
out the significant difficulties, ultimately exacerbating financial losses. By 
the time the PBMR principals submitted the cost projections for the 
prototype these had increased 7 fold from the original budget. 
Market risk 
The formulation of demand in the export market appears to have been 
compiled with insufficient rigour. The forecasts assumed the PBMR would 
win 2% of the power plant market share and therefore sustain annual sales 
of 30 modules, 10 being from South Africa. These forecasts were backed 
by letters of intent from Eskom and Exelon to buy 10 and 40 units 
respectively in the decade after commercialisation. The letters of intent 
were not binding on either parties and Eskom’s commitment was made on 
the proviso that the PBMR would be the cheapest option. After the release 
of a Detailed Feasibility Report by Price Waterhouse Coopers, Exelon 
exited the consortium. The report downgraded sales to 10 modules per 
annum. The anticipated export market was essential to enjoy production 
efficiencies. However, the appetite for nuclear power projects in many key 
markets was questionable. In Europe, with the exception of France and 
Finland, the prospects for nuclear power plant orders were highly 
improbable. The North and South American appetite was also severely 
diminished with no orders being placed since 1974 having come to fruition. 
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Canada had developed its own technology that had begun to run into 
safety and financial viability challenges. In Asia, Pakistan, India and China 
were pursuing their own nuclear programmes and attempting to develop in 
house technologies. On the African continent no country was actively 
pursuing nuclear power despite earlier putative attempts by Egypt and 
Nigeria. In addition the exit of strategic partners Exelon, Westinghouse, 
and British Nuclear Fuel killed the prospect of export markets outside 
Africa. Eskom’s eventual decision not to commission the first 10 order as 
originally planned meant that there was effectively no existing market for 
the PBMR.  
Political risk 
Political support for the PBMR can be described as shallow, erratic and 
fragmented. There was limited engagement by South Africa’s political 
principals. Eskom had acted as the principal driver and a key financial 
sponsor but its support waned decisively after the board resolved that 
Eskom was not a technology developer and made a decision to cease 
funding of the PBMR in late 2003. President Mbeki was however an ardent 
supporter of the PBMR and the Minister of Public Enterprises was 
designated to provide political leadership to the initiative, with a task team 
including the Director General of the Department of Trade and Industry 
Alistair Ruiters was established. Despite this high level support at the 
executive, the Department of Minerals and Energy did not support the 
endeavour. The shallow support for the PBMR extended to the ruling party 
alliance made up of the African National Congress (ANC), the South 
African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU). Affiliates of COSATU in the form of the National 
Union of Mine Workers and the National Union of Metal Workers were 
strongly opposed to the project based on the view that the roll out of an 
extensive nuclear programme could result in the replacement of coal fired 
power stations, which would result in coalminers losing their jobs. The 
Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel candidly described his view of the 
PBMR as “a four letter word”. President Mbeki was recalled by the ANC in 
2008 and Alec Erwin resigned from cabinet resulting in the removal of the 
two most senior executive members supporting the PBMR. With political 
sentiment in the ruling party having moved decisively against Thabo 
Mbeki, projects that he had championed were contaminated by 
association and faced open animosity under a new political leadership. 
These developments left the PBMR project isolated and compromised. 
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Project management and co-ordination 
The co-ordination of public sector institutions critical in enabling the 
success of the PBMR was severely lacking. At a minimum the PBMR 
required the active support of the departments of Energy and Public 
Enterprises, National Treasury, Eskom, the Nuclear Energy Corporation of 
South Africa (NECSA), and overall cabinet endorsement. The PBMR 
company’s designation as a state owned entity meant it fell under the 
department of Public Enterprises whereas a more appropriate reporting 
line would have been to the Department of Energy (DoE). The Department 
of Public Enterprises was a relatively small department in the government 
architecture but had to deal with sizeable challenges in a number of public 
organisations. Entities reporting into the department of Public Enterprises 
experiencing severe difficulties in 2004 included Eskom, Denel, South 
African Airways, Infraco and Alexkor. Arguably the capacity of the 
department to deal with these challenges was extremely stretched. This 
could have contributed to the diminished oversight that the PBMR 
received. The development of the PBMR would have been better suited to 
a reporting line via the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
(CSIR) and the Department of Science and Technology on account of its 
technical nature. The lack of a co-ordinating body addressing turf wars, 
vested interests, bureaucracy and bottlenecks resulted in government 
departments not co-operating with one another and a haphazard and 
chaotic project process. The lack of application of best practise project 
management principals in the development of the PBMR compounded its 
difficulties. There was no explicit project life cycle articulated with 
attendant project milestones and deadlines. There was also no overall 
project manager for the different participants. As a result, there were 
multiple participants including the PBMR company, Eskom, the regulatory 
authority giving input and feedback, yet there was no party with an overall 
“helicopter view” of what was going on. 
Organisational culture 
A significant proportion of the engineers originated from Denel, the state 
owned arms manufacturer. These employees had developed arms for 
South Africa during the apartheid era when budgetary considerations were 
not paramount. This culture permeated PBMR development and 
intensified financial strains. Whilst staffed with capable and driven 
employees, the PBMR company did not initially establish the requisite 
structures to institutionalise focus, goals, discipline and clarity. Internal 
controls, checks and balances, and accountability mechanisms were 
severely deficient. The number of employee rose from less than 100 in 
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2006 to in excess of 800 people. This growth occurred at a time when 
there was no product on the table and resulted in a massive corporate 
structure costing R 600 million per annum. Management struggled to put 
in place sound corporate governance mechanisms whilst at the same time 
monitor technical progress on the PBMR. Management focus was 
therefore diluted by having to establish internal operational and control 
mechanisms while simultaneously trying to monitor, guide, and oversee 
the technical and scientific development of the reactor.  
4.3.4  Institutional and legal arrangements 
The primary mechanisms governing the PBMR were the Companies Act 
and the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA).  Other applicable pieces 
of regulatory, policy and strategic frameworks include Treasury 
Regulations, the Medium Term Strategic Framework. Parliamentary 
oversight over Eskom would be spearheaded by the Standing Committee 
on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and the Portfolio Committee on Energy. 
Despite Eskom having 100% ownership, the governance structure of the 
PBMR Company sought to include the non-equity participating members 
of the consortium by way of a ‘co-operation agreement’. The 2009 Annual 
report of PBMR Ltd states effective control is not exercised by Eskom 
Holdings Limited, but in terms of a co-operation agreement between 
Eskom Holdings Limited, the IDC, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, 
and PBMR. A shareholder agreement that was intended to replace the co-
operation agreement and issue equity stakes to participants never came 
into effect as government failed to fulfil a condition precedent within the 
prescribed deadline. The shareholder agreement lapsed and parties 
reverted back to the co-operation agreement as a governance 
mechanism. The government’s hesitance was attributable to novel nature 
of the project and co-operation arrangements. It may also have preferred 
Areva as a partner. The cumulative result of this paralysis added to the 
uncertainty and lack of clarity regarding accountability for the PBMR. It 
was not the intention at the commencement of commercialisation for the 
government to carry the lion’s share of the funding responsibility. An 
original agreement proposed contributions by the original consortium of 
Eskom (40%), IDC (25%), Westinghouse (22.5%) and Exelon (12.5%). 
This agreement, together with a subsequently amended version in 
September 2005 was never signed, and the co-operation agreement never 
released into the public domain. Factors were further complicated when 
British Nuclear Fuel sold Westinghouse to Toshiba and facing financial 
challenges Toshiba reversed a commitment by Westinghouse to inject 
US$ 25 million into the PBMR. Eskom ceased making financial 
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contributions to the PBMR in 2004 and the primary driver of the PBMR 
was therefore the South African national government. 
4.3.5  Lessons learned 
Key lessons can be derived from the failure of the PBMR. The most 
glaring is the need to deepen and broaden political support. This is even 
more critical when the project is controversial and faces significant interest 
from key sectors of society. Such support is essential when a project 
encounters significant challenges, which in mega projects such as the 
PBMR is a virtual inevitability. The need to ensure effective co-ordination 
between departments and entities and their respective principals integral 
to the implementation of the project is essential. This ‘herding’ of 
participants includes a mechanism that institutionalises the role of each 
participant and provides a dedicated secretariat that overseas, directs, 
prompts, cajoles, castigates, and generally facilitates the overall 
progression of the endeavour. An important factor leading to internal and 
external uncertainty of the PBMR project was the lack of finality and 
closure regarding the funding model. It is essential for there to be clarity 
on the funding model not only for execution purposes but also to signal 
politically that the venture is a priority project and as such should be 
accorded the requisite focus. The capital allocated to key facilitators such 
as the regulatory and oversight bodies has to be increased significantly so 
that they develop the capacity to effectively and expeditiously execute 
their mandates. The lack of a robust funding model meant that the R 30 
billion required to construct the prototype and proceed to full 
commercialisation was not available. 
Compounding the uncertainty of the funding model was the lack of clarity 
on the final product regarding the capacity and key aspects of the 
technology including the direct versus the indirect cycle. Certainty and 
clarity regarding the final product would have reduced substantially the 
engineering and technical changes that were necessitated by the multiple 
amendments to the final product.  This would also have contributed 
significantly to a clearly defined market. As the PBMR was a FOAK 
development respondents conceded in pursuing the PBMR the South 
African government could have “bitten off more than we could chew”. The 
scale of engineering, scientific and technological factors that had to be 
developed and resolved was such that a project of this nature requires 
massive resources. The project sponsors could have pursued a piecemeal 
approach to the development of the PBMR including setting key 
milestones along the project’s critical path.  
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The utility of co-operation agreements and the varying levels of sincerity 
and commitment partners bring to a project is a key lesson. Westinghouse 
was in possession of a report detailing the challenges it encountered in 
previously developing similar technology and its subsequent failure. It 
withheld this document that contained substantively all the difficulties the 
PBMR had encountered. Westinghouse was represented on the board of 
the PBMR company and the representatives would have been keenly 
aware of their own failures. Westinghouse gave nominal support to the 
PBMR with a view that if it were successful they would increase their level 
of commitment and enjoy the benefits of its commercialisation. If however 
the venture failed to overcome the challenges already encountered at 
Westinghouse, their investment was not substantial and they could exit. 
The final lesson regarding the PBMR relates to understanding the 
business that you are in. Part of the logic underlying the South African 
government’s pursuit of the PBMR was that if commercialised it would 
support domestic manufacturing and industrial capacity through the 
production of modules for both domestic and international consumption. 
This was a misconception. Even if the PBMR had been successfully 
commercialised the manufacturing and industrial opportunities would have 
been limited, because most export markets would have insisted that a 
significant portion of the manufacturing of components take place in the 
host countries. Successful development of the PBMR would have 
essentially resulted in a technology business that would license its 
intellectual property and this would constitute its largest asset and revenue 
spinner. The PBMR company has been mothballed with the majority of its 
staff retrenched. The few remaining tasks involve the maintenance of two 
large test facilities and a number of assets, managing ownership of 206 
patents with a further 40 still in the process of registration.  
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4.4 Kalkbult Solar Plant 
FACT SHEET 
Project 
Description 
 The largest solar plant on the African continent on construction 
 Phase 1 capacity of 75 MW with brownfields expansion 
potential of 180MW (Phase 2) and 175MW (Phase 3) 
 Substructure-system: Fixed tilted 
 Solar modules: BYD 240P6C-30 polycrystalline 
 Inverter-system: SMA Inverters 
 Project yield: 2 035 kWh/kWp 
 Energy produced: 150 000 MWh per annum 
 Energy equivalent: 35 000 South African households 
 Area: 105 hectares 
Key Personnel 
to Kalkbult 
Project 
Company (Pty) 
Ltd 
 Raymond Carlsen – Chief Executive Officer – Scatec Solar 
 Mikkel Torud – Financial Director  
 Kari Fremme – Project Director – Scatec Solar 
Contractors 
 SMA Inverters – Inverter system 
 Kentz – Sub- Engineering, Procurement and Construction 
 PIA Solar – Design, manufacture and installation of fixed 
racking systems 
 Norton Rose: Legal adviser to project sponsors 
 Bowman Gilfillan and Trinity International: Legal adviser to 
lenders 
 Marsh: Insurance advisor to sponsors and lenders 
Objectives 
 Participation in South Africa’s Renewable Energy Independent 
Power Producers Programme 
 Energy diversification and security of South Africa 
 Socio-economic development  
 Establishment of solar projects as viable and competitive 
offering in energy mix 
 Monetize the green and environmentally sustainable aspects of 
project through carbon credits 
 Effect environmentally friendly energy generation 
Funding and 
Shareholders 
 Full funding requirement – €200 million (R 2.173 billion) 
 Scatec Solar AS (Norway) –60% 
o Norfund Norway (21% effective interest) 
o Itochu Corporation Japan  
 Simacel Kalkbult Holding (South Africa) – 20% 
o Kalkbult Community Trust (12.25% effective interest) 
o Black Women Community Trust (7.75% effective 
interest) 
 Standard Bank (South Africa) – 10% 
 Old Mutual (South Africa) – 10% 
Products and 
Services 
 Generation of 150 000 MWh per annum 
 Operation and maintenance of 75MW Plant over 20 year 
concession period 
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4.4.1  Background 
The South African Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers 
Programme (REIPPP) seeks to diversify energy and specifically electricity 
sources, develop and support of local industries in the provision of related 
equipment, and enable job creation. It has sought to apply international 
best practice in its design and execution. The 2011 iteration of South 
Africa’s Department of Energy Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) foresees 
an important role for renewable energy with a goal of 3 725 MW from this 
source by 2015.  
4.4.2  Financial structure 
Ownership structure 
The consortium members and shareholders of the Kalkbult Solar Plant are 
as follows. Scatec Solar AS has a 60% equity stake and is supported by 
key funders and shareholders in the Kalkbult project including a NOK 190 
million capital injection from Norfund Norway. Simacel Kalkbult Holding is 
a vehicle housing the 20% equity stake held by the local community and in 
accordance with the Black Economic Empowerment provisions of South 
Africa’s REIPPP. Standard Bank is a leading commercial bank in South 
Africa and holds a 10% stake. Old Mutual is Africa’s largest pension and 
retirement fund manager and administrator and also holds a 10% stake. 
Figure 4-2 illustrates the participant and ownership structure. 
How the financing was arranged 
Kalkbult is reportedly funded on a 76:24 debt to equity split. The debt 
funding was largely derived from Standard Bank of South Africa that acted 
as the mandated lead arranger and underwriter. Other debt providers are 
Liberty Group, DBSA, Futuregrowth Asset Management, and Old Mutual 
South Africa. Regulations prescribed that debt had to be raised from 
domestic capital markets as is detailed below. The equity participants 
were Scatec Solar Norway, Old Mutual, Standard Bank, and Simacel 
Kalkbult. The DBSA significantly funded the BEE equity stake. The 
financing arrangements for Kalkbult are summarised as follows in Table 
4.3: 
Table 4.3:  Kalkbult Solar Park Financing Arrangements  
Financing Type Term Loan 
Transaction Type New Build 
Total Value R 2 199.80 million 
Equity Raised R    521.50 million 
Gearing Ratio 76:24 
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Figure 4-2: Kalkbult Photovoltaic Solar Plant Participants (Scatec Solar: Kalkbult Project, 2012) 
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The project debt has a term of 15 years. This actually results in a 5-year 
buffer for the project lenders to have recouped their capital before the 
concession expires. A conservative appraisal of the capital expenditure 
reveals that in excess of 55% of these payments would accrue to non-
South African equipment suppliers largely in the form of the PV modules. 
The project cost breakdown reveals transaction costs constitute 
approximately 3.1% of the capital expenditure costs. If however the DoE 
Contribution, the Department Premium, and the Commitment Fees Paid 
are considered as transaction costs, this escalates the latter to 10.8%. 
This observation highlights the high transaction costs experienced in most 
project finance transactions. 
4.4.3  Key risks 
Regulatory and environmental 
The process followed to implement Kalkbult by way of the REIPPP was 
characterised by the following key features. The Request For Proposal 
(RFP) documentation is divided into three categories that prescribe 
general requirements and rules, qualification criteria, and economic 
development necessities. This first stage acts as a basis of communicating 
clearly and transparently the process to be followed in the auction, the 
obligations of prospective bidders, and minimum participation 
requirements to be eligible as a bidder. The second stage seeks to whittle 
down the applications received to those that most comprehensively and 
competitively meet the expressed qualification requirements. The 
preferred bidders are selected based on their submissions on 
environmental and land matters, economic development proposals, the 
financial model, technical merits, price competitiveness, and their 
organisational and institutional capacity. The final stage involves a 
comparative assessment where preferred bidders are ranked based on 
price, jobs created, local content levels of equipment, black economic 
empowerment credentials and community participation, enterprise and 
socio development. The evaluation process places a 70% weighting to the 
price bids whilst the remaining 30% is assessed on other development 
related objectives. On official selection Kalkbult as a winning bidder signed 
an implementation agreement with the government and a power purchase 
agreement (PPA) with state electricity utility Eskom. Each winning bidder 
is referred to as an Independent Power Producer (IPP). The completion of 
legal agreements result in the South African government guaranteeing the 
PPA through what is referred to as a Government Support Framework 
Agreement. 
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Regulatory requirements prescribe that all debt funding must be sourced 
from domestic banking institutions or capital markets. Each bidder is also 
required to lodge a guarantee of R 100 000 per MW with the amount being 
increased to R 200 000 when a bidder achieves preferred bidder status. 
Guarantees are forfeited if a bidder is disqualified from the program or 
breaches any applicable laws, or fails to sign the PPA, Implementation 
Agreement, Direct Agreement, and Connection Agreement within a 
specified time. Changes in the ownership arrangements are prohibited for 
three years after submission of a bid response to discourage speculative 
bidding. Subsequently these may take place only with the express 
permission of the Department of Energy. Similarly over the duration of the 
concession, no changes in control of the IPP are allowed without the prior 
written consent of the Department of Energy. Any changes in the 
shareholding by Black Enterprises or Black Persons may only be 
transferred to other Black Enterprises or black persons. 
Solar energy has few environmentally adverse side effects. The most 
pressing include land use competition where sites can be used for 
alternative purposes such as agricultural activity. The manufacture and 
operation of solar equipment results in certain toxic chemical by products. 
Furthermore the production of PV modules is extremely energy intensive. 
Aesthetically solar power can be an intrusive and scarring feature of the 
natural and built environments. During the construction and demolition 
phases solar power may result in certain levels of noise intrusion, whilst 
during planning construction and operation there may be some impact on 
the surrounding ecosystem, flora and fauna. Kalkbult’s environmental 
strengths included the fact that the project would have marginal 
environmental impact on the site upon which it is located. This is because 
the site is located in a remote area of the Northern Cape, and the land is 
only suitable for occasional grazing. The construction of the project 
allowed for continued grazing, and the farmers from whom land was 
leased enjoy rental income over the project’s duration. Of the 16 
comments received regarding the environmental impact assessment in the 
public participation process, none were negative and no objections were 
received opposing the venture. The Kalbult plant connected seamlessly to 
the national transmission grid due to an existing connection in close 
proximity to the site further limiting the environmental footprint. 
Community resistance 
The inclusion of the community trust and women’s empowerment group 
was a key feature in financing the transaction and in also adding to the 
legitimacy of the project. From a local economic development perspective 
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the project sponsors began working with communities before the RFP. 
This included sponsoring learning and sporting equipment for Hays 
Primary School that served the local community, together with the 
Mamelani Project that focused on youth health care education, 
subsistence farming skills, HIV training, and a living skills program. In its 
submission Scatec highlighted its skills development and training facilities 
in previous projects. This was supported by the forecast that the Kalkbult 
project would generate 450 jobs during the construction phase and 12 
permanent jobs would be created when fully operational.  
Construction and technology 
 
The physical construction of the plant took 10 months and was completed 
3 months in advance. Despite this the project director conveyed that every 
one-month of execution required two months of planning time. The project 
sponsors managed construction risk by commissioning the engineering, 
procurement and construction of the plant by way of a tender and turnkey 
contract. Scatec as the major sponsor was able to bring extensive 
international experience into these negotiations, particularly in the 
procurement of major hardware. The design, manufacture and installation 
of the fixed racking system were also secured by way of a tendering 
process culminating in a turnkey arrangement. Technologically the 
sponsors opted for tried and tested solar modules, inverter systems, and 
substructures, limiting capital expenditure, mitigating technology risk, and 
ensuring the project was bankable. On account of the large surface area 
covered by the plant a decentralised inverter system was designed and 
deployed by Scatec. Electricity of 204 W per panel is fed into 84 inverter 
hubs distributed across the site and collectively stepped up to 22 kV. Each 
inverter hub then feeds its power into the site’s substation where the 
power is further boosted to 132 kV before being fed into the grid. This 
system is monitored and managed via 1 500 sensors that transmit real 
time data to an on site control room and remotely via a dedicated internet 
based communications link. 
 
Energy yield 
 
The energy yield that could be harvested from the sight was corroborated 
using internal knowledge within Scatec and comparing this with 
independent third party sources. This allowed the sponsor to determine a 
predictable power output with solar irradiation levels at the project site 
forecast at 1935 Kwh/kWp. As a result of the predictability of the radiation, 
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equipment providers were more read to issue performance guarantees 
mitigating against performance and technical risks. 
 
Market 
 
The market risk was mitigated by the PPA signed between the project 
company and Eskom. The PPA obliges Telkom to purchase all the 
electricity generated at pre-determined prices. The PPA is effectively 
underwritten by a sovereign guarantee in the form of Government Support 
Framework Agreement. The South African government enjoys and 
investment grade credit rating. 
 
Foreign exchange 
 
Notable characteristics of the REIPPP relative to other parts of the world 
include the prescription that debt funding must be sourced directly in 
South African capital markets and are rand denominated. This diminishes 
foreign exchange exposures by matching interest payments to the 
currency of the PPA. In addition it results in interest payments remaining in 
the domestic economy and not being repatriated off shore that could have 
potentially exacerbated South Africa’s current account deficit. International 
project sponsors are free to hedge exchange rate risk exposures on 
repatriated profits at their own cost. The pricing of this hedging made it 
prohibitive for the project sponsors and naked foreign exchange risk was 
taken. 
 
Interest rate 
 
Naked interest rate risk was taken on the project debt facility, with a 
floating rate linked to the prime rate of interest. The tariff increments that 
are in part determined by the inflation rate give some protection to this 
exposure. 
4.4.4  Institutional and legal requirements 
Principal contracts 
 
The principal contracts in the Kalkbult project were the Power Purchase 
Agreement (PPA), the Implementation Agreement (IA), the Direct 
Agreement (DA), and the Connection Agreement (CA). The PPA was 
essential in providing a certain off-take to the project sponsors and debt 
providers. It enabled clarity regarding cash flows and revenue streams if 
the project performed in accordance with forecasts. Having an effective 
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sovereign guarantee strengthened the PPPA immensely. The 
Implementation Agreement was signed between the IPP and the DoE and 
put obligations to the IPP to deliver economic development targets. The 
DA gave step in rights for lenders in the event of default by the sponsors. 
The CA was signed between Eskom and the IPP and laid down the 
process and costs to be incurred for each project to be connected to the 
transmission grid. As a collective these contracts were essential in 
providing a stable regulatory framework, adequate safeguards for 
participants, and encouraging a competitive bidding process. 
 
Auction process 
As with many countries implementing renewable energy programmes, 
South Africa has adopted an auction system as opposed to a descending 
clock system, to select winning bidders and prescribe the renewable 
technology to be adopted. Renewable energy auctions have grown in 
popularity with the number of countries applying this method increasing 
from 9 in 2009 to 44 by 2013. 
4.4.5  Lessons learned 
The development, construction, and commissioning of the Kalkbult has 
been notable for its speed, stakeholder inclusiveness, scale, and overall 
success. Arguably the two most important contributors are the REIPPP 
and the capability of the developer in effectively commercialising the plant 
opportunity. Promoters of REIPPP expressed how well structured and 
unambiguous the programme is. It provides certainty around the capacity 
that will be made available, timelines, the tariff structures, the funding 
models, technology, environmental processes and compliance 
requirements. Participants observed the program “forces closure” 
regarding whether a developer’s project is going to proceed or not. Front 
loading the major building blocks to a bid including sources of funding, 
legal and regulatory permits, equipment specifications, EPC providers 
allows projects to move rapidly into construction if it is successful bidder.  
The REIPPP has not been without its detractors. The clarity and certainty 
lauded above compelled developers to put in upfront an extensive amount 
of work and investment to ensure compliance with a range of requirements 
to be eligible to bid. These costs often amounted to 10% or more of the 
entire capital expenditure for the project. These upfront costs created 
insurmountable barriers to entry for a number of potential bidders. The 
authorities have taken note of this criticism and have implemented 
changes in Round 4 of the program and back-load a significant proportion 
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of these costs. Approximately 70% of the due diligence work is performed 
pre-bid with the remainder on the successful award. Another criticism 
relates to the gaps of approximately one year between each bidding 
round. The extended gap between each round meant there was often a 
sense of “starting from scratch” as the lessons of previous rounds were 
not necessarily embedded and institutionalised amongst the various 
stakeholder and had to be re-taught. Another area of potential 
improvement is the level of local content in the capital equipment as 
significant portions of the capital equipment having to be imported.  
A key factor in Kalkbult’s success was the developer’s realistic 
expectations regarding the IRR expectations, together with the 
competitiveness of the funding package. The funding package was 
essential to the project because in an auction system the key driver is cost 
of debt so if you can reduce the cost of funding you can reduce the tariff 
and win, because there isn’t massive differentiation in equipment 
performance and price. International developers with strong balance 
sheets enjoyed a comparative advantage in some cases by funding entire 
projects with equity or having a very high equity component relative to 
debt. Alternatively they were able to issue guarantees and other credit 
enhancements to local banks providing debt capital to reduce the cost of 
debt funding. The reputation of the Norwegian developer Scatec and its 
proven capability in developing solar projects was a key contributor to the 
success of the bid. This experience also meant the developer was able to 
source effective EPC contractors with an understanding of risk allocation 
mechanisms, and who would be able to deliver on their contractual 
obligations. 
The mandatory sourcing of debt from domestic capital markets and the 
rand denominated tariff on the PPA reduced the attraction of the 
programme to a minority of international developers who preferred a hard 
currency denominated tariff. This requirement had the positive effect of 
creating a natural currency hedge between the PPA and the debt funding. 
The downside for the developer and other foreign investors who would 
need to translate dividend distributions into the Euro, Dollars or other 
alternative currencies was that they were exposed to rand dollar exchange 
rate volatility. By way of illustration the Rand/Dollar exchange rate 
fluctuated from US$1:R8.01 to US$1:R10.86 from the project’s award of 
preferred bidder status to 27 November 2014. This volatility represents a 
real depreciation of in excess of 35% and has resulted in dollar equivalent 
dividend distributions being compromised to the same degree. 
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Prescribing domestic debt funding arrangements in projects such as 
Kalkbult has had a number of significant benefits for the South African 
economy. Firstly it has provided a platform for local banks to be at the 
forefront of the debt issuance activities and not be overshadowed by larger 
international banks with deeper and cheaper sources of capital. In so 
doing South African banks have broadened and deepened their skills and 
human capital in the project finance space in general, and in the 
renewable power sector in particular. The skills accrual has had a 
multiplier effect on other professional service providers including auditors, 
EPC contractors, legal firms, environmental consultants, and other 
professionals across the development chain. 
Appetite for equity stakes by domestic institutional investors was moderate 
on account of a number of factors. Firstly SA institutions were not 
experienced with investing in renewable energy as opposed to 
international developers who had extensive track records. As such 
institutions that did invest tended to spread their equity exposure across 
multiple projects to diversify risk. Old Mutual for example took a 10% 
equity stake in Kalkbult but had multiple equity exposures in other projects 
as well. Challenges were also encountered with the funding for the BEE 
equity stakes with ultimately the DBSA and the IDC funding the majority of 
the latter. The prescription for communities to be included in the BEE 
schemes has proven a significant benefit to the communities in which 
projects are developed. The Kalkbult sponsors front-loaded some of the 
benefits to the local community in the form of education, training and 
employment opportunities, enabling the venture to garner community 
backing. The Kalkbult project company has benefited by having access to 
a better-trained workforce and immunising itself from sabotage.  
The success of the Kalkbult and other renewable energy projects has the 
potential to broaden South African capital markets. Respondents noted 
how refinancing of the debt would be the most immediate opportunity as 
the loans can be packaged into an instrument and sold off to yield funds at 
a margin. Appetite is expected to be strong as the projects will have a 
proven operational track record and are underpinned by the PPA inferring 
the debt has sovereign credit rating attributes. It is anticipated that 
investors with appetite for property funds] will potentially have appetite for 
power projects such as Kalkbult once a certain critical mass is reached, 
that is likely to result in the establishment of an additional asset class.  
A number of lessons and opportunities to enhance the execution of future 
REIPPP rounds and to spread the benefits of the programme are 
proposed. The first opportunity relates to South African company’s ability 
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to sell services in other parts of the African continent where energy and 
infrastructure related programmes are being rolled out. It is submitted that 
credit guarantees and enhancements on projects may currently be overly 
onerous and can be lightened, whilst still being comparable with 
international benchmarks. Greater clarity regarding the exact roles of 
NERSA and the DoE are proposed as conflicting interpretations have 
occurred regarding the responsibilities of each of these institutions. 
Another potential improvement would be for a debriefing session post 
bidding for unsuccessful developers, supplementing the letter currently 
received, and facilitating engagement as to remedies that developers can 
make to their bids for them to be more competitive. In response to 
dumping of equipment, a submission to the effect that anti-dumping 
mechanisms should be introduced including imposing minimum technical 
criteria on imported equipment. Finally the standardisation of contractual 
documentation in the bidding process is an intervention that has the 
potential to significantly ease the extent of front-loaded development 
costs.  
4.5 South Africa Country Cluster Comparison 
A comparison of the four case studies investigated in the South African 
cluster reveals a number of pertinent insights. Firstly, the depth and the 
liquidity of South African capital markets allow for large pools of capital to 
be sourced and applied towards large infrastructure projects. All debt and 
equity funding for the three projects was sourced from within South Africa, 
with the only exceptions being the 23.75% foreign owned equity portion of 
Seacom, the 5.51% contribution by international partners to the PBMR, 
and Scatec’s 60% equity contribution to Kalkbult. Significantly, the South 
African government was key to underwriting The Gautrain, PBMR, and 
Kalbult either directly or indirectly through state owned enterprises or 
related government institutions. Without state financial participation and 
related facilitation these ventures would not have been commissioned. The 
deterioration in the South Africa’s sovereign deteriorating credit rating from 
A- in 2011 to Baa2 in 2015 by Moody’s implies that the state is less well 
placed to underwrite large scale infrastructure projects. Debt funding from 
commercial banks was accessed for the proven technologies applied in 
Seacom, the Gautrain, and Kalkbult. Debt funding could not however be 
applied to a FOAK technology that was the PBMR. 
The nature of government participation also differed significantly across 
projects. With public initiatives such as the Gautrain and the PBMR 
extensive, detailed and pro-active participation by national, provincial and 
municipal levels of government, and government agencies were required to 
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facilitate the projects. Regarding Kalkbult, national government contributed 
by conceptualising and implementing a clear and credible regulatory 
framework, and underwriting the REIPPP by way of a sovereign guarantee. 
Due to the Seacom cable being located largely in international waters and 
the nature of the project, state participation was largely limited to regulatory 
aspects. 
The Seacom, Gautrain, and Kalkbult stakeholders made extensive use of 
technical, legal, and financial advisers, together with international service 
providers where required. The participation of international advisers on the 
other projects appears to have contributed to more robust and well-
conceptualised projects that outweighed the costs of these services. A 
notable aspect of the PBMR is the limited input of the international partners 
in the technical and operational affairs, and absence of external advisers. 
This may have been in part due to the fact that the project had a significant 
exploratory aspect, or sensitivities concerning intellectual property. The 
absence of external input on the PBMR appears to have resulted in the 
venture being more insular and less subject to oversight and monitoring 
especially on the technical development. 
The term horizons for the project sponsors reveals marked differences. 
The sponsors on Seacom were committed to the project for its full life 
whilst the Gautrain has commitment from the South African government in 
perpetuity. The shareholding in Kalkbult cannot change without regulatory 
approval. In contrast, the commitment of the South African government as 
the 100% shareholder of the PBMR was never explicitly articulated and 
evidently uncertain. This ambiguity by the sole project sponsor undermined 
the project’s credibility. The capital structures of Seacom the Gautrain, and 
Kalkbult post completion have evolved in accordance with the forecast 
funding model and been conservative in nature. Conversely the funding 
model for the PBMR was never clarified and the capital structure was 
largely determined by the generosity of government allocations decided on 
an ad-hoc basis.  While the governance arrangements on the Gautrain are 
clearly instituted by way of the GMA, and in the case of Seacom and 
Kalkbult by way of a shareholder agreement, the PBMR governance 
arrangements were never made final, and executive responsibility shifted 
between DTI, DPE, and DoE, with on-going reservations by treasury 
officials. The cases illustrate that the stability and clarity in the governance 
arrangements are a clear component contributing to project success.  
For all four projects investigated no significant breaches of sustainability 
regulations were noted. In the case of the Gautrain, and to a lesser extent 
Kalkbult, this can be attributed to the authenticity of the EIA and EMP 
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despite a number of imperfections in this respect. Regarding Seacom, the 
undersea cable has a small environmental footprint and key risks can be 
mitigated and addressed in the EIA process. The Seacom sponsors would 
also have been careful not to risk jeopardising the entire venture based on 
a sustainability breach at one location alone. The failure to construct a 
prototype of the PBMR ensured environmental impacts were limited to the 
conceptualisation and research phase. On all four projects no risks outside 
of the risk universe mapped out at conceptualisation have occurred that 
have not been mitigated. Unanticipated risks have included cable theft on 
the Gautrain and political upheaval in Egypt and piracy off the Somalia 
coast that resulted in cable connection delays for Seacom. The risk 
universe has largely been stable and predictable with the exception of the 
Egypt and Somalia occurrences that were effectively addressed.  
As at June 2015 the Gautrain, Seacom and Kalkbult projects post 
completion, are mature and stable. Additional rolling stock is being 
procured for the Gautrain to increase capacity as patronage as exceeded 
original forecasts. A feasibility study to extend the network is expected to 
be complete by the end of 2015. The Seacom venture is building on its 
backhaul and value added services. Importantly the business landscape 
has changed dramatically due to new entrants and significant declines in 
bandwidth prices necessitating an adaptive business model. The stability of 
the Seacom project has allowed the sponsors to refinance the debt 
facilities on more favourable terms. The Gautrain debt component can 
potentially be favourably refinanced with bankers expressing keen appetite 
for this, together with extending further advances for the next stage of the 
project assuming the successful outcome of the feasibility study. Table 4.4 
distils some of the key comparative attributes between Seacom, Gautrain, 
the PBMR, and Kalkbult contrasting key contributors to success and 
failure. 
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Table 4.4:  South Africa Cluster Com
parison 
Attribute 
Seacom
 
Gautrain 
PBM
R 
Kalkbult 
Geographic 
Source of Funding x 
D
ebt funding all South 
Africa 
x 
76.25%
 equity funding 
South Africa 
x 
D
ebt funding all South 
Africa 
x 
100%
 equity funding 
South Africa 
x 
100%
 equity funding South 
Africa 
x 
International partner 
contribution equivalent to 
5.51%
 of project costs 
x 
D
ebt funding all South 
Africa 
x 
 60%
 international equity 
funding.  
x 
40%
 equity funding South 
Africa 
Nature of Equity 
Participants 
x 
Private sector 
investm
ent funds 
x 
Provincial G
overnm
ent 
x 
N
ational G
overnm
ent 
x 
Private sector investm
ent 
funds and com
m
unity 
groups 
Governm
ent 
Participation 
x 
N
o governm
ent 
participation except on 
regulatory m
atters 
x 
Extensive participation 
by N
ational, Provincial, 
and M
unicipal tiers of 
governm
ent 
x 
Extensive participation by 
governm
ent via Eskom
, 
N
ER
, D
oE
, D
P
E and N
T 
x 
Participation by 
governm
ent via Eskom
, 
N
ER
, D
oE
, and N
T. 
D
rafting of R
E
IP
PP 
regulatory fram
ew
ork 
Debt Funding 
Institutions  
x 
SA C
om
m
ercial Banks 
x 
SA C
om
m
ercial Banks 
x 
N
ot applicable 
x 
 SA C
om
m
ercial Banks 
Use of 
International 
Service Providers 
x 
Extensive use of 
technical, legal, and 
financial advisers 
x 
Am
erican prom
oter and 
equity participant 
actively involved 
x 
International service 
providers 
com
m
issioned to roll 
x 
Extensive use of 
technical, legal, and 
financial advisers by all 
participating 
stakeholders 
x 
R
olling stock sourced 
from
 international rail 
groups 
x 
O
perating com
pany led 
x 
Insignificant participation 
by international partners 
x 
Lim
ited financial 
contribution by Exelon and 
W
estinghouse 
x 
N
o operational 
involvem
ent by Exelon and 
W
estinghouse 
x 
Extensive use of technical, 
legal, and financial 
advisers by all 
participating stakeholders 
x 
Equipm
ent sourced from
 
m
ultiple jurisdictions 
x 
O
perating com
pany led by 
Scatec 
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Attribute 
Seacom
 
Gautrain 
PBM
R 
Kalkbult 
out infrastructure 
by international service 
providers 
Tim
e Com
m
itm
ent 
of Sponsors 
x 
Long term
 and open 
ended 
x 
Perpetuity 
x 
U
ndefined 
x 
Long term
 over 20-year 
concession. R
egulatory 
approval required for 
changes 
Project Stage 
x 
Initial project concept 
m
ature and stable 
x 
Scope of project 
extending to 
dow
nstream
 backhaul 
operations and value 
added services 
x 
Initial project concept 
m
ature and stable 
x 
Extension of rolling 
stock assets to fill 
elevated dem
and 
x 
Feasibility study on 
netw
ork extension to be 
finalised in 2015 
x 
Project m
othballed 
x 
Adm
inistrative being 
perform
ed to register and 
m
anage intellectual 
property arising from
 
project 
x 
Initial project concept 
m
ature and stable 
 
Business 
Landscape 
x 
Sector experiencing 
significant changes 
including new
 cable 
entrants, technological 
advances enhancing 
perform
ance of existing 
infrastructure, m
assive 
drop in prices, huge 
volum
e increases 
x 
Evolving business 
m
odel from
 IR
U
s to 
annuity incom
e 
x 
C
hallenges and delays 
regarding the 
im
plem
entation on 
Provincial H
ighw
ays 
reduce econom
ic 
appeal 
x 
G
row
ing dem
and due 
to increased congestion 
x 
H
igh barriers to entry 
and international 
standard m
ake service 
offering very attractive 
x 
Affordability of service 
lim
ited to m
iddle class 
patrons 
x 
N
uclear technology being 
challenged on account of 
m
assive cost overruns on 
recent projects 
x 
Fukushim
a leakages due 
to tsunam
i in Japan have 
raised nuclear safety 
concerns 
x 
A num
ber of countries 
including G
erm
any have 
suspended construction of 
nuclear pow
er plants 
x 
R
EIPP
P in round 4.5. 
Increasing 
com
petitiveness in bidding 
and significant drop in 
prices. 
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Attribute 
Seacom
 
Gautrain 
PBM
R 
Kalkbult 
Capital Structure 
Post Com
pletion 
x 
N
o significant changes 
and conservative 
leverage adopted 
x 
N
o significant changes 
and conservative 
leverage adopted as 
largely funded from
 
public purse 
x 
N
ot applicable – project 
m
othballed 
x 
N
o significant changes  
Governance 
Structure Post 
Com
pletion 
x 
N
o significant changes  
x 
N
o significant changes 
x 
N
ot applicable – project 
m
othballed 
x 
N
o significant changes 
Significant 
Environm
ental/Sus
tainability 
Incidents 
x 
N
on reported 
x 
N
on reported 
x 
N
on reported 
x 
N
on reported 
Risk Universe 
Dynam
ics 
x 
Stable and w
ell 
m
anaged 
x 
Stable and w
ell 
m
anaged 
x 
S
ee ‘C
om
petitive B
usiness 
Landscape’ above 
x 
Stable and w
ell m
anaged 
Refinancing 
Initiatives 
x 
Successful refinancing 
of original debt facilities 
x 
R
efinancing being 
considered but not yet 
effected 
x 
N
ot applicable – project 
m
othballed 
x 
N
on reported 
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Mozambique Cluster 
4.6 The Mozambique Aluminium Smelter (Mozal) - Phases I 
and II 
FACT SHEET 
Project 
Description 
 Construction and operation of a two phase aluminium smelter 
 Development of Matola harbour facilities servicing smelter 
import and exports 
Key 
Personnel 
 
 Brian Gilbertson – Chief Executive Officer – BHP/Gencor 
 Paul Snyman – Financial Director – Alusaf (BHP/Gencor) 
 Louis Irvine – Treasurer - Alusaf 
 Jaco Kriek – Head of Project and Structured Finance – 
Industrial Development Corporation 
Contractors 
 Murray and Roberts and S&C Love – Engineering, 
Procurement, Construction 
 Pechiney – Aluminium Pechiney AP30S state of the art smelting 
equipment and related technology 
Objectives 
 Kick-start Mozambique industry and economy (impact on GDP 
and export earnings) 
 Demonstrate Mozambique’s receptiveness to foreign direct 
investment 
 Optimise Cahora Bassa power station and excess electricity 
generation capacity in Southern Africa 
 Create forward and backward industrial linkages via industrial 
park, Hillside Smelter in SA, and Maputo Corridor 
 Enhance greater regional co-operation 
 Socio-economic impact: job creation, quality of life, community 
development, fight poverty 
Funding and 
Shareholders 
 Full funding requirement – US$ 2.3billion (Phase I – US$ 1.34 
billion; Phase II – US$ 992 million) 
 Project debt US$ 1 060.6 million non-recourse funding – 
internationally syndicated (International Finance Corporation 
subscription of US$ 113.9 million) 
 Shareholding made up as follows: 
¾ BHP Billiton (47%) 
¾ Mitsubishi (25%) 
¾ Industrial Development Corporation (24%) 
¾ Government of Mozambique (4%) 
Products and 
Services 
 Aluminium ingots 
 Developed and fully functioning Matola harbour facility at 
Maputo 
  
158 
4.6.1  Background 
Mozambique has suffered a turbulent contemporary history. The country was 
colonised by the Portuguese from the mid-16th century until 1975 when the 
Marxist Frente de Libertacao (Frelimo) declared independence. Shortly after 
independence civil war broke out with a group called the Resistencia de 
Mocambique (Renamo). In 1992 Frelimo and Renamo signed the Rome 
Agreement bringing an end to the civil war. Under colonial rule Mozambique’s 
economy was dominated by the agricultural sector and production of sugar, 
cashew nuts, wood and sisal. At independence the country was one of the 
poorest countries in the world and remains one of the least developed 
countries with a human development index of 0.327, life expectancy of 49.5, 
and per capita income of US$ 1023.9 (Siftung Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index, 2014). Despite economic growth rates in excess of 7.2% over the past 
decade Mozambique continues to face key development challenges. The 
country is endowed with substantial natural resources including coal, gas, 
hydro-electric potential, arable land, and tourist attractions.  
The Mozal project is housed within the Beluluane Industrial Park 
approximately 17 kilometres south of Maputo and occupies 140 hectares of 
the park’s 660-hectares. Mozal arose out of a confluence of interests of a 
number of key participants. BHP had developed the Hillside and Bayside 
aluminium smelters in Richards Bay, South Africa, and noted an opportunity 
to replicate this success in Mozambique. Due to the close proximity of the 
envisaged Mozal plant to the Hillside smelter, BHP believed it could derive 
significant synergies by using existing suppliers, personnel, production 
techniques, and related operational infrastructure. Mozambique offered 
access to competitively priced electricity and harbour facilities, and qualified 
for preferential trade terms with the European Union. Eskom is the largest 
electricity generation and transmission utility on the African continent. In the 
1990s Eskom enjoyed surplus generation capacity and was seeking new 
markets to sell this surplus. The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) 
had participated in the funding of the Hillside smelter and had been mandated 
to operate beyond South Africa’s borders to facilitate industrialisation 
development and regional economic integration. BHP, Eskom, and the IDC 
approached the Mozambican government to obtain approval for the planned 
project. Key considerations in in punting the venture enhanced GDP, balance 
of payments, budget receipts, employment creation, and socio-economic 
conditions. 
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4.6.2  Financial structure 
Ownership structure 
The shareholders of the Mozal project together with their respective equity 
stakes are BHP Billiton (47%) a leading resources company and principal 
sponsor, Mitsubishi (25%) which is a Japanese conglomerate with a 
significant industrial portfolio making extensive use of aluminium, the 
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) (24%) which is a South African 
development finance institution, and the Mozambican government (4%). The 
contractual structure and deal arrangements of the Mozal project are 
illustrated in Figure 4-3 below. Non of the sponsors enjoy sole control over the 
project based on their equity stake in effect circumscribing any of them from 
acting unilaterally, particularly BHP. Mitsubishi’s significant shareholding was 
important to embed Mitsubishi as one of the key participants in the 
guaranteed off-take agreement. The IDC’s 24% complies to the latter’s 
mandate of not holding controlling stakes. The remaining 4% held by the 
Mozambican authorities allows for the project sponsors to advance the 
argument that the host government is a joint owner, whilst limiting the 
government’s capital contribution. This has the effect of enhancing Mozal’s 
political credibility and enhances the sponsors direct lines of communication 
to political principals  
How the financing was arranged 
Due to Mozambique’s turbulent political past, general under development, and 
the absence of an investment grade rating, raising capital for Mozal from 
commercial banks appeared highly improbable. Reticence was compounded 
by the fact that commercial lenders had limited experience in transacting in 
Mozambique. To attract the participation of international banks the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) played an essential role. The IFC 
highlighted that the project would contribute to successful economic reform 
initiatives, triple Mozambique’s exports, add more than 7% to the country’s 
GDP, create jobs, provide extensive training, and include construction and 
upgrading of key infrastructure that would also be used by other industries. 
Due to its extensive experience in developing markets, the credibility of the 
IFC in the evaluation and assessment of risk allayed some of the credit risk 
concerns of potential funders. The IFC was also perceived as an ‘honest 
broker’ by participants including the host government. The IFC was 
instrumental in aligning the contractual documents with the differing legal 
systems of Mozambique, South Africa, and England.  
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This integration supported the drafting of robust and comprehensive 
contractual documentation that would simplify understanding and reduce 
disputes. From a loan arrangement perspective, the IFC capital 
differentiated itself from private sector capital providers with longer tenors 
of 7 -12 year facilities for the senior debt and 8 -15 year facilities for the 
sub-ordinated debt. The IFC also extended loans on a sub-ordinated 
basis. Whilst this exposed it to greater risk, it decreased the risk of the 
private sector lenders and made the investment proposal more attractive. 
Finally, the IFC acted as an umbrella against political and sovereign risk. 
This provided additional assurance that the public authorities would not 
take any action that would compromise the project.  
The financing arrangements for Mozal are best observed over the two 
phases. The first phase projected total investment of US$ 1.340 billion of 
which US$ 520 million was financed through equity. This represents a debt 
and equity contribution to total capital of 61% and 39% respectively. The 
second phase of the project required an additional capital injection 
culminating in total historical funding of approximately US$ 2 billion. Of this 
amount US$ 1.1 billion constituted internationally syndicated non-recourse 
debt funding. Incorporating both phases results in a debt and equity 
contribution to total capital of 55% and 45% respectively. 
Table 4.5 below presents the scope of debt funders for the combined 
phases including banks, export credit facilitators, and development finance 
institutions. These lenders came from no less than 6 countries and 3 
multilateral DFIs. 
Table 4.5:  Mozal Loan Funding (BHP Welcome to Mozal, 2014) 
Lenders Grand Total US$ millions Country of origin 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) 113.9 Multilateral DFI 
Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) 52.1 Multilateral DFI 
PROPARCO 29.6 France 
Deutche Investitions und Entwickluingsgellschaft 
(FEG) 
30.7 Germany 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) 82.5 South Africa 
European Investment Bank (EIB) 32.9 Multilateral DFI 
COFACE Lenders (agent BNP Paribas) 189.3 France 
MOZFUND CGIC/SAECA supported lender 445.3 Multilateral DFI 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) 60.2 Japan 
Export Development Corporation (EDC) 24.1 Canada 
Grand Total 1 060.6  
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In the first phase the debt was split into two tranches of sub-ordinated and 
senior debt. The sub-ordinated debt amounted to US$ 150 million of which 
US$ 65 million was provided by the IFC, and the remaining US$ 85 million 
obtained from other DFIs. Characteristics of the sub-ordinated debt 
included a rate of interest with a fixed floor, and a variable component 
derived from the total sales generated by Mozal. The repayment schedule 
for the sub-ordinated capital only kicked in at the beginning of the eleventh 
year of the venture. This arrangement allowed providers of sub-ordinated 
debt to participate in the upside of the venture. The debt arrangements 
permitted the deferment of both the base and variable interest payment 
when the price of aluminium fell below a set price. These arrangements 
meant that the sub-ordinated debt had ‘quasi equity’ characteristics The 
senior debt of US$ 680 million was made viable by the procurement of 
insurance from Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation (CGIC) and the 
South African Export Credit Agency of US$ 400 million that covers lenders 
for commercial insolvency and political risk such as expropriation, an 
outbreak of war, contractual breaches, and currency convertibility and 
repatriation risks. The remaining US$ 140 million tranche on the senior 
debt was supplemented by DFIs including the IFC. Due to the sponsors 
combined experience and capability in aluminium smelters they did not 
make use of external financial advisers. The sponsors built an internally 
generated financial model, which was credible to lenders, minimised 
advisory costs, and facilitated rapid progress in moving the project from 
proof of concept to implementation. The IDC played an essential 
administrative role in the administration of 380 contracts and co-ordinating 
disbursement profiles as these had to be effected on a pro-rata basis 
across multiple facilities. Chase Manhattan acted as the principal 
international banker for the administration of offshore bank loans and 
related facilities. 
The IFCs participation in the Mozal project was driven by a combination of 
a developmental and economic intent. The financial return extracted by 
the IFC was high and correlated to the high-risk assessment of the project. 
The IFC ultimately generated a “massive return”. This return was made 
accentuated by the fact that the IFC did not share in the overrun and 
schedule risk, yet benefited from the project coming in below budget. This 
was an area of contention with the other shareholders who argued that the 
IFC was benefiting from risks that it did not take, and was accruing a 
return on the full US$ 150 million quasi-equity facility when in fact only US 
130 million of this facility had been drawn down upon. Other questionable 
characteristics of the IFC participation included the high level of 
bureaucracy, multiple technical advisers, and onerous transparency and 
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disclosure requirements. In summary the debt raising was a “difficult 
process” exacerbated by the number of parties involved, but without the 
IFC the funding for Mozal would not have reached financial closure.  
4.6.3  Key risks 
Regulatory and environmental 
Part of the package of incentives to enable Mozal by the Mozambican 
authorities was an exemption from corporate tax (currently levied at 32%) 
and customs duties, and the application of a 1% levy on turnover. Mozal 
was supported by an investment protection agreement between South 
Africa and Mozambique on 6 May 1997. This agreement gave reciprocal 
protection to investors from both countries to prevent expropriation and 
other interference from the host government. The project sponsors 
fostered the active engagement of both governments on the project 
highlighting the “difference between government support and government 
involvement”. The sponsors “wanted the support of the South African 
government…so if the Mozambicans changed their minds after the 
election…you could impose the agreements that had been reached…it 
was to deal with the political risk”. The sponsors however differentiated 
these activities from the respective governments getting actively involved 
in the project. The thinking in this respect was that seeking excessive 
government approval on a Mozal would expose it to government 
involvement and interference that could result in a deviation from the core 
project objectives. The implementation of Mozal was spearheaded by a 
very senior person from BHP in Mozambique who interacted directly with 
the Mozambican government. The first task in these interactions was to 
manage the linkages on which the project was dependent including 
restructuring of border procedures, and importation of capital equipment 
and operational inputs.  
The production of aluminium follows multiple stages from extractive, to 
processing and finally manufacturing and has a sizeable environmental 
footprint. This includes topsoil removal, deforestation, and changes to the 
hydrology where the bauxite feedstock is mined. These activities impact 
on biodiversity and introduce emissions into the environment. The smelter 
process using electrolysis to produce aluminium is a highly energy 
intensive method. The electricity used is generated in many instances 
from fossil fuels including gas, coal, and crude oil derivatives. Aluminium 
production may therefore be indirectly responsible for the adverse 
environmental impacts of extracting these energy sources that are not 
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renewable. Finally, the transportation costs for bauxite, alumina, and 
aluminium present an additional environmental burden.  
The environmental footprint of Mozal was relatively limited and addressed 
by a comprehensive EIA and EMP. Respondents noted that the IFC 
standards for environmental and labour were very demanding. The 
transparency and disclosure regime governing the IFC required a 6-month 
window period prior to approval to allow stakeholders sufficient time to 
give input. The environmental compliance aspects were generally 
regarded as “hygiene” factors that needed to be addressed in order for the 
financing of the project to be successful. After commissioning these 
factors were important in ensuring a broad set of stakeholders continued 
to support the project. Whilst there are no significant acts of environmental 
breaches in Mozal’s operations, a complaint to the IFC by a consortium of 
local and national non-governmental organisations relating to potential air 
emissions during the servicing of Mozal’s equipment in October 2010 was 
lodged, and resolved. To fulfil their corporate social responsibilities, the 
Mozal management have participated in a number of community initiatives 
notably through the Mozal Community Development Trust established in 
2001. The mandate of the trust was to invest in projects related to 
community infrastructure including health, small enterprise development, 
education, sports and culture. It was furnished with a budget of US$ 2 
million per annum at inception and partners other agencies and non-
governmental organisations. In 1998 Mozal revitalised the Beloluane 
Village School that lacked a roof, running water, and electricity. It was 
restricted to 130 pupils and suffered high levels of absenteeism including 
20% due to malaria contraction. After its rehabilitation the school 
increased its capacity to 700 pupils, extended the grades offered from a 
ceiling of grade 5 to include grades 6 and 7, and connected potable water 
and electricity. Measures were also successfully introduced resulting in a 
dramatic decline in the incidence of malaria and concomitantly, 
absenteeism. Between 2000 and 2003 an additional 25 classrooms have 
been built at 6 different primary schools and 3 secondary schools have 
been built. The trust also provides bursaries for tertiary education. Other 
social initiatives include the construction of a new police station in 
Beluluane with four donated vehicles and the construction of a clinic. The 
responsibility to maintain the schools and other public amenities resides 
with the Mozambican government. To foster agricultural development 
Mozal participated in the Machamba government program that targeted 
900 subsistence farmers in a 3-year agricultural upliftment project. The 
results of this intervention were a dramatic increase in crop yields and 
successful diversification of income from subsistence means. 
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Construction and technology 
A key factor in the conceptualisation of Mozal and the related risk 
management was the intention to monetise the synergies that would 
accrue from BHP’s experience in completing the Bayside and Hillside 
smelters. Accordingly Mozal used the same EPC firms (Murray and 
Roberts and S&C Love), and equipment and related technology providers. 
78% of the management team consisted of personnel who executed 
Bayside and Hillside.  Phase I of Mozal took 31 months from receipt of go 
ahead to the full commissioning of the smelter and came in at US$ 120 
million below budget, and 6 months ahead of schedule. Phase II of Mozal 
took 26 months from receipt of the go ahead to the full commissioning of 
the extended smelter and came in US$ 195 million below budget. Both 
phases were completed comfortably within the deadline dates and 
performed in accordance with specifications. The EPC contractors were 
incentivised to complete the plant expeditiously to enjoy early completion 
bonuses. 
Inputs, feedstock, and operational 
The major operational costs in Mozal related to alumina, electricity, labour 
and other raw materials. To hedge against fluctuations in the alumina price 
which represented 33% of production costs, a long term agreement that 
derived the price of alumina from the spot price of aluminium on the 
London Metal Exchange was entered into with BHP’s Australian 
operations. Electricity represented 25% of production costs and a 25-year 
electricity supply agreement between Mozal, Eskom and Electricidade de 
Mocambique (EdM) stipulated the electricity price would also be derived 
from the aluminium price. Skilled and experienced labour was sourced 
from BHP’s South African operations, whilst lower skilled labour was 
obtained from the local population. In order to secure an experienced and 
highly skilled management team a management contract securing the 
services of key management personnel from BHP was signed based on 
an incentive structured fee arrangement, further aligning their interests in 
the project. To enjoy the tax benefits expressed in the regulatory section, 
Mozal was located in a designated industrial zone. 
The operational parameters at Mozal prescribed that the plant operated on 
a 24-hour basis and could not be without power for in excess of two hours. 
To ensure electricity of supply, a special purpose vehicle called 
Mocambique Transmission Company (MOTRACO) and jointly owned by 
Eskom, the Swaziland Energy Board and EdM was established. 
MOTRACO was provided two independent electricity lines to Mozal with 
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the first line from South Africa directly into Mozambique. The second line 
went from South Africa, through Swaziland, and finally into Mozambique. 
Having two independent lines mitigated against the risk of plant 
redundancy in the event that a single line was disabled due to sabotage or 
other events. The power contract between Mozal and Eskom was 
renegotiated in 2010 and denominated in South African rand. Part of the 
logic informing the renegotiation was Eskom’s surplus capacity having 
become a deficit in the years subsequent to the commissioning of Mozal, 
and the greater reliance of the plant on electricity from the Cahorra Basa 
hydroelectric dam in Mozambique. 
Market, foreign exchange, and commodity risk 
To address market/demand Mitsubishi and BHP entered into a long term 
dollar denominated purchase agreement with the project company for the 
full output of the plant at market related prices. Mozal was managed as 
much as possible as a dollar based venture despite a significant portion of 
costs being denominated in South African rands. The cost of key inputs 
and outputs including alumina and aluminium were denominated in US 
dollars. In addition the electricity price was derived from the aluminium 
price which resulted in a natural hedge between the output price received 
and the second largest input cost. These initiatives established natural 
hedges on commodity and foreign exchange risks with a key consideration 
being all debt principal and interest repayments were denominated in US 
dollars. Operational expenditure such as consumables were left 
unhedged. Unhedged rand exposures included the construction costs to 
Murray and Roberts and S&C Love, together with the related materials 
that were imported from South Africa. The EPC contractors were 
immunised from settlement risk by the pre-arranged finance.  
Credit 
When the IDC began looking at the prospects for the Mozal project, 
international capital markets were effectively closed to Mozambique and 
This isolation could be attributed to the civil war, Marxist policies pursued 
by the Frelimo government after independence, and the country’s poor 
fiscal situation whereby a significant portion of its budget was derived from 
donors. Mozambique was perceived as impoverished, dangerous, risky, 
backward, and having limited business prospects. At that time Maputo had 
no more than two hotels of international standard whilst road infrastructure 
was dilapidated and electricity distribution erratic or non-existent.  
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It was essential to get the participation of the IFC to attract other 
international financiers. The project developers also actively sought to get 
as many financial institutions to participate as possible as increased 
numerical participation added to the credibility of the project and enhanced 
its investor appeal. South African involvement in the transaction including 
BHP and Eskom helped to draw parties into the arrangement.  To 
entrench IFC participation and support it was opted to use the Multilateral 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) which like the IFC is a member of the World 
Bank Group, to provide political risk insurance as opposed to the South 
African Export Credit Insurance Company (ECIC). Due to the number of 
parties involved, the transaction ended up becoming a complicated 
consortium involving approximately 20 banks, and the draft agreement 
contained 183 conditions precedent. The final funding agreement was 
signed just before midnight on the 30 June 1998 expiry date. The IFC 
played a critical role co-ordinating and securing support across debt and 
equity participants. The project team for the Mozal Aluminium Smelter was 
only formalised with the approval of the US$ 50 million facility from the IFC 
setting it up as a serious project having moved from proof of concept stage 
to implementation. Because the Mozambican banking system was 
characterised by shallow capital pools, illiquidity, and lingering questions 
regarding its integrity and stability, all bank accounts for Mozal were held 
in dollarized offshore accounts. 
Political 
As highlighted above, the debt capital providers and sponsors took out 
political risk insurance on Mozal via MIGA. Other developments leading up 
to the implementation of Mozal reflect the evolving political risk dynamic. 
Firstly the Mozambican government had made a decisive resolution to 
discard a fundamentalist pursuit of Marxist ideology and adopted 
pragmatic economic reforms. The Mozambican government’s intent in 
facilitating Mozal was for the project to act as a flagship to build credibility 
as a serious investment destination. Accordingly it was willing to offer 
generous concessions that signalled an improvement in political risk. 
Secondly the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was 
gaining greater cohesion as an economic block. Mozal’s thrust to 
purposefully create mutually beneficial linkages in SADC re-enforced the 
participating governments support including political principals such as 
Presidents Chissano and Mbeki. Bottlenecks and bureaucracy that could 
have compromised the project were effectively addressed. The IPA signed 
between South Africa and Mozambique also increased the confidence of 
investors in the project. Mozambique’s reliance on international donors 
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including the World Bank for a significant portion of its national budget, 
enabled the IFC to enjoy a political umbrella, and mitigate against 
untoward political interference. Finally, the Mozal project was attractive to 
the Mozambican and South African governments, and international 
development finance institutions on account of the massive economic 
impact it would have, and the broader social impact and development 
potential.  
4.6.4  Institutional and legal arrangements 
The key contracts in the Mozal project were 25 year power supply 
agreement with Eskom and EdM, 25 year alumina supply agreement with 
BHP Australia, the turnkey construction contract with Murray and Roberts 
and S&C Love, the equipment and technology contract with Pechiney, the 
BHP management contract, the long term purchase agreement with 
Mitsubishi and BHP, the loan agreement, and finally the shareholder 
agreement. The role these contracts played in enabling the project, and 
their key features have been highlighted in the sections above. 
Due to significant French participation and funding on the project, drafting 
the contracts in accordance with French law was considered. A number of 
participants registered reservations on account of their unfamiliarity with 
the latter. Capital providers were unfamiliar with Mozambican law, which in 
a number of respects lacked the relevant statutes, regulations and depth 
of case law to adjudicate commercial transactions of the nature, scale and 
scope of Mozal. In addition, the Mozambican courts record of 
independence and expeditiousness was of questionable repute. It was 
also clear that most capital providers would not have agreed to the 
application of South African law. As a result, all the underlying contractual 
arrangements were drafted in accordance with English law with legal 
recourse premised on English courts. The project developers 
commissioned Mozambican counsel in respect of key areas such as those 
relating to security and mortgage bonds on the transaction to ensure there 
was no inadvertent conflict with domestic laws and regulations. 
4.6.5  Lessons learned 
Perhaps the most important lesson from Mozal is the evolving nature of 
political risk. The first phase of the project required a large consortium of 
investors, extending the time it took to reach financial closure. The terms 
and conditions demanded from the project company were onerous. By the 
time the second phase of the project was executed, the perception of 
political risk in Mozambique had changed dramatically and positively. The 
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terms of the financing in phase 2 of the project were comparatively much 
more favourable, and the transaction easier to close. The financial 
arrangements for Mozal also differed significantly from similar 
arrangements in developed markets. This occurrence gives a hint as to 
how capital structure formulation in Mozambique may be unique, and the 
relative applicability of the main capital structure theories in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, that will be discussed in chapter 6. 
 The second lesson is that in countries such as Mozambique, the 
investment case may need to be looked at holistically, and include not just 
the envisaged operational plant, but also enabling logistical infrastructure 
including roads, harbours and ports. Without these, many potential 
projects remain unrealisable. Whilst the project developers actively 
engaged with the Mozambican and South African governments in the 
project execution, they managed to strike a correct balance, which limited 
direct government participation in the project, and unwanted government 
interference. The project developers enjoyed significant budget and time 
completion gains by making use of an experienced team that had recently 
executed similar projects. Corporate and institutional memory, human 
resources, and intellectual property may be a factor contributing to project 
success and failure that is not given due regard. 
Despite the objectives of the project being clearly spelt out and agreed 
between stakeholders including the Mozambican and South African 
governments, the project faces significant criticism particularly regarding 
the extent to which socio-economic benefits have trickled down to 
surrounding communities. This is in spite of the project developers 
seeming to have fulfilled all their socio-economic development obligations. 
The lesson here is that with large, highly visible ventures, it is likely to be 
extremely difficult to manage expectations, particularly from the public, but 
also other stakeholders including non-profit organisations, community 
groups etc.  
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4.7 Sasol Natural Gas Project 
 FACT SHEET 
Project 
Description 
 Exploration and development of Temane/Pande gas field - 
Mozambique 
 Construction of gas central processing facility - Mozambique 
 Construction of 865 kilometre cross border pipeline – South Africa 
and Mozambique 
Conversion of Sasol network – South Africa 
Key 
Personnel 
 Pieter Cox – Chief Executive Officer – Sasol 
 Hans Naude – Managing Director – Sasol Gas 
 Elmore Marshal – Sasol Sponsor  
 Beno van Waveren – Project Manager – Sasol Natural Gas 
Project (Central Processing Facility) 
 
Contractors 
GLMC Consortium 
 Grinaker-LTA (South Africa) – Engineering, Design, Procurement, 
Construction 
 McConnell Dowell (Australia) – Engineering, Design, 
Procurement, Construction 
 CCIC (Lebanon) - Engineering, Design, Procurement, 
Construction 
Europipe and Itochu Consortium– Pipe Supply Contract 
 Europipe (Germany) 
 Itochu – (Japan) 
 Hall Longmore (South Africa) 
 Kawasaki (Japan) 
 Salzgitter (Germany) 
 Foster Wheeler – Engineering, Design, Procurement, 
Objectives  Construction of commercial gas extraction and processing 
capacity. Development of pipeline and related transportation 
infrastructure to get gas to market 
 Promoting empowerment of indigenous population 
 Developing Southern African gas industry and enhancing regional 
economic integration 
 Environmental emissions improvements by substituting alternate 
fossil fuels for gas 
 Diversification of energy sources 
 Contribute to infrastructure development through development of 
roads and removal of landmines 
Funding and 
Shareholders 
 Full funding requirement – $1.2 billion (Gas field development and 
Central processing facility – $ 330 million; Gas Pipeline – $ 605 
million) 
 Project debt $ 540 million non-recourse funding – internationally 
syndicated (International Finance Corporation subscription of $ 10 
million) 
 Major equity participants made up as follows: 
¾ Sasol 
¾ Government of Mozambique 
¾ Companhia Mocambique de Hidrocarbonetos 
¾ Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos de Mocambique 
¾ International Finance Corporation 
¾ CMH 
¾ South African Gas Development Company 
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4.7.1  Background  
In the year 2000 the Mozambican government in conjunction with a 
number of international companies prospecting for hydrocarbons in the 
country, announced the discovery of sizeable natural gas deposits. The 
gas fields were discovered in the Rovuma Basin off the coast of Cabo 
Delgado Province, and in the Mozambique basin that spans an area that is 
both onshore and offshore in the Inhambane and Sofala provinces. These 
fields were adjudged to have 2.7 tcf that equated to a lifespan of 25 years 
(Gqada 2013). Four petroleum-licensing rounds, resulting in exploration 
blocks being allocated in 11 areas, followed the discovery. In accordance 
with a clause in the Petroleum Law 3/2001 the state reserves the right to 
participate in all concessions by way of a 100% state owned company 
Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos de Mocambique (ENH). 
The Sasol Natural Gas Project (SNGP) is a triple tiered development 
consisting of three core activities including gas extraction and purification 
at a central processing facility in Mozambique, transportation of gas by 
way of a pipeline to an industrial hub in South Africa, and the utilisation of 
the gas as a feedstock in value added petrochemicals manufacturing at 
the Sasol plant at Secunda, with residual sales of excess gas to other 
industrial and retail consumers. The project involved the drilling and 
development of the Pande and Temane gas fields located in 
Mozambique’s Inhambane Province and with commercial gas reserves of 
approximately 2.7 tcf. Complementing this extraction process is a Central 
Processing Facility (CPF) located in Temane to clean and purify the gas 
prior to transportation. The second tier of the project involved the 
construction of an 865 kilometre underground pipeline spanning both 
Mozambique and South Africa to transport the gas to a Sasol owned 
industrial hub in Secunda, South Africa. The Mozambican route of the 
pipeline extends for approximately 520 kilometres running from Temane to 
the South African border at Ressano Garcia. Five take off points were 
embedded into the pipeline at Ressano Garcia/ Maputo, Magude, 
Macarratane, Chigubu/Funhalouro, and Temane to facilitate domestic 
distribution and consumption. In South Africa the pipeline extends from 
Komatipoort and traverses 340 kilometres through Kaapmuiden, Badplaas, 
and Bethal to Secunda where Sasol’s synthetic fuel and chemical 
manufacturing plant is located.  
On arrival at the South Africa Secunda plant the natural gas is integrated 
into Sasol’s feed network. A portion of this gas is utilised as supplementary 
feedstock to coal. Technical and engineering conversions were effected on 
the Secunda plant to enable the utilisation of gas. Gas deliveries were 
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planned to begin at 80 million Giga Joules (GJ) per annum, rising to 120 
million GJ and be applied to the production of downstream chemicals 
including waxes, ammonia and solvents. Surplus gas is then fed into 
Sasol’s 500 strong industrial customer base and 13 000 domestic users 
fed via Egoli Gas. 
4.7.2  Financial Structure 
4.7.2.1 Ownership structure 
The consortium members and shareholders in the SNGP are illustrated in 
Figure 4-4 and are described below. Sasol Holdings is listed on the 
Johannesburg and New York Stock Exchanges. The company is a global 
petrochemicals and liquid fuels organisation with leading proprietary 
intellectual capital in related commercial processes. Sasol Petroleum 
International (SPI) is the vehicle company for the upstream gas and 
petroleum exploration and development activities of Sasol. Sasol 
Petroleum Limitada (SPT) is a Mozambican 100% owned subsidiary of 
SPI. It houses the 70% equity stake in the Temane/Pande gas fields and 
related gas central processing facility. Sasol Gas Holding (SGH) is a 
South African subsidiary of Sasol Holdings. It houses the equity stake in 
the pipeline portion of the project known as Republic of Mozambique 
Pipeline Investments Company (ROMPCO). ROMPCO is a company 
registered to house the physical infrastructure, liabilities, and general 
operating activities of the pipeline constructed between Mozambique and 
South Africa. It is a joint venture made up of three shareholders namely, 
the South African Gas and Development Company (25%), Companhia 
Mocambicana de Gasoduto (25%), and Sasol Gas Holdings (50%). The 
South African Gas Development Company (i Gas) is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the Central Energy Fund, the latter being a 100% 
government owned entity. It invests in gas related infrastructure and 
commercial assets. The Government of Mozambique (GOM) represents 
the executive branch of the Republic of Mozambique. Empresa Nacional 
de Hidrocarbonetos de Mocambique (ENH) is an entity set up by the 
Mozambican government to house the equity stakes in which it 
mandatorily takes up upstream oil and gas related ventures in 
Mozambique. Companhia Mocambicana de Hidrocarbonetos (CMH) is a 
company specifically created to house the assets, liabilities and operating 
activities of the Temane and Pande gas field developments together with 
the central processing facility constructed to purify the gas prior to 
transmission. Companhia Mozambican a De Gasoduto (CMG) is a 100% 
subsidiary of ENH and invests in gas pipeline and related infrastructure 
assets in Mozambique’s gas sector. 
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Figure 4-4: Sasol Natural Gas Project Participants (Sasol Holdings, 2014) 
                                      
 
M
o
za
m
b
iq
u
e
 
 
G
O
M
 
 
E
N
H
 
 
2
0
%
 
 
8
0
%
 
 
1
0
0
%
 
 
C
M
H
 
 
IF
C
 
 
S
P
T
 
 
2
5
%
 
 
5
%
 
 
7
0
%
 
 
R
O
M
P
C
O
 
B
R
A
N
C
H
 
 
G
a
s
 F
ie
ld
s
 a
n
d
 C
P
F
 
 
S
o
u
th
 A
fric
a
 
 
S
A
S
O
L
 
 
S
P
I 
S
A
S
O
L
 G
A
S
 
H
O
L
D
IN
G
 
 
R
O
M
P
C
O
 
1
0
0
%
 
 
P
ip
e
lin
e
 
174 
Figure 4-4 illustrates Sasol has an effective 70% stake in the Temane and 
Pande gas fields, together with the central processing plant through SPT 
and SPI. The IFC has a direct 5% equity stake in the gas fields and central 
processing plant. CMH houses the interests of the Mozambican 
governments and has a 25% equity stake in the gas fields and the 
processing plant. The Mozambican government also has a direct stake in 
CMH amounting to 20% of its equity. In the South Africa quadrant SGH is 
the 100% owner of South African registered ROMPCO. Sasol effectively 
owned 100% of the equity in the pipeline at the projects inception. 
How the financing was arranged 
In arriving at the financing arrangements a number of factors had to be 
taken into consideration including what each equity investor was 
contributing to the project besides capital, the limited appetite and capacity 
to commit capital to a potentially high risk project by state companies in 
both Mozambique and South Africa, and the fact that over 60% of the 
capital was to be applied to the pipeline construction and this was where 
the bulk of project risks resided. Mozambican legislation also prescribed 
that state equity participation to be mandatory in all hydrocarbon projects.  
The decision making process in both governments was extended whilst 
Sasol wanted to move rapidly ahead on the project. Mitigating these 
concerns were Sasol’s technical expertise and proven capability in the 
sector, and its willingness to use its own balance sheet as primary 
sponsor. The anticipated costs and respective capital contributions of the 
project in 2003 are expressed in Table 4.6.  
Table 4.6:  Total Project Costs – Upstream Development – (Sasol Holdings, 2014) 
Source of Funds and Application Amount “million” US$ 
CMH – Gas Fields and CPF 
Equity 
Debt 
Total 
 
 18 
 38 
 56 
IFC Total R10 
SPT – Gas Fields and CPF 
Equity 
Debt 
Total 
 
148 
182 
R330 
 
SGH – Pipeline, Gas Fields and CPF 
Equity 
Debt 
Total 
 
 
 285 
 320 
605 
Gross Project Cost  1 001 
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Debt funding for the project was raised in a competitive bidding process 
with debt providers bidding for various debt tranches. It is instructive that 
Standard Bank extended an R 1.05 billion secured long-term debt facility 
in 2005, had the option to syndicate this amount, yet decided not. Due to 
Mozambique’s frontier market status all facilities were covered by political 
risk insurance. 
4.7.2.2 Capital Structure 
Table 4.6 above reflects a debt to equity ratio of 53.9%: 46.1% based on 
anticipated project costs alone. Further insight on how the capital structure 
evolved can be deduced by analysing key financial metrics from the 
annual financial statements of ROMPCO. Table 4.7 below details key 
financial ratios in ROMPCO from 2005 to 2012. The years 2004/5 are 
distorted and do not reflect stable state operations. The marked 
improvement in the current ratio from 2004 and 2005 is primarily driven by 
an increase in cash from R 31 million to R 180 million. During the same 
period creditors declined R 281 million but was offset by an increase in the 
current portion payable of the long-term loan of R 236 million. Cash 
equivalents increased markedly to R 480 million by the end of 2007 
reflecting the highly cash generative nature of the pipeline. 2007 also 
marked a maiden dividend pay-out of R 118 million, increasing to R 260 
million and R 300 million in 2008 and 2009. These dividend declarations, 
the extinguishing of debt facilities of R 122 million and concomitant cash 
reduction, account for the deterioration in the current ratio to 0.52:1 by the 
end of 2009. Despite a R 360 million dividend pay-out in 2010, the cash 
situation stabilised resulting in a current ratio settling at above 0.84:1 in 
subsequent years.  
The DSCR from 2006 to 2009 reflects an improving trend as operating 
cash flows increased. The deterioration in 2010 is caused by the decline in 
cash generated from operating activities and the DSCR stabilises above 
2.23:1 in subsequent years. The debt to equity ratio begins at 99%: 1% 
reducing to 66%: 34% showing a clear preference for debt funding in the 
initial years of the project. The shareholder loans are settled in full during 
the course of 2012 in largely from record operating cash flows in excess of 
R 1.3 billion, resulting in a decline in the debt to equity ratio to 66%: 34%. 
Gross and operating margins from 2006 to 2012 are in a consistent range 
of 73% - 82%. The non-current liabilities constitute long-term debt 
obligations of approximately R3.2 billion from 2004 to 2007. The relative 
stability of this figure indicates that ROMPCO was servicing the interest 
accruing on these loans but making little contribution towards the 
repayment of the principal amounts until 2008.  
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Table 4.7:  Key Financial Features ROM
PCO: 2004 – 2012 (ROM
PCO Annual Reports, 2004 - 2012) 
  
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
Current Ratio 
0,39:1 
1,11:1 
1,93:1 
3,26:1 
1,61:1 
0,52:1 
0,94:1 
0,98:1 
0,84:1 
Debt Service 
Coverage Ratio 
3,10: 1
4 
0,27:1 
1,51:1 
1,72:1 
1,74:1 
2,30:1 
1,90:1 
2,23:1 
2,29:1 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio %
 
- %
 5 
99%
: 1%
 
96%
: 4%
 
94%
: 6%
 
90%
: 10%
 
90%
: 10%
 
89%
: 11%
 
82%
: 18%
 
66%
: 34%
 
Gross M
argin 
10,50%
 
67,67%
 
74,42%
 
75,33%
 
78,70%
 
81,57%
 
81,40%
 
78,57%
 
79,12%
 
O
perating M
argin 
639%
 
-1%
 
73%
 
71%
 
83%
 
77%
 
78%
 
80%
 
81%
 
Dividend Paid O
ut 
(R “000”) 
- 
- 
- 
118 000 
260 000 
300 000 
360 000 
330 000 
390 000 
Non Current 
Liabilities  
(R “000”) 
3 287 344 
3 340 235 
3 271 370 
3 149 187 
3 051 586 
3 128 431 
3 334 981 
3 094 715 
2 577 009 
Cash Flow
 
Generated from
 
O
perating 
Activities (R “000”) 
203 804 
126 666 
535 304 
671 555 
764 406 
989 675 
782 186 
1 130 306 
1 315 346 
                                            
4This has been calculated as cash generated from
 operating activities divided by the borrow
ing costs plus the short-term
 portion of the long-term
 debt. 
5N
egative equity due to accrued losses at the beginning of the project render this figure of lim
ited utility. 
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4.7.3  Key risks 
For the SNGP to be successful the governments of South Africa and 
Mozambique, and Sasol itself had to be actively involved. From the 
Mozambican authorities the project was reliant on the gas concession, 
registering land and servitudes, and the route the pipeline would traverse. 
From the South African authorities, the project was reliant on the 
legislation and regulations that would enable the importation of gas from 
Mozambique, the pricing methodology, the pipeline route, and the 
development of the South African residential and industrial market 
including gas distribution infrastructure. Significant portions of the risks in 
the SNGP were retained by Sasol.  The funding for the SNGP is therefore 
not a pure project finance model, but a hybrid model of project finance and 
traditional corporate finance. The key risks retained by Sasol included 
development risks on the gas fields, construction and initial operational 
risk on the ROMPCO pipeline, and explicit and perceived guarantees on 
portions of the debt arrangements. 
Regulatory and environmental 
At the time the SNGP was conceptualised he Gas Bill and related 
regulations governing Sasol’s importation of gas from Mozambique to 
South Africa had not been passed. Certainty for Sasol and other 
stakeholders was obtained by way of a special regulatory dispensation 
between the Minister of Minerals and Energy and the Minister of Trade and 
Industry. This agreement in effect put in place a series of protocols 
governing licensing and the regulations that would be applicable to Sasol 
in terms of the Gas Bill once it had been finalised into a legislative Act, and 
the relevant regulations had been effected. This regulatory agreement was 
novel in facilitating the transaction, and ensuring it was not held up by the 
legislative and regulatory process. The Pipeline Agreement is for a 30-year 
duration whereas the Gas Transportation Agreement is for a 25-year 
period. Project developers included a 5-year buffer period regarding when 
the contract with downstream customers expires to the time their license 
arrangements on the pipeline with the Mozambican’s terminates. The 
funding arrangements were also structured so that outstanding debts are 
settled before the end of these regulatory concessions.  
A series of legislative and regulatory prescriptions governed the SNGP. 
The most significant regulatory instruments impaction on the EIA in 
Mozambique included the National Environment Management Programme 
(NEMP), the Environmental Law (EL), and the Regulations for the 
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Environmental Impact Assessment Process (REIAP) that cumulatively 
required a license prior to commencement. In Mozambique the 
environmental compliance process was administered and reviewed by the 
Department of Environmental Impact Assessment in the Ministry for Co-
ordination of Environmental Affairs (MICOA). In South Africa the most 
significant regulatory instruments impacting on the EIA were the 
Environment Management Act (EMA) and the Environment Conservation 
Act (ECA). Legal authorisation is required prior to the commencement of 
such for transportation structures or the handling of hazardous or 
dangerous substances and ROMPCO fell within this ambit.  
The SNGP EIA and resultant Environment Management Plan (EMP) were 
drafted in 13 sequential and clearly stratified parts. Each impact was 
mitigated by a comprehensive set of measures in an EMP that was 
administered, monitored and managed by a dedicated team. The EIA 
evaluated the project per each phase. This allowed for a focused 
evaluation of the environmental footprint and targeted interventions to 
mitigate adverse impacts.  Environmental risk management was also 
allocated to project managers. The mitigating measures in the EMP were 
complemented by a series of qualitative interventions that addressed 
broader communal and societal factors. A wide-ranging public consultation 
process was also followed that culminated in the disclosure of the SNGP 
details to a range of stakeholders. The communication structures included 
the Mozambican Ministerial Task Group, Sasol Executive Management, a 
Project Liaison Committee of 26 members from Sasol’s operational 
management levels, public liaison and education, complaints 
management, and social development activities. The SNGP required a 
number of people to be relocated, and a Resettlement Planning and 
Implementation Programme was executed. In this respect the host 
governments were essential in obtaining servitudes and concessions on 
the pipeline route, and disruption of local communities was limited by 
laying the pipeline underground, which also had the benefit of making it 
less vulnerable to sabotage. 
Construction and technology 
Despite commissioning reputable EPC contractors in a competitive bidding 
process, Sasol retained and bore a significant proportion of the 
construction risk. This was on account of the fact that issues relating to 
servitudes, the route the pipeline would take, geological considerations 
etc. were beyond the control of the EPC contractors. A turnkey 
arrangement including these aspects was therefore unviable. EPC 
contractors were therefore engaged on a turnkey basis only on those 
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aspects over which they had direct control including pipeline manufacture 
and construction. The technology deployed was tried and tested with a low 
probability for malperformance. 
Market 
To mitigate against market risk, Sasol was the largest offtaker to 
ROMPCO and this was captured in the Gas Sales Agreement detailed in 
the institutional and legal arrangements below. In addition the 50% 
shareholding by iGas and CMG in ROMPCO post construction allowed 
access to retail and industrial customers in both countries. 
Credit and equity 
Standard Bank was lead arranger on the loan facilities to ROMPCO, and 
SPT. To mitigate against credit risk Standard Bank received loan 
guarantees from the World Bank/IFC and related insurance institutions. 
Project lenders were exposed to take the first loss in amount equivalent to 
5% of the principal amount of the guaranteed loan plus 6 months interest 
payments for the applicable interest payment period. For equity risk the 
guarantee arrangements took place in two phases. In the first phase 
effected in 2003 MIGA issued equity guarantees to Sasol amounting to 
US$ 72 million. This consisted of a ROMPCO equity guarantee of US$ 45 
million and an SPT guarantee of US$ 27 million for Sasol’s catalysing 
equity injection in the pipeline construction and the gas field and 
processing facility, respectively. The second iteration of the guarantee 
arrangements in 2004 replaced the equity guarantees issued in 2003, and 
in addition covered loans taken by SPT and ROMPCO. As with the earlier 
version the guarantee covered risks of transfer restriction, expropriation, 
war and civil disturbance and breach of contract.  
Foreign exchange and interest rate 
On account of the limited convertibility and volatility of the Mozambican 
Metical, the domestic currency was unable to perform the role of legal 
tender in transactions relating to the SNGP. The upstream activities 
including the gas extraction and central processing facility incorporated a 
natural hedge as the gas proceeds were denominated in United States 
dollars and matched by costs predominantly in the same currency. The 
ROMPCO pipeline had considerable foreign exchange exposure as a rand 
based entity with dollar costs and with final consumers in South Africa 
would settle their consumption in rands. This foreign exchange exposure 
in ROMPCO was addressed in the tariff structure by incorporating a dollar-
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based element in the formula effectively dollar referencing a proportion of 
the income and expense structure. This mechanism was essential as 
customers and sovereigns in both South Africa and Mozambique would 
have refused signing dollar based off-take agreements with 25 years of 
exposure. The financial statements of ROMPCO reveal the purchase of 
financial instruments to hedge the foreign exchange risks on account of 
the multiple currencies and national jurisdictions of parties to the project, 
together with the fact that natural gas is a dollar denominated commodity 
in international markets. ROMPCO also fixed its interest rate by utilising 
interest rate swaps to exchange its floating interest exposure to a fixed 
interest rate exposure of 7.55% on designated liabilities.  
Political 
As highlighted earlier, political risk insurance including transfer restriction, 
expropriation, war and civil disturbance and breach of contract was a 
mandatory condition of the lenders participation in the project. This 
significantly increased transaction costs. Respondents expressed 
willingness to not taking political risk insurance in contemporary 
Mozambique. This infers that transactors should incorporate flexible 
insurance clauses that allow for periodic re-pricing, that may allow for a 
reduction in transaction costs if the political environment improves. The 
IPA signed between South Africa and Mozambique presaging the SNGP 
added to the armoury of political risk mitigants by committing sovereigns 
and their underlying institutions to support cross border investments. The 
importance of interactions especially with host governments and 
communities was an essential element in mitigating against political risk. 
In Mozambique particularly, the relationship development was intentional, 
structured, because the country had limited expertise in dealing with 
international banks and complex funding structures. The key goal was 
“making sure everybody is comfortable with the process and that they do 
not feel that something is being forced upon them…[and] as long as the 
transaction is fair and everybody understands how each party will benefit 
then the relationship can only grow…”.  
4.7.4  Institutional and legal arrangements 
There were a series of legal agreements and contracts in the execution of 
the SNGP. These are summarised below in Table 4.8, with elaborations on 
the key contracts following thereafter.  
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Table 4.8:  Project Agreements (Sasol Holdings, 2014) 
Rights and Obligations Commercial Operations and Participation South Africa Mozambique 
Cross Border 
Agreement 
Cross Border 
Agreement 
Gas 
Transportation 
Agreement 
Upstream Operation and 
Maintenance Agreement 
Mozambique 
Pipeline 
Agreement 
Pipeline 
Agreement 
Gas Sales 
Agreement 
Pipeline Shareholder’s 
Agreement 
Gas Act 
Petroleum 
Production 
Agreement 
 
Joint Operating Agreement 
Regulatory 
Agreement 
Production 
Sharing 
Agreement 
 Pipeline Operation and 
Maintenance Agreement 
The Petroleum Production Agreement (PPA) articulated the Mozambican 
government granting SPT and CMH exclusive rights for the development, 
production and disposal of reserves located in the Temane and Pande gas 
fields. This was the basis upon which all the upstream activities were 
predicated. SPT and CMH subsequently signed a Joint Operation 
Agreement (JOA) for the development of the gas fields with SPT being 
designated as the operator in terms of this agreement. The PPA was also 
followed by a Gas Sales Agreement (GSA) that regulated the commercial 
agreement and terms between the gas sellers (SPT, CMH, and the IFC), 
and the buyer of the gas SGH. 
The pipeline agreement (PA) granted authorisation to ROMPCO to 
construct, own and operate the gas pipeline and related infrastructure for a 
period of 30 years, and was issued by the Mozambican government. The 
PA was supported by a Gas Transportation Agreement between ROMPCO 
and the upstream project participants. The Gas Transportation Agreement 
secured a revenue stream for ROMPCO by way of a ship or pay obligation 
in favour of ROMPCO for a period of 25 years. 
The contractual agreements are structured around the different phases of 
the contract. The first set of contracts prescribe the terms of engagement 
for the organisations that are party to the upstream activities, namely SPT, 
CMH and the IFC. These arrangements are then followed by contracts 
setting out the terms by which the extracted and processed gas will be 
sold to SGH, which owned 100% of ROMPCO at the project’s 
commencement. In addition, the transportation arrangements of the gas to 
Secunda are set out with ROMPCO. The final tranche of contracts deals 
with the downstream regulatory aspects and distribution terms with end 
users.  
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4.7.5  Lessons learned 
The SNGP offers two broad categories of lessons. The first category is a 
broad range of interventions including regulatory and financial measures 
without which the project would not have been possible. The second 
category of lessons identifies weaknesses in the institutional 
arrangements that underpin many infrastructure projects in Africa, and 
proposals as to how to address these. 
The ability for private sector players to constructively engage and work 
jointly with sovereigns is an essential capability. This is accentuated where 
countries must collaborate with each other to facilitate a cross border 
project. The emphasis by Sasol on developing a mutually beneficial, long 
term, and transparent relationship particularly with the Mozambican 
government is instructive. Sasol deviated significantly from conventional 
commercial arrangements to enable the SNGP. This included deferring 
the capital contribution of other sponsors, and facilitating their deferred 
participation by way of the call option agreement.  The construction of the 
pipeline in a manner that offshoot stations could be built in at a later date 
to supply the domestic Mozambican market gave the Mozambican 
authorities confidence that the gas extracted would at some point be 
applied to the local economy. This goal has come to fruition with buses in 
Maputo and the Mozal Aluminium Smelter using gas derived from the 
SNGP as sources of fuel.  
Companies executing projects impacting on rural communities need to 
take even greater measures to ensure these communities are consulted 
and that there is buy-in to the project. Obtaining approval from national 
authorities only is insufficient and can undermine the legitimacy of a 
project. The use of normative tools and legislation alone is insufficient to 
ensure companies act responsibly regarding human rights, the 
environment and social justice. Consequently, companies should seek to 
embed within their fabric strong human rights and social responsibility 
mechanisms. The latter need to be universally applied across divergent 
countries to avoid employees seeking to fulfil the bare minimum standards 
required. In this respect normative rules should be mandatory in 
developing countries with an independent and fully resourced institution 
established to audit and verify compliance. NGO’s creating “demand” for 
social justice should also create “supply” by way of training and engaging 
with legislators and other stakeholders to capacitate them to ensure 
legislation and regulatory measures support the attainment of social and 
environmental justice.  
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4.8 Mozambique Country Cluster Comparison 
A comparison of the two case studies investigated in the Mozambican 
cluster makes a number of pointed revelations. Most apparent is the 
essential role played by South African capital markets with 71% and 100% 
of equity capital for Mozal and the SNGP being sourced from SA. While 
both projects made extensive use of international debt funding from four 
continents, the Mozal project was the most prodigious. This occurrence is 
explained by the fact that the project was pioneering in nature and the 
participation of multiple funders was a purposeful risk management 
strategy. The improving investment climate in Mozambique more than 20 
years after the conceptualisation of Mozal has diminished the need of such 
large funding consortiums as evident in the SNGP. 
The sponsor arrangements in the projects are revealing. In Mozal, BHP 
and Mitsubishi were sponsors who benefited from the project at other 
stages of the value chain including supply of bauxite (BHP) and provision 
of alumina (Mitsubishi). Each individual sponsor as a result was not fully 
exposed to the entire value chain, which served as a risk mitigating 
exercise and beyond Mozal, focused Mitsubishi and BHP on the part of the 
value chain that they were directly able to control. The small stake owned 
by the Mozambican government gave the project political legitimacy and 
the participation of the IFC provided a political umbrella. In contrast beyond 
the limited equity participation of the Mozambican government in the 
Temane Gas Field and CPF, Sasol alone sponsored ROMPCO. It 
controlled the entire value chain on the SNGP from gas extraction, 
purification, transportation, and final consumption. The sponsorship 
arrangement was informed by Sasol’s technical capacity to execute the 
project, but also on the reluctance of the participating sovereigns to bear 
construction risk. Without this high degree of commitment on the part of 
Sasol, the project may not have been commissioned.  
On Mozal the participation of the Mozambican and South African 
governments was largely confined to regulatory and facilitating initiatives 
for the entire project life. In contrast the SNGP commences with 
government participation limited to the above, but post construction the 
equity participation of both governments amounts to 50% in ROMPCO. 
The arrangement allowed Sasol to take the full construction risk, but limit 
its capital exposure together with other political risk exposures by, reducing 
its stake in ROMPCO after operational steady state was achieved.  
Both projects made extensive use of international professional advisers 
due to the geographically diverse funding consortium and service providers 
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commissioned. This contributed to both projects integrating international 
best practice across engineering, financial and legal processes enhancing 
the robustness of the projects. Project sponsors on both contracts were 
committed to the venture for its full life with no equity exits recorded to 
date. As of June 2015 both projects were mature and stable in their 
operations and the capital structure was evolving as forecast. The business 
landscape differs markedly for each venture. Mozal is subject to the 
dynamics of a highly integrated international aluminium industry. The tax 
incentives granted by the Mozambican government appear unlikely to be 
renewed when the project life concludes, and the generous electricity tariff 
will be renegotiated with power shortages bedevilling Southern Africa. 
Conversely the SNGP is exposed to generic international energy 
dynamics. The logistical and technical complexity of transporting gas 
however makes this sector more localised and less vulnerable to global 
shocks. With dedicated long-term customers in the form of Sasol, iGas, 
and CMH, the project is stable and firmly positioned. Whilst the diversity of 
the international funding consortium reduces the prospect of refinancing 
the Mozal debt facilities, the SNGP sponsors are receptive to potential 
refinancing on agreeable terms. The non-refinancing of Mozal is informed 
also by potentially large breakage fees on the part of the sponsors, and 
that debt providers may be reluctant to sacrifice pricing and yield that 
would be difficult to obtain on greenfield projects at present. Table 4.9 
distils some of the key comparative attributes between Mozal and the 
SNGP and the key contributors to success. 
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Table 4.9:  M
ozam
bique Case Com
parison 
Attribute 
M
ozal 
Sasol Natural Gas Project 
Geographic Source of 
Funding 
x 
D
ebt funding from
 South Africa, Asia, Europe and 
N
orth Am
erica 
x 
Equity funding from
 71%
 -South Africa, 25%
 - Japan 
x 
D
ebt funding from
 South Africa, Asia, Europe and N
orth 
Am
erica 
x 
100%
 equity funding from
 South Africa 
Nature of Equity 
Participants 
x 
M
ulti-national in com
m
odities m
ining and processing 
x 
M
ulti-national in m
anufacturing w
ith significant 
alum
inium
 input requirem
ents 
x 
S
ym
bolic stake by G
overnm
ent of M
ozam
bique 
x 
D
FI 
x 
Private sector petrochem
icals corporation 
Governm
ent 
Participation 
x 
Participation by M
ozam
bican and S
outh African 
governm
ents lim
ited to regulatory m
atters and project 
facilitation 
x 
Participation by M
ozam
bican and S
outh African governm
ents 
lim
ited to regulatory m
atters and project facilitation in pre-
construction phase 
x 
Post construction, both sovereigns exercised options and took 
indirect 25%
 stake in R
O
M
PC
O
 each 
Debt Funding 
Institutions  
x 
International consortium
 of banks  
x 
D
FIs 
x 
C
om
m
ercial B
anks 
x 
 D
FIs 
Use of International 
Service Providers 
x 
Extensive use of technical, legal, and financial 
advisers in finalisation of funding package 
x 
Sm
elter equipm
ent sourced from
 France 
x 
Extensive use of technical, legal, and financial advisers  
x 
M
ultiple international operators in EPC
 of pipeline 
 
Tim
e Com
m
itm
ent of 
Sponsors 
x 
Full duration of project 
x 
Full duration of project 
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Attribute 
M
ozal 
Sasol Natural Gas Project 
Project Stage 
x 
Initial project concept m
ature and stable 
 
x 
Initial project concept m
ature and stable 
Business Landscape 
x 
Project subject to international alum
inium
 industry 
dynam
ics 
x 
G
enerous tax incentives unlikely to be extended 
x 
Sim
ilarly pow
er purchase agreem
ent w
ill be 
renegotiated 
x 
C
om
m
ercial m
erits of project continuance from
 2020 
unclear 
x 
G
eneric challenges of international energy m
arkets and 
natural gas sector 
x 
Project robust w
ith com
m
itted long term
 custom
ers 
Capital Structure Post 
Com
pletion 
x 
C
apital structure stable and evolving as forecast 
x 
C
apital structure stable and evolving as forecast 
Governance Structure 
Post Com
pletion 
x 
N
o significant changes  
x 
N
o significant changes 
Significant 
Environm
ental/Sustai
nability Incidents 
x 
N
on reported 
x 
N
on reported 
Risk Universe 
Dynam
ics 
x 
Stable and w
ell m
anaged 
x 
Stable and w
ell m
anaged 
Refinancing Initiatives 
x 
N
on reported 
x 
R
efinancing being considered but not yet effected 
x 
Prospect of using infrastructure bonds on future projects of 
this nature 
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Zimbabwe Case 
4.9 Chisumbanje Ethanol Plant 
FACT SHEET 
Project 
Description  Anhydrous ethanol production plant (ethanol milling, fermentation, and distillation) 
 Development of designated agricultural land to provide 
sugarcane feedstock 
 Co-generation electricity plant (by product) 
 Downstream biomass manufacturing 
Key 
Personnel 
 Billy Rautenbach – Project principal, owner, and sponsor 
 Paul Smith – Operations Director – Green Fuel (Pty) Ltd 
 Graeme Smith – Operations Manager – Green Fuel (Pty) Ltd 
 Derek Elliot – Legal Counsel – Green Fuel (Pty) Ltd 
 Lilian Muungani – Public Relations Officer – Green Fuel (Pty) 
Ltd 
 Basil Nyabadza – Chairman – Agricultural and Rural 
Development Authority 
Plant  First Knives Turbine and Drive – Refurbishment in Brazil 
 Defibrator and Drive Motor – Supplied by Bononi (Brazil) 
 Mills – Refurbishment in Brazil 
 Turbines and Primary Boxes – Refurbishment in Brazil 
 Boiler – Supplied by Caldema (Brazil) 
 Turbo Alternator Complete – Purchased in Brazil 
 Distillery - Refurbished 
 Storage Tanks – Fabricated on site 
Objectives  Production of 100 million litres of ethanol per annum 
 Blending of ethanol into domestic petrol  
 Development of regional agricultural sector 
 Employment creation and poverty alleviation 
 Energy security and independence 
 Reduce foreign exchange outflows for energy imports 
 Generate electricity by product of up to 36MW 
Funding and 
Shareholders 
 Investment range to date: December 2013– US$ 130 million - 
US$ 330 million 
 Full funding requirement – Circa US$ 2.3billion (Phase I – US$ 
1.34 billion; Phase II – US$ 260 million; Phase III – US$ 450 
million; Phase IV – US$ 1 billion) 
 Green Fuel (Private) Limited– SPV housing assets and 
operations of Chisumbanje Ethanol Plant 
 Shareholding of Green Fuel made up as follows: 
 Government of Zimbabwe (10%)  
o Agricultural and Rural Development Authority of 
Zimbabwe  
 Macdom Investments and Rating Investments (90%)  
Products and 
Services 
 Anhydrous ethanol and refined sugar 
 Electricity 
 Fusel oil and high protein stock feed 
 Energy briquettes and chip board manufacturing 
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4.9.1  Background 
The Chisumbanje Ethanol Project (Chisumbanje) cannot be fully 
understood without a historic contextualisation of social, economic and 
political developments in Zimbabwe spanning the past 130 years. These 
events have had an indelible impact on the capital structure, governance 
arrangements, risk management, and environmental and sustainability 
challenges encountered. The first historical consideration relates to the 
disenfranchisement of land from indigenous populations from by colonial 
forces beginning in 1890. This was followed by a series of uprisings or 
“Chimurenga” culminating in the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979, and 
national independence in 1980. To conclude the Lancaster House 
Agreement, sections retaining existing land ownership patterns, and 
prohibiting expropriation were prescribed for a period of 10 years (Martin 
et al. 1981). As the political fortunes of the governing party Zanu (PF) 
deteriorated on account of an economic meltdown, a fast track land reform 
programme was instituted in 2000. This forcefully expropriated land from 
the descendants of colonial settlers who were commercial farmers, and 
distributed significant tracts to indigenous population. This has resulted in 
a situation where the relationship between the possession of title deeds 
and ownership of land is tenuous. In addition, significant portions of land 
are under government ownership, or are held in communal ownership 
under the custodianship of traditional leaders. Land continues to be a 
highly contested resource. 
The first ethanol blending plant on the African continent was the Triangle 
Ethanol Plant in Zimbabwe that began production in 1980. Its activities 
included the blending of ethanol into petrol at levels of 12% to 15%. The 
plant’s had a capacity of 120 000 litres per day, using multiple feedstocks 
including molasses, cane juice, and raw sugar. To support import 
substitution and domestic industrialisation 60% of the plant components 
were produced locally. This plant stopped producing ethanol and instead 
began to produce industrial alcohol for export to Europe after losing 
government support in 1995. This marked the end of ethanol blending in 
Zimbabwe until the commissioning of the Chisumbanje Ethanol Plant. In 
2008 the Zimbabwean government requested investors to invest in a new 
ethanol plant in the country. The Chisumbanje Ethanol Plant was 
subsequently commissioned by a firm called Green Fuel with construction 
of the first phase completed in September 2011, and with an annual output 
of 100 million litres of ethanol. It was envisaged that the plant would also 
commission an electricity-generating unit of 18.5 MW that could be 
expanded to 36 MW by 2012. The scope of activities incorporated in the 
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plant includes milling, fermentation, distillation, and dehydration of ethanol. 
Further downstream activities include the generation of electricity via 
methane gas derived from anaerobic digestion of waste products from the 
plant. The manufacture of energy briquettes and chipboard products are 
also envisaged. This case study is characterised by a high level of 
obscurity with key institutions, including the Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory 
Authority complaining about access to information.  
4.9.2  Financial structure 
Ownership structure 
The shareholders of Chisumbanje are the Government of Zimbabwe 
(GOZ) with a 10% via the Agricultural Rural Development Authority 
(ARDA). State participation is critical to the project as the GOZ passed 
legislation and regulations prescribing mandatory blending. ARDA is also 
essential to the project due to large land tracts under its custodianship 
including 22 estates with 98 000 hectares of arable land, and irrigable 
capacity of 19 000 hectares. Most of the land for Chisumbanje has been 
sourced from ARDA. Green Fuel (Private Limited) is the special purpose 
vehicle housing the operations of the Chisumbanje Ethanol plant and the 
related assets. It describes itself as a company specialising in renewable 
ethanol production and related activities. Macdom Investments (Macdom) 
and Rating Investments (Rating) are the largest investors in Green Fuel 
with a combined 90% shareholding. These companies are vehicles for the 
investment activities of one of the key developers of the Chisumbanje, 
namely, Billy Rautenbach.  
How the financing was arranged 
Zimbabwe has suffered severe bank and capital market disruptions 
particularly post 2000. International development finance institutions 
including the World Bank, IFC, and IMF suspended financial support when 
the country fell into arrears on existing facilities. With the liquidity 
constraints in Zimbabwe’s domestic banking sector and mandatory 
reporting requirements for banks on significant credit exposures, it is 
improbable that the capital was sourced domestically. The principal 
sponsor Billy Rautenbach is has claimed an investment of US$ 330 million 
in the plant as of December 2013, whilst the Chairman of ARDA has 
committed US$ 260 million for the construction of a dam to augment 
supplies. These claims are and the nature of the injections in the form of 
debt and equity, and the proportions thereof also remain undisclosed. 
References to interest service charges by sponsors may indicate an 
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element of debt funding. The proportion of debt funding and the resultant 
debt to equity ratio cannot be established. The parties extending the credit 
facilities are also not generally known. What is evident is that the assets 
are made up of two main parts. The first is the plant and related 
equipment. And the second is the land used to grow the sugar cane and 
related infrastructure including dams, irrigation facilities etc. 
Operational arrangements 
The operational arrangements pertinent to the Chisumbanje Ethanol plant 
are captured in Figure 4-5 below. The foundation of the project is a 20-
year Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) concession to produce ethanol in 
the designated area issued by the government of Zimbabwe to the 
operator Green Fuel. The government of Zimbabwe awarded ‘National 
Project Status’ to Green Fuel according this venture priority status and 
treatment. The Environmental Management Agency (EMA) is responsible 
for evaluating the EIA submitted by Green Fuel prior to commencing the 
project. The EMA failed to issue a response to the submission after 60 
months resulting in Green Fuel proceeding by default. ARDA’s 
participation enabled Green Fuel access to state owned arable land that 
was operating below capacity. This was the basis upon which sugar can 
feedstock was to be cultivated for the ethanol plant. As a state entity 
ARDA provided political cover for contentious land issues with local 
communities as detailed in the risk management section. The final player 
in the operational arrangements was the Zimbabwe Energy and 
Regulatory Authority (ZERA). ZERA controversially issued a license to 
Green Fuel. This license enabled Green Fuel to be a registered supplier 
for the mandatory blending of anhydrous ethanol with unleaded petrol.  
4.9.3  Key risks 
Regulatory and environmental 
The Zimbabwe Energy Regulator (ZERA) was established in 2011, which 
coincided with the year in which the first phase of the Chisumbanje 
Ethanol Plant became operational. As a result, ZERA was not involved in 
the regulatory oversight on the conceptualisation or commissioning of the 
plant in 2008, and has sought to apply its regulatory prerogative 
retrospectively on an existing plant. The Chisumbanje Ethanol Plant is an 
anomaly from a regulatory perspective in a number of respects. The 
developers obtained a 20-year concession to Build Operate and Transfer 
(BOT) the plant allowing them to recoup their capital investment and  
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Figure 4-5: Chisum
banje Ethanol Plant Operational Arrangem
ents 
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generate profits. The BOT provisions effectively gave the operator 
independence in the management of operations, limiting the potential for 
external political interference. This arrangement is important, as there 
were a number of critics of the project who argued that it should have 
been structured as a joint venture with the state. 
 Firstly, the Zimbabwean regulatory requirements on ethanol production 
prescribed a partnership or joint venture with government across three 
spheres namely, agricultural, transportation and plant operations. These 
regulations were not fully applied in the case of Chisumbanje, which is 
largely premised on a BOT arrangement with no government participation 
in the plant operations and transportation spheres. ZERA was in the 
difficult position of having to determine the price to be paid for ethanol 
based on a formula that included the capital replacement cost, heat 
content of the ethanol and other technical aspects. This responsibility was 
complicated by the fact that the plant has multiple processes with different 
cost structures. In addition the ability of the regulator to independently 
verify cost submissions on the plant was compromised by the fact that the 
project was first built and only regularised thereafter. While ZERA was 
able to subsequently obtain certain disclosures from Green Fuel including 
on the financial, technical, operational, legal and related documentation, 
the Green Fuel principals have not been “as forthcoming” as would be 
expected. IPPs submit the set documentation to ZERA under a non-
disclosure agreement with the understanding that the “regulator is 
primarily interested in the cost structure of plant as this is essential in 
determining the tariff”. In the Chisumbanje case, even the regulator is 
dissatisfied would the disclosure process and details. 
Key to the Chisumbanje project was the introduction of regulations 
prescribing the mandatory blending of ethanol with petrol. It is noteworthy 
that these regulations were not in place in 2009 when the construction of 
the plant commenced. These regulations only came to pass in August 
2013 resulting in a temporary mothballing of the plant for two years. 
During this period Green Fuel lost significant amounts as it continued to 
pay salaries and service debt interest. The pricing of the ethanol has been 
a key issue of contention. ZERA has set a floor price of US$ 0.75 per litre 
to ensure certainty for producers. This price is significantly higher than 
almost all international equivalents. In January 2015 the ethanol price of 
US$ 0.95 was the highest in the world. According to the regulator this 
price has been established to enable the project to cover its cost and 
recoup its capital investment. The US$ 0.95 tariff is below the Green Fuel 
tariff proposal based on a cost plus model of US$ 1.05 per litre. These 
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elevated prices have proven to be contentious amongst the Zimbabwean 
public. The broad public resistance to using blended fuel in part stems 
from the fact that the mandatory nature of the regulations does not give 
end users an option. Fleet managers have also expressed reservations on 
the effect the blended product has on the mechanical integrity of the 
engines in their vehicles, possibly rendering original equipment 
manufacturer warranties invalid. The steep drop in the price of crude oil 
has also compromised the economic viability of ethanol blending since 
July 2014. In January 2015 imported petrol in Zimbabwe cost US$ 0.50 
per litre. Ethanol was being blended into this at US$ 0.95 per litre 
rendering the economics of the blended product highly questionable.  
Green Fuel has sought to integrate sustainable and environmentally 
friendly agricultural practices by ensuring no land clearing and minimum 
tillage in the cultivation of sugar cane. In addition, the plant includes 
comprehensive downstream activities that utilise waste products from the 
ethanol plant for other economically beneficial activities. Three key pieces 
of legislation govern the Chisumbanje Ethanol Plant in Zimbabwe. The first 
of these is the Environmental Management Act (EMA). The EMA 
prescribes that an Environmental Impact Assessment be performed and 
authorisation received prior to commencement. EMA’s failure to adjudicate 
Green Fuel’s EIA within 60 months meant authorisation for the project was 
granted by default. The second piece of legislation is the Energy 
Regulatory Authority Act administered by ZERA as described above. The 
final piece of legislation is the Agricultural Land Resettlement Act that sets 
out the requirements and procedures for the legal and equitable 
resettlement of rural communities in the conduct of agricultural activities. 
The displacement and relocation of people has damaged the community 
fabric and resulted in the destabilization of households and the loss of 
social ties as families move further away from each other. Food security 
for many families who practised subsistence farming and hunting 
livelihoods has also suffered. Relocations have resulted in a degree of 
loss of access to social services such as schools, clinics and hospitals that 
have compromised the health and education opportunities of learners. 
Many residents have complained of not having received compensation for 
this relocation and displacement. There have been sporadic community 
protests regarding the project. The resettlement of families has resulted in 
disputes regarding compensation after being forcibly removed from their 
ancestral homes. The locality has also witnessed a militarisation and 
heightened police presence. Benefits that have accrued as a result of the 
project have included employment opportunities for locals and increased 
commercial activity in the adjacent town and urban areas. The 
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construction of dams, irrigation and related facilities has increased the 
infrastructure stock and the more intense utilisation of land resources has 
elevated economic output.  
Finally, the project appears to have been exempted from Zimbabwean 
indigenisation laws that require a majority percentage to be owned by 
locals. In addition, that capital equipment imported to execute on the 
project was not levied the statutory import duty. 
Construction and technology 
The project developer’s made significant use of Brazilian technical 
advisers and expertise in the plant design, procurement, and construction 
phases. However, these external skills were transferred to the local 
management team in terms of the day to day running of the plant making it 
largely skills self-sufficient. This was an achievable goal as expertise on 
the management and operations of ethanol plants were available within 
Zimbabwe from earlier ethanol plants. Capital equipment was primarily 
sourced from Brazil a technological leader in the field of ethanol 
production, and manufactured domestically.  In sourcing equipment from 
Brazil sponsors ensured the project is unlikely to be compromised by the 
unavailability of spare parts or related equipment, as Brazil is not a 
participant in EU and US sanctions on the Zimbabwean government and 
its proxies.   
Feedstock and key inputs 
By partnering with ARDA in the sourcing of agricultural land, Green Fuel 
successfully aligned its interests with those of the state. This arrangement 
is particularly important owing to the vexatious land issue that remains in 
Zimbabwe. Despite the many protests and community reservations 
regarding the land acquisition process detailed above, Green Fuel has 
remained largely immunised from operational and political disruptions that 
these upheavals could potentially have triggered. The partnership also 
limited the capital injection into the project as the land was not purchased 
outright from ARDA, but is to be utilised over the 20-year concession 
period with enhancements made to the irrigation capacity and related 
cultivation infrastructure. Presently Green Fuel has approximately 10 000 
hectares under sugar cane production in nearby proximity to the ethanol 
plant. Proximity of the crop to the plant enables a seamless and efficient 
logistical process, not subject to external transportation vagaries. 
Construction has included 13 feeder dams to store water for irrigation 
purposes and counter the effects of drought. Extensive irrigation 
195 
infrastructure has also been put in place. Independent farmers in the 
surrounding area also supplement sugar cane feedstock. 
Market 
The mandatory blending of ethanol into petrol commencing in August 2013 
provides the equivalent of an off take agreement to Green Fuel by obliging 
petrol distributors to blend ethanol into their product at stipulated levels. As 
there are no other ethanol producers supplying the petroleum sector in 
Zimbabwe, this gives Green Fuel a captive market and monopoly position. 
Green Fuel’s assurance of a market came to fruition when ZERA 
controversially issued a license to Green Fuel in terms of the Petroleum 
Act. This license enabled Green Fuel to be a registered supplier for the 
mandatory blending of anhydrous ethanol with unleaded petrol. Blending 
levels commenced at E5 at inception in 2013 and were subsequently 
increased to E10. 
Foreign exchange and credit 
When commencing investment and construction of the plant in 2009, the 
sponsors took advantage of the fact that inflation and exchange rate risk 
had effectively been eliminated by the dollarisation of the Zimbabwean 
economy. The venture would have been unviable under a 
hyperinflationary Zimbabwean dollar monetary system. The dollarized 
economy facilitated a natural hedge against foreign exchange risk as all 
factors of production including capital equipment, input, and output prices 
were denominated in US dollars. Part of the dollarisation reforms in 
Zimbabwe included liberalisation of both the current and capital accounts. 
Investors in the project could therefore legally transfer proceeds to 
external national jurisdictions to settle liabilities, distribute profits, or 
warehouse capital in more stable banking geographies. Owing to the 
opacity of this project, details in this regard were not accessible. 
Political 
Chisumbanje appears to have encountered and surmounted significant 
political risks. Under the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 
Zimbabwe that spanned the period 2008 to 2013 there were public 
disagreements between state officials and agencies regarding the project, 
including a parliamentary investigation and a set of recommendations by 
Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara. The recommendations made 
prescribed community restitution and compensation by the project 
developers, and a conversion of the project from a BOT to a joint venture, 
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with the state having a direct stake. The recommendations by the 
parliamentary committee were never implemented. This contestation 
further led to the blending regulations not being passed and the temporary 
closure of the plant. With Zanu winning an outright majority in the 2013 
elections and the dissolution of the GNU, mandatory blending regulations 
were passed and the plant resumed operations. As highlighted in the 
regulatory section key questions remain regarding the integrity of the 
processes leading to Chisumbanje receiving its ethanol producer license, 
EIA, and exemption from local ownership requirements. The principal 
sponsor, Billy Rautenbach’s close association with Zimbabwean President 
Robert Mugabe and Zanu (PF) saw him included on a list of individuals on 
whom EU and US sanctions and restrictions were imposed. The project 
missed an opportunity to sell carbon dioxide to South African listed and 
German owned African Oxygen. Despite a non-disclosure agreement, 
memorandum of understanding, and successful due diligence process, 
African Oxygen concluded it could not participate in the transaction due to 
it being 56% owned by the German Linde Group, that is subject to the 
Bribery and Corruption Act and related EU directives. Potential partners in 
Chisumbanje expressed the concern “what happens if …government 
changes, Mugabe moves, or even if Grace [Mugabe] becomes the new 
president, we don’t know what the situation may be…”. The life cycle of 
the plant is detailed below. 
Table 4.10:  Chisumbanje Ethanol Plant Life Cycle and Timelines 
Project Life Cycle and Timeline Date 
Invitation to investors 2008 
Granting of 20 year concession October 2008 
Beginning of construction 2009 
Plant commissioning 2011 
Receipt of blending license from ZERA August 2013 
Mandatory E5 blending requirements promulgated August 2013 
 
4.9.4  Institutional and legal arrangements 
The key institutional and legal frameworks regarding Chisumbanje have 
been highlighted in the sections above. These include the BOT 
arrangement, the licensing of Chisumbanje as an ethanol producer, the 
EIA, and the role of ARDA in providing land for the project. Important 
considerations in the conceptualisation of Chisumbanje include the fact 
that Zimbabwe was in economic turmoil, and the ability to raise capital on 
large projects was limited by the country and many of its political actors 
having been effectively frozen out of the international banking system. 
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4.9.5  Lessons learned 
Despite the controversy surrounding the Chisumbanje project, and gross 
irregularities in its commissioning, the venture offers key lessons for 
application. Beginning with the defects, the lack of a regulator at the time 
of the project’s commissioning undermined the level of oversight. The 
failure of regulatory oversight is also evidenced by the fact that the EIA for 
the venture was never approved, and only granted by default. The 
Chisumbanje project is also mired in questions regarding the issuing of the 
ethanol production license. As a result, it was a subject of political 
contestation between Zanu PF and the MDC. The political nature of the 
project, including an overtly politically inclined principal sponsor has made 
the project more driven and dependant upon the country’s fluid political 
environment, as opposed to a fundamental commercial and economic 
case. Chisumbanje demonstrates how the execution of project and 
infrastructure finance is significantly altered in countries that are in 
transition, where there is significant political and economic contestation, 
and the institutions and rules governing these societies are evolving. This 
may result in regulatory circumvention, a lack of transparency, and the 
collusion of state players in compromising the interests of local 
communities. Due to the tariff paid to Green Fuel and mandatory blending 
requirements, public opposition to the initiative remains elevated. This is 
also fuelled by the fact that on an individual basis the public would as of 
January 2015 be paying significantly less for imported unblended petrol.  
The project also demonstrates non-traditional forms of capital raising, 
when ventures have limited access to conventional capital sources, 
including access to international capital markets. The most significant 
capital contribution to Chisumbanje in terms of value and utility is 
undoubtedly the land leased by ARDA for the development of the sugar 
cane plantations and to secure the plant feedstock. In arranging the 
project, the developers systematically sought to circumvent mainstream 
international banking and settlement platforms, and capital equipment 
sources from the EU and US, to shield the project from EU and US 
sanctions and potential disruption. The final lesson relates to the setting of 
a floor of US$ 0.75 for each litre of ethanol. Whilst the merits, amounts 
and processed followed in arriving at this decision may be questionable, 
this intervention provided a fundamental economic platform from which the 
project proceeded. A single case was examined in Zimbabwe rendering a 
comparison irrelevant. Detailed below is a summary of the case and its 
key attributes. 
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 Table 4.11:  Zim
babwe Case Com
pilation 
Attribute 
Chisum
banje Ethanol Plant 
Geographic Source of 
Funding 
x 
G
eographic sources of funding outside of Zim
babw
e unknow
n 
x 
D
ebt to equity ratio of project undisclosed 
x 
Evidence suggests lim
ited use of debt on account of liquidity challenges in Zim
babw
ean banking sector, and 
international sanctions on m
ajor sponsor B
illy R
autenbach 
Nature of Equity 
Participants 
x 
D
om
estic corporate/individual financial sponsor 
x 
Zim
babw
ean governm
ent through AR
D
A
 
Governm
ent Participation 
x 
G
overnm
ent equity participation of 10%
 in recognition of AR
D
A
 lease of land to G
reenFuel 
Debt Funding Institutions  
x 
U
nknow
n  
Use of International Service 
Providers 
x 
U
se of Brazilian advisors and technical experts in the plant construction 
Tim
e Com
m
itm
ent of 
Sponsors 
x 
Full duration of project 
Project Stage 
x 
Initial project concept m
ature 
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Attribute 
Chisum
banje Ethanol Plant 
Business Landscape 
x 
Project dependent upon the retention of m
andatory blending requirem
ents 
x 
Project dependent upon regulatory prescribed price of ethanol 
x 
Significant drop in oil price during 2014 and 2015 challenging the financial m
odel and econom
ic assum
ptions 
underpinning C
hisum
banje 
x 
Project exposed to current and future com
m
unity and political dynam
ics 
Capital Structure Post 
Com
pletion 
x 
C
apital structure unknow
n  
Governance Structure Post 
Com
pletion 
x 
N
o significant changes  
Significant Environm
ental/ 
Sustainability Incidents 
x 
M
ultiple events recorded including aggrieved local com
m
unity 
x 
Local disturbances resulting in violent confrontations and the deploym
ent of police and arm
y 
x 
Extended strikes by em
ployees 
x 
Serious environm
ental breaches through the release of toxic effluent from
 plant 
Risk Universe Dynam
ics 
x 
U
nstable and poorly m
anaged 
Refinancing Initiatives 
x 
N
on reported 
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4.10 Conclusion 
This chapter began by documenting the selected case studies across four 
main criteria namely, the capital structure, and risk management. Having 
collated and considered data relating to each case and concluded in-
country cluster comparisons, the chapter concludes with a referral to 
chapter 5, wherein a cross case analysis of all the cases is performed 
building on the format in which the case studies are organised. Specifically 
these categories are the governance, institutional, and legal 
arrangements, the risk management, and the financial structure. The 
environmental and sustainability considerations are examined as a fourth 
category separated from the risk management in chapter 5. This 
distinction is justified by the potential distress in the form of loss of human 
life and environmental degradation social and environmental breaches 
may cause to affected communities and environments. 
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5 Analysis and findings across the case studies 
The case studies laid out earlier in the chapter document the uniqueness 
of each project, and the different factors shaping and influencing key 
project pillars. The 7 case studies set a foundation through which key 
assertions and insights relating to the governance (institutional and legal) 
arrangements, capital structure, risk management, and sustainability 
considerations were extracted from each case. In this section these key 
assertions derived from each individual case study are distilled, discussed, 
and cross-referenced across all the cases to determine each assertion’s 
generalizability and limitations. The implications of the assertions on 
project and infrastructure finance are considered insofar as they contribute 
to project failure or success. As a result of the cross case analysis the 
thesis begins to distil and compare management practice in the execution 
of project and infrastructure finance, and commonality in practices begin to 
emerge together with proposals that have the potential to enhance project 
success if implemented. The cross case analysis also provides a platform 
for comparing actual managerial practice with academic theory in chapters 
5 and 6, the reasons for deviation between theory and practice, and 
propositions to deepen our understanding of project and infrastructure 
finance in Sub-Saharan Africa. This analytical process was valuable in 
synthesizing and organising key and common themes, analysing these 
themes in defined units, and prompting the final arrangement of the 
research findings logically and coherently.  
The key assertions derived from the battery of case studies are grouped 
into the categories of governance, capital structure, risk management, and 
sustainability in accordance with the research questions. Where assertions 
are applicable to more than one category they are allocated to the most 
profound and impactful category to limit duplication. The applicability of 
each assertion identified to each case study is ranked as significant (blue), 
relevant (red), or contradicted (yellow). Significant denotes that the 
assertion was derived directly from the case study. Relevant denotes that 
even though the assertion was not explicitly apparent in the case, it has 
direct applicability to it. Contradicted denotes a situation where an 
assertion in one case is contradicted by the actual arrangements of 
another case. Where an assertion is not applicable to a particular case, 
the ‘block’ is left unmarked.  
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The key to be applied for each assertion in Tables 5.1 to 5.4 is as follows: 
Key: 
S – Significant 
R – Relevant 
C – Contradicted 
The names of the case studies have been abbreviated in the tables 5.1 to 
5.4 as Seacom (SE), Gautrain (G), Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (P), 
Kalkbult (K), Mozal (M), Sasol Natural Gas Project (S), and Chisumbanje 
(C).  
5.1 Governance, institutional, and legal assertions 
across the case studies 
Table 5.1 distils the governance assertions and the degree of 
transferability to the full battery of case studies. A cross case analysis of 
the governance arrangements in the case studies generates a number of 
valuable insights between successful and failed projects. The strength and 
credibility of the project developer is of critical importance. Projects 
including Seacom, the Gautrain, Kalkbult, Mozal and SNGP are 
characterised by project developers with deep technical capabilities 
complemented by strong balance sheets or ready access to capital. The 
strong technical capabilities mitigate against insurmountable engineering 
and construction challenges being encountered, and significantly improves 
the prospects of the project being successfully constructed. In contrast 
where project developers have limited technical capabilities or where the 
nature of the venture is a FOAK as in the case of the PBMR, the project is 
vulnerable to encounter engineering and construction impediments. The 
complexity of the PBMR engineering amplified this technical deficit 
contributing to its failure. Conversely in the Chisumbanje case, the 
developers also had limited technical experience. Ethanol production 
facilities on an industrial scale were however proven in Zimbabwe and 
other parts of the world with the process and technology being relatively 
easy to master.  
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Table 5.1:  Governance, Institutional and Legal Case Study Assertions  
Assertions from
 the case studies 
 
Significance of assertions to 
each case study: 
 
SE 
G 
P 
K 
M
 
S 
C 
A1. The strength and credibility of the project developer is essential to obtain buy in from
 other 
stakeholders including governm
ent decision m
akers, and the project to m
ove from
 concept to pre-
feasibility stage. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
A2. Extensive project preparation prior to the com
m
issioning of construction is critical to form
ulating a 
clear road m
ap for the project that addresses potential hindrances, m
aps the project’s critical path, and 
sets a foundation for the project’s overall co-ordination and m
anagem
ent. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
R 
R 
A3. Effectively executed projects have explicit goals and objectives w
ith attendant tim
elines established 
upfront, w
ith progress closely m
onitored and evaluated at key m
ilestones. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
R 
A4. A robust regulatory fram
ew
ork governing the project including the role of applicable agencies and 
public sector departm
ents facilitates clear, effective, and efficient project execution. This includes w
here 
the project com
pany is located and the attendant reporting lines. 
R 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
A5. The utilisation of international advisers in legal, technical, financial and other areas enhance the 
robustness of the project particularly w
here the project is a first in a jurisdiction and dom
estic expertise 
are lim
ited. 
S 
S 
R 
S 
S 
S 
R 
A6. 
Experienced 
project 
leaders 
are 
essential 
for 
the 
project 
m
anagem
ent 
of 
projects 
from
 
conceptualisation through to the operational stages. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
R 
A7. Project team
 continuity critical as project m
oves from
 concept, to feasibility, com
m
issioning, 
construction and operations. A lack of continuity can result in m
ajor disruptions, elevated risk, and loss of 
institutional m
em
ory. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
R 
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Assertions from
 the case studies 
 
Significance of assertions to 
each case study: 
 
SE 
G 
P 
K 
M
 
S 
C 
A8. Project sponsors m
ust have ability to access key decision m
akers especially governm
ent officials 
and regulatory officers. C
onstructive engagem
ents including effective lobbying for the project are 
essential. 
S 
S 
S 
R 
S 
S 
S 
A9. W
here local partners are participants, these m
ust be credible and effective in protecting the projects 
interests in the applicable jurisdictions. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
A10. 
R
obust, 
clear 
and 
docum
ented 
governance 
arrangem
ents 
including 
m
inority 
protection 
are 
essential for a stable governance structure, and conducive to long term
 equity participation by sponsors. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
R 
A11. The internal project com
pany arrangem
ents m
ust be supportive of the project goals. This includes 
the m
ix betw
een technical and com
m
ercial staff, the establishm
ent of internal corporate capacity such as 
in risk m
anagem
ent, hum
an resources, and general operations. Q
ualitatively, the corporate culture that 
is nurtured should be aligned to fulfilling the project aim
s.  
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
R 
A12. A
 com
pact sponsor consortium
 enhances the speed and efficiency of the decision m
aking process. 
This agility is diluted as the sponsor base or lending consortium
 broadens. 
S 
R 
R 
S 
S 
S 
S 
A13. E
nsure strong project docum
entation. This w
ill ease the speed at w
hich the project can be 
executed on com
m
issioning on account of the clarity, and attract debt-funding institutions due to the 
com
fort derived from
 a rigorous docum
entation process. 
S 
S 
R 
S 
S 
S 
R 
A14. Strong co-ordination and organisation of project allow
ing all participants and stakeholders to be 
directed tow
ards com
m
on objectives and instilling discipline and focus into project activities. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
A15. Broad based political support increases the robustness and resilience of the project to political 
R 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
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Assertions from
 the case studies 
 
Significance of assertions to 
each case study: 
 
SE 
G 
P 
K 
M
 
S 
C 
changes particularly those relating to key personnel. 
A16. W
here a public institution is a key sponsor or underw
riter to a project, m
echanism
s need to be put 
in place to allow
 the public purse to enjoy financial upside beyond pre-determ
ined return param
eters. 
This om
ission m
ay result in private sector operators enjoying super profits w
hile the public sector bears 
the bulk of the risk. 
 
S 
S 
R 
R 
R 
S 
A17. The long-term
 com
m
itm
ent of project sponsors to the full project life enhances the venture’s 
robustness and the quality of long-term
 decision-m
aking. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
A18. D
irect equity participation by the host governm
ent and representation on the project com
pany 
board 
enhances 
project 
legitim
acy 
and 
facilitates 
clear 
lines 
of 
com
m
unication 
w
ith 
governm
ent 
principals regarding the project. 
 
S 
S 
 
S 
S 
S 
A19. The participation of m
ulti-lateral institutions such as the IFC
 can enhance governance on account of 
the latter’s extensive expertise in em
erging m
arkets and established relationships w
ith m
any countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
 
 
S 
S 
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In addition to bringing in Brazilian consultants in the plant construction and 
commissioning, the developers manufactured key plant components 
domestically and ensured skills transfer to the local management team to 
allow the plant to run independently. Therefore, despite limited technical 
capacity by the developer simpler and proven technology applied at 
Chisumbanje mitigated against the project failing on account of technical 
difficulties. 
The duration of commitment of project sponsors has a significant effect of 
a project’s resilience. Where sponsors are committed to a venture for its 
full project life, project resilience, stability, coherence and prospects of 
success are significantly improved. This is evident in Seacom, Gautrain, 
Mozal, SNGP, and Chisumbanje where sponsors do not have an exit 
strategy and are committed for the project’s full life. This characteristic 
contributes to project success because sponsor decision-making is 
informed by the long-term success of the underlying project as opposed to 
short-term profit taking. The quality of sponsor decisions is therefore 
enhanced supporting both the success and longevity of a venture. As a 
juristic entity the project also benefits from having a stable core of 
sponsors frequently with strong balance sheets who can support the 
venture if it encounters temporary periods of financial or operational 
difficulty. This contributes to enhanced credit ratings and lower risk 
perceptions improving access to further capital requirements and the 
terms on which such funding is sourced. In contrast where a sponsors are 
equivocal in terms of their long-term participation in a project this injects a 
number of uncertainties.  
The first is ambiguity as to whether a project concept will proceed to 
commissioning and execution. This doubt permeates the decisions of all 
stakeholders in the project who effectively hedge their bets anticipating 
that the project may never come to fruition, thereby diluting commitment 
and investment in their respective roles. This aspect was a clear 
contributor to the failure of the PBMR. Even where a project is constructed 
and commissioned, the exit of a key sponsor is likely to weaken the 
venture as external parties may suspect that the sponsor is exiting due to 
adverse insider knowledge of the project’s prospects, and a new 
shareholder will lack the experience accumulated on the project to date. 
Despite the flaws inherent in Chisumbanje, a key contributor to its 
resurrection was the unambiguous and long-term commitment of the 
project sponsors. 
Clearly and explicitly articulated project goals and milestones are an 
essential contributor to project success. This clarity of purpose originates 
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from the project sponsors through the governance structures put in place. 
While the explicit goals of Seacom, the Gautrain, Kalkbult, Mozal, SNGP 
and Chisumbanje evolved and were shaped during the project concept 
stages, finality on the project goals and scope were achieved before each 
venture reached financial closure. This allowed the sponsors to have a 
clear, definite and stable business plan to funders instilling certainty as to 
the project objectives and intended outcomes. Only when these primary 
goals had been achieved did the sponsors initiate brownfield or other 
value added extensions to the business model including venturing into 
backhaul operations by Seacom, enquiries to extend the Gautrain network 
by the GMA, and phase 2 of Mozal. The emphasis on explicit goals has 
the effect of focusing management attention on the objectives at hand and 
limiting distractions and diversions. Different participants and stakeholders 
are able to co-ordinate their responsibilities and deliverables towards 
common goals enabling congruence in project execution.  
Such clarity facilitates for a sequential process of project commissioning, 
construction and operation in a disciplined, rigorous and purposefully 
myopic manner. On account of this rigour Seacom, Gautrain, Kalkbult, 
Mozal, SNGP, and Chisumbanje were also executed more closely in 
accordance within budgetary parameters further consolidating each 
project’s prospects for success. In contrast the PBMR lacked clear and 
explicit goals. This contributed significantly to its failure by causing 
extensive re-engineering of changing plant specifications, poor co-
ordination and co-operation amongst stakeholders and participants, unmet 
deadlines, and the incurrence of expenditure above budgeted amounts. 
A transparent and certain regulatory framework enabled the 
commissioning of the five successful projects. Seacom obtained certainty 
regarding landing points in participating countries and the regulations 
governing this. Similarly, the legal framework for the Gautrain and Kalkbult 
was effected by way of legislation and corresponding regulations. The 
SNGP enjoyed the certainty expressed in the Gas Agreement with the 
South African authorities stipulating the terms by which gas could be 
imported into South Africa together with the pricing methodology, and 
Mozal enjoyed the benefits of explicit tax concessions and terms of being 
located in an industrial development zone. All these legal and regulatory 
interventions put in place by the host governments and state agencies 
gave legal certainty to the conditions under which these projects would 
operate. A failure by the respective state actors to issue these regulatory 
certainties would have resulted in all the above projects either not being 
commissioned, or being located in jurisdictions able to provide such 
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certainty. In contrast, the regulatory process for the PBMR was difficult, to 
some degree acrimonious, and unclear. This arose from the fact that the 
PBMR technology was novel and application was made to the regulator on 
completion of key component designs with the NER expected to approve 
qualifying submissions. A lack of clarity in terms of the regulatory standard 
was compounded by the regulator having limited experience, capacity and 
skills in assessing new design applications. The uncertainty regarding 
regulatory standards contributed to delays and increased costs, further 
jeopardising the PBMR. Similarly, for Chisumbanje, the absence of a 
regulatory authority on commissioning resulted in limited regulatory 
oversight on the venture and failure to compile regulations essential for its 
viability including mandatory blending. As Chisumbanje was temporarily 
shut down after construction as a lack of mandatory ethanol blending 
regulations resulted in no buyers of the end product. 
Project team continuity was an assertion that projected itself forcefully in 
the successful execution of projects. In particular, the Mozal project 
illustrated the benefits that were derived from using the same project team 
that executed the Hillside and Bayside smelters in South Africa to execute 
Mozal. The synergistic benefits included both phases of Mozal being 
completed well within deadlines and budgets. Intentionality on project 
team continuity was also observed in Seacom, the Gautrain, Kalkbult, 
SNGP, and Chisumbanje. It was particularly important the more 
technically complex a project was and enabled the construction of 
institutional memory and skills retention. The five cases above that 
ensured project continuity were able to more seamlessly execute on the 
project in its different stages including conceptualisation, pre-feasibility, 
feasibility, financial closure, commissioning and construction, and 
operations contributing critically to project success. Where team continuity 
was lacking as in the PBMR institutional memory was compromised, 
mistakes were made and repeated, and project coherence and co-
ordination were sub-optimal. These fault lines manifested in breached 
financial budgets and deadlines contributing significantly to project failure. 
Internally within a project, the governance arrangements amongst 
sponsors and participants can result in project success or failure. Where 
multiple sponsors are involved as in the case of Seacom, Kalkbult, Mozal, 
SNGP, and to a lesser extent Chisumbanje, a clearly crafted shareholder 
agreement that all equity participants abide by increases the project’s 
stability and prospects for success. While there were shareholder 
disagreements in all the above projects, the internal governance 
arrangements expressed how such matters would be engaged and 
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resolved internally, without compromising project operations. By way of 
example the importance of dividend declarations differed between different 
shareholders in Seacom and ROMPCO, but a solution that all 
shareholders agreed to was arrived at and these projects operations 
continued unabated. In contrast the PBMR suffered multiple setbacks 
regarding its governance arrangements. Specifically, the co-operation 
agreement with international participants was never implemented. 
Subsequently the international participants exited the venture and ceased 
to fund it. Finally, within South African government departments, Eskom, 
the DBSA, and the IDC, there was no overarching governance 
arrangement that all parties subscribed to. This disparate approach by 
stakeholders undermined overall commitment to the PBMR including 
financial, administrative and political support, delegitimising the project 
and setting it up for failure. ROMPCO in contrast initially had Sasol as a 
sole sponsor and shareholder. Such an arrangement enabled Sasol to 
make decisions speedily without the requirement to consult other 
shareholders in the construction of the pipeline. Coherence in the internal 
governance arrangements contributes importantly to successful project 
execution by facilitating an environment where sponsors and participants 
contribute fully and are committed to and invested in a project’s success. 
The governance arrangements in the above paragraph are also integrally 
linked to the importance of effective local and international partners in 
contributing to project success. Without effective local partners the 
Seacom developers would have been unable to obtain rapid regulatory 
approval for landing points in various countries. Similarly, the Gautrain 
project developers were able to access key decision makers and garner 
both political and government support.  
A key enabler of both Mozal and the SNGP are the task teams involving 
government principals that were able to resolve bottlenecks and make 
decisions at the appropriate levels. Chisumbanje also demonstrates how 
project developers were able to obtain the participation of ARDA for 
significant land tracts and despite a turbulent political environment, 
ultimately receive an operating license and lobby successfully for 
mandatory blending. These projects illustrate the importance of local and 
international partners to enable a project and its success. In contrast, the 
South African principals were luke warm in their support for the PBMR and 
ineffective in garnering broad based political support. This ineffectual 
indifference contributed significantly to the termination of the PBMR. In 
addition, the international partners that were meant to facilitate access to 
American and British markets and regulatory approval exited the 
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collaboration rendering their contribution in these markets of no value. 
This greatly circumscribed the potential market for the PBMR, further 
undermining its financial viability. 
The final consideration in factors contributing to project success and 
failure in the governance arrangements relates to the equity participation 
of host governments and DFIs. The Seacom and Kalkbult projects are the 
only projects where there is no direct or indirect state or DFI participation. 
This has not compromised the projects in any way, and may have 
contributed to the speed of execution. Seacom’s lack of state equity 
participation is attributable to the fact that over 90% of the cable and 
related infrastructure is located in international waters and outside the 
jurisdiction of any single state. The Seacom developers would also have 
had a number of options as to where landing points occurred, reducing the 
need for state equity participation to obtain regulatory approval. The clear 
benefits of the cable for participating countries also meant political 
principals were attracted to landing points on their territories. Kalkbult 
could forego state equity participation as this was exchanged for 
community participation, and the state was an integral participant in the 
project by way of the PPA and guarantee to Eskom. 
The project developers were also able to raise the capital required 
independently of state players or DFIs including using IRUs. In contrast all 
other projects had state or DFI participation. State support was essential 
for the Gautrain to be commissioned, as without it private sector players 
would have been unwilling to take on traffic risk. In addition, the 
government provided the bulk of capital. Due to its exploratory nature the 
PBMR required state support. Capital markets lack appetite for projects of 
this nature and the concept would not be developed without state funding. 
Having varying state participation in Mozal, SNGP and Chisumbanje is a 
strategic move aligning the interests of the project developers with the 
host government. This was particularly important where the host 
government oversaw critical project aspects including port infrastructure, 
gas reserve concessions, and land leases. Having state participation has 
enabled these projects to be protected from adverse regulatory and 
related interventions from the host governments, contributing to project 
stability and success. 
5.2 Capital structure assertions across the case studies 
Table 5.2 distils the capital structure assertions and the degree of 
transferability to the full battery of case studies. The first foundational 
observation made relates to the importance of deep and liquid domestic or  
211 
Table 5.2:  Capital Structure Case Study Assertions  
Assertions from
 the case studies 
 
Significance of assertions to 
each case study: 
 
SE 
G 
P 
K 
M
 
S 
C 
B1. The dom
estic presence of deep and liquid capital m
arkets, enable the aggregation of savings that can 
be invested in capital-intensive projects. The absence of such m
arkets result in capital scarcity and an 
inability 
of 
countries 
to 
fund 
infrastructure 
from
 
dom
estic 
sources 
lim
iting 
developm
ent. 
C
ontinued 
deepening and broadening of dom
estic capital m
arkets including im
proved financial sector regulations 
contribute directly to increasing the available capital stock for infrastructure investm
ent. 
S 
S 
 
S 
S 
S 
C 
B2. Public resources are frequently a key catalyst in enabling project and infrastructure initiatives in 
developing m
arkets. This intervention is m
ore acute w
here dom
estic capital m
arkets are narrow
 and 
shallow
. The state’s role as a catalyst extends beyond the provision of capital and m
ay include im
plicit or 
explicit guarantees on patronage or m
andatory utilisation of the product or service e.g. m
andatory blending 
of ethanol. 
 
S 
S 
S 
 
S 
S 
B3. International and regional m
ulti-lateral institutions such as the IFC
 and the D
B
SA participating in a 
borderline concept are essential in a project obtaining broader buy in by stakeholders and financial closure 
and com
m
issioning being achieved. 
 
 
 
 
S 
S 
C 
B4. The participation of com
m
ercial banks and other related private debt providers w
ho com
prehensively 
scrutinise a potential venture and challenge the underlying assum
ptions allow
s a final project concept to 
em
erge that is m
ore robust and rigorous increasing prospects for success. 
S 
S 
R 
S 
S 
S 
R 
B5. W
here possible and practical obtain capital for construction of venture from
 future users and related 
beneficiaries. This w
ill have the effect of reducing debt levels, increasing the equity, and a generally m
ore 
conservative capital structure m
ore conducive to project success. 
S 
S 
S 
R 
S 
S 
R 
B6. For sponsor equity contributions, lim
it the usage of back leveraged structures. These structures have 
the effect of com
prom
ising long term
 decision m
aking for a venture due to the need to service interest 
obligations on sponsor debt obligations. 
S 
R 
 
R 
R 
R 
R 
B7. To increase the prospects of financial closure on a project, decrease the levels of leverage prior to 
S 
S 
 
R 
R 
S 
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Assertions from
 the case studies 
 
Significance of assertions to 
each case study: 
 
SE 
G 
P 
K 
M
 
S 
C 
actual construction i.e. as far as possible have a conservative debt to equity structure. P
ost construction 
w
here a venture’s operations are stable and it is cash generative, leverage can be increased sharply and on 
com
m
ercially m
ore favourable term
s. 
B8. Project developers w
ill need to take full pre-construction risk w
here governing authorities and banks 
cannot accept this risk burden. This w
holesale take on of risk can be unw
ound in stages post construction 
and after the project has reached a steady state in its operations perm
itting the entry of new
 equity and debt 
participants. 
R 
R 
S 
S 
R 
S 
S 
B
9. A
 key aspect of a project’s feasibility should be a clear, stable, reliable, and predictable funding m
odel. 
Ideally the funding m
andate should not be subject to recurring authorisation once m
ade e.g. national 
budgetary allocations. U
nfunded m
andates jeopardise a project from
 the onset, as stakeholders are non-
com
m
ittal tow
ards ventures that can be sum
m
arily term
inated. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
B10. Em
bed m
echanism
s into debt funding arrangem
ents that allow
 for refinancing of debt w
here justified 
w
ithout excessive breakage fees in debt package. 
S 
S 
 
R 
S 
S 
R 
B11. Im
m
unise or hedge the capital structure from
 foreign exchange m
ovem
ents. Floating exchange rates 
in Sub-Saharan Africa are volatile and hedging against these m
ovem
ents in the capital structure perm
its 
focus on the operational perform
ance of the underlying project. Traditional banking hedging products are 
likely to be prohibitively expensive and hedging w
ill of necessity need to occur through novel enabling 
m
echanism
s including the Treasury and the C
entral B
ank. 
S 
S 
 
S 
S 
S 
S 
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regional capital markets to enable funds to be channelled towards 
potential projects. The Seacom venture made effective use of South 
African capital markets in raising all its debt funding requirements, and 
50% of the equity funding. South African capital markets are 
acknowledged as the deepest and most advanced on the African 
continent. In the absence of funding from South Africa the project 
developer would have incurred significant difficulty in sourcing the 
requisite funds from other capital markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Alternatively, the project developer could have opted to source funding 
from outside Sub-Saharan Africa.  This would likely have resulted in an 
extended capital raising exercise that would have substantially 
transformed the transient opportunity that Seacom sought to monetise. At 
best the Seacom project would not have been executed in its original form 
and within the time frames achieved. At worst, failure to raise overseas 
funding may have resulted in Seacom not reaching financial closure. The 
regulations governing the REIPPP prescribed the sourcing of debt funding 
from South African banks. Project developers were therefore restricted 
largely to deciding on an optimal debt to equity mix. The Mozal and SNGP 
encountered capital market deficiencies in Mozambique. To circumvent 
these and ensure the ventures progressed the Mozal project made 
extensive use of an international funding consortium including the IFC and 
the IDC. The absence of these international funding sources would have 
stymied the project at conception. Similarly, the project sponsor of the 
SNGP primarily mobilised capital from South African capital markets, in 
addition to their own balance sheet. The SNGP would not have reached 
financial closure in the absence of these funds. To a lesser degree the 
Gautrain made use of commercial debt funding from South African banks. 
The less than 10% of capital provided by the banks infers that the project 
would have progressed even without this injection. Similarly, in the case of 
the PBMR, funding from capital markets was negated by state funding as 
raising debt on a FOAK project was impractical. The Chisumbanje project 
is an anomaly. As highlighted in the case study, Zimbabwean capital 
markets were unable to raise the requisite capital. Zimbabwe was also 
barred from accessing funds from international multi-lateral institutions 
including the IMF, World Bank and IFC. The injection of capital by private 
actors seemingly linked to political principals furnished the funding for 
Chisumbanje. The project would have failed to materialise where private 
participants employed their own capital to underwrite the project, and if 
overt political support for the project was not in place. The embryonic 
nature of capital markets in many Sub-Saharan African countries are a 
significant barrier to large capital-intensive projects. 
214 
With the exception of Seacom the cases indicate that large infrastructure 
or commercial projects are difficult to execute in the three countries 
without public resources or funding acting as a catalyst.  
The Gautrain was capitalised by the South African national and provincial 
governments for almost 90% of its overall funding requirements. Had the 
state not capitalised the Gautrain to this degree the venture would not 
have been commissioned. Similarly, the PBMR was almost wholly reliant 
on direct or indirect government funding in its attempt to commercialise its 
reactor concept. No private sector organisation would have funded the 
exploratory work that was the PBMR. The SNGP made use of natural gas 
resources in Mozambique that are technically owned by the state. The 
Mozambican government’s issuance of a concession at Temane was 
essential to the project, without which the project could not have 
proceeded. While Mozal did not require a resource concession, the state 
in essence enabled the project through significant tax concessions that 
ordinarily would have been levied. Without these generous tax 
arrangements, the attractiveness of smelter in Mozambique would have 
been outweighed by the risks of locating the plant in an untested frontier 
market. State resources in the form of land made available by ARDA were 
essential for the execution and on-going operations of Chisumbanje. 
Chisumbanje would not have been viable without the land lease feedstock 
for the plant would have been inadequate. Seacom is an exception to the 
observations above due to the internationalised nature of the project, and 
the fact that it provides an intangible service proven to be robust and 
funded by private sector operators alone in many parts of the world. 
In frontier markets hobbled by underdeveloped capital markets, the 
participation of multi-lateral institutions is valuable in broadening the 
funding consortium and attracting the requisite capital. The Mozal and 
SNGP projects both made use of IFC funding to varying degrees. In the 
case of Mozal, the absence of IFC participation would have resulted in 
other international capital providers not joining the funding consortium, and 
as a result the project failing to reach financial closure. The SNGP would 
have progressed without the capital injected by the IFC if this was the only 
consideration. Non-participation in totality by the IFC would have severely 
jeopardised the commissioning as the political umbrella the IFC gave the 
project was invaluable. It is also reasonable to argue that had Mozal not 
been executed and set a precedent that international investors could 
securely develop projects in Mozambique, the SNGP may never have 
been commissioned.  
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The developed nature of South African capital markets negates the 
catalysing impact of DFIs such as the IFC. This is evidenced by the fact 
that no IFC or international DFI funding was used on Seacom the Gautrain 
or the PBMR. The participation of commercial banks by way of debt 
funding is highly advantageous to a project. The due diligence conducted 
by banks to determine a project’s commercial rigour including the financial 
model and forecast cash flows results in safeguards being embedded into 
the project structure during funding negotiations. Legal and related due 
diligences also means that the project is evaluated by seasoned bankers 
in areas including regulatory and environmental compliance extending the 
probing to other essential aspects not directly related to the capital 
structure. In each of the Seacom, Gautrain, Kalkbult, Mozal and SNGP 
projects that underwent commercial banking scrutiny, the unfavourable 
deviation in forecast financial performance versus actual is insignificant 
and inconsequential. This indicates project assumptions and modelling 
were largely accurate and in the case of the Gautrain even conservative in 
terms of patronage.  
These conservative assumptions to a large degree originated from bank 
funders. They had the effect of making the underlying projects more 
realistic and resilient in the event of underperformance by building in a 
buffer in the event of underperformance. In contrast the PBMR lacked 
such rigorous scrutiny and input by funders. This lax funder regime and 
oversight resulted in costs and deviations from set financial parameters 
and milestones being flouted with limited consequences. These continual 
breaches culminated in ballooning cost incurred by the sponsor and a 
withdrawal of support for commercialisation due to a lack of confidence 
that the venture would achieve the anticipated outcomes and the 
excessive funding requirement. In the case of Chisumbanje, the lack of 
accountable debt funders enabled the project to be commissioned in the 
absence of regulatory clarity on mandatory blending, the EIA, and despite 
a challenging political environment. As a result, Chisumbanje was 
mothballed when these regulatory hurdles were not resolved due to 
gridlock regarding the project in the government of national unity. The 
2013 election in which Zanu PF won an outright majority and proceeded 
implement the outstanding regulations led to the project’s resurrection. 
Commercial bankers would have withheld funding until these matters were 
resolved and prevented the plant lying idle for an extended period. 
Paradoxically, had Chisumbanje been entirely dependent on commercial 
bank funding on traditional terms, the plant would never have been 
constructed as banks had no appetite for a project with such a risk profile. 
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An important consideration in the capital structure arrangements of 
projects is the use of back leveraged structures where some sponsors are 
unable to put up their full equity contribution. Back leveraged structures 
were utilised by a minority of sponsors in the Seacom transaction. Whilst 
not sabotaging the project the back leveraged structures had the effect of 
increasing the contestation between sponsors on the amount and 
frequency of dividend declarations. This distracted from the long term 
strategic plans of the venture. The Seacom example is instructive in 
demonstrating the potentially divisive effect of back leveraged structures 
amongst sponsor consortiums. Back leveraged structures were effectively 
avoided on ROMPCO by deferring the participation of iGas and CMG to 
post construction, and Sasol putting up the full equity cheque. Where this 
is possible, this arrangement would appear more preferable. The other 
cases have an absence of back leveraged structures indicating the 
strength of the project sponsors and a possible aversion to back 
leveraging based on the disadvantages detailed above.  
The degree of proposed leverage in project conceptualisation has a 
significant influence in reaching financial closure. Highly leveraged 
projects imply limited skin in the game by project sponsors and an 
elevated risk profile. Conversely lower leverage decreases the risk for debt 
funders on account of the increased equity contribution from sponsors. 
The conservative debt to equity ratios observed in Seacom, Gautrain, 
ROMPCO, and Mozal relative to other project finance transactions infer 
that the sponsors sought to derisk the projects through higher equity 
injections. These actions made the projects viable in terms of their ability 
to attract debt funding for the remaining capital requirement. Project 
developers may sabotage a project achieving financial closure if leverage 
is based on developed market comparatives such as debt to equity ratios 
75%: 25%. To finesse a project past financial closure in emerging and 
frontier Sub-Saharan markets, more conservative debt to equity ratios are 
frequently required.  
It is highly probable that Chisumbanje was substantively premised on this 
principle due to the difficulty it would have encountered in raising debt 
capital. Post construction, it is notable that Seacom, ROMPCO, and Mozal 
enacted more aggressive leverage. This development arose due to the 
fact that operational projects that are cash generative represent a 
substantially lower credit risk. Commercial banks would have been far 
more amenable to advancing credit on better terms on post construction 
operational projects, and the latter three ventures took advantage of this 
market reality. Refinancing of project debt on more favourable terms after 
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construction is a feature that should be built into the project architecture. In 
this respect project developers must negotiate funding terms that are 
amenable to refinancing without excessively punitive breakage fees. 
A clear and predictable funding model informed in part by the capital 
structure differentiates successful and failed projects. Seacom raised 
upfront capital and tied in customers via IRUs. Other channels of annuity 
income were generated through on-going sales of bandwidth in the 
wholesale market. Despite new entrants and steep declines in data prices, 
income streams were maintained by increased volumes ensuring the 
venture was commercially viable. The Gautrain had conservative forecasts 
for revenue generation via patronage underwritten by the Gauteng 
Provincial Government via the MRTR giving the operator a clear and 
reliable funding mechanism. Revenue for Kalkbult, Mozal and SNGP was 
made certain by strong and credible off takers in the form of Eskom, 
Mitsubishi and Sasol respectively. These revenue streams informed both 
the capital structure and funding model contributing significantly to project 
success. In contrast annual allocations of funding by sponsors of the 
PBMR were unclear and decided upon annually with no firm and explicit 
commitment beyond. Further contributing to project failure was the fact 
that the forecast sales of reactors proved to be extremely overly optimistic 
and premised on flawed logic and assumptions. A combination of 
terminated funding and insufficient demand culminated in the funding 
model flaws being exposed and project collapse. Similarly, with 
Chisumbanje, the failure to effect mandatory blending regulations led to 
the facility’s closure, as there was no effective off taker and concomitant 
revenue. Only the passing of blending regulations and the subsequent 
revenue streams allowed for Chisumbanje’s resurrection. 
The final consideration in the capital structure arrangements is the need to 
immunise the capital structure (and project operations) from exchange rate 
volatility. Seacom’s operations had a built in hedge with most income and 
costs being dollar denominated. In the case of the Gautrain, the foreign 
exchange risk was taken on by National Treasury and the South African 
Reserve Bank in their roles as institutional enablers. Kalkbult debt was 
sourced in South Africa and denominated in rands, as was the PPA. Mozal 
and SNGP embedded natural hedges into the project arrangements at 
conception while dollarisation in Zimbabwe made foreign exchange risk 
redundant for Chisumbanje. A failure to immunise a project from foreign 
exchange risk could scupper its viability in two ways. Firstly, commercial 
hedging instruments may be excessively costly and derail economic 
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viability. Secondly banks may balk at advancing facilities on a project with 
naked foreign exchange risk. 
5.3 Risk management assertions across the case 
studies 
Table 5.3 distils the risk management assertions and the degree of 
transferability to the full battery of case studies. Underpinning all the 
successful projects is a clear regulatory framework established prior to 
project commissioning. This framework includes a prescribed process of 
project commissioning including time frames for feedback and ultimate 
decision-making and selection. Seacom ensured regulatory approvals 
were in place for landing points in participating countries even though not 
subject to one overarching national jurisdiction. Kalkbult was executed 
within the parameters of the REIPPP, and the Gautrain was established 
and regulated via the Gautrain Management Agency Act and PPP 
regulations, and subject to other rules. The Mozal sponsors ensured the 
tax regime and terms of the industrial development zone were 
contractually agreed upon at project conceptualisation, while the SNGP 
obtained certainty on the regulatory framework through the Gas Sales 
Agreement, two Pipeline Agreements, a Regulatory Agreement and a 
Product Sharing Agreement with the South African and Mozambican 
governments. In contrast the exploratory nature of the PBMR necessitated 
that regulatory appraisal could only be conducted after the project 
developers submitted a component design. The regulator had the power to 
reject submissions or send them back with amendments required. Such a 
process is arguably unavoidable on FOAK nuclear energy projects. If not 
managed effectively, they result in extended development times and 
increased costs. This was exactly what occurred in the regulatory approval 
process on the PBMR contributing to project failure. In the Chisumbanje 
case two key regulatory oversights are observed. The first is the absence 
of mandatory blending regulations on plant commissioning resulting in the 
plant lying redundant after completion. The second is the non- approval of 
the EIA.  
The continuance of the project despite the absence of EIA approval has 
contributed to the on-going and unresolved community resistance to the 
plant that has occasionally turned violent and required the intervention of 
the law enforcement authorities.  
 
219 
Table 5.3:  Risk M
anagem
ent Assertions 
Assertions from
 the case studies 
 
Significance of assertions to each 
case study: 
 
SE 
G 
P 
K 
M
 
S 
C 
C
1. 
For 
both 
national 
authorities 
and 
project 
developers, 
a 
clear 
and 
transparent 
regulatory 
fram
ew
ork laying out a prescribed process of project com
m
issioning including tim
e fram
es for 
feedback and ultim
ate decision m
aking and selection. Such transparency significantly reduces the 
probability of corrupt practices and contributes to national authorities achieving m
ore com
petitively 
priced and efficient projects. Project developers have greater certainty as to how
 the process w
ill 
unfold and certainty as to w
hen decisions w
ill be m
ade. 
 
S 
S 
S 
R 
R 
S 
C
2. W
here state procurem
ent is involved the adjudication m
ethodology to be applied including the 
respective w
eighting per category should be disclosed in advance. All bids received subm
itted should 
be evaluated on these criteria and the results disclosed for both successful and losing bidders. Such 
probity increases perceptions of legitim
acy and fairness, and com
m
unicates clearly how
 successful 
bidders w
ere superior to losing bidders. 
 
S 
 
S 
R 
R 
S 
C
3. S
tate actors should support credible, capacitated, and independent oversight and regulatory 
bodies shielded from
 political influence. The im
partiality and effectiveness of regulatory bodies 
im
proves the quality of projects authorised and the quality of oversight conducted on ventures in 
operation. 
R 
S 
S 
S 
R 
R 
S 
C
4. Em
bed risk m
anagem
ent into the project conceptualisation and construction design, as opposed 
to im
plem
enting risk m
anagem
ent initiatives after project com
m
issioning. S
uch a process results in 
m
ore effective and econom
ically efficient risk m
anagem
ent execution. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
C
5. Institutionalise the risk m
anagem
ent function as a dedicated departm
ent covering all aspects of 
project operations for holistic, proactive, and co-ordinated risk m
anagem
ent. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
C
6. C
om
prehensive, credible and genuine E
IA
 and EM
P processes including public participation 
processes. Executed properly this enhances the legitim
acy of the project and reduces the likelihood 
of legal, regulatory, and com
m
unity challenges to the venture m
aking it m
ore robust. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
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Assertions from
 the case studies 
 
Significance of assertions to each 
case study: 
 
SE 
G 
P 
K 
M
 
S 
C 
C
7. R
ecognised and trusted avenues for com
plaints and recourse by affected stakeholders especially 
individual and com
m
unity concerns. A
 failure of these structures m
ay result in violent disturbances 
disrupting project operations. 
S 
S 
R 
S 
S 
S 
S 
C
8. Institutional and regulatory flexibility by state agencies. This assertion proposes that governm
ents 
exercise their constitutional prerogative judiciously in rem
oving bottlenecks or im
plem
enting enabling 
m
echanism
s required on large-scale infrastructure and com
m
ercial projects. The m
itigation of these 
risks m
akes the underlying project viable. 
R 
S 
R 
R 
S 
S 
S 
C
9. Project developers m
ust establish a dedicated com
m
unications capability particularly to address 
public concerns and com
plaints. This responsiveness and visibility is essential as large-scale projects 
are by nature disruptive particularly during construction. 
R 
S 
R 
S 
R 
R 
R 
C
10. Education of key decision m
akers coupled w
ith lobbying w
here required. This intervention 
allow
s project developers to com
m
unicate the benefits of the venture and to influence policy m
akers 
in such a m
anner that they do not inadvertently m
ake decisions detrim
ental to the project. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
C
11. Link operator com
pensation and incentives such as tax concessions to operational m
etrics. This 
intervention provides a clear m
onetary incentive for the operator to m
anage project risks.  
 
S 
S 
S 
R 
R 
R 
C
12. W
hile risks are delegated to subcontractors w
ho can best m
anage them
, the project team
 
should confirm
 and establish that the parties to w
hom
 the risks have been subcontracted have the 
capacity to m
anage these risks. 
R 
S 
R 
S 
R 
R 
R 
C
13. Each risk should ultim
ately have a single risk ow
ner for clear responsibility and accountability. 
R 
S 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
C
14. The com
position of the project team
 and com
pany betw
een technical and com
m
ercial personnel 
m
ust be carefully calibrated to ensure a blending of technical progress and oversight, w
ithin 
acceptable com
m
ercial param
eters. The corporate culture of the project com
pany m
ust be able to 
integrate the frequently com
peting and conflictive dem
ands of technical and com
m
ercial principals. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
R 
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Assertions from
 the case studies 
 
Significance of assertions to each 
case study: 
 
SE 
G 
P 
K 
M
 
S 
C 
C
15.H
ost governm
ents should have a significant investm
ent in the project either by w
ay of direct 
participation 
or indirect stakeholder interest. This increases the project’s resilience to 
adverse 
unilateral interventions by host governm
ents. 
 
S 
S 
 
S 
S 
S 
C
16. Institutional enablem
ent in the form
 of for exam
ple patronage guarantees or foreign exchange 
risk facilitation by public institutions derisks projects to the extent that previously unviable ventures 
becom
e doable. 
 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
C
17.M
aintain a com
petitive bid process on procurem
ent so as not to be exposed to a single solution 
provider until a final decision is m
ade as to the w
inning bidder. This m
ay require the project developer 
to bear som
e of the bid costs. Such expenditure is outw
eighed by the qualitative and financial 
benefits that accrue from
 com
petitive bidding. 
R 
S 
 
S 
R 
S 
R 
C
18. E
nsure the project is arranged such that there are alternatives to European and N
orth Am
erican 
capital equipm
ent, paym
ent system
s, funding, and m
arkets. This m
akes the project resilient to 
econom
ic sanctions arising from
 geopolitical differences.  
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
S 
C
19. Project developers should proactively share the credit for the project w
ith local principals 
particularly regulators, state agencies and politicians. This engenders deeper support from
 decision 
m
akers, and broadens the base of supportive stakeholders.  
S 
S 
R 
S 
S 
S 
S 
C
20. The participation of m
ultilateral institutions including the W
orld Bank and IFC
 continue to have a 
halo effect on a project especially w
here it is being com
m
issioned in a frontier m
arket perceived to 
have elevated risk. Such institutions participation is often catalytic. 
 
 
 
 
S 
R 
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This public rejection of the plant may seriously compromise its social 
license to operate. In projects where the state is directly commissioning 
the project and undertaking the procurement such as the Gautrain, the 
regulatory framework should articulate the procurement process including 
adjudicating methodology. The procurement process should also build in 
transparency mechanisms including making selected submission 
documents available to the public and disclosure on the factors informing 
winning and losing bidders. These practices decrease the possibility of 
corruption and gives project developer’s greater certainty as to how the 
process will unfold. It is notable that Seacom, Gautrain, Kalkbult, Mozal, 
SNG, and Chisumbanje effected competitive bidding and procurement 
processes. Competitive bidding processes were advantageous in not only 
reducing the cost of capital equipment, but also in mitigating the risk of 
over reliance on one equipment or service provider. Supporting the 
regulatory frameworks above requires credible, capacitated, oversight 
bodies within the project and at national level. The Seacom, Gautrain, 
Kalkbult, Mozal and SNGP projects institutionalised risk management 
within each project by way of dedicated teams or committees. These units 
embedded risk management into all stages of the project from 
conceptualisation to operations. In contrast the risk management function 
in the PBMR was established 7 years after project commencement. This 
contributed directly to a failure to flag and remedy glaring risk occurrences 
that crystallised into project killers. A dedicated and independent risk 
management team does not appear to have been put in place at 
Chisumbanje. This observation, and the failure of the project team to act, 
account for the community challenges and environmental breaches that 
have occurred and continue to threaten the project. At a national level the 
GMA acts in managing risk and conducting oversight over the Bombela 
Consortium that operates the Gautrain. Seacom sits under the auspices of 
the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa insofar as 
South African business affairs are concerned. The PBMR falls under the 
ambit of the Nuclear Energy Regulator. These institutions have significant 
resources to carry out their regulatory and oversight mandates. In the case 
of the Nuclear Energy Regulator, its skills and capacity to vet and approve 
FOAK nuclear developments is arguably questionable. The SNGP fell 
under the National Energy Regulator of South Africa, and the DoE who 
regulated and oversaw the South African portion of the project with 
equivalent institutions in Mozambique. Chisumbanje’s deficient oversight 
regime is significantly attributable to the fact that the Zimbabwe Energy 
Regulatory Authority had not been established when Chisumbanje was 
commissioned. As a result, attempts at retrospective regulation have been 
somewhat difficult. Projects that conducted comprehensive, credible and 
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genuine EIA and EMP processes are less susceptible to social and 
environmental breaches and concomitant disruption. Seacom, Gautrain, 
PBMR, Mozal and SNGP conducted these processes thoroughly, in part 
due to the rigorous South African legislative framework on these issues. 
Despite a number of legal challenges and occasional problems, these 
projects have retained their legitimacy and social license to operate. In 
contrast the Chisumbanje project circumvented EIA approval through a 
technicality and political manoeuvring and suffers on-going public 
contestation and a lack of legitimacy. This led to the project being 
mothballed during the government of national unity, and makes the 
venture vulnerable to political events. A key mitigator in managing 
community risk is a dedicated communications capability particularly to 
address public concerns and complaints. This responsiveness and 
visibility is essential as large-scale projects are by nature disruptive 
particularly during construction. 
Institutional and regulatory flexibility are essential in a number of the case 
studies both for risk management purposes but also to enable projects to 
proceed. The Gautrain could not have proceeded without the provincial 
government agreeing to underwrite the patronage levels. Similarly, the 
project may have been stymied if the provincial government had been 
compelled to purchase expensive foreign exchange hedging instruments, 
the latter risk being shouldered by the Treasury and Reserve Bank. The 
PBMR would also not have proceeded beyond the concept stage in 2000 
without significant financial support from government and a handful of 
political principals. In the absence of the Gas Regulatory Act, the South 
African government signed Regulatory Agreement with Sasol enabling the 
project to go ahead with certainty as to the regulatory regime. Similarly, in 
the case of Mozal the Mozambican government intervened in the port 
clearing and customs function to ensure that imports and exports were 
processed efficiently through the harbour, and bonded warehouse facilities 
could be established at Mozal. The Zimbabwean authorities were essential 
in enabling Chisumbanje with land from ARDA without which the project 
would not have materialised. These observations highlight the importance 
of the state in mitigating risk and creating a conducive environment for 
project execution. 
The quality and frequency of communication with stakeholders appears to 
contribute significantly to educating stakeholders and promoting the 
project at hand. The Seacom principals actively communicated the 
benefits of the project to decision makers across participating countries 
and have continued to lobby or the ventures interests. This has been 
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important not only in the venture’s establishment but also in addressing 
bottlenecks in backhaul networks, monopoly practices, and regulatory 
impediments. The GMA proactively set up a dedicated and well-staffed 
communications team including in electronic, print, and social media that 
promoted the Gautrain. Similarly, the sponsors of Mozal and SNGP 
trumpeted the benefits accruing to Mozambique of the two projects to 
engender government and public support. By way of contrast the PBMR 
never had a communications function in place to inform and educate the 
public on the venture. Initially media support for the project was strong but 
when this turned to criticism the public latched onto the negativity. 
Similarly, the Chisumbanje communications function was limited to the 
community in which the project was located. This was despite the fact that 
the project had national ramifications. Because the project has been 
negatively received, the communications function is largely defensive in 
posture, heading off the attacks on the project, and not marketing its 
positive attributes. A final and important part of the communications 
process is for project sponsors to share credit with local partners 
especially key public decision makers and politicians. This was abundantly 
clear in the execution of Seacom, the Gautrain, Mozal and SNGP. Sharing 
credit was virtually non-existent with the PBMR and Chisumbanje on 
account of the negativity attached to these projects. 
A key risk management device devised and implemented in the Gautrain 
project is to link the MRTR compensation of the operator to operational 
performance metrics. This mechanism incentivised the operator to fulfil 
performance metrics failing which its compensation would be adversely 
affected. While this mechanism was only applicable to a single case in this 
thesis where the state retained ownership of the assets but outsourced the 
management, it has broad implications for similar arrangements, and PPP 
across the world.  
The penultimate risk management assertion emerges most strongly from 
the Chisumbanje case. The project context dictated that the venture 
responds to geopolitical constraints including sanctions on the country and 
primary project sponsor. The project sponsors circumvent sanctions and 
protect their venture from external interference in four key ways. Firstly, 
funding for the project is raised from private investors as opposed to 
international DFIs, multilateral institutions, or commercial banks subject to 
international banking regulations. Secondly, the project sources capital 
equipment from South America, a region of the world generally not party to 
EU or American sanctions, but also with world leading ethanol plant 
engineering and technical capability. The project output is targeted at local 
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markets only neutralising the threat of foreign markets being 
compromised. The fourth risk management intervention appears to have 
been the circumvention of international payment systems including SWIFT 
allowing financial transactions enabling the project to occur. These risk 
management interventions are instructive for project developers in 
Southern Africa where relationships with the EU (and Britain in particular) 
and the USA have proven to be volatile. Project architects would be 
advised to consider designing projects with alternative funding, markets, 
capital equipment and payment systems in mind should geopolitical 
events warrant this for a venture’s survival. 
The criticality of using international legal, financial, technical and related 
advisers in the risk management process has been articulated in the 
Governance Assertions above. Similarly, the commercial and technical 
composition of the project team, the continuity required to enable effective 
risk management, and the delegation of risk to a single project owner to 
enable a successful project have been captured in the Governance 
Assertions and will not be duplicated. 
5.4 Sustainability assertions across the case studies 
The sustainability assertions captured in Table 5.4 across the case studies 
echo a number of the observations made in the governance and risk 
management assertions. They are however punctuated by prospective 
action and sustainability interventions measures that may not have been 
explicitly performed within the 6 case studies, that contain real resonance 
if applied. As highlighted in the risk management assertions, 
comprehensive, credible and genuine EIA and EMP processes enhance 
the legitimacy of projects and reduce the likelihood of legal, regulatory, 
and community challenges to ventures. This is evidenced in Seacom, 
Gautrain, Kalkbult, Mozal, SNGP, and PBMR, while severely lacking in 
Chisumbanje with concomitant disturbances on the project. 
One of the important observations in all the projects with the exception of 
Chisumbanje is that sustainability is designed into the project architecture 
at the conceptualisation phase. As such key environmental and social 
requirements are integrally woven into the project’s architecture reducing 
the prospect of sustainability breaches, oversights or omissions. These 
projects included in the EIA process many qualitative factors and notably 
local community sensitivities in the form of ancestral burial sites and 
places of cultural and religious significance. The project architecture was 
accordingly designed to avoid inflaming identified sensitivities.  
226 
 Table 5.4:  Sustainability Case Study Assertions 
Assertions from
 the case studies 
 
Significance of assertions to 
each case study: 
 
SE 
G 
P 
K 
M
 
S 
C 
D
1. C
om
prehensive, credible and genuine EIA and E
M
P processes including public participation 
processes. Executed properly this enhances the legitim
acy of the project and reduces the likelihood of 
legal, regulatory, and com
m
unity challenges to the venture m
aking it m
ore sustainable. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
D
2. R
ecognised and trusted avenues for com
plaints and recourse by affected stakeholders especially 
individual and com
m
unity concerns. A failure of these structures m
ay result in violent disturbances 
disrupting project operations. 
R 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
D
3. Em
bed sustainability considerations into entire project architecture from
 conceptualisation and 
construction design to operations, as opposed to im
plem
enting sustainability initiatives after project 
com
m
issioning. Such a process results in m
ore effective sustainability com
pliance and execution. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
D
4. B
eyond the generic processes of the EIA process, project developers need to understand local 
sensitivities. These m
ay include issues of significant cultural and religious im
port such as ancestral burial 
sites, or colonial legacies including land ow
nership. Projects m
ust be designed to adequately address 
these hum
an concerns. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
D
5. In evaluating the sustainability credentials and m
erits of a project, stakeholders need to carefully 
consider the im
balance in pow
er relations betw
een project developers and com
m
unities, especially rural 
com
m
unities. 
R 
S 
R 
S 
S 
S 
S 
D
6. The m
anner in w
hich norm
ative rules such as the Equator Principles are arranged including self-
regulatory m
echanism
s lim
its the reliance regulators and oversight agencies should confer on them
. 
S 
R 
 
R 
S 
S 
R 
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Assertions from
 the case studies 
 
Significance of assertions to 
each case study: 
 
SE 
G 
P 
K 
M
 
S 
C 
D
7. S
tates and regional bodies need to establish enforcem
ent authorities and pow
ers for com
pliance w
ith 
norm
ative rules w
ith clear legal ram
ifications in the event of non-com
pliance for such rules to be fully 
effective. 
R 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
D
8. C
ountries need to standardise sustainability rules and regulations across regions and econom
ic 
com
m
unities e.g. S
AD
C
, C
O
M
ES
A, and the E
AC
. This w
ill reduce regulatory arbitrage on sustainability 
requirem
ents, set clear and consistent standards, and support regionally based ventures.  
 
R 
 
 
S 
S 
S 
D
9. Incentives and com
pensation paid out by national authorities and agencies should be directly linked 
to com
pliance w
ith sustainability regulations creating clear financial inducem
ents to com
ply. 
 
S 
R 
S 
S 
S 
S 
D
10. H
olding com
panies should be stripped from
 lim
ited liability provisions if a subsidiary breaches 
sustainability provisions but lacks the financial m
eans to m
ake full com
pensation. 
R 
R 
R 
R 
S 
S 
S 
D
11. R
egional (S
AD
C
) censure for serious environm
ental and sustainability breaches in the form
 of 
license w
ithdraw
als, fines, com
pensation, and loss of license to operate. 
R 
 
 
 
S 
S 
S 
D
12. For sustainability activists, a focus on the project com
pany stakeholders in em
bedding and 
com
plying w
ith sustainability obligations. This approach is particularly attractive for listed m
ulti-national 
com
panies w
ith high public profiles and brand recognition. 
S 
R 
R 
R 
S 
S 
S 
D
13. The state is frequently party to contraventions of com
m
unity rights. As such m
echanism
s to hold the 
state accountable for such dereliction of duties and for com
m
unities to receive com
pensation from
 the 
state itself. 
 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
D
14. Transparency m
ust be achieved regarding how
 the governm
ent applies the financial benefits derived 
from
 the project. This is im
portant so that stakeholders and local com
m
unities in particular feel the direct 
benefits of the project. Lim
ited transparency increases the probability of project incom
e being m
isdirected 
 
S 
S 
R 
S 
S 
S 
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Assertions from
 the case studies 
 
Significance of assertions to 
each case study: 
 
SE 
G 
P 
K 
M
 
S 
C 
as a result of corruption, com
m
unity m
em
bers enjoying indiscernible benefits, and the venture’s legitim
acy 
being com
prom
ised. 
D
15. S
ignificant local equity participation (in addition to state ow
nership) in underlying projects. This 
enhances com
m
unity buy in, increases the prospects of econom
ic benefits of the project flow
ing directly 
to the com
m
unity, and gives the com
m
unity representation at board level and related subcom
m
ittees. 
R 
S 
R 
S 
S 
S 
S 
D
16. A collaborative tension betw
een project developers and environm
ental activists and N
G
O
s w
hereby 
inform
ation is shared and rem
edies sought w
here potential sustainability deficiencies are encountered. 
R 
S 
S 
R 
S 
S 
S 
D
17. W
here possible lim
it the environm
ental footprint of a project by building on existing infrastructure 
channels e.g. a pipeline parallel to a highw
ay or clustering of nuclear facilities. 
R 
S 
S 
R 
S 
S 
S 
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Limiting the environmental footprint of a project may also be achieved by 
building the venture parallel to existing infrastructure where possible. 
Significant portions of the Gautrain were constructed juxtaposed to 
existing highways. The PBMR prototype was envisaged to be located 
within the confines of the existing Koeberg power plant, while phase two of 
Mozal was located in the same industrial park as phase 1. Even the 
Chisumbanje plant was constructed in close proximity to existing sugar 
cane fields and ethanol blending plants. Whilst parallel infrastructure was 
limited to guide the SNGP, the laying of the pipeline underground was an 
intentional strategy to limit disrupting farming activity and wildlife, together 
with reducing the risk of sabotage, hence making the venture more 
sustainable.  
Across the case studies the efficacy of normative rules including the 
Equator Principles was arguable. While the normative rules are valuable 
across all projects with the exception of PBMR and Chisumbanje, 
practitioners treated them as ‘hygiene’ issues. Legal and technical 
compliance were required to ensure project progression, with limited 
investment beyond having achieved these objectives. The sound business 
practices of the project developers in Seacom, Gautrain, Mozal and SNGP 
resulted in no significant sustainability breaches in these operations. The 
lack of enforcement capability in the normative rules however contributed 
greatly to them being viewed as purely ‘hygiene’ issues. In this respect the 
self-regulated normative rules are woefully inadequate. 
As discussed in the risk mitigation section, on-going education of 
stakeholders coupled with communication can manage negative public 
sentiment towards a project particularly in the construction stage. Winning 
over public support for a project together with key decision makers 
enhances a project’s sustainability by reducing hostility towards it. Project 
sponsors at Seacom, Gautrain, Mozal, and SNGP engaged in 
comprehensive public engagement processes in various project stages 
contributing to success. In contrast public education and communication 
were stilted in PBMR and Chisumbanje that culminated in negative public 
sentiment undermining their legitimacy. Project teams can also develop 
collaborations with environmental activists and regulatory bodies. While 
these relationships will understandably be characterised by contestation 
on issues, the sharing of information will enrich the project teams 
understanding of its strengths and weaknesses in adhering to 
sustainability regulations. The imbalance in power relationships between 
project developers and communities can be huge impediment to attaining 
equitable sustainability arrangements. Frequently project sponsors are 
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multi-national corporations with sizeable balance sheets. They are able to 
mobilise large teams of legal, financial, technical and related resources 
globally. Their size and prominence gives them access to decision makers 
including ruling political classes in host countries and in their countries of 
origin. In contrast communities in which these projects are executed in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are rural, impoverished, and of limited education. This 
reality requires specific interventions in African markets to attain reciprocal 
sustainability provisions by project developers at on par with those in 
developed markets. Mozal, SNGP, and Chisumbanje are illustrative of 
projects occurring in impoverished rural communities where power 
relationships heavily favour the project developer. The following proposals 
attempt to facilitate more equitable power and therefore negotiation 
relationships. The research findings infer that sustainability arrangements 
in projects would be strengthened by the codification of normative rules 
into binding laws with accompanying prison terms and fines if breached. 
Complementing this initiative, economic and regional unions such as 
SADC, COMESA, and the EAC need to standardise these environmental 
laws. Standardisation reduces the likelihood of regulatory arbitrage by 
developers in locating a project in one country as opposed to another. It 
also simplifies sustainability compliance for project developers where the 
underlying venture is cross border in nature as in Seacom or SNGP. 
State incentives granted to project developers such as rebates, tax 
exemptions, and other monetary inducements should be conditional on 
meeting and on-going compliance sustainability with predetermined 
sustainability targets. In similar respect, limited liability provisions in a 
project company should be rescinded where serious environmental and 
sustainability breaches occur allowing injured parties recourse to 
compensation from the project sponsors and their respective holding 
companies. To broaden the focus on sustainability compliance, regulations 
may also support recourse claims to include banks funding a project. The 
latter would compel banks to assess and monitor sustainability compliance 
in clients. The role of the state as a prime culprit in committing 
environmental and social violations needs careful assessment. Due to the 
almost overwhelming depth of resources and bureaucratic hurdles that the 
state may deploy to stymie lawsuits of this nature two key measures are 
required. The first is to set a standard for state agencies and players that 
is at the very least equivalent to those for private sector players. The 
second measure involves a more streamlined and expedited legal process 
for lawsuits involving the state to enhance government accountability and 
reduce delays. Regulations should also be promulgated publicly disclosing 
the monetary receipts that government and related agencies derive from 
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projects at least annually. To what ends the government has applied these 
funds to should be explicitly disclosed to the public in a detailed as 
opposed to aggregated format. 
Sustainability activists would be well advised to focus significant portions 
of their energy on the shareholders of the project sponsors, particularly 
where these originate in democratic, developed markets, and where the 
holding company has a high public profile. Shareholder pressure is one of 
the most effective levers in ensuring a project company’s compliance with 
sustainability provisions. While equity participation in the Gautrain, PBMR, 
Mozal, SNGP, and Chisumbanje is at national and in the case of the 
Gautrain also provincial government level, equity participation at local 
community level in the project locality would be advantageous. Firstly, the 
community would be able to organise itself to ensure it benefited directly 
from the project. Secondly, board representation and participation in other 
project company forums and committees would allow the community 
leadership access to information and allow them input into the decision 
making process. Having equity participation at community level could also 
reduce the corrosive effect of corruption at central government level. The 
final consideration for sustainability activists and practitioners is to make 
use of anti-bribery laws in Europe and the USA that extend to European 
and American companies operating in other national jurisdictions. 
Sustainability activists could discourage rent-seeking activities through the 
prospect of dishonest project developers facing sanction in both the host 
country and their own home jurisdictions. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter began by documenting the selected case studies across four 
main criteria namely, the governance arrangements, capital structure, risk 
management, and sustainability considerations. For the 7 cases the 
assertions were collated, compared and analysed for significance, 
relevance and applicability. Insights from the 7 case studies were also 
discussed for potential future application. In collating these insights into a 
clear and logical framework, a basis was derived for the project and 
infrastructure model proposed in the following chapter of this thesis. The 
cross case analysis is essential leading into chapters 7 and 8 that examine 
the applicability of the main capital structure and institutional and risk 
management theories to project and infrastructure finance in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
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6 Introducing the Normative Project and 
Infrastructure Finance Model 
The thesis has up to this chapter, explored and examined the deployment 
of project and infrastructure finance in Sub-Saharan Africa focusing on 7 
large-scale in South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe conducted in the 
past twenty years. Five of these projects were successful while two were 
failures (one of the unsuccessful projects was subsequently resurrected). 
The criteria applied to determine success or failure as stated in chapter 1 
were that deviation from budget was less than 10%, the project once 
operating performed at 95% or more of the original engineering 
specifications, and construction was executed within the set time frames 
with an acceptable deviation of 10%. Detailed case studies were 
completed on each of these projects with a specific emphasis on each 
project’s capital structure, governance, risk management, and 
sustainability arrangements. Observations were made on the qualitative 
project arrangements that supported project success or contributed to 
project failure.  
The existing theory on project finance provides a valuable basis for 
understanding the framework and architecture of project finance 
transactions across the world. The existing theory however fails to provide 
an adequate lens through which to view, analyse, interrogate, and 
understand the specific contextual conditions impacting on project and 
infrastructure finance in Sub-Saharan Africa. The findings below and the 
conceptual model advanced propose a platform that distils the key 
contextual factors that influence project finance arrangements in South 
Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The section will summarise the key 
findings and propose a lens through which to more fully understand project 
finance transactions called the Normative Project and Infrastructure 
Finance (NPIF) model, captured in Figure 6-1.  Project and infrastructure 
finance stakeholders will of necessity have to balance competing priorities 
with limited resources to execute the interventions proposed, and foster 
enhancements that advance projects and the related institutional 
environment at that specific point in time. As improvements are made in 
top priority areas identified and these are resolved, resources can be 
directed at second tier priorities and so on.  
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NPIF does not seek to convey a sequential approach. All the pillars 
contribute to define and inform the contextual environment and its 
conduciveness for project finance and infrastructure related investments. 
The dynamic environment in which project finance transactions occur and 
the broadly encompassing nature of NPIF mean that interventions will be 
on-going and the equilibrium will change progressively as the project 
finance environment advances. As such the NPIF model is not sequential 
in nature but envisages a series of co-ordinated initiatives across all pillars 
of the model that enhance the project finance environment and prospects, 
yet is subject to on-going improvement. 
The capturing and distillation of important regional and contextual 
considerations allow for an analysis of the project finance theory versus 
actual practice in chapters 5 and 6, and why and how the application of 
capital structure and agency theories need to be modified when applied to 
South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. 
6.1 Key findings  
The key findings below distil the critical insights and conclusions of the 7 
case studies. These have been organised under the headings of Capital 
Markets, Geopolitical Resilience, Shaping the Project, Sustainability, and 
Institutional and Regulatory Flexibility. These findings are applicable 
across the three countries across which the research was conducted, and 
relevant to commercial and infrastructure ventures applying project finance 
principles. Findings that were case specific and not of universal application 
have not been incorporated into the conclusions and subsequent model.  
6.1.1  Capital markets 
A key impediment to the greater uptake of project finance and 
infrastructure ventures can be attributed to narrow and shallow financial 
markets. In the countries covered by this thesis this bottleneck is 
particularly observable in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The immature 
development of financial and capital markets in these countries and other 
nations in Sub-Saharan Africa results in the mobilisation of local savings 
being compromised. As a result, such countries often lack a sufficiently 
large contractual savings industry that can aggregate savings and channel 
these towards large project finance and infrastructure transactions. The 
result of this failure to mobilise savings in a formal, regulated, and trusted 
financial system starves the country of a domestic source of long term 
finance, resulting in dependence on multi-lateral financiers and 
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international banking consortiums for capital. This situation is frequently 
compounded by the fact that the size of financial markets in African 
countries remains small on a global scale and relative to the size of these 
countries economies. As a result liquidity is often lacking deterring both 
domestic and foreign investors who seek assurance on the ability to be 
able to enter or exit a position with minimum friction.  
Some of the key obstacles to the development of deep and liquid capital 
markets include inadequate regulatory frameworks that make for a highly 
concentrated banking sector, very low intermediation rates, and inefficient 
collateral registry systems that further impede access to credit.  
The banking sector concentration results in oligopolistic and anti-
competitive inclinations by incumbents. The banking sector may also fail to 
exercise its role of intermediation due to very high interest rate spreads 
that make credit expensive while deposits are poorly remunerated. This 
may require the reorganisation of the banking system through innovatively 
opening the sector to competition from both banking and non-banking 
entities. Deepening and broadening capital markets is likely to be a 
medium to long term project that has been observed in a number of key 
markets including Nigeria and Kenya. The efficacy of these interventions 
will largely be driven by the appropriateness of the policy interventions and 
the institutional environment that emerges as a result. These can be 
expected to include measures to improve the regulatory environment, 
purposeful interventions to build and stimulate market liquidity and 
improve the frequency and volumes of financial securities transacted, and 
possible integration of regional securities exchanges as a means of 
achieving critical mass. 
A key insight that emerged was that even in countries with deep and liquid 
capital markets like South Africa, public funding is frequently critical to 
catalyse large project finance initiatives. Government participation as an 
enabler as such continues to be essential. Commercial banks participation 
in projects has the enhanced effect of adding rigour and robustness to the 
project arrangements through scrutiny of operational and financial models, 
and the imposition of covenants to make the project viable, and ensure 
debt providers recoup their capital disbursements.  
6.1.2  Geopolitical resilience 
The pillar requiring project finance ventures to have geo-political resilience 
built into their architecture is not new in Southern Africa, yet has played a 
significant role in how projects have been arranged, and even what 
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projects have been executed. During the liberation struggles in 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe in the 1960’s and 1970’s the incumbent 
regimes sought to ensure strategic assets were less vulnerable to 
sabotage, and the attendant disruption of commercial activity and life in 
general. Both the pre and post independence governments also sought to 
reduce excessive reliance on South African trade routes resulting in large 
investments in alternative routes such as the Beira Corridor by Zimbabwe 
and Mozambique, domestic ethanol production, and the establishment of 
local refining capacity in Rhodesia. 
The nature of geo-political risk in SADC post 1994 has changed. In the 
first instance it has become less regional and more global in nature. The 
resolution of the liberation struggles in South Africa, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe has reduced the regional geo-political threat, while deeper 
integration into the global economy has increased vulnerability to 
international censure. Specifically countries and projects are vulnerable to 
unilateral sanctions particularly from the European Union and the United 
States of America, and multilateral sanctions from institutions such as the 
United Nations. While the source of disagreements that trigger sanctions 
stem from political differences, the form the sanctions take is primarily 
economic in nature. Sanctions may include the targeting of key individuals 
by way of freezing international assets and bank accounts together with 
travel bans. Broader sanctions may include pressuring multi-nationals 
invested in the targeted country to divest of their operations, restrictions in 
the export of capital equipment and spare parts to targeted countries, and 
general encumbrances to inhibit their ability to export and conduct 
international commerce. These measures have the potential to paralyse 
and render inoperable a project finance or infrastructure venture. 
 The sanctions arsenal may also take the form of the curtailment of 
investment capital flowing into the targeted country by international capital 
providers in the private sector. This measure can be buttressed by the 
suspension of disbursements and capital support by multi-lateral financial 
institutions including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and 
the International Finance Corporation. International transactional banking 
activity, including the ability to repatriate profits may also be closed off by 
restricting the country’s ability to transfer funds via the Society of 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). Where export 
markets in Europe or North America are an integral part of the project, 
sanctions may take the form of prohibiting the importation of the produce 
of projects in targeted countries effectively compromising the market for 
the venture, and collapsing its financial viability. 
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Arbitration and mediation proceedings premised on North American and 
Western European legal systems are increasingly perceived as biased in 
favour of corporations from these regions. This is predominantly the case 
where disputes are between foreign shareholders and domestic 
stakeholders indigenous to the jurisdiction in which the project is located. 
Accordingly, domestic project stakeholders may seek promote the host 
nation’s own legal system, or alternatively opt for dispute resolution to be 
conducted within the rules and geography of independent nations 
unaligned to North American and European interests.  
These potential and very real restrictions applied to Zimbabwe infer that a 
prudent measure by Sub-Saharan countries would be to actively diversify 
sources of capital investment flows to other sources and regions of the 
world beyond North America and Western Europe, that are not as 
politically invested and active in the internal political dynamics within each 
country. Closer commercial relationships with other regions may also 
provide alternative routes for effecting international transactions outside of 
the SWIFT system should access to the latter be compromised. Projects 
may need to be technically configured in such a way that alternative 
equipment suppliers, technical advisors, and experts beyond North 
America and Europe can ensure on-going operations in the event of 
adverse geo-political developments. It is highly advisable that where 
exports are concerned markets are significantly diversified and the project 
is not singularly reliant on European and North American demand. 
6.1.3  Shaping the project 
Merrow (2011) describes shaping the project as ‘a business-led process 
by which sponsors evaluate the key attributes of a potential project, 
develop and gather information that is needed to make key decisions, and 
then allocate the value of the project to the various stakeholders to make 
the project environment stable enough for successful execution while 
holding enough of the project’s value for themselves to make the venture 
worthwhile’ (p.54). While the focus of the author is on evaluating, 
designing and making a final decision as to whether to proceed or ‘kill’ the 
project, the shaping of the project will be considered more holistically in 
this thesis to include the process after a decision to proceed has been 
made.  
A seemingly obvious aspect relating to the development and execution of 
a project is the need to have explicitly well formulated project goals and 
objectives. These act as a beacon guiding how a project unfolds, curtailing 
the possibility of scope creep, and giving the project executors clear 
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targets and aims to reach. Clear project goals and objectives also allows 
decision points in the roll out of a project to be identified, and on-going 
evaluation of the project’s progress relative to the primary objectives. A 
failure to set explicit goals as evidenced in the PBMR has serious 
ramifications on the project outputs, cost, meeting of deadlines, goal 
congruence amongst stakeholders, and the ability of project sponsor’s to 
ensure accountability and responsibility for decisions made. Clarifying the 
project goals and objectives appears an elementary exercise. It is however 
frequently compromised by a host of factors. These may include political 
pressure to commence without having determined the ultimate objective. 
Project goals and objectives may also be compromised by the fact that 
clarifying these may require a significant investment of resources, that 
would in effect be a sunk cost if a decision was made not to proceed with 
the venture. A failure to define the goals and objectives on a project and 
apply rigorous control measures to adhere to these is a fundamental 
project ‘killer’. 
Having made the decision to execute on a project, it is essential to ensure 
there is continuity in the project team. This does not mean that the team 
remains unchanged, but that new team members meeting the skills set 
required at different project stages are obtained whilst maintaining a core 
team and set of expertise that are present throughout a project’s lifecycle 
from conceptualisation to operationalization, and beyond. A failure to 
maintain the core project team may result in a loss of institutional memory 
that manifests in incorrect decision-making. Careful consideration must 
also be made of the blend of technical and commercial skills within the 
project team. An imbalance of these two skills sets has the potential to 
compromise the project functionally or financially. In a similar vein the 
appropriate location of the project company in terms of reporting lines is 
essential. Having a project with a reporting line to principals that do not 
have a technical understanding of the project, or who are indifferent 
overseers of a venture can severely undermine project accountability and 
corporate governance, and also the attainment of project goals. This 
aspect is applicable in both a corporate setting, and perhaps even more 
pertinent when the project is driven or funded by the public fiscus, as the 
oversight function of commercial banks may be limited or not at all 
present. 
An overlooked and neglected aspect of developing projects of an industrial 
scale is the communications platform with stakeholders and affected 
communities. The very nature and scale of these projects inevitably mean 
they will have an impact on a wide range and large number of people, 
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making them vulnerable to criticism and attack. As such, beyond the 
stakeholder consultation process, it is essential to establish a dedicated 
communications platform that is dynamic, proactive, and responsive. It 
must engage aggrieved parties and complainants actively using all media 
outlets including the growing influence of social media. This engagement 
and transparency not only keeps stakeholders informed, but over time can 
lead to a change in perceptions and neutralise unjustified hostility or 
misunderstanding regarding the project.  
Having deep and broad political support from the governing party and 
structures, and across political participants is an important factor in making 
a project more robust and less susceptible to economic cycles. Projects 
with deep and broad based political support can endure the political 
demise of key sponsors, as there is organisational support beyond these 
individuals. Projects premised on a few political principals may suffer a 
lack of political support and credibility if these principals vacate their 
positions.  
The thesis introduced the term of ‘the psychology of influence’ as a 
necessary attribute for successful project developers. The psychology of 
influence speaks to the credibility and need for a project development 
team to have access to key stakeholders and decision makers especially 
amongst the regulatory and political establishment. This influence does 
not endorse unacceptable practices such as bribery and corruption, but 
rather addresses the need to be able to obtain an audience with decision 
makers to articulate the developer’s position, logic, and activities, 
especially where there are disputes and facts are contested. The 
psychology of influence also extends to being able to persuasively engage 
with establishment principals expressing the virtues of the project from 
their point of view, and selling the project merits in terms of the benefits to 
the community and country concerned. This ability to access and engage 
key institutions and individuals extends to the project is operational phase 
of a venture as pro-active and on-going industry lobbying is frequently 
required due to dynamic sectoral and regulatory developments.  
The utilisation of experienced legal, technical and financial advisers by 
stakeholders proved to be a key contributor to successful project 
execution. This measure is even more important where the project is a first 
of a kind for the local jurisdiction and domestic skills in the execution of 
such a venture are shallow. Deploying experienced advisers enables the 
project developer to tap into the expertise and experience of practitioners 
from across the world and integrate international best practice into the 
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entire process of project conceptualisation, commissioning, and 
construction. 
The investment horizon of the project sponsor is key in helping to shape 
the project and incline it towards success or failure. Where equity 
sponsors have a long-term investment horizon that extends to the full life 
of the project, the stability of the sponsoring consortium is conducive to 
long-term decision making, premised on the venture’s success over its 
entire life. This reduces the temptation of project managers to succumb to 
destructive short-term decisions and increases the long-term prospects of 
a project even when difficulties are encountered. Equity sponsors with 
shorter time horizons expose a project to instability in the shareholding 
structure, corrosive short-term decision-making, and the loss of 
institutional memory on the exit of the original equity participants. Where a 
project has significant foreign exchange exposure, immunising both the 
capital structure and operations from exchange rate volatility is very 
important. Such immunity allows the project managers to focus on 
operational factors within their direct control and limits the distracting effect 
of exchange rate volatility. In addition the process of immunisation 
establishes a clear and transparent business model with explicit 
performance goals and targets by which the project can be measured. As 
traditional hedging costs may be prohibitive institutional facilitation by the 
central bank and treasury may be required. 
Where an operator is commissioned to manage and operate the project, 
operator incentives including billing models, subsidies, and tax incentives 
should be linked to the operational metrics of the project. This has the 
effect of incentivising the operator to meet operational performance targets 
set, failing which the operator’s financial compensation is accordingly 
compromised. Risk management in the project should not be conducted 
extraneously, but should be embed into the project architecture from 
conceptualisation, and institutionalised in the project management by way 
of a dedicated risk management function. 
The final aspects influencing the shaping of a project include the fact that 
in Sub-Saharan Africa the commercial opportunity may be transient in 
nature as a result of rapid technological and commercial factors such as in 
the Seacom project. Developers therefore need to be able to arrange the 
project architecture to facilitate agility to monetise temporary opportunities 
that may erode over time. Where big-ticket acquisitions are being 
commissioned, developers would be well advised to maintain a 
competitive bid process as far as possible into the procurement stages. 
While this may increase bid costs initially, and these may need to be 
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subsidised, the competitive tension can enhance the planning on the 
project construction and execution, and result in significant cost savings 
on account of a more competitive bidding process. The final consideration 
in the shaping of a project relates to the advantages that can be derived 
from embedding scalability into the initial green fields venture. The cost of 
integrating a scalable model frequently has marginal financial or technical 
implications on a project, yet embeds significant advantages if the project 
is successful and brownfields extensions occur.  
6.1.4  Sustainability 
While corporate social responsibility and sustainability issues manifest 
primarily as community and environmental matters globally, the contextual 
environment requires different and country specific interventions. 
Developed markets in Western Europe and North America generally have 
a greater range of instruments to instil responsible behaviour by project 
developers. These include legislation and regulations, an array of 
environmental and oversight bodies, greater awareness of sustainability 
matters by the broader population, the reputation risk faced by a company 
in the event of irresponsible actions, more active civil society 
organisations, well capacitated institutions such as local governments, and 
a better understanding of individual and group rights in the broader 
population. This context provides a platform by which there is greater 
accountability on sustainability issues on projects executed in these 
regions.  
The well-developed and multi-layered checks and societal safeguards 
detailed above may be absent or embryonic in developing markets in Sub-
Saharan Africa. As a result normative rules that are voluntary such as the 
Equator Principles may be effective in developed markets, yet ineffective 
in countries such as Mozambique or Zimbabwe. Project owners may also 
apply the normative rules and standards to varying degrees with greater 
compliance in countries with high levels of oversight, and less compliance 
where oversight is poor. This regulatory arbitrage in sustainability matters 
can in part be addressed by compliance with key normative standards 
such as the EP’s mandatory in Sub-Saharan Africa. This action will 
contribute to a uniform application of international sustainability norms and 
standards in less developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The self- 
regulatory nature characterising normative rules such as the EP’s is 
unsuitable in most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Normative rules need 
to be monitored and enforced by way of independent audits. Explicit 
provisions also need to be made for more vulnerable rural communities 
and people subject to communal ownership structures, that are 
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susceptible to an unsurping of key human rights by both project owners 
and their own government’s.  
From a regional or continental perspective, supra-national regulations may 
be an effective tool to enforce uniformity in CSR standards. Such tools can 
be channelled through SADC and the AU. The success of such measures 
is demonstrated by the European Commission’s mandate and actions in 
developing a comprehensive anti-corruption policy and the European 
Union Anti Corruption Act. The policy has culminated in the passage of 
legislation in EU countries that imposes criminal and commercial sanctions 
on EU companies and individuals failing to comply both within the EU and 
also in their activities beyond such as the Bribery Act in the UK, and the 
German Anti-bribery and Corruption Act. 
Demand side initiatives enforcing the application of laws and standards 
can be blended with supply side interventions. These include systematic 
and on-going programmes to train and educate key stakeholders such as 
legislators, regulators and environmental agencies on CSR, and the 
ramifications it can have on national development. Collaboration with 
environmental organisations is an effective manner by which the 
authorities may be able to supplement their regulatory and enforcement 
function. From a project owner perspective, collaborating with 
environmental agencies may also be used a self interested measure to 
gain objective input of the environmental performance of the venture from 
external parties that may be more forthcoming and brutal than employees.  
The importance of including community equity ownership as opposed to 
government ownership or ownership by equity participants not resident in 
the community in which the project takes place is an important proposition 
of the NPIF model. Community ownership allows for the financial and 
related benefits of the project to be enjoyed more directly by the 
population most affected by the venture. Local ownership also enhances 
grassroots participation in projects and empowers communities to hold 
project management teams accountable for promises made or 
environmental and social breaches. The insertion of community ownership 
as a key aspect of the sustainability provisions contrasts markedly from 
most current arrangements where participation by the host jurisdiction 
generally occurs at national, and occasionally provincial levels. 
Because many project finance ventures are executed through special 
purpose vehicles, the equity sponsors and their respective holding 
companies are effectively shielded from financial liability in the event of 
severe sustainability miscarriages warranting financial censure, and that 
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the project company is unable to make fulfil. Legal amendments into the 
limited liability provisions of juristic persons may need to be effected that 
enable recourse to the holding company for compensation where there are 
serious sustainability breaches and the project company is unable to settle 
the full financial amount. Furthermore, where the project company enjoys 
incentives including billing models, subsidies, and tax inducements, these 
should be linked to the sustainability goals and metrics of the project. This 
has the effect of incentivising the operator to comply with sustainability 
provisions or incur financial loss. 
Due to the fact that government agencies and principals are frequently 
party to the molestation of rural and vulnerable communities together with 
project developers, countries may need to design mechanisms that place 
a greater degree of legal responsibility on the state to protect rural 
communities and environments. Communities should be entitled to claim 
compensation from the government if there is a dereliction of these duties, 
and beyond fines, jail terms should be imposed as a court perogatives to 
act as a deterrent for errant civil servants. Projects developers can also 
monitor and evaluate community and environmental matters by integrating 
into each project conduits through which community and environmental 
issues can be raised and escalated by all stakeholders. Constructing 
projects parallel to existing infrastructure and consulting communities on 
alternative pathways or locations where feasible can also reduce the 
social and environmental footprint of projects. 
This pillar concludes with an observation made in the conduct of the 
research. A respondent noted how the true motivations for a project 
developer or company to comply with CSR requirements are frequently 
difficult to determine and pin down. A leading factor compelling project 
companies to fulfil CSR obligations is the degree of shareholder insistence 
that this aspect is addressed. If shareholders did not prioritise this aspect, 
project owners would apply themselves far less diligently to their CSR 
obligations. Regulators may be well advised to devise strategies that 
target sources of influence or leverage within project developers that 
influence them to legitimately fulfil their CSR obligations that may not be 
obviously apparent. 
6.1.5  Institutional and regulatory flexibility 
Large project and infrastructure projects in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
frequently greenfield ventures that have never before been executed in a 
country. Consequently institutions within that country have limited or no 
experience in facilitating the project, and the rules surrounding the venture 
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have not been designed in a manner that fully addresses all the related 
regulatory requirements. It is often an essential requirement that public 
institutions including government departments, central banks, legislative 
bodies and regulators co-ordinate and co-operate in their roles in order to 
‘facilitate’ a large transformational project. Such facilitation should occur 
within the confines of the law, and without it a potential project may be 
rendered unviable on by a range of bottlenecks.  
Facilitating interventions may take a number of forms. These include 
government appetite to take on foreign exchange risk on public projects 
where the cost of procuring exchange rate hedging instruments had the 
potential to make a project unviable. The government can also underwrite 
patronage levels or usage of public infrastructure. These interventions 
were essential to the successful commissioning of the Gautrain Rapid Rail 
Link. 
As the laws and regulations will usually be found wanting, public officials 
and institutions need to be able to expeditiously put in place enabling laws 
and regulations, or intermediate measures such as the Gas Agreement in 
the Sasol Natural Gas Project, that provide regulatory certainty for a 
project to commence. A continual beefing up of regulatory capacity and 
capability needs to be purposefully pursued, and policy makers need to 
work with private sector institutions to intentionally enable skills transfer 
and institutional building into the host economy so that a growing 
proportion of the expertise including advisers, lawyers, technical experts 
and banks can be sourced domestically. In summary, public officials must 
be responsive to the legal, commercial, and operational considerations 
that can compromise a project, but can be resolved with an appropriate, 
balanced, and legal application of governing authority. 
Where the state is directly involved in the procurement process either by 
way of selecting successful bidders or directly engaged as equity sponsor 
and project developer transparent, predictable and structured procurement 
processes are essential. Such processes embed integrity and economic 
efficiency into a project and have the virtuous effect of attracting more 
international players improving the competition amongst bidders or 
suppliers. 
Regarding the legal architecture it is proposed that each country puts in 
place an overarching policy framework and contact point for defined 
project finance and infrastructure ventures. The objective of this ‘one stop 
shop’ is to have a single point of contact where all regulations, licenses, 
clearances and other mandatory requirements to effect a project can be 
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obtained. This arrangement should reduce the bureaucratic burden of 
having to approach multiple government departments for the same project, 
encourage communication and co-ordination between public institutions 
themselves, and by reducing the level of friction to start projects, increase 
the speed and execution of ventures. The legal framework should be 
coupled with a process of nurturing capable, credible, and independent 
state players including regulators, oversight bodies and related institutions. 
In addition to the regular update of key laws and regulations affecting 
project and infrastructure finance to ensure a progressive legal 
architecture, a harmonisation of laws regionally should also be 
implemented. Such a harmonisation in the SADC region would create a 
large and more attractive project finance and infrastructure market for 
potential investors. Harmonising laws would also encourage and enable 
the commissioning of more cross border and regional projects, and reduce 
the legal costs and uncertainty that arise due to a lack of reciprocal 
recognition of legal arrangements between countries in the same region, 
with fundamentally very similar legal foundations and practices. 
Harmonising laws may also reduce CSR regulatory arbitrage with project 
developers moving projects to jurisdictions with lower CSR requirements. 
To implement these regional interventions, the greater participation of the 
secretariats in SADC, the EAC, ECOWAS and the AU will be e key 
requirement.  
6.1.6  Deal arrangements 
The deal arrangements and terms surrounding project finance and 
infrastructure ventures have largely been adopted from developed 
markets. While most of the inherited features are prudent and wise, a 
number of enhancements to address contextual conditions in Sub-
Saharan Africa are proposed.  
The first proposition that is fundamental to all projects is the formulation of 
a clear, stable, predictable, and reliable funding model. The absence of a 
clear funding model will result in a project failing to reach financial closure. 
Alternatively, where a funding model is compromised after plant 
construction, the venture will encounter serious financial and operational 
difficulties that will qualify its going concern status.  
NPIF also proposes an exit mechanism for certain private sector investors 
after they have fulfilled their construction or related role, and a period of 
time has elapsed to ensure that the project operations were stable. Such a 
mechanism would address two points. The first would be to allow 
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companies who partake in the construction of projects to exit once the 
projects reach a stable state and not be locked into an operational plant 
that is not their core business. Secondly by allowing specific non-core 
equity participants to exit projects under prescribed conditions, this can 
catalyse the appeal of participating in projects of this nature by EPC 
contractors. Having a liquidity event on minority stakes could further 
catalyse the development of capital markets that facilitate the trade in the 
equity and debt stakes related to these ventures, and increase their 
liquidity and the price transparency of the underlying financial instruments. 
As public infrastructure programmes often require an explicit or implicit 
government guarantee in different forms, it is important that the public 
investment also generates a return commensurate with the risk that the 
fiscus is taking. Accordingly, it is proposed that in the event that public 
funds or guarantees are issued to private operators, the deal terms should 
articulate and define the IRR the operator is entitled to earn. Beyond this 
return, the national fiscus should participate in super profits in 
compensation for guaranteeing and underwriting the project with public 
funds. This mechanism is more equitable in enshrining an agreed upon 
IRR for private sector investors, but allowing for a more equitable 
distribution of monetary benefits across the private and public sectors if 
the project surpasses initial performance forecasts. A corollary measure is 
also to put in place mechanisms for the public sector sponsor to also 
participate in indirect economic and commercial benefits that accrue such 
as increased property prices and higher footfall in retail shopping malls as 
a result of infrastructure projects such as the Gautrain. The latter 
arrangement allows the fiscus to also enjoy the indirect economic benefits 
that accrue to projects that have been underwritten by the state. 
Back leveraged structures that effectively increase the debt to equity ratio 
of a venture need to be managed carefully. Excessive back leverage may 
result in equity participants demanding more immediate dividend 
distributions in order to service debt obligations. This situation may 
prioritise short-term cash flow requirements over the medium to long-term 
strategic objectives of the project. To encourage a larger number of project 
bidders, procurement programmes should be arranged in such a way that 
bid costs are back loaded, and where possible only incurred by winning 
bidders. From a financial perspective projects may enjoy significant 
financial benefits if they are arranged in two parts. The first part would 
obtain financing for the construction of the project and the project reaching 
certain performance milestones. Due to the risks in this first part funding is 
generally more expensive. To stimulate funder’s appetite in this risky 
247 
phase project developers may adopt more conservative leverage. After the 
first phase had been completed, a second funding package could 
effectively refinance the project at on more competitive terms on account 
of its lower risk profile. Leverage levels could also be increased as 
operations will have reached a steady state and the venture will be cash 
generative. This systematic ring fencing of construction risk would also 
have the positive effect of attracting a broader range of investors 
particularly when the venture is operational.  
The final proposal on deal arrangements is applicable when the 
procurement for infrastructure is being done on a fleet basis e.g. the 
Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Programme (REIPPP) in 
South Africa. Fleet programmes can be made more economical by the 
regulator standardising key documents including legal agreements thereby 
reducing the need for each project developer to incur these costs 
individually, and also allowing a clearer comparison of the submitted bids. 
Table 4.1 expounds on the assertions of NPIF by capturing the key 
requirements that inform the model and make it durable. These actions 
are implementable by project developers and sponsors, commercial 
banks, regional and international DFIs, multi-national institutions, project 
subcontractors, environmental activists, regulatory bodies, and other 
stakeholders. 
6.2 Conclusion 
The NPIF model proposed above submits a lens through which project 
and infrastructure ventures executed in Sub-Saharan Africa can be viewed 
more holistically. The model builds on the observations of the case studies 
that highlight that the contextual environment differs markedly from many 
part of the world including higher degrees of uncertainty, elevated levels of 
complexity, greater inequality and poverty, and a higher imperative for 
business inclusiveness. These observations are important to consider in 
anticipation of assessing the applicability of existing academic theories on 
project and infrastructure finance in this region, and how the exiting theory 
may be extended. The following two chapters build on the cases analysed 
in chapter 3, and the summary conclusions of the NPIF model proposed, 
to examine the applicability of the existing theories on project finance, 
through the prism of each case studies capital structure, and other 
arrangements including, institutional, legal, and contractual provisions, risk 
management, and sustainability considerations. 
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Table 6.1:  Norm
ative Project and Infrastructure Finance M
odel Key Requirem
ents  
 
Geopolitical 
Resilience 
Shaping the 
Project 
Sustainability 
Institutional and 
Regulatory 
Flexibility 
Deal 
Arrangem
ents 
Capital M
arkets 
1. 
D
iverse regional 
sources of funding 
C
ontinuity of project 
team
. The project 
team
 should be 
supported by a 
com
pact sponsoring 
consortium
 
M
andatory 
com
pliance w
ith 
norm
ative 
standards 
Bold facilitation 
interventions by 
public sector 
principals 
Predeterm
ined exit 
m
echanism
s for 
selected investors 
D
eep and broad 
capital m
arkets 
2. 
Technical and 
engineering 
solutions including 
equipm
ent and 
spare parts not 
exclusive to one 
regional group 
C
om
m
unications: 
dynam
ic, proactive 
and responsive 
Independent audits 
of C
SR
 obligations. 
In evaluating 
com
pliance, 
consider the 
im
balance in pow
er 
relations betw
een 
project com
panies 
and local 
com
m
unities 
Im
plem
entation of 
enabling law
s, 
regulations, or 
interm
ediate 
m
easures 
Profit participation 
by public guarantor 
beyond 
predeterm
ined IR
R
 
M
obilise dom
estic 
savings 
3. 
Alternative 
settlem
ent system
s 
outside SW
IFT and 
traditional global 
paym
ent channels 
D
eep and broad 
political support and 
access to decision 
m
akers by project 
developers 
C
om
pliance 
enforcem
ent by 
focusing on 
shareholders for 
m
ulti-nationals 
R
egional 
harm
onisation of 
project and 
infrastructure 
investm
ent law
s 
and regulations 
R
estrict back 
leverage structures 
to m
itigate against 
com
prom
ising long 
term
 strategy to 
m
eet debt 
obligations 
Functioning and 
liquid debt and 
capital m
arkets 
4. 
U
tilise host country 
legal system
 as 
prim
ary contractual 
adjudication 
jurisdiction. 
Alternatively pre-
select neutral 
sovereign for 
Explicit and clear 
project goals and 
objectives including 
strong project 
docum
entation and 
decisive project co-
ordination 
Standardised 
regional C
S
R
 
requirem
ents 
G
reater prom
inence 
of supra-national 
structures 
M
echanism
s for 
public sponsor 
participation in 
indirect econom
ic 
benefits and 
com
m
ercial 
m
ultiplier 
Effective regulatory 
fram
ew
orks 
(security/integrity) 
relating to financial 
services sector 
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Geopolitical 
Resilience 
Shaping the 
Project 
Sustainability 
Institutional and 
Regulatory 
Flexibility 
Deal 
Arrangem
ents 
Capital M
arkets 
resolution of legal 
and related 
contractual m
atters 
5. 
Alternate m
arket 
options beyond 
N
orth Am
erica and 
Europe if project is 
export oriented 
Im
plem
ent a 
com
petitive bid 
process 
C
o-operate w
ith 
environm
ental 
organisations to 
enhance internal 
and external 
oversight 
Seam
less and 
overarching policy 
w
ith single contact 
point for project 
developers 
pursuing project 
and infrastructure 
finance initiatives 
Back load bid costs 
R
egulatory 
intervention to stop 
oligopolistic/anti-
com
petitive 
behaviour due to 
excessive bank 
concentration 
6. 
 
O
ptim
al project 
com
pany location 
and reporting lines 
Specific protection 
for rural 
com
m
unities and 
com
m
unal resource 
ow
nership 
arrangem
ents 
Transparent and 
structured 
procurem
ent 
processes 
R
ing fence 
construction risk 
Public resources 
(funding or other) 
frequently critical to 
catalyse large 
project finance 
initiatives 
7. 
 
Build in scalability 
Supply side training 
and education for 
legislators and 
regulators 
D
evelop of capable, 
credible and 
independent state 
players including 
regulators, 
oversight bodies 
and related 
institutions 
Take out pre-
construction risk 
leverage to allow
 
project greater 
prospects of 
achieving financial 
closure. Leverage 
can be increased 
post construction 
Participation of 
com
m
ercial banks 
enhances project 
rigour and 
robustness 
8. 
 
M
ake extensive use 
of international 
legal, financial, and 
technical 
particularly w
here 
project is first of a 
kind in the country 
Prescribe local 
equity ow
nership as 
a significant part of 
shareholding 
structure as 
opposed to 
exclusively national 
 
Standardisation of 
docum
entation on 
fleet build program
s 
Shield capital 
structure from
 
foreign exchange 
m
ovem
ents 
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Geopolitical 
Resilience 
Shaping the 
Project 
Sustainability 
Institutional and 
Regulatory 
Flexibility 
Deal 
Arrangem
ents 
Capital M
arkets 
governm
ent equity 
participation 
9. 
 
Long term
 sponsor 
com
m
itm
ent to the 
project ideally for 
the full life of the 
project 
Legal recourse to 
holding com
pany 
balance sheets for 
com
pensation if 
there are serious 
sustainability 
breaches and SP
V 
is financially unable 
to m
ake good on 
these 
 
Essential that there 
is a clear, stable, 
predictable and 
reliable funding 
m
odel 
Integrated and 
seam
less insurance 
coverage from
 
project construction 
to operations. 
10. 
 
O
perator incentives 
such as tax 
concessions linked 
directly to 
operational m
etrics 
C
onstruct projects 
parallel to existing 
infrastructure 
 
D
evelop 
infrastructure 
program
s on a fleet 
basis to enjoy 
greater econom
ies 
of scale 
 
11. 
 
Em
bed risk 
m
anagem
ent into 
the project 
architecture 
Legal recourse to 
state if there is 
failure to protect 
rural com
m
unities 
and environm
ents, 
w
ith com
pensation 
by the governm
ent 
if there is a 
dereliction of duty 
 
 
 
12. 
 
Ensure optim
al m
ix 
of project team
 
including balance 
betw
een technical 
and com
m
ercial 
expertise 
Link operator 
incentives such as 
tax concessions to 
sustainability 
m
etrics 
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Geopolitical 
Resilience 
Shaping the 
Project 
Sustainability 
Institutional and 
Regulatory 
Flexibility 
Deal 
Arrangem
ents 
Capital M
arkets 
13 
 
 
Build into the 
project architecture 
dedicated conduits 
through w
hich 
com
m
unity and 
environm
ental 
issues can be 
raised and 
escalated by all 
stakeholders 
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7 Capital Structure Determinants 
Important components of the research questions posed in this thesis 
include an enquiry as to how capital structure is arrived at in project and 
infrastructure ventures in the selected countries. This includes a 
consideration of the applicability of the main capital structure theories, 
including the static trade-off and pecking order theories, and an 
examination of reasons for consistency or deviation with these theories. In 
addition the thesis seeks to consider the applicability of the limited 
academic research on capital structure in project finance initiatives to 
South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The analysis of the 
applicability of the existing theory and observations made, are to be 
contrasted and compared with the actual decisions and reasons offered by 
project sponsors and managers in arriving at the capital structure choices 
of their respective ventures. This facilitates a comparison between theory 
and practice, and the formulation of an extended theory based on specific 
project, regional, and contextual considerations. Finally, the impact of 
agency considerations between sponsors/managers, and capital providers 
is the final lens through which the formulation of capital structure is to be 
examined in the research questions posed.   
This chapter commences with a restatement of the assumptions 
underlying the mainstream capital structure theories, and a consideration 
of the appropriateness of these assumptions in the context of business, 
economic, and related conditions in South Africa, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe, together with the 7 case studies compiled. It begins by 
interrogating the assumptions underlying Miller and Modigliani’s (1958) 
proposition that capital structure is irrelevant and the value of a firm is 
determined by profits and the risks of the underlying assets, the 
assumptions of the static trade-off theory that the capital structure of a firm 
is determined by the trade-off of the benefits and cost of debt, and the 
assumptions in the pecking order theory proposing that monitoring and 
bond costs are minimised by using internally generated profits, then debt, 
and finally equity issuances. The objective of this exercise is to assess the 
extent to which these assumptions confirm or challenge the applicability 
and viability of these theories to capital structure formulation in project and 
infrastructure finance in Sub-Saharan Africa. The next section of the 
chapter compiles and rates the top 5 considerations of practitioners in the 
formulation of capital structure for each case. This enables an assessment 
of the key drivers of capital structure in each project, and posits qualitative 
considerations as to alternate factors impacting on capital structure in the 
selected countries. It also enables an interrogation to the degree of 
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relevance of the mainstream theories above in explaining capital structure, 
and the reasons for deviations between theory and practice in capital 
structure formulation. This evaluation is followed by a consideration of 
actual debt to equity ratios in the 7 case studies, and contrasted with what 
is generally expected in the academic literature on project finance 
ventures of this nature. The final part of the analysis involves a 
consideration of agency factors in the formulation of capital structure. 
These take into account dynamics between sponsors and debt capital 
providers, and within sponsor consortium arrangements.  
The conclusion to the chapter restates the degree of relevance of the main 
capital structure theories, including the limited academic literature in 
project finance, in understanding capital structure determinants in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Finally proposals on attracting greater domestic and 
international capital providers to project and infrastructure ventures in 
Southern Africa are offered. 
7.1 Source and blend of funding  
7.1.1  The applicability of assumptions informing capital 
structure theories to project finance 
Miller and Modigliani assumptions 
Miller and Modigliani (1958) made 6 key assumptions in arriving at their 
proposition that the value of a firm is determined by profits and risks of 
underlying assets, and capital structure is irrelevant. These assumptions 
were the existence of perfect capital markets, no taxes, no transaction 
costs, identical borrowing costs for companies and investors, symmetry of 
market information, and the absence of bankruptcy costs. The first 
assumption of perfect capital markets is a significant distortion in the 
selected case studies and jurisdictions, over the 25 years during which 
these projects were executed. In South Africa this period included the pre-
1994 prescribed assets regime where banks and asset managers were 
compelled to invest a proportion of their assets in government bonds and 
related instruments. International economic and related sanctions also had 
the effect of disrupting the workings of capital markets within South Africa 
until 1994. This was exacerbated by the existence of exchange controls 
that restricted the movement of capital into and out of the country, and 
while greatly reduced still remain. Until 1996, South Africa maintained a 
fixed exchange rate against major international currencies as one of the 
tools regulating international capital flows (Eun et al., 2012). These factors 
indicate the assumption of perfect capital markets in South Africa over the 
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past 25 years to be largely erroneous. South Africa does however display 
relatively deep, liquid, well regulated, and an internationally regarded 
capital markets architecture. This includes the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange, the Bond Exchange of South Africa, and the banking, pension 
fund, and asset management sectors. The situations in Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe are significantly further behind South Africa in achieving perfect 
capital markets. In addition to the limited development of the banking, 
asset management, pension fund, stock exchanges and other capital 
aggregators, these countries have onerous capital and current account 
controls, exchange controls, prescribed assets, and been variously 
challenged in tapping into international capital markets over the 25 year 
research period. Domestic capital markets are characterised by 
practitioners as shallow and illiquid. The assumption of perfect capital 
markets in these three countries is wholly incorrect and significantly 
undermines the robustness of Miller and Modigliani’s (1958) theoretical 
proposition across all 7 cases and the three countries in which they are 
executed.  
The assumption that there are no taxes does not seem to undermine the 
propositions of the model. This supposition appears to be one of 
convenience that strips out varied tax obligations across different 
jurisdictions and sectors. Interestingly, of the 7 cases collated taxation 
implications appear to be marginal. In the Seacom case 90% of the cable 
was located in international waters, allowing tax obligations to be 
significantly circumvented legally. The Gautrain is not profitable and 
performs a public service (GMA Annual Report, 2014). As a result it has 
no corporate income tax obligations. The PBMR was also never profitable, 
and any taxes that could have occurred if it had been successful, would 
have largely flowed back to the fiscus making it tax neutral. The Mozal 
project also received significant tax concessions, rendering tax 
considerations in the capital structure formulation largely redundant. The 
assumption of no taxes has medium applicability to Kalkbult, SNGP, and 
Chisumbanje, which are governed by the standard company tax 
obligations in South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The assumption 
of no taxes appears reasonable in application to project finance and the 
case studies in the thesis, giving qualified support to Miller and 
Modigliani’s (1958) theoretical proposition. The importance of this 
assumption however seems to be marginal. Similarly the assumption of 
identical borrowing costs for companies and investors is highly applicable 
to all the cases except PBMR where no debt funding was obtained. The 
assumption is largely a matter of convenience and simplification, and 
enables an efficient examination of the main theoretical proposition. 
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The assumption that there are no transaction costs is a very important 
consideration. The sponsors of Seacom opted to use indefeasible rights of 
usage in part to alleviate capital raising transaction costs. Similarly the 
Gautrain, Kalkbult, Mozal, and SNGP made use of multiple credit 
enhancing mechanisms including equity and debt guarantees, political risk 
guarantees, bonds etc. resulting in transaction costs being significant 
factors. These costs not only affected the capital structure and overall 
project costs, but frequently transaction costs were incurred to enable 
capital to be raised in accordance with the prescribed terms of capital 
providers.  The no transaction cost assumption is lent qualified support by 
the PBMR as capital was largely sourced from the South African treasury 
and related DFI’s. While transaction costs may have been small as a 
result, the opportunity costs are likely to have been significant. In the case 
of Chisumbanje, transaction costs on capital raising would have been 
substantially reduced by the fact that the bulk of the capital injected into 
the project was in the form of arable land, and not monetary in nature. The 
lease from ARDA does not appear to have transaction fees related to it.  
Assuming no transaction costs significantly undermines the robustness 
Miller and Modigliani’s (1958) theoretical proposition for at least 5 of the 7 
cases, and its applicability to capital structure formulation in project 
finance. 
The assumption of symmetry of market information is largely erroneous. 
Significant information asymmetries between project sponsors and debt 
capital providers are present in all the projects. Particularly in Seacom, 
Gautrain, Kalkbult, Mozal and SNGP this resulted in the extensive use of 
technical advisers and experts, as part of the due diligence processes 
prior to financial closure of the debt packages. Information symmetry may 
have been more relevant in Kalkbult due to the transparency prescribed by 
the REIPPP process. The nature of project finance including the use of 
special purpose vehicles, the highly technical nature of many projects, and 
the general autonomy of the management team from banks providing debt 
capital, increases the likelihood of information asymmetries. This 
significant assumption made largely in the context of listed public 
companies is wholly inappropriate in a project financing arrangement. The 
final assumption in Miller and Modigliani’s (1958) theory pertains to the 
absence of bankruptcy costs. This final assumption is unrealistic for the 
purpose of exploring capital structure in project finance. Specifically, all 7 
cases face a real risk of bankruptcy on account of their standalone 
incorporation, with limited recourse to the sponsors. This is a primary 
consideration by debt providers. The bankruptcy risk is made more acute 
in project finance due to the fact that the secondary value of the liquidated 
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projects under a bankruptcy scenario, is a fraction of the invested 
amounts, exposing capital providers to significant losses.  
In summary the assumptions underlying Miller and Modigliani’s (1958) 
proposition are all of low to medium applicability, with the exception of 
identical borrowing costs for companies and investors, which is high. 
Preliminarily, this makes the explanatory and predictive power of the 
proposition that capital structure is irrelevant questionable to the 7 projects 
under examination. It also potentially indicates the limitations in applying 
this theory to how capital structure is formulated in project and 
infrastructure finance in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.  
Static trade-off assumptions 
The static trade-off theory is characterised by the key assumptions that 
capital structure is determined by the trade-off between the benefits and 
costs of debt. Benefits accrue in the form of a tax shield and a reduction of 
manager discretion. Costs of debt are incurred in the form of bankruptcy 
risks and agency conflicts between shareholders and debt providers. As a 
result debt acts as a disciplinary tool mediating between shareholders, 
management, and debt capital providers. The applicability of the 
assumption that capital structure is determined by a trade-off between the 
benefits and cost of debt was low in the Seacom, Gautrain, PBMR, Mozal 
and Chisumbanje cases. The Seacom, Gautrain, PBMR, Mozal, and 
Chisumbanje cases made conservative use of debt. This was not driven 
by a cost benefit analysis of the debt implications, but other factors more 
germane to the individual projects that are addressed in the sponsor and 
management considerations in arriving at capital structure below. The 
Kalkbult and SNGP were moderately influenced by considerations of the 
benefits and costs of debt in their capital structure, and this assumption 
has qualified support in these cases. The applicability of the assumption 
regarding the benefits of the tax shield on debt echoes the first 
assumption. Specifically, the Seacom transaction was largely immunised 
from corporate tax obligations due to the cable predominantly residing in 
international waters, the Gautrain and PBMR were not profitable with no 
short to medium term tax obligations envisaged, and Mozal enjoyed 
corporate tax exemptions except for a 1% levy on turnover. The tax shield 
benefit on interest expense therefore only significantly accrued to Kalkbult 
and SNGP. 
The assumption that debt is beneficial in that it curtails management 
discretion has limited applicability in the 7 cases. Firstly for all the 7 cases 
the overall project objectives were laid out, and by establishing SPVs for a 
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defined purpose, management discretion was structurally significantly 
curtailed. For Seacom, Kalkbult, Mozal, SNGP, and Chisumbanje, the 
sponsors were active members of the executive and management teams, 
reducing the disparities between the interests of shareholders and 
managers. The reduction of management discretion may have been 
moderately applicable to entities participating in the Bombela Consortium 
on the Gautrain, to whom funding was advanced directly. In the same 
manner, the higher debt levels in the Kalkbult project has the effect of 
reducing managerial discretion. The fact that the main sponsor Scatec is 
integrally involved in the management of the project, makes the restraining 
nature of debt a secondary and not primary curtailment mechanism.  
The assumption pertaining to the costs of debt associated with the legal 
and administrative risks of bankruptcy is important for companies without 
public funding. Specifically this assumption is highly applicable to Seacom, 
Kalkbult, Mozal, and the SNGP. It has low applicability to the Gautrain and 
the PBMR as these projects have a public mandate. Financial, business, 
and economic considerations that would render a private sector project, 
would not necessarily result in the termination of projects with a public 
mandate, as they are likely to enjoy financial and related support from the 
state. The PBMR received state funding until 2009 despite serious 
financial and technical setbacks, with support being terminated when the 
costs of constructing the prototype and further investment became 
exorbitant. As mentioned earlier, the Gautrain enjoys on-going subsidies 
through the patronage agreement, is not expected to generate profits, and 
it is highly improbable that the venture would be allowed to go bankrupt by 
the national and provincial governments. The assumption of bankruptcy 
has medium applicability to the Chisumbanje project. This is on account of 
the fact that the bulk of project capital is related to land. The value and 
utility of this land would not be compromised in the event that the ethanol 
processing plant failed. Bankruptcy risk on a value basis is thus 
significantly reduced. 
The assumption relating to agency conflicts between shareholders and 
debt providers has high applicability in the case of Seacom, Kalkbult, 
Mozal, and SNGP. These projects are characterised by significant levels 
of gearing. This assumption would have medium application in the 
Gautrain and Chisumbanje on account of relatively low gearing. It would 
be entirely irrelevant for the PBMR as no debt was incurred. The final key 
assumption in the static trade-off model considers debt as a disciplinary 
tool. In the case of Seacom, the Gautrain, PBMR, and Chisumbanje this 
has a low level of applicability on account of conservative or non-existent 
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debt levels. Debt does act as a medium disciplinary tool in the case of 
Kalkbult, Mozal, and SNGP. As highlighted earlier in the discussion on 
reduction of manager’s discretion, other interventions are used primarily, 
and debt is a secondary measure. In summary, the assumptions of the 
static trade-off theory are predominantly low to medium in applicability, 
with the exception of some high applicability areas relating to bankruptcy 
and agency conflicts between shareholders and debt providers. 
Preliminarily, this makes the explanatory and predictive power of the 
proposition that capital structure is determined by a trade-off between the 
benefits and costs of debt questionable for the 7 projects under 
examination. It also potentially indicates the limitations in applying the 
static trade-off theory to how capital structure is formulated in project and 
infrastructure finance in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.  
Pecking order assumptions 
The pecking order theory is characterised by the key assumptions that to 
minimise monitoring and bonding costs, firms prefer to deploy retained 
profits, then debt, and finally fresh equity issuances. The second key 
assumption relates to asymmetry of information particularly between 
management and shareholders. The relevance of the pecking order theory 
to project and infrastructure finance ventures is inherently limited in its 
scope by the fact that projects are commenced via SPVs with no retained 
earnings. As a result, on project commencement, retained earnings from 
the SPV are generally non-existent, but may accrue over subsequent 
years. There is limited evidence for the utilisation of retained profits to fund 
projects in preference to debt and fresh equity issuances on all the 7 
cases. In part this may be due to the fact that monitoring and bonding 
costs are generally high even with moderate application of debt, and as 
such do not increase proportionally with higher debt levels. The incentive 
to use retained earnings to limit monitoring and bond costs is therefore 
blunted beyond a certain level of debt. This would appear applicable for 
Seacom, the Gautrain, Kalkbult, Mozal, and the SNGP. Monitoring and 
bonding costs appear to be largely immaterial in the PBMR and 
Chisumbanje due to limited or non-existent debt exposure. The 
applicability of the assumption around asymmetry of market information is 
high due to the different level of technical knowledge between debt capital 
providers, project developers and their associated management teams. In 
summary, the minimising monitoring and bonding costs assumption has 
low applicability, whilst the information asymmetry assumption has high 
applicability. Table 7.1 below distils the applicability of key assumptions 
per each case study under the three capital structure theories considered.
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Table 7.1:  Applicability of Assum
ptions in Capital Structure Theories 
Assum
ptions - M
iller and M
odigliani (1958) 
Seacom
 
Gautrain 
PBM
R 
Kalkbult 
M
ozal 
SNGP 
 Chisum
banje 
 
 
Perfect capital m
arkets 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
 
 
No taxes 
M
edium
 
Low
 
Low
 
M
edium
 
Low
 
M
edium
 
M
edium
 
 
 
No transaction costs 
Low
 
Low
 
M
edium
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
M
edium
 
 
  
Identical borrow
ing costs for com
panies and investors 
High 
High 
Low
 
High 
High 
High 
High 
 
 
Sym
m
etry of m
arket inform
ation 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
M
edium
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
 
  
The absence of bankruptcy costs 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
 
 
Assum
ptions - Static Trade-off Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital structure determ
ined by trade-off of benefits and 
costs of debt 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
M
edium
 
Low
 
M
edium
 
Low
 
 
 
Benefits of debt: tax shield 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
M
edium
 
Low
 
M
edium
 
Low
 
 
 
Benefits of debt: reduction of m
anager discretion 
Low
 
M
edium
 
Low
 
M
edium
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
 
 
Costs of debt: bankruptcy risks (legal and adm
inistrative) 
High 
Low
 
Low
 
High 
High 
High 
M
edium
 
 
 
Costs of debt: agency conflicts betw
een shareholders and 
debt providers 
High 
M
edium
 
Low
 
High 
High 
High 
M
edium
 
 
 
Debt as a diciplinary tool 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
M
edium
 
M
edium
 
M
edium
 
Low
 
 
 
Assum
ptions - Pecking O
rder Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
inim
ising m
onitoring and bonding costs 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
Low
 
 
 
Assym
m
etry of m
arket inform
ation 
High 
High 
High 
M
edium
 
High 
High 
High 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Applicability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low
 
The assum
ption has low
 applicablity to the case, and underm
ines the robustness of the theoretical propositions. 
M
edium
 
The assum
ption has applicability to the case, and gives qualified support to the robustness of the theoretical propositions. 
High 
The assum
ption has high applicability to the case, and strongly supports the robustness of the theoretical propositions. 
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In summary, the assumptions underpinning the main capital structure 
theories appear to have very limited applicability to capital structure 
formulation in project and infrastructure finance based on the 7 case 
studies to which they have been applied. Preliminarily, it would be 
reasonable to be cautious about the capital structure predictive and 
explanatory capability of these theories to project finance. 
7.1.2  Ranking practitioner priorities in arriving at capital 
structure 
The earlier section evaluated the applicability of the assumptions informing 
the main capital structure theories. In general, the applicability of these 
assumptions was low when applied to project and infrastructure finance. 
Because of the low applicability of these assumptions, it preliminarily 
cautioned against reliance on the predictive and explanatory powers of 
these theories to project finance.  This section collates the five major 
factors informing the capital structure formulation of each of the 7 projects 
based on the interviews with project practitioner, and the case studies 
compiled. It then ranks these five factors in order of importance, in effect 
constructing a ranking of the top five considerations that dictated the 
capital structure adopted. It explains the logic and thinking of the 
practitioners in arriving at these 5 factors and rankings. The section then 
summarises what the overarching determinants of capital structure, and 
the implications of this in the formulation of capital structure in project 
finance ventures in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Figure 7.2 below lists for each case study the 5 key determinants 
informing the capital structure based on the interviews of practitioners who 
partook in these projects. Each of the determinants is ranked from 1 to 5, 
with 1 being the highest consideration and 5 the least resonant of the top 
5. Owing to the recurrence of common determinants across the cases, 
these have been colour coded to more forcefully illustrate both the actual 
determinants, and their prioritisation within each case, and across the 
cases as a whole. The colour coding clusters the determinants into the 
categories of access to capital, de-risking of the project to ensure 
bankability, the capacity of capital contributions of equity participants, host 
government facilitation, and other determinants. 
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Table 7.2:  Practitioner Priorities in Form
ulating Capital Structure 
Seacom
 
Gautrain 
1. 
Access to capital (i.e. ability to source and raise requisite capital) 
1. 
Access to capital (i.e. ability to source and raise requisite capital) 
2. 
De-risk project. Ensure bankable risk profile to support point 1 above 
2. 
De-risk project. Ensure bankable risk profile to support point 1 above 
3. 
Speed of execution in capital raising (deploy IRUs) 
3. 
Instil private sector rigor through using com
m
ercial bank funding 
4. 
Securing confirm
ed off-takers 
4. 
Lock in key EPC contractors 
5. 
Capacity of capital contributions of equity participants 
5. 
Curtail capital contribution of national and provincial treasuries 
PBM
R 
Kalkbult 
1. 
Access to capital (i.e. ability to source and raise requisite capital) 
1. 
Access to capital (i.e. ability to source and raise requisite capital) 
2. 
Solicitation of capital contributions from
 local D
FI’s and SO
Es 
2. 
REIPPP prescription debt capital be sourced from
 SA banks 
3. 
Solicitation of capital contributions from
 international partners  
3. 
PPA w
ith Eskom
 and explicit sovereign guarantee 
4. 
De-risk and reduce pressures on project in short term
 i.e. no debt service obligations 
4. 
De-risk project. Ensure bankable risk profile to support point 1 above 
5. 
Prototype not com
m
issioned due to uncertain outcom
es and potential contingent 
liability on national budget 
5. 
Capacity of capital contributions of equity participants 
M
ozal 
SNGP 
1. 
Access to capital (i.e. ability to source and raise requisite capital) 
1. 
Access to capital (i.e. ability to source and raise requisite capital) 
2. 
Political risk considerations 
2. 
Capacity of capital contributions of equity participants 
3. 
De-risk project. Ensure bankable risk profile to support point 1 above 
3. 
De-risk project. Ensure bankable risk profile to support point 1 above 
4. 
Concessions by M
ozam
bican governm
ent on tax, bank accounts currency and 
jurisdiction, repatriation of profits 
4. 
Political risk considerations 
5. 
Project expertise and experience of operator BHP 
5. 
Facilitation of Sasol as prim
ary sponsor 
Chisum
banje 
 
Key 
Access to capital 
De-risk project to ensure bankability 
Capacity of capital contributions of equity participants 
Host governm
ent facilitation 
O
ther 
1. 
Access to capital (i.e. ability to source and raise requisite capital) 
2. 
State facilitation by contribution of non-m
onetary capital in the form
 of land 
3. 
Regulatory facilitation m
andatory blending requirem
ents, ethanol production license, 
EIA granted by default 
4. 
Political facilitation: BOT vs partnership/joint venture. Relationship betw
een Rautenbach 
and political principals 
5. 
W
ater availability and related enabling infrastructure 
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Before discussing the key determinants expressed by practitioners as to 
the top 5 factors influencing the capital structure of each project, it is 
instructive to note again the actual debt to equity ratios for each case 
summarised in Table 7.3. To a significant degree there is a divergence 
between the actual capital structures observed, relative to what would 
have been expected based on the predominant and prevailing capital 
structure theories. The reasons for the deviation from anticipated capital 
structure is explained to a large degree by the practitioner considerations 
in arriving at each project’s capital structure.  
 
Table 7.3:  Capital Structure Summary 
 
Project Seacom Gautrain PBMR 
 
Kalkbult 
 
Mozal 
 
SNGP 
 
Chisumbanje 
 
   
    
 
Debt: Equity 25%:75% 28%:72% 0%:100% 
 
75%:25% 
 
61%:39% 
 
54%:46% 
 
n/a 
Seacom 
The most significant factor influencing the capital structure in the Seacom 
was the question of access to capital. The executors were focused on 
ensuring that they were able to source and raise the requisite capital for 
the project. This key consideration was demonstrated by the fact that 
similar concepts including the envisaged Africa One cable had been 
aborted in large part due to a failure to reach financial closure. Appetite by 
equity and debt capital funders in such a venture on the African continent 
was uncertain. Furthermore, sources of capital from the African continent 
were limited on account of under-developed debt ad equity capital 
markets. The equity participants in the project reflect how this equity 
challenge was resolved. Equity funding was sourced from a combination 
of South African, Middle Eastern and American sources. The South 
African equity participants, namely Remgro, Convergence, Shanduka, and 
Sanlam were established and highly regarded private equity players with 
sizeable balance sheets. Herakles and IPS also came with significant 
capital backing. The principal sponsors also came with very good business 
reputations enabling the project to raise debt capital from South African 
commercial banks. As a collective the sponsors benefited from being 
perceived by debt capital providers as being credible, trustworthy, and 
having the means to execute the project on account of their deep 
knowledge and commercial understanding of the markets that the Seacom 
cable was designed to service. Access to capital was a key consideration 
also because the developers understanding of the project potential and 
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assessment of risks, is likely to have differed from capital providers 
particularly from outside the continent without the same level of insight and 
understanding. The exit of a European bank originally meant to be an 
equity investor is indicative of this. The project sponsors as a collective 
were subsequently able to interact with Nedbank and Investec, who 
arguably had a better appreciation of the risks and opportunities in the 
Seacom project relative to non-African international banks. The banks 
moved decisively in arranging facilities and finalising term sheets that 
addressed to most prominent risk of the project being unable to raise the 
requisite capital. 
The second most important consideration in the formulation of Seacom’s 
capital structure was the need to de-risk the project sufficiently so as to 
ensure the project was bankable, and supporting the first point above. 
Despite the use of tried and tested technology, as the first undersea cable 
servicing the African continent, the project was perceived to bear elevated 
risk levels. To de-risk the project key interventions were implemented in 
the capital structure. Firstly leverage was greatly diminished by raising a 
significant tranche of the project’s capital through IRUs, reducing default 
risk. The IRUs also garnered simultaneous off-takers to a significant 
portion of the cable’s capacity ameliorating the market risk. The 
confidence shown by large credit worthy commercial entities signing IRUs 
signalled the project’s strong business case and credibility. The third most 
important consideration influencing Seacom’s capital structure formulation 
was the need to be the first to market. This was a critical aspect of the 
project concept and the transient opportunity identified. To achieve speed 
of execution the number of equity participants was purposefully designed 
to be compact allowing speedier and more efficient decision-making 
processes. This differed substantially from the traditional consortium 
arrangements with a much larger shareholder base. The deployment of 
IRUs further supported the speedy raising of capital for the project. The 
speedy raising of the project capital and execution of the project build, 
ensured Seacom was first to market, and was able to capture and 
monetise the pent up demand as a result of its first mover advantage. The 
fourth key determinant is also related to the IRUs, in that they enabled firm 
off-takers to be secured even before project construction commenced. 
This is a recurrent characterisation in project finance. The final top 5 
consideration informing Seacom’s capital structure was the capacity of 
equity participants to make equity contributions to the venture. With a total 
project value of US$ 600 million funded predominantly by equity, some 
partners had significant constraints. This resulted in some of the back 
leveraged structures detailed in the actual case exploration. Capital 
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structure in the project has subsequently been influenced by the need to 
distribute retained earnings as dividends to allow these back leveraged 
debt obligations to be serviced. 
Gautrain 
The primary factor influencing the capital structure of the Gautrain was the 
access to capital i.e. the ability to source and raise the requisite capital. 
The Gautrain was the first high-speed metropolitan rail network in South 
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. As a consequence of this the project was 
perceived to have a high degree of uncertainty regarding execution, 
timelines, funding, and patronage etc. South African banks had no 
experience in directly funding a project of this nature, and as a result were 
relatively risk averse. The banks also used traditional cash flow based 
funding models to determine a venture’s debt servicing capacity 
culminating in conservative leverage. The banks risk profile of the project 
was also elevated by the duration of the contractual agreements between 
the Gauteng Provincial government and the Bombela Consortium that 
extend over 20 years, with the debt tenors premised on this term. The long 
concession duration exposed the banks to higher levels of uncertainty, 
unexpected occurrences, and as a result, contingent liabilities. As a result 
of these facts, the national and provincial governments were compelled to 
furnish the majority of the capital for the Gautrain by injecting equity into 
the project, and debt capital was limited. The national government was 
also concerned that excessive borrowing for the Gautrain in domestic debt 
capital markets could have the unintended consequence of crowding out 
private sector borrowing. The commitment of the national and provincial 
governments, and the utilisation of pubic funds predominantly for the 
project, allowed the venture to proceed more rapidly than would have 
been the case if the majority of the capital were sought by way of debt. 
The second factor practitioners prioritised and impacting on the Gautrain’s 
capital structure was the necessity to de-risk the project, to enable the 
raising of both debt capital and public funding, but also to attract credible 
EPC contractors internationally. The day-to-day operational management 
of the project assets and the Bombela consortium were institutionalised in 
the GMA. The exposure of debt capital providers was mitigated by a 
patronage guarantee absolving them from traffic risk, and the extensive 
construction and operating risks were dispersed to the Bombela 
consortium, with financial ramifications if these were not adequately 
managed. Similarly, the state took on the foreign exchange risk, as 
insisting that it remained in the project would have compromised its 
financial viability. These derisking and facilitation interventions had a 
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significant influence on the final capital structure and risk profile of the 
project, enhancing its bankability and reducing its risk to attract debt 
capital from local banks. The third priority in the capital structure 
formulation is sponsors of the Gautrain purposefully sought to instil private 
sector rigor into the project by using commercial bank funding. This was 
an intentional risk mitigation intervention that not only resulted in debt 
capital being raised, but also supported the implementation of risk 
mitigation measures, enhanced the credibility of the initiative, helped the 
sponsors in negotiating terms with EPC contractors and related vendors. 
The fourth most important determinant in the capital structure formulation 
of the Gautrain was the need to lock in EPC contractors and align their 
interests with the sponsors by compelling them to contribute a portion of 
the project capital. The capital contributions from the EPC contractors 
were also useful in incentivising performance in the execution of project 
obligations as EPC contractors were both vendors and equity participants. 
The fifth most important determinant in the Gautrains capital structure was 
the attempt to curtail the capital contribution of the national and provincial 
treasuries. Despite the overall large contributions to the project from public 
funds, South Africa was faced with fiscal constraints and competing 
priorities. As a result the sponsors wanted to limit or defer their overall 
contribution to the project where feasible. Whilst the debt capital sourced 
from the private sector constituted a small proportion of the overall capital 
base, it effectively reduced the capital injection by the state. 
PBMR 
References to a capital structure in the execution of the PBMR have the 
potential to cause greater confusion, as opposed to offering greater clarity. 
On this account, the financial arrangements relating to the PBMR will be 
referred to as the funding model. The most significant factor influencing 
the funding model in the PBMR was the question of access to capital. 
Importantly, the PBMR was a FOAK project that had not been successfully 
commercialised anywhere in the world. Due to its exploratory nature 
commercial debt funding was not a realistic alternative. The only option of 
the SA government was to fund the project primarily from the fiscus. This 
also had limitations due to the competing priorities of the SA government, 
and extensive social and development commitments. The national budget 
invariably had a political dimension to it, with funding for the project versus 
other priorities contested. The second factor was the solicitation of capital 
contributions from local DFIs and State Owned Entities (SOEs) including 
the IDC and Eskom. The latter were an important source of funding for the 
venture, as they were an alternative to the national budget and less 
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subject to political contestation. Eskom and the IDC also stood to benefit 
directly if the PBMR was successful. It is notable that at the time the 
PBMR was being vigorously executed in the mid 2000s, both Eskom and 
IDC were enjoying significant profits and cash flows, and had the financial 
capacity to fund the project. By 2008, Eskom was suffering major capital 
constraints due to a new build program. Similarly the IDCs balance sheet 
began to deteriorate at the start of the international financial crisis in 2007.  
 
The third most important determinant to the PBMRs funding model was 
the solicitation of capital contributions from international partners. These 
contributions were to share the development costs and lock the 
international partners into the project strategically. In addition to providing 
funding it was envisaged that the international partners would assist in 
selling and licensing the PBMR in European and American markets if 
successfully commercialised. The fourth consideration in PBMRs funding 
model related to a bid to de-risk and reduce short-term pressures on the 
project by ensuring the venture had no short-term financial repayments, 
including debt-servicing obligations. The final consideration addresses the 
financial reasons as to why the PBMR was effectively terminated by the 
South African government. The envisaged proto-type was forecast to cost 
in excess of R 30 billion, with uncertainty in terms of final costs, outcomes, 
and the commercial potential. Due to the loss in confidence in the project, 
the high price tag, competing priorities, and contingent financial liabilities 
that could arise with its continuance, a decision was made to terminate the 
venture. 
Kalkbult 
The most important consideration in the determination of the capital 
structure of the Kalkbult project by practitioners was access to debt and 
equity capital. The Kalkbult project was awarded in the first round of the 
REIPPP. As the REIPPP was a new policy tool, it did not have a record of 
successfully executed projects in its first round iteration. Uncertainty was 
also fuelled by the failed Renewable feed In Tariff (REFIT) attempted by 
the South African authorities a decade earlier. The principal sponsor 
Scatec was an established European player with a significant balance 
sheet, and access to European capital markets. Scatec’s experience in the 
construction and management of solar energy plants, assessment of risk, 
reputation, and proven track record were essential in attracting both equity 
partners, and debt capital providers. From an equity capital perspective, 
capital invested in this form is locked into the project and has limited 
flexibility over the 20-year concession period. The REIPPP and DOE 
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regulations prescribe that changes in equity are forbidden in the first three 
years of the concession period, and DOE approval is required even in the 
years thereafter. Such an arrangement makes the retraction and 
repatriation of equity injections difficult, encouraging lesser contributions of 
this nature, and a greater application of debt. The second most important 
and related determinant of capital structure in Kalkbult was the mandatory 
REIPPP prescription that all debt be sourced from South African banks. 
Due to South Africa’s highly developed debt markets this was an attractive 
proposition enabling a natural currency hedge between the interest rate 
and the tariff, and tax deductibility of the interest expense.  
The third most important consideration was the signing of the PPA 
(including the tariff over the concession period) with Eskom and the 
explicit government guarantee on the latter. This measure gave a high 
degree of transparency and certainty regarding project cash flows, 
enabling the application of higher degrees of debt funding. On the project’s 
execution the South African government also enjoyed an investment grade 
credit rating, helping project developers to secure reasonable funding 
terms, and reducing the amount of equity capital required. The fourth most 
important factor in determining the capital structure of Kalkbult was a bid 
to derisk the project to make it bankable and attract the requisite debt 
capital. While this was in part achieved by the reputation and experience 
of Scatec, the receipt of the PPA and overall robustness of the REIPPP, a 
meaningful contribution of equity capital was considered a vital ingredient. 
The final consideration in the formulation of the Scatec capital structure 
related to the capacity of equity participants to contribute capital. Scatec 
was able to readily raise significant amounts of equity capital. However, it 
needed to be cognisant of the reality that other equity partners were 
unwilling or unable to inject high levels of equity into the project. The 
empowerment vehicles in the form of the community trust and women’s 
group faced particular challenges in this regard, curtailing equity injections 
into the project. 
Mozal 
Mozal marked the emergence of Mozambique into the mainstream 
regional and global economy after the abandonment of Marxist policies 
and a resolution of the civil war. As the first large project to be executed in 
this new era, the first and most important factor determining the capital 
structure was access to capital. In order to attract sufficient debt capital, a 
large lending consortium of over 20 banks was established anchored by 
the IFC. The size of the consortium allowed for exposures to the project by 
each lender to be limited. In addition a significant proportion of the debt-
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funding consortium was made up of multi-lateral DFIs with appetite for 
lending risk, but limited or no appetite for equity risk exposure. The bulk of 
the capital was thus sourced in the form of debt funding. The second most 
important consideration in determining the capital structure of Mozal was 
the political risk considerations associated with Mozambique. Despite 
political risk cover and credit risk cover being procured from MIGA and 
ECIC respectively, both debt and equity capital provider assigned an 
elevated level of political risk to Mozambique. Debt funding was therefore 
a more attractive proposition to the project developers than equity funding. 
The third most important factor in determining the capital structure of 
Mozal was a bid to derisk the project to make it bankable and attract the 
requisite debt capital. This was achieved by ensuring that a significant 
portion of the capital funding the project was in the form of equity. The 
significant equity contribution signalled the sponsors’ commitment to the 
project. The fourth consideration influencing the capital structure, were the 
concessions made by the Mozambican government. Firstly the exemption 
from corporate tax and the imposition of a flat 1% levy on turnover meant 
that any tax benefits to be derived from the deductibility of interest 
expense were rendered null and void. Furthermore, the terms of the 
project allowing bank accounts to be held offshore and the immediate 
repatriation of profits reduced the degree to which retained earnings 
contributed to the project’s capital structure. These banking arrangements 
were to a significant degree informed by political risk mitigation concerns 
addressed in the second consideration. The final factor influencing the 
capital structure of the project was the expertise and experience of the 
operator BHP. BHPs experience reduced the equity-funding requirement 
by communicating that the levels of uncertainty regarding the technical 
execution and engineering of the project were low and readily mitigated. 
Sasol Natural Gas Project 
The most significant contributor to the capital structure arrangements in 
the SNGP is a consideration of access to capital. Whilst Sasol was 
prepared to inject significant equity capital into the project and enable 
credit facilitation by leveraging off its strong balance sheet, for the project 
to proceed significant amounts of debt capital were essential. Being based 
in South Africa allowed Sasol to access South African debt capital 
markets, and the existing deep relationship with Standard Bank was 
immensely beneficial. The second important consideration in determining 
the capital structure related to the capacity of other equity participants to 
make equity contributions. The government owned South African iGas and 
Mozambican ENH were unwilling to inject equity capital into ROMPCO 
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and be exposed to construction risk. As a result the funding for this largest 
part of the project had to be formulated in a novel way enabling iGas and 
ENH to inject their equity contribution only after the project was 
operational. This had the effect of increasing the debt component in the 
overall project, and particularly the ROMPCO portion. The third and 
related consideration was to derisk the project sufficiently to ensure it was 
bankable. In this respect the overall leverage of the project was made 
relatively conservative with a debt to equity ratio of 53.9% : 46:1%. The 
debt to equity ratio in the ROMPCO leg of the transaction was however 
markedly different beginning at 99%:1% in 2004, and closing at 66%:34% 
in 2012. The lower leverage in 2012 is largely attributable to the 
subsequent equity injection of iGas and ENH. 
Political considerations were key in the formulation of the capital structure. 
In addition to equity risk insurance and loan guarantees being procured, 
the debt funding costs were fixed to 7.55% by deploying interest rate 
swaps. These interventions enabled a stable and coherent debt package 
that had clear path to retirement, and reduced the likelihood of 
restructuring, refinancing, or other similar interventions. The final and 
essential aspect informing the capital structure of the SNGP was the 
facilitation of Sasol as primary sponsor. The SNGP is not a pure project 
finance transaction as defined in the literature review. It contains the core 
aspects of project finance, but is buttressed by the credit enhancement 
and related facilitation effected by Sasol to enable the transaction to be 
concluded. It is therefore a hybrid transaction incorporating both project 
and corporate finance aspects. 
Chisumbanje 
The capital structure of the Chisumbanje project was primarily constrained 
by access to monetary capital funding from internal and external sources. 
Access to capital internally was limited due to the economic crisis in 
Zimbabwe, including hyperinflation up till the introduction of dollarisation 
that decimated the capital base of the banking sector. Mainstream 
international financial institutions including DFIs had limited appetite to 
fund Zimbabwean projects in general on account of both the economic 
deterioration that had occurred, uncertainty regarding the political outlook, 
and targeted sanctions against President Robert Mugabe, and individuals 
politically and commercially connected to him. The principal sponsor Billy 
Rautenbach was one of those individuals with close connections to the 
president, and on the EU and USA sanctions list, cutting off capital from 
these jurisdictions. As a result of this the state facilitated the bulk of the 
capital to Chisumbanje through a non-monetary equity contribution in the 
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form of land from ARDA. This is the second most critical factor that 
informed the capital structure of the project. Current accounting 
conventions (and concomitant capital structure calculations) have not 
been designed to recognise a non-monetary contribution as effected in the 
Chisumbanje project. The furnishing of land by the state can variously be 
described as irregular and un-procedural, lacking transparency, and 
questionable in law. As a result they fail to capture the value of the land 
made available to the project in the overall capital structure arrangements. 
Such an omission would fail to reflect a critical and the most significant 
input by value, without which the project could not have proceeded. 
The third most important factor informing the capital structure was 
regulatory facilitation, again either augmented directly by the state or by 
way of state institutions. These included the issuance of an ethanol 
production license and mandatory blending requirements by the ZERA. In 
addition, the EMA failed to issue a verdict on the EIA in effect resulting in 
environmental authorisation being granted by default. The actions by 
regulatory and state institutions, that culminated in favourable outcomes 
for Green Fuel, despite these institutions themselves conceding due 
process in terms of their own working s had not been followed, appears to 
indicate political override of the regulatory processes. The decisions 
enabling the project to proceed enabled project sponsors to inject more 
levels of equity into the project operations, and to extend the land usage 
the venture encompassed. Limitations regarding the availability of 
appropriate land were in part addressed by commissioning surrounding 
farmers to plant sugar cane on their smallholdings and supplement own 
produced feedstock. The fourth decisive factor in the capital structure also 
arose from the political decision making process. Chisumbanje was 
contested on the grounds that it was executed as a BOT as opposed to a 
partnership/joint venture. Had the partnership/joint venture route been 
pursued, the capital structure is expected to have diverged significantly 
from the BOT arrangements. Importantly, ARDA’s bestowment of land 
would be recognised more explicitly in the funding arrangements, and the 
state’s other facilitative contributions would have warranted capital 
acknowledgment. The final consideration informing the capital structure on 
Chisumbanje was the need to invest in enabling infrastructure including 
dams, irrigation equipment etc. This requirement increased the capital and 
equity contributions of the principal sponsor above and beyond the funding 
of the ethanol production plant. 
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7.1.3  Managerial agency factors in capital structure 
formulation  
Agency costs and information asymmetry are key considerations in the 
determination of capital structure in the static trade-off and pecking order 
theories, together with the project finance literature. In the collation of the 
top 5 factors influencing capital structure in each of the cases expressed in 
Table 7.2, in no case was the concern regarding managerial discretion 
listed as a consideration. This is not to suggest this factor was irrelevant to 
the project as a whole, but rather that other means may have been applied 
so that managerial/shareholder conflicts of interest were not primarily 
required to be addressed by capital structure interventions. Before 
considering potential shareholder/manager agency costs for each case, it 
is important to note that in all the cases the overall project outcomes were 
clearly defined. The PBMR had challenges regarding defining the 
technical specifications of the reactor, but the overall outcome was clear in 
constructing a miniaturised pebble bed modular reactor that would 
generate electrical power. On account of these clearly defined project 
outcomes, and singular goal in each venture, the scope for management 
discretion was inherently severely curtailed. 
In the Seacom project potential shareholder/manager agency costs were 
addressed by ensuring the executive management team was 
predominantly made up of the project sponsors themselves. This included 
the CEO of Seacom, and other employees seconded from the project 
sponsors to the project company. This arrangement occurred seamlessly 
in large part because the employees in the sponsor companies involved in 
developing the project and getting it operational retained strategic 
managerial roles in the project company. With internal and external 
reporting lines to project sponsors, the prospect of agency costs due to 
shareholder/managerial conflicts was significantly ameliorated. In part this 
was viable for Seacom because the project company employs 
approximately 110 people in total. The practice of seconding sponsor 
employees to the project company to achieve this objective ha continued. 
As a result managerial discretion regarding strategy, dividend 
declarations, investment and divestment, borrowing, procurement, 
stakeholder engagement and interaction, without sponsor participation, 
knowledge, and authorisation, is negligible.  
In the case of the Gautrain, the issue of shareholder/managerial discretion 
was addressed in three ways. As a PPP, the Bombela Consortium is 
responsible for managing its own staff and operations subject to specified 
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guidelines. These guidelines constitute the second intervention in the form 
of the GMA setting performance criteria and explicit operational outcomes. 
These operational outcomes are the basis upon which compensation to 
the Bombela Consortium is determined, including importantly the 
patronage guarantee levels. The Gauteng provincial government 
established a dedicated entity in the form of the GMA to conduct oversight 
and protect the provincial interests. Consequently the GMA monitors, 
reports on, and enforces the agreed upon operating metrics for the 
Gautrain. The GMA cannot unilaterally amend the agreed terms without 
approval from the provincial authorities. The third intervention alleviating 
shareholder/manager agency is the legal requirement that the GMA 
reports into and is responsible to the Gauteng provincial government. The 
GMA gets its budget from the provincial government, and whilst 
operationally autonomous, requires authorisation for non-operational 
decisions including for example the procurement of new carriages and 
trains as observed in 2015. The strategy of the project sponsors to 
mitigate against shareholder/manager agency costs has been to apply the 
PPP framework by not directly managing private sector contributors, but 
setting, monitoring, and enforcing operational outcomes. Management in 
the Bombela Consortium or the GMA cannot deviate from operational 
outcomes, or engage in non-operational activities including capital 
expansion or borrowing, without authorisation from the principal sponsor, 
specifically, the provincial government. 
In the case of the PBMR, it would be reasonably expected that the primary 
sponsor in the form of the South African government, would have used the 
fact that the project derived the bulk of its capital from the national budget 
as a tool to dictate terms, and limit agency costs due to managerial 
discretion. In practice this was unsuccessful because the government’s 
project goals were not explicit, changed, and were contested by Eskom 
and the PBMR management and engineering team. The exploratory 
nature of the project also meant technical and engineering considerations 
trumped financial considerations, weakening the power of the sponsors 
over the management and engineering team. Within the PBMR, the 
administrative managers, including the CEO lacked the technical and 
scientific skills required to engineer the reactor, and as a result struggled 
to hold accountable their own technical team, despite the fact that it 
reported into them. The DFIs and international partners were limited in 
their influence on the management team on the PBMR because the 
overwhelming bulk of the capital originated from the South African 
government, with the incumbent president having a keen interest in the 
project continuance. Finally, despite the PBMR company being constituted 
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as a subsidiary of Eskom, the Eskom management team had indirect sight 
over management activities, and sought to distance Eskom from the 
project early on in its life. Combined with the multiple reporting lines 
across different government departments, managerial oversight over the 
PBMR was erratic, weak, uncoordinated, and potentially under-resourced. 
The result was that the funding model and budgetary allocations were 
ineffective in guiding, monitoring, overseeing, enforcing, and directing 
managerial actions. 
The Kalkbult project restricted the extent of potential manager/shareholder 
agency costs through three key interventions. In the first intervention 
primary sponsor Scatec seconded key employees and executives to both 
the project company and the company that managed the plant through an 
operating agreement. Secondly, the management fee payable to the 
operating company was transparent and authorised by the other equity 
sponsors. Thirdly, the nature of a solar photovoltaic plant is such that it is 
not labour intensive, and significant aspects of the plant’s operations can 
be automated. Monitoring of key operational metrics on the plant is 
therefore performed via satellite by Scatec in Norway, negating the need 
for a sizeable and separate management team located in South Africa. 
Issues of managerial discretion thus played an insignificant role in the 
capital structure formulation of the project. 
The Mozal project was effectively an owner-managed project. BHP held 
47% of the equity and was the principal sponsor with the highest equity 
stake. In addition to this the project company had an incentive based 
management contract with BHP, on account of its extensive experience 
and expertise in developing aluminium smelters. The executive 
management team and other key staff members responsible for the 
management of Mozal’s day to day operations came from BHP, 
particularly in the early years of the project. It is notable that an explicit 
decision was made that no single sponsor would have a majority stake in 
the project. This resolution was largely applicable only to BHP as it was 
the only sponsor approaching a majority stake. In addition to having the 
largest equity stake, the fact that BHP managed the plant is likely to have 
resulted in concerns by minority shareholders that BHPs position in the 
project company was overly dominant. As a result, minority shareholder 
protection considerations, coupled with the allocation of the management 
contract to the principal sponsor, were balanced by ensuring that BHP did 
not take up a majority equity stake in the project company. While not 
necessarily altering the capital structure, this had the effect of finalising the 
shareholder arrangements. 
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The SNGP is also characterised as essentially being an owner- managed 
project. Sasol owned a majority stake in all aspects of the project at 
commencement, with changes in equity ownership in ROMPCO post 
construction, and operations reaching steady state. From a managerial 
perspective, it is difficult to distinguish between employees of Sasol and 
the project entities particularly in the early years of the project’s 
operations. This was necessitated by the fact that not only was Sasol the 
principal sponsor, but that amongst all sponsors Sasol alone possessed 
the technical expertise and intellectual property in the value creation 
process across different stages of the project. The substantive integration 
of the SNGP into Sasol’s overall management significantly addressed 
shareholder/owner agency costs concerns. As such, shareholder/owner 
agency costs were an insignificant consideration in the formulation of the 
capital structure. 
The Chisumbanje project reflects a similar pattern to most of the projects 
above. Sponsors remain intensely engaged in the project company 
including seconding and deploying their own executives to the project 
company, and a seamless interchange between the project sponsors and 
the project company executive management team. The capital structure in 
Chisumbanje predominantly reflects equity contributions in the form of 
land. The circumstances surrounding the project were not amenable to 
significant changes in the capital structure framework, and evidently, 
manager/shareholder are secondary and insignificant considerations in the 
project’s capital structure formulation. 
In summary, the importance of deploying capital structure as a measure to 
reduce agency costs between shareholders and management can be 
observed to have had low prominence in the 7 case studies. The most 
prominent and effective measure to reduce shareholder/manager agency 
costs was to deploy sponsor employees into the respective project 
company. These employees were involved in the development of the 
project and as a result had extensive expertise. In addition to contributing 
to the management team of the project company, their role was to also 
ensure the interests of the sponsors were protected, and their plans 
executed. This rotating arrangement between being employed by the 
sponsor and being employed by the project company is evidenced by the 
observation that key executives seconded to and employed by the project 
company, frequently returned back to their positions with the original 
sponsor employee after a duration of time had elapsed. Such methods to 
mitigate shareholder/manager agency costs were effective and 
implemented without resort to changing the project capital structure. 
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These arrangements were in part enabled by the fact that the limited 
number of project sponsors resulted in concentrated ownership levels. 
Concentrated ownership is more conducive to more effective managerial 
oversight, as opposed to diffuse ownership patterns frequently applicable 
to listed companies. Furthermore, the challenges in raising capital may 
have relegated the management of conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and managers to other secondary mechanisms beyond 
capital structure formulation.  
7.1.4  The main drivers of capital structure in the case 
studies 
Access to capital 
The analysis in the above sections and distilled in Table 7.2 is useful in 
observing the main drivers of capital structure in the selected cases, and 
discussing the reasons as to why these drivers have such prominence.  
Without exception the main factor contributing to capital structure is 
access (or lack thereof) to requisite equity and debt capital. This 
consideration is paramount in every single case due to the observations 
made in the PIFE model, regarding the shallow and narrow capital 
markets that characterise most of Sub-Saharan Africa. Practitioners 
purposefully designed the envisaged capital structure to enable them to 
attract and secure the requisite capital. This contrasts with the position of 
project developers in developed markets where access to capital can be 
assumed as a given, if the project overcomes financial, operational, and 
regulatory hurdles. Uncertainty regarding access to capital also saw the 
extensive application of alternate funding methods including IRUs on 
Seacom, massive state equity funding on the Gautrain and PBMR, and 
non-monetary state equity injections on Chisumbanje. Observing and 
acknowledging the primacy of access to capital as the most significant 
contributor to capital structure renders the assumption of perfect capital 
markets contained in Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) hypothesis to be 
wholly misplaced. Applying this assumption leads to inappropriate, 
incorrect and irrelevant conclusions as to the derivation of capital structure 
in the cases as the contextual environment in raising capital in these 
markets is largely divorced from the environment in which the Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) hypothesis was formulated. 
De-risk project for bankability 
The second most prevalent consideration in capital structure formulation is 
closely correlated to the first, and relates to de-risking projects to support 
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their bankability and financial closure. The prevalence of de-risking 
indicates that there is an elevated perception of risk in the cases 
investigated. While the key risks and mitigating interventions relating to 
each case have been identified and discussed, it appears that project and 
infrastructure projects in the three countries contained risk profiles 
warranting strategic mitigation in the capital structure to ensure the 
projects remained bankable. Applying conservative leverage in the capital 
structures of Seacom, the Gautrain, PBMR, Mozal, SNGP, and 
Chisumbanje was essential to reach financial closure and ensure project 
bankability. This conservative application of leverage increased the 
prospects of project execution, and if neglected could have jeopardised 
project implementation.  
Capacity of capital contributions by equity participants 
The third most prevalent factor influencing project capital structure was the 
capacity of different sponsors to make equity contributions. In each of the 
case studies the capacity of participating sponsors to make equity 
contributions differed markedly. Generally Mozambican, Zimbabwean, and 
local national sponsors in countries such as Kenya and Tanzania, 
including private and state players, faced severe equity constraints. 
International sponsors, together with South African based corporates and 
banks enjoyed much deeper equity resources. Accommodating these 
parties within a fair ownership arrangement within the project companies 
was a key challenge. In the Seacom case, some of the smaller equity 
participants resorted to using back leveraged structures, and insisting on 
significant equity distributions to service these. In Kalkbult, the community 
trust and women’s group raised equity funding from the DBSA using a 
complex and expensive preference share structure. For the SNGP the 
equity contribution of iGas and EMH was deferred for a number of years in 
the ROMPCO leg of the transaction. And in Chisumbanje, the state 
resorted to a non-monetary contribution in the form of land.  
Host government facilitation 
In 6 of the 7 cases, host government facilitation is the fourth most 
prevalent contributor to capital structure formulation. Seacom is the only 
project where host government facilitation was not one of the top five 
factors impacting on capital structure. Host government facilitation was 
however essential in enabling landing points and other regulatory 
approvals. For the Gautrain and PBMR host governments influenced the 
capital structure and funding model by directing to the project the 
overwhelming bulk of the equity funding required. This occurred directly 
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through the national budget, and indirectly through capital injections from 
government controlled DFIs, effectively defining the capital structure. In 
addition the patronage agreement on the Gautrain, together with the 
sterilisation of the project’s foreign exchange risk exposure ensured debt 
funding could be raised, and the project could proceed. State facilitation 
for Kalkbult was highlighted in the PPA with Eskom that was underwritten 
by a sovereign guarantee. In Mozal extensive concessions were made on 
tax, bank accounts, profit repatriation, import and export duties etc. that 
enabled the project to operate seamlessly, and raise significant portions of 
debt capital.  For Chisumbanje mandatory blending and the application of 
state owned land had a massive influence on the projects capital structure 
arrangements. These cases demonstrate that project and infrastructure 
finance initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa face considerably higher barriers 
where support and facilitation from the host government is missing. Host 
government facilitation was essential in the projects mentioned above, and 
without it, these projects would likely have failed reached to reach financial 
closure. 
Other factors 
There were a number of other important factors that influenced the capital 
structure of the cases that are not directly related to one another and 
cannot be clustered under a single banner. These included the reputation 
of project developers and their related expertise, and the locking in of EPC 
contractors by ensuring they also had equity exposure to the underlying 
projects when they were operational. Securing off-takers on the project 
outputs and political risk considerations were also top 5 considerations 
amongst the cluster of projects. Whilst these factors were raised as 
independent matters by practitioners, it is likely that they indirectly 
contributed to the access to capital and de-risking of project priorities, 
which were the top two primary factors determining capital structure. 
Summary 
The determinants of capital structure in the cases differs from what would 
be expected if applying the static trade off theory, the pecking order 
theory, and the limited academic literature on project finance. In particular, 
with the exception of Kalkbult, the remaining 6 cases reflect very 
conservative leverage. This can in part be explained by the following 
observations. Firstly, many of the cases involve pioneering projects that 
are being executed for the first time in the respective countries. To de-risk 
these projects to attract equity and debt capital, limited application of debt 
is effected. Secondly, the benefits of debt in the form of interest rate 
 278 
deductibility and the arising tax shield appears to be of lesser importance, 
and therefore prominence in the capital structure calculus. This can be 
explained by the fact that a number of these projects do not have 
profitability as a core goal (Gautrain and PBMR), a number have bespoke 
tax arrangements (Mozal and SNGP), and Seacom had very limited tax 
obligations in each country on account of 90% of assets being located in 
international waters. Furthermore, the significant state facilitation on a 
number of the projects meant that cash flows from tax would simply be a 
circular flow of funds from state to project, then back to state. All in all, the 
deductibility of interest is a factor that is over emphasised where the static 
trade off and pecking order theories are applied to capital structure in 
project and infrastructure finance in the cases detailed. Thirdly, agency 
conflicts between shareholders/managers are readily mitigated through 
other interventions, with the priorities in the capital structure arrangements 
geared towards accessing capital and de-risking the project. 
A striking observation in the cases was the very limited incidence of 
conflicts between shareholders and debt capital providers. In the case of 
Seacom robust discussions occurred between these parties when a 
working capital facility was being negotiated. Debt capital providers sought 
greater clarity in terms of the projects forecasts of future annuity income. 
These matters were resolved and the facility advanced, despite never 
being used. Ultimately all debt obligations were consolidated with one 
banking institution, namely Nedbank on mutually agreed terms. On Mozal, 
shareholders expressed reservations that the IFC took fees on non-
disbursed funds as the project was completed well below budget. In the 
Gautrain, the sponsors communicated that in the event of a refinancing of 
the debt facilities, they would expect to participate in the benefits that 
accrue (the debt sits nominally with the members of the Bombela 
Consortium). The limited conflict between shareholders and debt capital 
providers indicates that terms and conditions of debt funding were 
comprehensive and fulfilled by the respective project companies. The 
incidences above occur largely due to changes in the existing facilities, or 
new facility applications. 
7.1.5  Applicability of mainstream capital structure theories 
Despite the critique of the static trade-off theory, pecking order theory, and 
project finance literature, the cases corroborate a number of propositions 
on capital structure formulation in the academic literature. Firstly in the 
static trade-off theory, Decloure (2001) highlights how different legal, 
economic, social and business contexts affect capital structure. The 
pecking order and static trade-off theories are limited in capturing these 
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important contextual considerations, in part because their underlying 
assumptions preclude a number of meaningful background matters. As a 
result the theories do not fully explain capital structure in the selected 
cases and countries. Another factor highlighted by Gwatidzo and Ojah 
(2009) is that capital structure in Sub-Saharan Africa is strongly influenced 
by reputation. This was evident in projects that leveraged off the reputation 
of the developers and sponsors in arriving at their capital structure 
including SNGP, Gautrain, Seacom, Mozal and Chisumbanje. In addition 
the interventions in formulating the capital structures in each of the 7 
cases supported the proposition that where rudimentary capital market 
systems are the case, firm/sponsor specific factors act as private market 
remedies. The lower long term debt ratios observed in Seacom, the 
Gautrain, PBMR, SNGP, Mozal, and Chisumbanje support the observation 
by Booth et al (2001) and De Wet and Gossel (2016), that lower long term 
debt ratios may be attributable to potentially higher agency costs between 
sponsors and debt capital providers. Adding to this are the higher capital 
raising transaction costs exacerbated by the need for political risk and 
related insurance on both equity and debt tranches that disincentivise the 
utilisation of debt capital in particular (Titman and Wessels, 1998). The 
deduction by Bevan and Danbolt (2004) that leverage is correlated to 
tangibility appears to be highly applicable. The PBMR, which sought to 
develop intellectual property, deployed no long-term leverage, whilst the 
other cases with more tangible assets with the exception of Chisumbanje, 
make significant use of long term debt. Finally regarding the academic 
literature on the static trade-off theory, Kunt and Maksimovic (1994) are in 
agreement with the observation in the cases that capital structure appears 
to be more influenced by agency theory than tax based theory. In this 
regard the ability of sponsors to convince debt capital providers to 
advance facilities seems to be the primary agency deliberation. 
Support of the pecking order theory premised on information asymmetry 
by Myers and Maljuf (1984) and Myers (2001) seems to have less 
applicability in the 7 cases studied. This is because external debt 
providers arguably have more information on the project relative to listed 
companies. Debt providers are more actively involved in the capital 
structure formulation from project planning, and put in place more 
comprehensive monitoring and reporting systems. As noted in the cases 
sponsors frequently second their own staff to key positions in the project 
company, reducing information asymmetry between sponsors and 
managers. The Seacom case illustrates Allen’s (1993) observation that 
retained earnings may be preferred to preserve flexibility to deploy debt. 
This application of this observation appears to be of limited application in 
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the other case studies. However the hypothesis that leverage may be 
constrained by the non-availability of debt funding is supported and 
explains the relatively conservative debt levels in all the cases. The 
proposition that retained earnings may be a preferred funding source so 
as to maintain the existing control structure (Adedji 1998; Baskin 1989; 
Allen 1993; Fazzary et al. 1976; Jensen and Meckling 1976) is largely 
irrelevant in the context of project finance. This is because the equity 
ownership arrangements are purposefully designed to be stable and 
largely static. In the 7 cases investigated, the only changes in equity 
ownership noted were in the ROMPCO pipeline. These were built into the 
project capital structure from conception, and occurred to facilitate key 
stakeholders taking a deferred stake in the project company. Whilst 
Donaldson (1961) and Fazzary et al (1988) argue that retained earnings 
may be preferable due to transaction costs on debt and equity. This 
observation has limited applicability in project finance because transaction 
costs on all capital are typically incurred on financial closure and project 
commencement. Subsequent retained profits generated are generally not 
directly competing with other sources of capital. As highlighted in the 
literature review the transaction costs on project finance are typically very 
high. In summary, the mainstream capital structure theories seem limited 
in their explanatory and predictive capability for project and infrastructure 
finance in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
The academic literature does however support a number of the 
observations of the primary determinants of capital structure in transition 
economies. The most significant of these appears to relate to the supply of 
capital and its impact on leverage. Simplistically constrained capital 
supplies reduce leverage whilst greater access to capital has the effect of 
increasing leverage. The observations in the cases on capital structure 
appear to support the observations of Faulkender and Petersen (2006), 
Sufi (2009), Choi (2008), and Lemmon and Roberts (2010), who observe 
the effect of capital supply on differential leverage levels in firms. Similar 
effects were observed in the 7 case studies under consideration, which 
appeared to be affected by capital supply constraint considerations. 
 
7.1.6  Potential capital structure interventions  
This section on potential capital structure interventions will be delivered in 
two parts based on the top 5 considerations articulated by practitioners in 
determining capital structure. This first part will detail proposals that could 
attract more capital to project and infrastructure finance, de-risk such 
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ventures, and increase capital contributions capacity by equity participants 
in South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The second part will 
consider measures that can be taken to enhance project bankability in 
formulating capital structure. 
The first proposal relates to the limited role of private equity firms in the 
cases chosen. Private equity capital (which is differentiated from sponsor 
capital e.g. Sasol in the SNGP) was only tapped into for the Seacom 
project. Private equity capital is significantly underutilised in sourcing of 
equity capital for project finance. In the case of Seacom some of the 
private equity participants including Shanduka, Remgro and Convergence, 
were not specialist infrastructure investors, but were able to determine the 
merits of the investment case, and commit appropriate equity capital. 
Unlike traditional private equity funds, these investors did not insist on a 
predetermined exit time horizon and invested in the project as long-term 
anchor investors. South Africa has a sizeable private equity sector with 
significant funds under its custodianship. Interacting with principals in 
private equity and packaging potential projects within a palatable 
framework or mandate could potentially attract significant capital flows 
both from domestic and international sources. The prevalence of private 
equity funds with exclusive infrastructure mandates in many developed 
markets attests to the potential of this option. Obtaining a significant 
portion of the required project capital through upfront payments such as 
IRU’s has the potential to partially address access to capital challenges. 
Upfront payments would likely only be viable on projects with very 
transparent and stable revenue streams, where demand and market risk 
were negligible. These conditions are arguably fulfilled in projects such as 
Kalkbult and others in the REIPPP, toll roads, and other lower risk 
ventures. Projects under the REIPPP would be particularly suitable in this 
regard due to the PPA underwritten by a sovereign guarantee by the 
South African government.  
An explicit distinction between greenfield and brownfield project packaging 
would also be a highly effective manner to package and promote projects 
for development. The two most prominent hurdles of accessing capital and 
de-risking a venture are likely to have been significantly ameliorated in 
brownfield projects. Brownfield projects also have a track record of 
financial and operational performance, and socio-economic impact. 
Institutionalising a capital conduit for brownfield projects that fulfil a 
prescribed mandate and matching these with potential capital providers 
could enhance capital flows to projects, and the speed at which financial 
closure is reached. There are also significant brownfield opportunities in 
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power reticulation, water provision, toll roads, ports, and airports. This 
approach would facilitate an incremental approach to attracting capital as 
opposed to a big bank approach that frequently characterises mega-
projects. 
The current initiatives supporting infrastructure development including the 
AfDB, IFC, World Bank, OPIC, and Power Africa are characterised by 
several weaknesses. To start with these multi-lateral institutions have 
significant layers of bureaucracy compromising their agility relative to a 
well-managed private sector investment boutique. Secondly, these 
institutions are subject to political machinations based on the relationship 
between beneficiary countries and capital contributing countries. And 
thirdly, these institutions have a mandate to service the entire Sub-
Saharan Africa region, diffusing their focus on states that are most ready 
and proactive to take advantage of the available support. These 
weaknesses could be addressed in the following manner. Soliciting and 
commissioning four regional (Southern, Central, East, and West Africa) 
private sector boutiques/asset managers that are dedicated infrastructure 
asset managers. These boutiques would be given a clear mandate to 
originate qualifying infrastructure transactions. Sub-Saharan countries 
would need to meet set criteria to be eligible for these funds, similar to the 
conditions articulated in the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). 
Asset managers would be compensated based on pre-determined 
formulae on deals closed, and the operational performance of funded 
transactions. The weaknesses in the current arrangements would be 
potentially addressed by reducing bureaucracy through a leaner and 
incentive based private sector asset manager with a tight mandate. The 
pre-qualification of countries to the fund would enable political interference 
to be reduced. In addition the asset managers would be able to focus on 
those countries that are better prepared to close and execute transactions. 
A fund of this nature could be a useful conduit to match capital custodians 
in developed markets suffering from poor and in some cases negative 
returns on traditional debt investments, with much higher yielding 
infrastructure investments in Sub-Saharan Africa. The amount of capital 
disbursed to the asset managers and the size of the book could be 
increased incrementally based on performance. While all these measures 
are being done to some degree, the efforts are diluted, fragmented and 
lack sufficient scale. The approach above would enable focus, agility, and 
scale-ability. 
An additional proposal regarding attracting capital to project finance in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the design of financial instruments that allow retail 
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investors to participate in selected projects that are regulated. By way of 
example, retail savers and potential investors are excluded from direct 
investment in successful projects in the REIPPP program as capital 
contributions are sourced from wholesale markets. Reserving a tranche of 
each project e.g. 10% for retail investors in lower denominations would 
enable such projects to broaden their sources of capital. This would also 
encourage formal savings and investment schemes in local markets, 
contributing to the development of capital markets. The fact that the 
REIPPP is highly regulated by the DoE, is funded by domestic banking 
institutions, and has developers with international reputations, could be 
leveraged institutionally to ensure the interests of retail investors were 
protected, just as institutional investors from pension funds hold listed 
companies to account. In South Africa retail investment products for 
inflation linked government bonds have been in existence for over 10 
years, are well understood, and distributed through the Post Office 
network. Retail savings could also be used to tap local currency funding in 
countries such as Mozambique. This could reduce the reliance on dollar 
denominated capital, support the development of local capital markets, 
and reduce current account outflows arising from debt service 
repayments. If in Mozambique for instance a renewable energy project 
were able to source significant local currency funding, a possible halfway 
house would be to denominate the tariff in a blend of local and foreign 
currency.  
An important consideration in the capital structure calculus is the foreign 
exchange exposure. This is particularly acute on large projects that may 
have hard currency costs, but domestic currency revenues such as the 
Gautrain. Hedging these large foreign exchange exposures on a project-
by-project basis is extremely expensive and can be the determining factor 
in a project’s viability and prospects of reaching financial closure. 
Accordingly, there are significant benefits to be derived from the 
establishment of a wholesale foreign exchange hedging platform to 
achieve economies of scale and reduce costs. All projects on the REIPPP 
could for example have the option to purchase a rand versus dollar hedge 
on foreign exchange exposures on an annual basis. Whilst eligible 
participants could elect to opt out, aggregating the price of the hedge 
across multiple projects would make it more competitively priced than 
each project pursuing this route alone. This would also give foreign equity 
investors greater certainty as to their likely dollar denominated returns 
over a 12-month horizon. 
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In Sub-Saharan Africa, the ability to contribute non-monetary capital such 
as land to project equity as in Chisumbanje could make a significant 
positive difference in capital structure formulation. In part this is because 
the region sits with vast tranches of undeveloped land viable for 
agricultural development. In addition, the capital expenditure to develop 
agricultural land is generally less intensive such as developing a mineral 
core body, permitting much greater recognition of the land contribution. 
The interventions above have the potential to address significantly the 
three primary considerations and challenges in formulating capital 
structure articulated by practitioners as access to capital, de-risking the 
project to make it bankable, and the capital contributions capacity of equity 
participants. 
The second part of this section addresses measures that can be 
implemented to optimise capital structure. The first proposition in this 
regard is that project developers should offer capital subscription options 
that address the different risk appetites and parameters of potential 
funders. This extends beyond tradition notions of traditional equity, 
mezzanine finance, working capital facilities etc. The cases revealed that 
there is a need to stratify potential providers in a manner that include more 
institutions but also defines in more granular terms the demands of 
different capital providers. As highlighted earlier long term private equity 
capital providers appear underutilised, whilst banks may have different 
views on debt funding. In the SNGP Standard Bank sought to hold the full 
loan to maturity, election not to syndicate to other banks. Conversely on 
Seacom, Investec was happy to have amounts outstanding settled earlier 
than anticipated as the bank had earned significant fees off the transaction 
and was not focused on book building. Offering capital tranches that 
appeal to what different equity and debt capital providers are seeking may 
assist greatly in optimising capital structure. A key consideration in capital 
structure formulation was frequently state facilitation in the form of 
sterilising foreign exchange exposures and guarantees. These functions 
could arguably be more efficiently performed by multi-lateral DFIs 
including the World Bank, the IFC, and the IMF. Establishing such facilities 
that can be accessed by infrastructure practitioners in the project 
conceptualisation stage, and the receipt of a commitment regarding these 
factors equivalent to a term sheet, could contribute to much more 
favourable capital structure arrangements. In summary this section 
proposed measures to attract more capital to project and infrastructure 
finance in Sub-Saharan Africa, and concluded with interventions that could 
contribute to optimise the capital structure in these projects.  
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7.1.7  Conclusion on capital structure 
 
The chapter on capital structure determinants began by interrogating the 
assumptions of the main capital structure theories and their applicability to 
project and infrastructure finance in Southern Africa. It followed this with a 
collation and ranking of the top 5 determinants of capital structure for each 
of the 7 cases as conveyed by interviewees that participated on the 
projects. These determinants were broadly classified into access to capital 
(ability to source and raise requisite capital), de-risking project to ensure 
bankability, the capacity of capital contributions of equity participants, host 
government facilitation, and other. The chapter then discussed the 
divergence between the capital structure theories and the actual 
practitioner motivations and decisions in the capital structure formulation.  
A consideration of agency matters between sponsors and managers, and 
sponsors and debt capital providers in the formulation of capital structure 
was then discussed. This analysis was capped by proposals to attract 
more capital to project and infrastructure projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
based on the lessons from the cases in capital structure construction. 
 
The static trade-off and pecking order theories are useful in submitting a 
theoretical framework for the formulation of capital structure, and positing 
explanatory and predictive deliberations. However these theories are 
significantly limited by their underlying assumptions. A review of the 
academic literature supporting these theories revealed highly 
mathematical and deductive models with clear explanatory powers and 
robust predictive capability. Essentially these models applied theory to 
data. An important weakness of these models included that data that could 
not be readily cleaned and accurately plugged in mathematically e.g. 
political transition, different social, business, and economic environment, 
national aspirations, alternate and dynamic legal systems etc. is excluded. 
In addition data and information that is incomplete, emerging, and evolving 
is difficult to capture and thus excluded. Whilst this rationalisation of model 
inputs enables manageability and convenience, it detracts from the 
relevance and veracity of model outputs. Specifically, this thesis argues 
that is extremely difficult to have an overarching mathematically driven 
model on the determination of capital structure on project and 
infrastructure ventures in Sub-Saharan Africa. Capital structure is the 
outcome of a wide array of contextual factors including but not limited to 
social, economic, legal, political, and geopolitical factors to list a few. The 
environment in which projects take place is complex and sometimes 
chaotic. This makes it difficult to capture in existing models, as capital 
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structure formulation is not simply a mathematical and deductive process. 
In arriving at each project’s capital structure in the 7 cases, the 
practitioners applied a much broader set of tools including understanding 
the contextual environment. This allowed them to take into account project 
and country specific factors, evolving dynamics, apply judgement, facilitate 
project progression and bottlenecks in accessing capital. Practitioners 
applied a sceptical attitude to academic theory, and concluded on the 
capital structure based on a subjective, rigorous, and pragmatic 
understanding of the prevailing reality applicable to each project. 
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8 Stakeholder Agency Dynamics 
This chapter applies stakeholder agency theory to the 7 case studies in 
order to investigate how different stakeholders interact with the project 
company, and how the project company through its management chooses 
to prioritise engagement with stakeholders. The emphasis is on the 
descriptive branch of stakeholder theory, that is, how firms actually 
behave. In this regard, limited reference is made to the normative and 
instrumental branches. As discussed in the literature review, analysing 
project participant interactions through the lens of stakeholder agency 
theory allows a deeper exploration of the multiple factors that influence 
stakeholder exchanges and decisions. This enables the incorporation of 
increased complexity to more accurately discern motives, considerations, 
and resultant actions.  
Stakeholder agency theory is especially relevant to South Africa, 
Mozambique, and Zimbabwe for a number of reasons. Firstly, these 
countries have a relatively recent experience of colonialism and apartheid. 
Key features regarding how these societies are structured persist from this 
legacy of colonialism and apartheid. These countries are characterised by 
a higher degree of uncertainty and complexity, extreme inequality and 
poverty, and business organisations are expected to conduct their affairs 
in a manner in which inclusiveness is imperative. Because these countries 
are in various stages of social transition, their societies are characterised 
by heavy contestation by a variety of stakeholders. A key contributor to 
this contestation is the transformation agenda that post colonial/apartheid 
democratic governments have sought to implement, to address the 
structural remnants of their difficult history. These governments seek to 
direct economic development in societies with deep social fissures, 
develop the strategic capacity to define the vision and course of social 
development, and where necessary make difficult choices to ensure 
decisions are implemented. Legitimate vision and goals may however be 
compromised by a number of factors including poor organisational and 
state capacity, resistance from incumbent beneficiaries of the status quo, 
and corrupt actors within the state that intervene to undermine state 
processes in governments departments, regulators, and state-owned 
enterprises. This cocktail of factors has an important influence on how 
stakeholder interactions occur within these societies, and the state 
institutions that regulate project and infrastructure finance ventures. 
This chapter will begin by restating the factors that inform how to analyse 
stakeholder relationships based on stakeholder agency theory. The aim of 
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this will be to frame the nature of the relationships between the project 
company and each stakeholder, and understand how stakeholders are 
prioritised, using stakeholder agency theory as the basis. This process will 
inform the drafting of a matrix for each case study that captures in a single 
picture the overarching stakeholder environment including stakeholder 
characteristics, salience, mandate, resources available, and strategic 
alliances, level of interest, and access to other stakeholders. The matrix 
will consider 5 key stakeholder categories relative to the project company, 
namely, sponsors, managers, contractors, government and state 
institutions, and community representatives including environmental 
organisations (agency issues between debt capital providers and sponsors 
were examined in chapter 7). An examination and analysis of each 
project’s matrix will then follow, with insights and observations 
documented. The insights obtained from the cases will then be used to 
extract and compile an overarching explanation of the main factors 
influencing priority for engagement in the cases, and potential 
interventions to improve stakeholder interactions within the countries in 
which the projects were executed.  
8.1 Analysing stakeholder relationships 
In analysing stakeholder interactions applying stakeholder agency theory, 
and determining the priority of engagement amongst multiple 
stakeholders, five key factors require determination and consideration. 
These are the level of power/importance, the level of interest, the 
resources available, linkages, and access, of each respective stakeholder. 
A consideration of all these factors allows a determination to be made as 
to the priority for engagement. The level of power for a stakeholder is 
decided by the ability of a stakeholder to influence or hinder progress 
towards the project objectives. Power levels may change based upon the 
stage of the project. The level of interest is determined by an evaluation of 
how high the goal in question is in the stakeholder’s priorities. The level of 
interest can be further broken down into two features, namely urgency and 
mandate. Urgency will capture the importance of swift action by the 
stakeholder, and mandate will capture the level of legitimacy and official 
claims a stakeholder may have. Higher power and higher interest 
stakeholders are likely to be prioritised for engagement. Low power and 
low interest stakeholders are likely to have low priority for engagement. It 
can be reasonably anticipated that stakeholders with a high level of 
interest but low power relationship will be kept informed of progress. 
Stakeholders with high power and low level of interest are likely to be kept 
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satisfied with overall progress through on-going information and 
involvement in planning. 
The resources available to a stakeholder is a consideration of the levers at 
the disposal of the stakeholder to enable optimal progression of the 
project, or to compromise project progression, and effectively hold a 
venture to ransom. The resources and capabilities stakeholders have at 
their disposal will constrain their actions. Links between stakeholders 
consider what relationships a stakeholder has with other stakeholders and 
the nature of these relationships. This would include alliances in operation 
between stakeholders and conflicting interests between stakeholders. The 
ease of access each stakeholder enjoys to other stakeholders can also 
support or inhibit the engagement process. Access considerations may 
include whether the senior leaders of the stakeholder group can be 
contacted, and whether face-to-face engagement is impractical due to 
geographical constraints. Once all these dynamics have been accounted 
for a single picture of the overall stakeholder environment can be 
developed and captured in a matrix. From this can be derived a priority for 
engagement plan based on an evaluation of these 5 factors. Tables 8.1 to 
8.7 below capture and reflect a matrix for each of the 7 case studies. This 
is accompanied by discussions regarding how the ratings for each 
stakeholder were arrived at for each factor, and the priority for 
engagement attributed to the respective stakeholder, based on the facts 
and insights extracted from the applicable project 
8.2 Stakeholder analysis in the cases 
Seacom 
Table 8.1 below captures the five factors that culminate in the prioritisation 
for engagement for Seacom. The sponsors enjoyed a high level of 
importance on the project. Sponsors included the project conceptualiser 
and developer, equity capital providers, and highly regarded established 
organisations. As a collective they had the power to not only pursue or 
terminate Seacom’s commissioning, but remained integrally and actively 
engaged in operational activities after project launch. The level of interest 
of the sponsor was high both regarding urgency and mandate. From an 
urgency perspective sponsors sought to take advantage of the transient 
opportunity of no competition that Seacom sought to capitalise on. As 
conceptualisers and active promoters and developers of the project the 
legitimacy and mandate were also high. Sponsors enhanced their 
mandate by incorporating a 76.25% African ownership. The resources 
available to the sponsors were extensive. In addition to equity  
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capital, the sponsors possessed deep technical expertise on undersea 
cables, and the commercial determinants of success and failure in such 
enterprises. The sponsors also enjoyed an extensive network of contacts 
in terms of EPC contractors in undersea cables, debt capital providers in 
the form of banks in South Africa and beyond, and external access to 
decision makers including political principals and regulators. In terms of 
links between the different stakeholders, the differentiation between the 
sponsors and the executive management team in Seacom was blurred. 
The executive management team in the project team was effectively 
deployed from sponsors and referring to links between the two 
understates how conflated sponsors and management were in the project. 
Sponsors therefore had extensive direct internal access to the other 
stakeholder groups. Of all the stakeholders in the Seacom project, only the 
sponsors wielded sufficient power to solely stop the project. Accordingly 
sponsors are allocated a high priority for engagement. Importantly the high 
priority for engagement with sponsors remained after the project was 
operationalized due to their presence in the executive management team, 
and on-going active involvement.  
The management of the Seacom project possessed a high level of 
importance. In part this was on account of their direct relationship with the 
sponsors detailed above. But in addition the managers were entrusted 
with executing the project strategy, and dealing with operational issues 
that had the potential to compromise the project including accidental cable 
damage, client relationship management, and brand reputation. As the 
primary point of contact with other stakeholders, the management team on 
Seacom were essential in co-ordinating activities, and competing 
demands that the project faced. As owner managers the level of interest 
was high both regarding the urgency of the tasks being performed, and 
mandate as they had the dual roles of being owners and custodians. The 
resources available to the management team included those enjoyed by 
the sponsors above, and also information on the day to day operations of 
the company including developments in marketing and securing clients, 
tariff patterns as new entrants came into the market, trends in data usage, 
challenges in linking with end users in landlocked countries, and other key 
operational aspects that impacted significantly on the project. As a close 
ally to the sponsor, and with strong relationships with suppliers, regulators, 
political principals, management links in Seacom are strong. Internal 
access to other stakeholders was also good as management was the 
primary conduit to interact with the project company, including monitoring 
and enforcing contractual agreements, and compliance with applicable 
regulations Accordingly the priority for engagement with the management 
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team is rated as high. The level of importance of contractors is observed 
as high. This due to the fact that contractors played the essential role of 
mapping the seabed cable route, laying the cable, and installing and 
commissioning related cable landing equipment that would render the 
project operable. A failure by the contractors to fulfil their contractual 
obligations could have sabotaged or delayed the project. The urgency with 
which these contractors carried out their obligations was high. This was in 
part contributed to by the fact that the cable laying industry was in a 
recession that had persisted due to the massive investment and 
overcapacity in the late 1990’s and early 2000s. The mandate of EPC 
contractors was high as they were legitimately contracted. The resources 
available to contractors were few in the sense that they could during a 
brief window threaten to suspend or terminate the work being done on 
laying the cable. This threat was significantly deterred by the signing of a 
turnkey contract that capped the amount that would be paid for the 
services rendered, together with offering incentives for timely and early 
completion. Beyond the contracts signed the contractors appear to have 
had very limited links with the other stakeholder categories. Contractors 
enjoyed good internal access particularly to sponsors and management 
during the planning, laying and operationalization stages of the cable. 
After contractors had fulfilled their contractual obligations and the Seacom 
project was live and stable, this access diminished and the level of 
importance, interest, and access dropped significantly. Accordingly the 
priority for engagement with contractors has been rated as medium. It 
would have been high in cable construction, but suffer a steep decline 
thereafter to medium, due to the low level of involvement required from 
contractors in daily operations. 
Government and state institutions across all the countries had a medium 
level of importance. Governments were key to obtaining regulatory 
approval to establish landing points. However, once this approval was 
obtained the importance of these authorities waned significantly. Some 
governments such as the Tanzanian authorities continue to wield higher 
importance due to the fact that they have not liberalised their 
telecommunications sectors, and can therefore significantly influence the 
scope of Seacom’s operations. The level of interest for both urgency and 
mandate were medium because there was no direct financial or related 
participation in the project’s conceptualisation and roll out. Government’s 
however had the incentive and opportunity to co-operate with the project 
developers to enable their populace access to more affordable data. The 
resources of the respective governments were few and mainly in the form 
of regulatory landing permissions and other industry protocols. An implicit 
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link existed between the governments and their populations who would be 
the final consumers of data. This link was however tenuous as there were 
no recognised and powerful formal social organisations mobilising on the 
Seacom cable specifically. Governments enjoy medium access to other 
stakeholders, mainly in the form of regulatory prescriptions. On account of 
these considerations the priority for engaging with government is rated 
medium. 
Community organisations on Seacom had a low level of importance. In 
part this was due to the low environmental impact and physical presence 
of the cable. Another contributor was that communities were generally not 
formally mobilised regarding Seacom, and interactions were largely with 
state representatives. Due to their limited knowledge of the cable 
implications the level of urgency was also low, despite the fact that as final 
consumers the mandate would have been high. Resources available to 
community participants were few and largely in the form of voice and 
appeals to representative state officials. In this regard a loose link existed 
between the states and communities, but this was not evidenced to be 
used to any significant effect. Access of community organisations was 
poor, in large part due to the fact that community organisations were not 
formalised and their interactions with other stakeholders therefore diffuse. 
On account of these observations, the priority for engagement with 
communities is rated a low. 
Gautrain 
Table 8.2 below captures the five factors that culminate in the prioritisation 
for engagement for the Gautrain. The Gautrain is peculiar in having 
government institutions as sponsors, and the state also carrying out 
regulatory and facilitation initiatives. As a result these two stakeholders will 
be looked at jointly. The sponsors of the Gautrain in the form of the South 
African government and the Gauteng provincial government have a high 
level of importance. In addition to conceptualising and developing the 
Gautrain, the sponsors furnished 72% of the capital in the form of equity 
injections. Similarly the government has high importance as it effectively 
underwrites the annual patronage agreement, and provides on-going 
political support. Political support is essential as the project consumes a 
significant portion of the province’s transport budget, and the Gautrain 
cannot be sustained without this. State institutions were also essential in 
facilitating the Gautrain by sterilising its foreign exchange exposure that 
threatened to sabotage the project, and for ensuring robust 
conceptualisation through the prescribed PPP process done via the 
national treasury. The urgency and mandate of the sponsors/government  
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are high as the plan was to have the project operational by the 2010 
Soccer World Cup, and the government authorities have a mandate to 
develop mass transit infrastructure. The resources available to 
sponsors/government were many including financial, access to political 
and business principals, and organs of state. The sponsors/government 
also had an effective alliance with management through the GMA, that 
was mandated to oversee the interests of the province on the Gautrain, 
monitor the Bombela consortium, and ensure contractual obligations were 
met. Internal access to other stakeholders is good and bolstered by the 
alliance with the GMA regarding operational matters. Sponsors/ 
government have a high priority for engagement, as they were essential to 
the commissioning of the Gautrain, are essential for its continued 
operations, and together with the alliance with management are arguably 
the most influential stakeholders. 
Management on the Gautrain is housed in the GMA that has a high level 
of importance because it monitors the Bombela consortium regarding 
infrastructure and rolling stock deliverables, operational performance 
metrics and strategy, brand reputation and media coverage, customer 
relations management, documentation and contractual management to 
name a few key tasks. As a dedicated agency enforcing legal agreements, 
the GMA is the nexus through which stakeholders interact. The level of 
interest both in terms of urgency and mandate of the GMA is high as it is a 
provincial entity reporting into the provincial government. Resources 
available to the GMA are many including law (including arbitration), 
penalties as determined in the contracts, and the ability to withhold 
disbursements of amounts via the patronage agreement. In addition the 
GMA has a formidable and effective administrative infrastructure to 
execute required actions. The alliance between the GMA and 
sponsors/government enhances its legitimacy, whilst allowing it to function 
autonomously. The GMA enjoys good access to all stakeholders as the 
nexus of all matters relating to the Gautrain. The priority of engagement 
for management on the Gautrain is consequently high. 
Contractors have a high level of importance on the Gautrain. This first 
stems from the fact that contractors were essential in the planning and 
construction of a very sophisticated venture. However, even post 
construction the operating company in the Bombela consortium is very 
important because it runs and operates the Gautrain under a concession 
arrangement. In this regard contractors may be split into two categories. 
The first category relates to contractors involved solely in the construction 
of the system with no residual interest post-construction. The second 
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category is of contractors that have a significant interest in the operational 
phase. The former’s importance diminishes post construction whilst the 
latters high importance remains intact. The urgency and mandate of the 
contractors is high as the project was significant in their portfolio of 
activities and they were mandated to perform these functions after the 
Gauteng provincial government had followed due process. The resources 
available to the contractors relate to the fact that the skills required to 
assemble a system such as the Gautrain (rolling stock, signalling 
equipment, electronic systems etc.) are held by a handful of companies 
internationally. The number of competitors is thus limited. In addition, the 
management of the system over the 20-year contractual mean that the 
relationship with the sponsors is long term in nature, and there are 
significant barriers to switching operating companies or equipment 
suppliers and specifications. Therefore while the resources of the 
contractors may be limited to operating the system after construction, this 
is an essential input for the system to perform. The conflict between 
Murray and Roberts (a member of the Bombela consortium) and the GMA 
regarding water seepage in the Rosebank underground leg of the railway 
line strengthened the alliance between sponsors/government and 
management. The internal access of the contractors is good to enable 
seamless communication on matters. Contractors therefore enjoy a high 
priority engagement, as they were essential to the assembly of the project, 
and to its continued operation. 
The community had a medium level of importance on the Gautrain. Firstly, 
community participation on the proposed Gautrain was a prescribed 
requirement, and land had to be nationalised to enable servitudes and 
lines to be laid. The community also had a medium level of importance, as 
specific portions of it would be the users of the facility. The importance of 
the community does not appear to have been high because a large, 
organised and formalised community representative organisation did not 
emerge, and the sponsor/government alliance decisively advanced the 
project. Community urgency was also medium and largely restricted to 
parties inconvenienced because their land was the subject of mandatory 
expropriation, people who feared the effect of the systems proximity on the 
valuation of residential properties, and those inconvenienced by the 
disruption caused by construction. The mandate of the community on the 
Gautrain is high as it is directly impacted on both in terms of positive 
developments and negative ones. The resources available to community 
organisations were few and mainly in the form of legal interdicts and 
complaints via the media (voice). The media complaints were highly 
effective in getting the attention of the GMA. Overall internal access by 
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community groups was poor on account of their diffuse nature. The rating 
for priority engagement for the community on the Gautrain was medium. 
PBMR 
Table 8.3 below captures the five factors that culminate in the prioritisation 
for engagement for the PBMR. As with the Gautrain there is a conflation 
between the sponsors and government/state institutions so these will be 
discussed jointly. The key sponsors of the PBMR in the form of the South 
African treasury and contributors including Eskom and the IDC had a high 
level of importance. Their regular financial contributions were essential in 
commencing and continuing the project. Similarly, on account of the funds 
expended the sponsors attached a high level of interest (both positive and 
negative) to the project. The PBMR enjoyed initial support from key 
government officials, Eskom as the national electricity company, and the 
IDC. This enabled it to have a medium mandate. The mandate was not 
high as South Africa had competing priorities and the nature of the project 
was exploratory. Similarly the urgency applied by state institutions was 
medium due to a lack of buy in and conviction regarding the project. The 
sponsors/government enjoyed moderate/some resource availability in the 
form of funding, and being able to engage and co-operate with other 
organs of state with varying degrees of success. Technical resources were 
however limited to those in South Africa largely under the employ of the 
PBMR company and NECSA, with little international input. Despite 
extensive links between sponsors, state institutions and the management 
of the PBMR company, these were compromised because these 
stakeholders were frequently both allies and adversaries. This included 
matters relating to the specifications of the PBMR, funding, reporting lines, 
and responsibility and accountability. Access to internal stakeholders 
enjoyed by sponsors and state institutions was high, despite questions 
regarding how well this access was used or under utilised. In summary the 
priority for engagement of sponsor/government is high as these 
stakeholders initiated the PBMR, enabled subsequent financial and related 
support, and ultimately made the decision to terminate the project. 
The management of the PBMR was compromised in terms of their 
importance because they lacked the institutional/technical capacity to 
monitor the project effectively and implement rigorous project 
management procedures. In addition, their focus was distracted by the 
need to formalise and stabilise the departments within the PBMR 
company. Management’s ability to steer the PBMR company towards its 
core objective of commercialising a mini nuclear reactor were significantly 
curtailed. 
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Management did have some resources available in the form of significant 
but erratic financial support, and an experienced and skilled technical and 
scientific team. The ability to access external resources was however 
limited. The management of the PBMR had conflicts and allies with 
sponsors and state institutions, together with environmental organisations 
against nuclear energy, diluting the potential benefits that could be derived 
from these links. Overall internal access was good despite being 
characterised by resistance and disagreement in a number of respects. 
The factors for consideration would initially appear to indicate a medium 
priority for engagement for the management team of the PBMR. The 
researcher submits that this would be erroneous because the matrix 
captures deficiencies in management and overall project management of 
the PBMR with hindsight. If these deficiencies had been significantly 
addressed, and management rendered effective, a high priority for 
engagement is appropriate. Contractors for the PBMR were required to 
manufacture bespoke parts and components for the reactor. The 
contractors have a medium level of importance mainly because they were 
essentially outsourced service providers with very little integration into the 
project beyond set purchases. Most contractors were also interchangeable 
and wielded limited exclusivity power. Contractors therefore have a 
medium level of importance. There were a few exceptions including the 
American contractor tasked with manufacturing the pebbles. Overall, 
contractors were limited in terms of the overall project and of medium 
importance. As a result of the arms-length arrangements with contractors 
addressed above the urgency and mandate of the contractors was also 
medium. Contractors were largely restricted to their own internal technical 
resources, with the PBMR company communicating the required 
specifications, and therefore categorised as having some resources 
available. Contractors had negligible links to other stakeholders in the 
project, and their access to the PBMR company was good. The priority for 
engagement for contractors is medium as they were not integral to the 
project development, were largely interchangeable, and commissioned by 
way of arms length, short term, supply contracts. 
The community level of power was low in part because community 
organisation was limited in scale and its ability to mobilise significant 
numbers of participants. Because the PBMR was still in development 
stage the urgency was also medium. The mandate of community and 
environmental organisations was also medium on account of limited 
participant mobilisation. Resources available to community organisations 
were limited and largely limited to educational initiatives to mobilise 
participants and reporting in the media. The community organisations, 
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being anti-nuclear, were in conflict with sponsors, state institutions, and 
the management of the PBMR company. Their internal access to other 
stakeholders was poor, and largely restricted to formal regulatory 
consultative sessions. On account of these observations, the priority for 
engagement with community organisations in the PBMR was low. 
Kalkbult 
Table 8.4 below captures the five factors that culminate in the prioritisation 
for engagement for Kalkbult. The sponsors to Kalkbult possessed a high 
level of importance. In addition to providing 25% of the project capital 
requirements sponsors possessed international solar project development 
technical skills and experience, a deep understanding of the South African 
economy and related capital markets, and legitimacy in the community in 
which the project was located. The urgency of sponsors was high in order 
to firstly participate and win in terms of the process prescribed in the 
REIPPP, and having been selected as a winning bidder, executing the 
project and commencing operations within the set terms. The mandate of 
the sponsor consortium was high based on the fact that it was a 
successful bidder in credible and transparent bidding process, its 
demonstrated technical capability, and its representative nature including 
community and a women’s group. The resources available to the 
consortium were many. These included the technical capability of Scatec, 
the extensive use of technical, financial, and legal advisers, strong 
balance sheets, and established networks in South African capital markets 
and with EPC contractors. The sponsors in Kalkbult established strong 
alliances with management and community groups (including having 
selected community groups as equity shareholders). Access to internal 
stakeholders by sponsors was good and entrenched by the close 
association between the sponsors and management team. On this 
account the priority for engagement with sponsors was high.  
The management team had a high level on power in part because of the 
close association with the sponsor by way of the operating company being 
staffed by Scatec seconded executives. In addition, post construction the 
plant was not labour intensive allowing management to monitor most key 
performance indicators remotely via satellite and effect most remedial 
actions electronically through the same medium. The urgency of 
management was high based on the prescribed timelines in REIPPP and 
the intent of sponsors to execute the project within budget, on time and 
fulfil operating specifications. 
 
301 
Table 8.4:  Kalkbult Prioritisation of Stakeholders 
Stakeholder
Level of pow
er or 
im
portance
Level of interest
Resources Available
Links
Access
Priority for Engagem
ent
Urgency
M
andate
Sponsors (S) 
High 
High 
High 
M
any 
Ally w
ith M
 and G 
Good 
High 
M
anagem
ent (M
)
High
High
High
M
any
Ally w
ith S and G
Good
High
Contractors (C)
M
edium
High
High
Som
e
-
M
edium
M
edium
Governm
ent/State 
Institutions (G)
High
High
High
M
any
-
Good
High
Com
m
unity (CO
)
M
edium
M
edium
M
edium
Som
e
Ally w
ith S 
M
edium
M
edium
Key 
High priority factor 
M
edium
 priority factor 
Low
 priority factor 
 302 
The mandate of management was also high due to the formal awarding of 
the successful bid to the project by the DOE. While the focus of resources 
for management related to the commissioning of EPC contractors in the 
project implementation, and managing operational performance post 
connection to the Eskom grid, the management team had access to most 
resources available to the sponsors including technical advisers and 
capital. As such many resources were available to the management team. 
A strong alliance was established between the management team, 
sponsors and community organisations (in particular the equity 
shareholders in the sponsoring consortium). Management also enjoyed 
good access to all internal stakeholders as the focal point of most 
interactions. The overall prioritisation of management was therefore high.  
Contractors to Kalkbult had a high level of importance particularly in the 
construction and assembly faces. Post connection to the Eskom grid and 
operations reaching steady state, this importance declined significantly as 
management was able to operate the plant independently. The inter-
changeability of EPC contractors and equipment suppliers rendered them 
of medium importance. Contractors had a high degree of urgency and 
mandate on account of the incentives and penalties incorporated into the 
contractual arrangements, and because of the strict deadlines prescribed 
in the REIPPP bid award conditions. Contractors had some resources in 
the form of their technical, construction and engineering capacity to 
execute the venture. Beyond these capabilities, resources to influence 
other stakeholders were limited. No significant alliances were observed 
between contractors and other internal stakeholders, and while contractors 
enjoyed good access to management, access to other stakeholders was 
limited, and overall medium. 
The government’s power in Kalbult was high due to the fact that through 
the DOE it ran the REIPPP, regulatory agencies vetted and approved the 
EIA and EMP, Eskom, as a state owned company issued the PPA, and 
the state guaranteed the PPA. The level of urgency in the government was 
high due to the severe electricity shortage in the country, and the need to 
demonstrate credibility with respect to the implementation of key policies. 
As a democratically elected government trying to achieve a desired 
outcome security of supply in electricity, the government mandate was 
high. Government had many resources available. It commissioned 
independent technical, financial, accounting, and legal advisers in the 
design and execution of the REIPPP. It also mobilised organs of state 
including Eskom, the IDC and the DBSA to effect actions necessary for 
the REIPPP to proceed successfully. Its links to other stakeholders in the 
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form of alliances are absent as the state played the role of enabler and 
referee. Access to internal stakeholders within Kalkbult by the state was 
good and overall the government enjoyed a high priority for engagement. 
Community organisations had a medium level of importance. Whilst the 
REIPPP conditions made community participation mandatory, the project 
developer could choose which community group they partnered with. The 
urgency for the community was high due to the potential for socio-
economic development particularly employment opportunities. The 
community mandate was also high as it demonstrated the project was 
inclusive and fulfilled regulatory requirements in Kalkbult’s case by having 
20% of the equity in a community trust and women’s group. The 
community had some resources available to it in the form of financial and 
advisory support from the DBSA and IDC, and the fact that the DOE 
reviewed the terms of community groups partaking in the equity of 
Kalkbult. The community equity shareholders established a strategic 
alliance with the other sponsors and had medium internal access to other 
stakeholders. A medium priority for engagement could be attributed to 
community organisations. 
Mozal 
Table 8.5 below captures the five factors that culminate in the prioritisation 
for engagement for Mozal. The sponsoring consortium enjoyed high 
importance in Mozal. In addition to providing the equity capital, consortium 
members had vast technical and operational skills essential to the project, 
were vital providers of feedstock and off-takers to the final product, and 
essential to the entire value creation process entailed in the aluminium 
smelter. The urgency of the sponsoring consortium was also high on 
account of the fact that significant resources had been directed by 
sponsors to develop the concept, raise funding, negotiate terms, and bring 
the project to fruition. The on-going support obtained from the 
Mozambican government including favourable tax terms gave sponsors a 
high mandate. Resources available to the sponsors were many and 
included an international network of commodity suppliers and aluminium 
buyers, technical and operational capacity, relationships with political 
principals in Mozambique and South Africa, significant balance sheets, 
and extensive organisational infrastructure and capacity that could be 
directed towards the Mozal project. The sponsors enjoyed an alliance with 
the management team by virtue of BHP being the largest sponsor and 
also operating the plant, and had an ally in the Mozambican authorities 
that sought to use Mozal as a flagship to attract international investment.  
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The internal access of the sponsors with other stakeholders was good in 
part due to the close proximity with management. Due to these factors the 
priority for sponsor engagement was high. 
Management also enjoyed a high level of importance, as it was 
responsible for operating the plant based on the management agreement 
awarded to BHP. Based on earlier projects executed at Bayside and 
Hillside in South Africa, the management team brought extensive 
experience and technical capability. The management contract 
incentivised efficiency by linking compensation to the profitability and 
efficiency of the smelter. The urgency and mandate of the management 
team were high due to two key features. Firstly BHP as sponsor and 
manager of the plant benefited more than any other party from completing 
the plant within budget, and the smelter operating as efficiently and 
profitably as possible. Secondly, BHP’s 47% stake as sponsor re-enforced 
this alignment of interests in the management contract. The resources 
available to the management team included all the human resources and 
technical capacity within the plant. It however also extended to resources 
and skills residing in other sponsors which management had access to. 
The management team was strongly allied to the sponsors and the 
government and state institutions giving it good internal access to all 
stakeholders.  As a result the priority for engagement with the 
management team was high. 
The main contractors in the form of Pechiney, Murray and Roberts and 
S&C Love, had a high level of importance particularly in the construction 
and assembly faces. Post operations reaching steady state, this 
importance declined significantly as management was able to operate the 
plant independently. The urgency of the contractors was high as the 
sponsors particularly BHP represented significant and recurring clients. 
The mandate for contractors was also high due to the same parties being 
contracted on earlier projects with BHP. The contractors had some 
resources available to them mainly within the parameters of their 
construction, technical and engineering expertise, and their ability to 
deploy these internationally. The equipment provided by Pechiney was 
state of the art, and once fitted would be difficult to change to other 
equipment providers. In addition the turnkey arrangements and time 
completion incentives on the construction of the plant, and fitment of the 
smelter supported expeditious execution. Beyond these other resources 
were limited. The contractors do not appear to have had links and 
alliances with the other stakeholders except via the contractual 
arrangements with the project company. The access of the contractors to 
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internal stakeholders particularly sponsors and the management team was 
good. Because of the importance of timely completion within budget, and 
ensuring the plant performed in accordance with specifications set, the 
priority for engagement with contractors was high. 
The government and related state institutions had a high level of 
importance in the establishment of Mozal. Firstly, the government was 
responsible for issuing a number of regulatory prescriptions that enabled 
to project including exemption from corporate tax, permits and operating 
licenses, a fast track import and export regime for incoming feedstock and 
out going aluminium ingots, offshore banking authorisation, access to 
ports, and other interventions that removed potential blockages on the 
project. The urgency of the government was high as it sought to 
accelerate economic development in Mozambique, and use the Mozal 
project as a flagship to attract foreign investment. Similarly the mandate of 
the government as a democratically elected representative of the 
Mozambican people was high. The government had some resources 
available to it largely in the form of granting regulatory concessions, 
internal political support, and external political contacts with the South 
African government. It had very limited financial, technical, and other 
resources that could assist the project. The Mozambican government was 
closely allied with both sponsors and managers of the project, and had 
good access to all the internal stakeholders.  
Community organisations had a low level of importance on Mozal. In part 
this was due to the fact that the project was localised to within a particular 
area that was sparsely populated at the time the project was 
commissioned. In addition the community groups appear to have had 
limited organisational capacity. The urgency with which community groups 
responded to Mozal was low, in part because the project was new and 
novel, and the outcome of the project and expectations were not clearly 
established. In addition the mandate of community organisations was also 
low as the project was seen as a national initiative as opposed to a local or 
community initiative. The consequence of this was that the mandate and 
legitimacy of Mozal resided more with the national government as 
opposed to community organisations. Community protagonists had limited 
resources available in part because of the constrained financial situation. 
The most powerful resource was arguably voicing community interests 
through the public participation process and related EIA compelled by 
funding from the IFC, and accessible media channels. There was an 
absence of alliances between community organisations and other 
stakeholders, whilst access to other stakeholders beyond regulated and 
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prescribed channels is low. Based on these factors priority for 
engagement with community organisations was low.  
SNGP 
Table 8.6 below captures the five factors that culminate in the prioritisation 
for engagement for SNGP. Sasol was the dominant and most important 
sponsor in the SNGP. References to sponsors in this case can largely be 
attributed to Sasol itself, with a residual element attributable to other 
sponsors who played a much smaller role. A significant aspect supporting 
Sasol’s high power status stemmed from the fact that it participated in the 
entire value chain from gas exploration, extraction and processing, to 
transportation through ROMPCO, and receiving the feedstock at its plant 
in Secunda. No other stakeholder (including other sponsors) participated 
in the value chain to this degree. This dominance of the project by Sasol in 
part stemmed from the fact that it had conceptualised and actively 
developed the project and decided what the scope and objectives would 
be. It can be argued that other sponsors were brought in to facilitate and 
de-risk the venture, but added limited value in terms of the main 
motivations driving the venture. Sponsors had high urgency for two main 
reasons. For Sasol the SNGP was a significant capital investment 
integrated into its core operations in Secunda, and therefore essential to 
its overall operations. For other sponsors this was an important 
opportunity to attract further investment into Mozambique’s transitioning 
political environment and economy. Furthermore, the project opened up 
new commercial opportunities for sponsors such as iGas and ENH and 
CMG. The legitimacy and mandate of the sponsors was high English on 
account of direct and indirect South African and Mozambican government 
ownership in all parts of the project. In addition the South African 
government had significant indirect holdings in publicly listed Sasol by way 
of the state pension fund and the IDC. The resources of the sponsors 
were extensive. In addition to the operational, technical, scientific, financial 
and human resources within Sasol, the incorporation of ownership stakes 
by government institutions in South Africa and Mozambique gave the 
sponsoring consortium access to a network of political principals, 
regulators, and decisions makers who pro-actively tool action that 
facilitated the project execution. Sponsors possessed strong alliances with 
management, as a significant proportion of this team was Sasol 
employees delegated to the project, and government institutions due to 
their direct and indirect interests in the project.  
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Access to other internal stakeholders was good on account of the 
sponsors powerful position as an enabler with close alliances to 
management and government institutions, a highly legitimate mandate, 
and with extensive resources. The priority for engagement for sponsors 
was therefore high. Management enjoyed a high level of importance 
across the project parts largely due to the fact that its technical skills in 
formulating and executing the project were critical to project success. In 
addition, the executive management team was sourced from Sasol and 
therefore enjoyed strong support from the primary sponsor. The urgency 
of the management team was high as the SNGP was a significant capital 
investment in the Sasol portfolio, and would affect the core operations at 
the Secunda plant. Furthermore, due to Sasol’s position as the primary 
sponsor, the legitimacy and mandate of the management team was high 
to execute as planned and approved. The resources available to the 
management team included all the resources available to the sponsors 
including the operational, technical, scientific, financial and human 
resources within Sasol, and the co-operation of state institution in the 
overall project implementation. The management team possessed strong 
alliances with sponsors and government, and had good internal access to 
all stakeholders as a focal point of interactions amongst participants. The 
priority for engagement with the management team was therefore high. 
Contractors played a highly important role because all three legs of the 
project required effective engineering, procurement, and construction to 
ensure project success. In addition the manufacture of the pipeline added 
to the importance of contractors. To dilute the importance of an individual 
contractor, Sasol constructed the two consortiums dealing with EPC and 
pipeline manufacture respectively. Each consortium had multiple 
contractors that could mitigate disruptions caused by any other contractor 
failing to fulfil its obligations. The contractors were also sourced from a 
spread of national jurisdictions further reducing concentration in contractor 
exposure. In addition to incentivising contractors and managing costs by 
signing turnkey contracts, the contractors were protected from exposure to 
non-technical risks such as obtaining servitudes on the pipeline route and 
other regulatory approvals. The urgency for the contractor consortiums 
was high as the value of the project was significant by international 
standards and Sasol was an important global client. In addition contractors 
enjoyed a high mandate based on the legal agreements signed and the 
overall legitimacy of the project garnered by the sponsors. Resources 
available to contractors are categorised as moderate/some as they had 
extensive technical resources, strong financial and balance sheet support, 
and legal recourse in the form of the contractual arrangements. Beyond 
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these the resources of the contractors were limited. In addition the turnkey 
and incentive based contracts encouraged speedy resolution of any 
difficulties or disagreements. The contractor consortiums lacked any allies 
of note amongst the other stakeholders. Of necessity they enjoyed good 
access to the sponsors and management team, but limited direct access 
to state institutions and community as these interactions were co-
ordinated by management. This resulted in medium access. The priority 
for engagement for contractors was high due to their essential role in the 
EPC on all stages of the project. Post completion and successful 
operationalization, the level of importance would have declined 
significantly. 
State institutions form both the Mozambican and South African 
governments possessed high levels of importance as enablers of the 
SNGP. From the granting of exploration rights, to the issuance of an 
extracting license, regulatory approvals for the pipeline including the gas 
transportation agreement, and finalising a gas sales and tariff formula to 
name a few. The level of urgency and mandate in state institutions was 
high due to policies that encouraged regional economic integration, and 
the support of influential political principals in the executive branches of 
both democratically elected governments. The resources available 
included organs of state in both the executive and legislative branches, 
and the networks (internal and external), influence, and decision-making 
powers associated with these organs. State institutions had alliances with 
both sponsors and management, and good access to all internal 
stakeholders due to their facilitation role. Due to state institutions holding 
key levers that facilitated this project, their priority for engagement was 
high. 
Community organisations possessed medium importance in the SNGP. In 
part this was due to the fact that the project’s footprint and potential for 
disrupting community activities was significantly mitigated by laying the 
pipeline underground. The urgency and mandate of community 
organisations was also medium due to very few immediate corrosive or 
negative implications of the SNGP, and the dispersed nature of affected 
communities reduced to ability to secure a high mandate. Resources 
available to community organisations were few, with significant reliance on 
project management, sponsors and state institutions for information. The 
impoverished situation of many of these rural communities ensured they 
lacked financial resources, and the lack of coherent organisation a loud 
and influential voice. There were notable alliances between community 
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organisations and other stakeholders, and the access of community 
organisations to other internal stakeholders was low. The priority for  
Chisumbanje 
Table 8.7 below captures the five factors that culminate in the prioritisation 
for engagement for Chisumbanje. The substantive sponsors of 
Chisumbanje were Green Fuel and the government of Zimbabwe through 
the land provision enabled by state owned entity ARDA. The level of 
power of the sponsors was high as project developers not only 
conceptualised, developed, raised capital, and secured political support for 
the venture, but also exerted indirect influence across key regulatory 
institutions that were essential to the establishment and continuation of 
Chisumbanje. The urgency for sponsors was high once a decision had 
been made to proceed, as significant resources were committed. The 
mandate of GreenFuel was low as it was simply a private investor with the 
individuals owning Green Fuel having a questionable ethical and moral 
business past. The incumbent Zanu PF government of Zimbabwe was 
also facing challenges regarding its political legitimacy, culminating in 
elections in 2008 that resulted in a government of national unity, and the 
mothballing of the project. Resources available to the sponsor included 
technical skills to develop and operate an ethanol plant, capital to procure 
related equipment from Brazil, access to significant tracts of government 
held land, and an integral alliance with politicians in the governing party.  
The combination of Green Fuel and the Zimbabwean government meant 
sponsors had many resources at their disposal. Sponsors possessed 
strong alliances with management and state institutions. This resulted in 
good access to all internal stakeholders and a high priority for 
engagement. The sponsors on Chisumbanje therefore had a high priority 
for engagement. Management and one of the sponsors Green Fuel are 
conflated in Chisumbanje. The executive management team and key 
positions in the operations of the plant are both sponsors and managers to 
the project. As a result, management possesses high levels of importance. 
The urgency for management was high due to the fact that the 
management team was constituted to develop and manage the 
Chisumbanje project alone. The mandate of the management team was 
compromised by the challenges of legitimacy attached to sponsors and 
therefore low. While management possessed some resources including 
the day to day management of the ethanol plant, a significant portion of 
the resources available were dependent upon the facilitator availing these, 
in particular the land upon which the sugar cane was grown.  
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The management team had strong alliances with both the sponsors and state 
institutions, and good access to all internal stakeholders by virtue of running 
the project operations. Overall the management possessed a high priority for 
engagement. Brazilian sourced contractors played a limited role in 
Chisumbanje, mainly in the form of installing second hand equipment from 
Brazil in the setting up of the ethanol plant. Post installation, the use of these 
contractors was minimal. Their level of power was therefore low. The urgency 
for the contractors was medium on account of the assignment being a short-
term equipment purchase and installation task, with a conservative monetary 
value attached to it. As an independent third party commissioned by 
management and with limited interaction with all internal stakeholders the 
mandate of contractors was medium. Resources available to the contractors 
were few and focused on the contractual terms to execute the tasks 
requested, and their technical capacity to undertake these. In addition, there 
were multiple contractors internationally that had the same technical capacity. 
No significant alliances were noted between the contractors and other 
stakeholders, and the access of the contractors was low as they primarily 
dealt with management in their interactions, and exited after completing the 
assignment. As a result of the ability to readily replace contractors, and their 
short and limited engagement in the project construction, a low priority for 
engagement is accorded. Government and state institutions possessed a high 
level of importance in Chisumbanje. This was justified by their contribution of 
ARDA land that was essential to the project, and the role-played by key 
regulatory agencies including ZERA and EMA in enabling the venture. The 
level of urgency by state institutions was dependent upon the political 
incumbents. It was high at the commissioning of the project when Zanu PF 
was in power, medium during the government of national unity that included 
the MDC, and high again in 2013 when Zanu PF reverted to being the 
majority government. The mandate of state institutions was low evidenced by 
challenges by communities regarding relocation, parliamentary challenges 
during the government of national unity to the entire project, and widespread 
public resistance to mandatory blending of ethanol. Government has applied a 
wide range of resources to Chisumbanje including the leasing of land to the 
project company, prescribing mandatory blending, issuing an ethanol 
producing license, effectively exempting the plant from compliance with 
environmental processes, and deploying law enforcement agencies including 
the army and police to quell community uprising s against the project. 
Government institutions also have strong alliances with the management and 
sponsors of Chisumbanje, and enjoy good access to all internal stakeholders. 
Government and state institutions thus have a high priority for engagement. 
Community organisations including environmental advocates have a low level 
of importance in Chisumbanje. This is partially due to the fact that the 
communities directly affected by changes in land usage and location are rural, 
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with limited education and resources to resist the sponsors assisted by state 
institutions. The urgency and mandate for community organisations is high as 
the project has a direct and immediate impact on livelihoods including places 
of residence, sources of employments and income, and the hospitability of the 
surrounding environment, for people frequently with extended and strong 
ancestral and commercial links to the area. The resources available to 
community organisations are few. In part this is due to the impoverished 
circumstances of these rural groups. In addition because these communities 
are sparsely populated, their ability to mobilise and build organisational 
capacity to protect their interests is compromised. The power of voice through 
appropriate channels is not effectively used due to this lack of capacity, and 
resistance is expressed by way of sporadic disturbances against the project 
company. There were no significant alliances noted between community 
groups and other internal stakeholders and the access of the community to 
other stakeholders is low. Consequently, community organisations are rated 
low for priority engagement on Chisumbanje. 
8.2.2  Priority for engagement in the cases 
The 7 cases analysed above reveal a number of insights regarding the 
prioritisation of stakeholders, and the reasons for this. Sponsors and 
management consistently score a high engagement priority. This can be 
attributed to shareholders and managers being highly invested in the projects 
and having committed significant upfront costs including development costs 
and equity. As a result the shareholder and managers exercise significant 
influence over each ventures development and make important decisions that 
inform the project. Sponsors and managers are also in the practice of forming 
strong alliances as in the case of Seacom, Gautrain, Kalkbult, SNGP, Mozal 
and Chisumbanje, and often the distinction between sponsors and 
management is blurred and the two stakeholders are inseparable. Frequently 
sponsors and management enter into strategic alliances with government 
institutions making their importance even greater. Sponsors and managers 
possess extensive resources available to them entrenching their power and 
internal access to other internal stakeholders. 
Contractors possessed medium to high priority for engagement mainly 
depending on the nature of the contract. Where the contractor had a high 
level of interest due to the size of the contract as in Seacom, Gautrain, 
Kalkbult, Mozal, and SNGP, the priority for engagement is high. Where the 
level of interest is medium or low due to the financial insignificance of the 
contract as in the PBMR and Chisumbanje, the priority for engagement is low. 
Importantly the importance of the contractors changed depending on the 
stage of the contract. Contractors were highly important in the project 
development and construction phases. If the contractor had no subsequent 
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operational involvement, the importance of the contractor declined 
considerably as in Seacom, Kalkbult, Mozal, SNGP, and Chisumbanje. In the 
Gautrain project the Bombela consortium remained highly important even 
after construction, as they were the project operator. Contractors generally 
possessed some resources particularly regarding technical execution of the 
construction phases of the contract, and in the Gautrain the actual operations 
of a rapid railway system. Contractors had very few alliances and links with 
other internal stakeholders and their interactions were to a large part 
regulated largely by contractual arrangements. They had good access to 
management and sponsors to facilitate construction, after which access levels 
generally declined.  
Government and related state institutions enjoyed a high priority for 
engagement in all the cases except for Seacom where this was medium. 
Seacom was exceptional because the project spanned multiple jurisdictions 
weakening the importance of individual governments. The high priority for 
engagement of state institutions can be attributed to two main reasons. Firstly 
frequently governments are sponsors to the projects and have equity 
participation in them. This was evident in the Gautrain, PBMR, Chisumbanje, 
SNGP, and Mozal. Furthermore state institutions made essential contributions 
in facilitating the projects including foreign exchange risk sterilisation and the 
patronage agreement in the Gautrain, land lease in Chisumbanje, cable-
landing rights in the case of Seacom, and allocations from the national budget 
and DFIs for the PBMR. Secondly, state institutions played an essential 
regulatory role including the PPP division of national treasury in vetting and 
approving the Gautrain that played a significant role in shaping the project. In 
addition the custodianship over the REIPPP by the DOE including evaluation 
and selection of successful bidders was highly important for Kalkbult. The 
liberalisation of the telecommunications sectors impacted on Seacom 
penetration of targeted markets, while approval for ROMPCO servitudes, the 
Gas Agreement between South Africa and Mozambique, and limited land 
displacements enabled the SNGP. The investment protection agreement 
between Mozambique and South Africa supported both the Mozal and the 
SNGP diminishing substantially expropriation risk, and Mozal enjoyed tax 
concessions specifically designed to accommodate the project. In Zimbabwe 
state institutions issued Chisumbanje with an operating license, by default 
exempted them from environmental impact checks, and prescribed mandatory 
blending. These decisions by government institutions were essential to the 
project’s commencement and continuation. Governments of the respective 
countries had high interest in all the projects because of their potential to have 
a significant impact on their national economies and social development. 
State institutions were generally characterised as having some to many 
resources available to them and were frequently allies with sponsors and 
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management as detailed earlier, and enjoyed good access to internal 
stakeholders. 
Community organisations including environmental groups were characterised 
by a low priority for engagement. Primarily this could be attributed to the low 
to medium level of importance of community organisations. The low level of 
importance can in part be attributed to community organisations not being 
involved in the early stages of the project, leaving them at a significant 
disadvantage in terms of information and being able to shape and influence 
the project. Community organisations also displayed low to medium levels of 
active interest. In part this is because projects such as Seacom, Gautrain, 
PBMR, Mozal, and SNGP were new in the countries in which they were being 
implemented, and the implications of these ventures had never been directly 
observed. Community organisations also had few to some resources. For 
projects such as SNGP, Mozal, and Chisumbanje limited resources could 
largely be attributed to poor rural, agricultural subsistence communities, who 
lacked the capacity to mobilise as a collective and build organisational 
capacity to look after their interest. Community organisations also displayed 
weak to non-existent links with other stakeholders and had low access to 
other internal stakeholders, exacerbating their isolation.  
An interesting observation from the cases regarding community organisations 
related to how sponsors in the 7 cases appear to display a preference for 
alliances with state institutions as opposed to the communities in which the 
projects are located. This preference by sponsors can be explained by the 
attraction of alliances with state institutions because of their legally enshrined 
decision making powers, and extensive domestic and regional networks that 
allow them to project influence and power. State institutions also have 
extensive resources including regulatory powers, access to political principals, 
financing (even if limited), and land, and law enforcement powers including 
the police and military forces. The state also gave the Gautrain, PBMR, 
SNGP, and Mozal, high levels of legitimacy. In contract community 
organisations offer little to sponsor groups and were often characterised as 
impoverished, unaware of the project implications, and poorly organised. This 
observation raises two particularly pressing questions. The first is whether 
large project and infrastructure projects should only be entered into with state 
representatives as opposed to community organisations, as the latter 
frequently lack the capacity to negotiate such arrangements? Secondly, 
where such arrangements are only entered into with state institutions, what 
measures are required to prevent state institutions that should be 
representing the interests of communities, colluding with project sponsors and 
undermining these very community interests? The only project where 
community groups owned an equity stake was Kalkbult. And the reason for 
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community equity participation in this case was the prescriptions in the 
REIPPP. 
Monitoring and evaluation 
The monitoring and evaluation function in the 7 cases reflects key 
divergences from the mainstream academic literature on large listed 
companies. The most significant difference is the limited substantive 
differentiation between sponsors and management in all the projects with the 
exception of the PBMR. In 6 of the projects the executive management team 
was essentially constituted of employees seconded from the sponsor 
organisations, who had been extensively involved in the project from 
conception, to construction and operationalization. In deploying them to the 
project company in the operational stages, sponsors not only sought 
continuity, but also ensured they had direct control over executive 
management, and were not implementing monitoring and evaluation through 
indirect personnel and instruments. To a significant degree this conflation of 
sponsors and management reduced agency cost risks, and was a more 
effective and efficient monitoring mechanism. As opposed to listed company 
arrangements where shareholder and management goal congruence is an 
important challenge requiring the implementation of extensive interest 
alignment mechanisms and monitoring, management and sponsors in 6 of the 
cases were in a closely knit alliance, and frequently holding both roles. This 
reduced significantly monitoring and evaluations costs incurred, and facilitated 
a greater alignment of strategy and execution between sponsors and 
managers. This arrangement was enabled by the fact that the project 
sponsors had significant technical and operational skills required in each 
project’s operational management within their own organisations. It was also 
necessitated by the fact that sponsors had committed significant resources to 
the projects and would have been unwilling to risk a traditional arms length 
shareholder/ manager arrangement typified in listed companies. 
In the case of the Gautrain, whilst a semi-autonomous management institution 
in the form of the GMA was established, this was appropriate due to the 
complexity of the project, including the extensive number of contractors, and 
the fact that the Bombela consortium required extensive on-going monitoring 
over the concession period, as it managed the operating company. The GMA 
was in a strong and close alliance with the provincial government, exemplified 
by the fact that it was registered as a provincial entity whose mandate was to 
look after the interests of the provincial government, and that it was ultimately 
accountable to the latter. The significant monitoring and evaluation costs 
incurred in maintaining the GMA are justified by the significant monetary 
investment in the project by the sponsors, the importance of qualitative 
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metrics such as train punctuality and reliability, and the significant public 
interest in the project’s performance and success. 
The PBMR was also established as a semi-autonomous entity but suffered 
substantial deficiencies in the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. This 
can be attributed to multiple reasons including that the implementation of 
monitoring and evaluation systems began to be implemented well into the 
project’s life in 2004, whereas the project had commenced in the later 1990s. 
Management also had great difficulty in effectively monitoring and evaluation 
progress on the project due to its technical and scientific nature, whereas 
executive management was largely possessed of commercial skills. In 
contrast to all the other cases, the sponsors in the PBMR were very limited in 
their direct involvement in the project. In part this was due to the multiple 
reporting lines between Eskom and various government departments, and 
also because key officials in Eskom and government departments, actively 
sought to distance themselves from the project. As observed in the individual 
cases, in all the projects extensive use was made of performance based 
contracts and turnkey contracts and related bonding mechanisms. These 
were rigorously monitored and managed by the project companies, and in the 
case of the Gautrain, within the GMA.  
Crafting responses 
The manner in which sponsors and management crafted and shaped the 
project arrangements to address the different stakeholder interests is largely 
captured in each case under the financial structure, key risks, and institutional 
and legal arrangements sections. It is instructive however to note the 
responses of project principals to challenges that arose in the projects. The 
Seacom project encountered formidable challenges in securing landing points 
in the chosen countries. Practitioners addressed this resistance by 
highlighting the benefits that would accrue to the respective countries, and 
also actively ensuring political principals shared in the credit on the positive 
and social effects of the venture. On-going engagement with policy makers 
and purposeful, deliberate and well-orchestrated advocacy were key aspects 
of managerial responses. Where these engagements were unsuccessful, 
project managers sought to circumvent obstructionist countries by using 
alternate routes that would still ultimately allow them to reach and service 
target markets, failing which co-operation agreements with incumbent 
competitors with back haul infrastructure were pursued. 
The GMA encountered extensive criticism of the Gautrain from the general 
public and community organisations especially during to the highly disruptive 
construction phase. Management’s response was to craft a highly responsive 
and engaged marketing and public relations capability. This function 
communicated to stakeholders each stage of the project, where disruptions 
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were occurring due to construction activities, and responded (though not 
necessarily resolved) public complaints and grievances across multiple media 
platforms including social media. Regarding court challenges to the Gautrain’s 
route and its environmental implications, management addressed the law 
suits by demonstrating compliance with all necessary laws and regulations, 
and winning every case. When the operations of the Gautrain were disrupted 
by copper cable thefts and industrial action management ensured the public 
was well informed through its communications strategy. In addition, these 
operational risks had been delegated to the Bombela consortium that were 
highly incentivised to resolve them in a timely manner as the contractual 
arrangements had significant penalties disruptions. Disputes between the 
sponsors of the Gautrain and the Bombela consortium have been generally 
resolved internally, with the exception of a water ingress dispute that was 
finally resolved by arbitration in the province’s favour. 
Despite limited initial resistance to the PBMR from environmental 
organisations, this increased throughout the project’s life. Whist it was difficult 
to address “in principal objections to nuclear energy”, management actively 
sought to address other objections. Regarding the risks associated with 
extending the physical footprint of nuclear facilities in South Africa, the 
prototype for the PBMR was envisaged to be built within the vicinity of the 
Koeberg nuclear power plant precinct. Management also actively engaged 
with environmental groups and exchanged information and data with them. 
The thinking in this regard was that whilst there was a very low probability of 
reconciling the demands of environmental groups and the project objectives, 
the project would benefit from the additional layer of monitoring that these 
groups performed. 
No significant resistance or conflicts to the Kalkbult project were observed. 
However management have embedded on-going interactions with community 
representatives via the community trust and women’s group. In both the 
Mozal and SNGP ventures formalised channels to address community 
grievances have been utilised successfully. Regarding operational challenges 
to the projects in their construction and operational stages extensive use of 
government channels has been made, justifying the strategic alliances with 
state institutions. The Chisumbanje project has been characterised by 
dysfunctional community engagement processes that have resulted in 
sporadic community protests targeting and threatening the ethanol plant. 
Despite managerial insistence of engagement with affected communities, 
these processes have been unsuccessful in large part possibly because the 
project mandate and legitimacy is questionable with surrounding residents. 
The result of this acrimonious environment has been the deployment of law 
enforcement agencies in the form of the police and military forces by 
government to the area. The entry of law enforcement agencies into this 
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contested project is extremely controversial, as government is perceived to be 
an effective sponsor of the venture, and thus conflicted in its use of public 
resources. 
Impact on operational performance 
The impact on operational performance of stakeholder disagreements in 
Seacom has manifested in the form of challenges in developing back haul 
networks in certain countries, restricting access to end users. Delays in laying 
the cable through Egypt during the construction phase resulted in unplanned 
incremental costs of approximately US$ 60 million. For the Kalkbult, SNGP, 
and Mozal there were no notable stakeholder conflicts experienced that could 
not be resolved and resulted in a significant impact in each of these projects 
operations. The prototype for the PBMR was never constructed and the 
venture not commercially operationalized rendering redundant the question on 
the impact on operational performance. Finally the Chisumbanje plant has 
been characterised by significant operational disruptions. The plant was 
mothballed from 2008 to 2013 during the rule of the government of national 
unity, owing to a lack of a number of regulatory approvals. There have been 
sporadic outbreaks of community protests against the ethanol plant and acts 
of sabotage directed towards it. Chisumbanje remains a highly contentious 
venture with characterised by widespread public disapproval and 
contestations regarding its legitimacy. 
8.2.3  Understanding institutional fragility 
An important observation in the cases studied is the role of formal and 
informal state institutions as stakeholders, and in enabling or frustrating 
project progression. Coupled to this is the important recognition highlighted in 
the introduction to this chapter of the political, social and economic dynamics 
that are playing out in South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The 
respective governments are pursuing what can be broadly described as a 
wholesale transformation project to address the relatively recent legacies of 
colonialism and apartheid that result in these three countries being 
characterised by higher degrees of uncertainty, complexity, extreme 
inequality, and poverty. This situation frequently results in fierce contestation 
between different stakeholders, and state institutions become key points of 
engagement. This section will begin by briefly describing the role of state 
institutions centrality to the transformation project that the three countries 
above are seeking to pursue. It will introduce the concept of a “confident 
state”, which describes how the government’s posture towards state 
institutions based on its internal and external confidence. Finally it will apply 
these insights to the actions and behaviours of formal and informal state 
institutions in the case studies. 
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A confident state in may be defined, as a government that believes that its 
policy objectives enshrined through various policies and institutions, will not 
be subverted by either internal or external actors. An internally confident state 
has the sense that the political environment is stable and coherent, and the 
legitimate power of the state will not be unsurped through illegal or subversive 
processes. This implies a maturing political system, where the rule of law 
fundamentally functions, and majority rule is not frustrated by powerful and 
narrow vested interest. Majority rule is further not inconsistent with 
constitutionalism and the protection of minority and investor rights. An 
externally confident state is secure that the international political dynamic is 
neither intrusive nor obstructionist, and respects the sovereignty and 
legitimate power of the incumbent government. This implies other countries, 
particularly from beyond the Sub-Saharan Africa region, will not interfere in 
the domestic affairs of the host country. Such perceived interference may be 
in the form of overtly taking sides with contesting political parties, and 
providing foreign financial funding and related resources to non-governmental 
organisations and other civil society actors that are in opposition to the 
incumbent government. External interference of this nature has the effect of 
intensifying political contestation with incumbent governments fearful that their 
legitimate authority may be unsurped by externally funded stakeholders, in 
order to defend the status quo, or advance other agendas not in the national 
interest. Whether the threat is perceived to be internal or external, where the 
incumbent government loses its sense of confidence, there is a perceived 
existential threat to the ruling party and the country’s emerging democracy. 
The incumbent government may become defensive and reactionary, justifying 
the suspension of the rule of law, negating or ignoring institutional rulings, 
violating minority rights, and expropriating assets in the name of national 
survival.  
Confidence in state institutions is an essential requirement of governments as 
when legitimate and effective institutions are in place, political principals can 
willingly cede powers to other actors and individuals through these 
institutions. These institutions have the potential to impact significantly on the 
incumbent government’s political project, and while strongly influenced by 
government through policy frameworks, political principals may not have 
direct control over the institutional workings. To be confident in these 
institutions, incumbent governments require them to be sympathetic to the 
overall transformation project. These institutions are frequently led by 
individuals who made a significant contribution to the liberation effort, and can 
implicitly be trusted to make decisions that do not subvert the transformation 
agenda, but rather add impetus to it. Where the government/political 
principals are not confident in these institutions, this may result in them being 
undermined by government actors because political principals feel vulnerable. 
Politically in South Africa this manifests as ANC fears of the influence of the 
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Democratic Alliance, which is the official opposition and has close ties to the 
corporate sector, in Mozambique Frelimo fears the influence of Renamo, and 
in Zimbabwe Zanu PF is concerned about the influence of the MDC. State 
institutions can become arenas of contestation because they determine to 
whom state financial resources flow, the officials leading these institutions 
apply executive powers, and these decisions can alter the balance of forces 
amongst the contesting stakeholders. This narrative has been and continues 
to be a compelling force in the evolution of state institutions across the 
political and economic spectrum in Southern Africa, and has a direct bearing 
on project and infrastructure finance ventures that are regulated by these 
institutions. 
In the SNGP and Mozal, it is instructive that the committees/forums set up to 
enable the execution of these projects were not formally institutionalised. 
Formal institutionalisation would likely have included autonomous or semi-
autonomous public institutions with the capacity and authority to service 
existing and prospective and new projects. This lack of formal 
institutionalisation was not an oversight but intentional. An informal apparatus 
allows political principals to more easily place trusted collaborators into key 
positions of influence, and where necessary to remove them. This lack of 
formalisation emphasises personal relationships and access to individuals to 
enable projects, in contrast to ceding these powers to a dedicated institution. 
A similar situation is observed in South Africa where proposals have been 
made that the Independent Power Producers (IPP) Unit currently a unit in the 
DOE be established as a separate government authority with an explicit and 
focused mandate to procure energy from private sector bidders. The IPP Unit 
remains under the DOE and reporting into the respective cabinet minister, 
with strong political resistance to its semi-autonomous institutionalisation. 
In Zimbabwe, the contestation surrounding the legitimacy of the Chisumbanje 
project has resulted in ZERA, EMA, ARDA, and even parliament becoming 
arenas of political contestation stemming from the project. Firstly during the 
government of national unity from 2008 to 2013, the Chisumbanje project was 
mothballed as regulatory approvals from state institutions could not be 
obtained due to contestation on the project between Zanu PF and the MDC. 
Subsequent to Zanu PFs ascendancy after the 2013 elections, ZERA issued 
an ethanol production license despite conceding that it had failed to achieve 
full regulatory oversight over Green Fuel. This was subsequently followed by 
the introduction of mandatory blending in the country, with Green Fuel as the 
sole supplier, despite massive public resistance, and questionable economic 
justifications. As highlighted EMA failed to process the EIA of Green Fuel, 
resulting in it obtaining regulatory approval by default. The utilisation of ARDA 
land and the impact of this on surrounding communities is another area of 
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state institutions being questioned regarding the legitimacy of their actions to 
the national interest as opposed to partisan political interests. 
The consequence of a low confidence in the state may result in political 
principals attacking and undermining state institutions that they perceive to be 
obstructionist to the transformation project. This may result in institutional 
paralysis due to political gridlock, institutions lacking clear and explicit 
mandates, unfunded institutions, and political appointees to institutions that 
require technocratic leadership. Incumbent governments effectively undercut 
their own policy positions, pronouncements, and the authority and power of 
mandated institutions. Non-institutionalisation of forums and committees 
makes it difficult to develop and build institutional memory, that can be used 
when prospective projects are under consideration, and may result in erratic 
choices and decision making, as these are driven by the individual committee 
incumbents and not an overarching policy and institutional framework. 
The factors leading to institutional fragility above can be in part addressed by 
the following measures. Within the country, leaders from the key societal 
stakeholder groups should endeavour to reach an accord committing to 
resolving contested areas internally, and disavow external intervention, 
support and funding. Fidelity to this principal would also limit the extent to 
which incumbent governments can blame external parties for domestic 
challenges. This principal is especially important for minority groups and 
corporations, as they are highly vulnerable to being used as scapegoats by a 
government that perceives itself to be facing an internal or external existential 
threat. 
For external governments such as the USA and the UK, and organisations 
such as the EU, a reassessment of policy responses under such stressed 
circumstances is recommended. Applying targeted sanctions on political 
principals, suspending access to financial resources disbursed by the World 
Bank/IFC and IMF, and cutting off access to the global financial system 
ratchets up the perceived external threat, and diminishes the external 
confidence of the incumbent government. This provokes an extreme reprisal 
that can only be effected if domestic institutions are further undermined, 
resulting in self-fulfilling downward cycle of events. To avoid such disruptive 
developments and ruptures in international relations, influential countries such 
as the USA and UK may need to be more astute regarding sensitivities based 
on the colonial and apartheid experience. The sponsorship of political 
organisations and politically inclined non-governmental organisations is likely 
to result in diplomatic confrontations. Similarly, while disagreements between 
governments are inevitable, expressing arguments and invectives in the 
mainstream media is counterproductive, and diplomatic channels would likely 
be more effective. Where deep differences do occur, the involvement of 
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regional organisations such as SADC to act as facilitators for conflict 
resolution adds legitimacy and credibility to the process. This was the case 
with Zimbabwe where the governments of Botswana and Zambia, amongst 
others, challenged the socio-economic effects of the fast track land reform 
program that removed commercial farmers. 
In summary the governments of South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe 
continue to have internal and external confidence concerns. Project finance 
practitioners, sponsoring banks, and external participants need to be aware of 
these challenges, and their potential impact on institutions regulating their 
ventures. 
8.3 Conclusion on stakeholder agency dynamics 
This chapter applied the principals enshrined in stakeholder agency theory I 
haven’t seen much theory to determine how stakeholders are prioritised. A 
matrix incorporating the key determinants influencing stakeholder interactions 
was compiled for each case. The matrix concluded with a determination as to 
whether the applicable stakeholder would have a high, medium, or low priority 
for engagement by the management of the project company. In arriving at this 
conclusion, the factors that informed a stakeholder’s prioritisation were 
considered, and how differentials in power, resources, mandate, and access 
affected shareholder interactions. Based on the results of the examination, 
reasons were extracted as to why sponsors, management, and government 
institutions enjoy high engagement priorities, in contrast to contractors and 
community organisations that enjoy medium to low engagement priorities. The 
importance of state institutions, which emerged as important stakeholders 
requiring high prioritisation in engagement, was explored, including why state 
institutions are frequently arenas of contestation in South Africa, Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe. 
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9 Summary and Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
The focus of this study has been on exploring contextual considerations that 
impact project and infrastructure execution in South Africa, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe, and determining their impact on the capital structure and 
stakeholder arrangements in the underlying projects. Using 7 case studies in 
the energy, transportation, telecommunications, agriculture and industrial 
processing sectors, the study is constructed to achieve three objectives. 
Firstly to determine important contextual considerations that influence the 
execution of project and infrastructure finance in the three countries of focus. 
Secondly to investigate what the main determinants of capital structure and 
financing behaviour for project finance ventures are, and to what degree 
assumptions in the mainstream static trade-off and pecking order theories, the 
explanatory powers of these theories, and the limited academic literature on 
project finance, is applicable to project finance ventures in the three countries. 
And thirdly, to investigate the interactions between important stakeholders 
that participate in project finance transactions and determine how 
stakeholders interactions are managed, power is distributed, engagements 
prioritised, and broader community and societal interests integrated. The 7 
case studies were all commissioned between 1994 and 2014, and 40 
interviews were conducted with practitioners to extract qualitative insights as 
to what informed practitioner decisions in project execution. 
 
This chapter aims to present the main conclusions and discuss some of their 
possible implications for financial, state, and corporate policies. In addition, 
limitations to the study will be discussed. The chapter ends with suggestions 
for future research. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.2 provides 
a summary of the main findings of the study and some of the potential 
implications. Section 9.3 lays out the limitations of the study. And finally 
section 9.4 makes recommendations for further research. 
9.2 Findings and implications 
Findings on contextual factors 
 
The first contribution of the thesis was to collate important contextual and 
structural factors that shaped the 7 cases investigated. These were expressed 
in a model that enables a clearer perspective of key contextual and structural 
factors impacting on how projects are executed in the three countries. The 
NPIF model proposed offers a lens through which project and infrastructure 
ventures executed in Sub-Saharan Africa can be viewed more holistically. The 
model builds on the observations of the case studies that highlight that the 
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contextual environment differs markedly from many part of the world including 
higher degrees of uncertainty, elevated levels of complexity, greater inequality 
and poverty, and a higher imperative for business inclusiveness. The NPIF 
model is useful in understanding the macro-environment impacting on project 
finance transactions, proactive measures to address potential challenges and 
hurdles.  
 
Findings on capital structure 
The first finding regarding capital structure is that the assumptions 
underpinning the main capital structure theories appear to have very limited 
applicability to capital structure formulation in project and infrastructure 
finance on the 7 case studies against which they have been examined. These 
assumptions include the existence of perfect capital markets, no transaction 
costs, symmetry of information, the absence of bankruptcy costs, benefits of 
debt as a tax shield, debt as a disciplinary tool, and minimising monitoring and 
bonding costs. The 7 cases revealed that capital supply constraint 
considerations were arguably the most important determinant of leverage. 
This disjuncture from the main capital structure theories in part arises from the 
fact that the latter were crafted and expanded upon in developed markets, 
making their applicability to transitional economies questionable, and to 
project finance in the South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe tenuous. 
Implicit from this finding is that the predictive and explanatory capability of 
these theories for project finance transactions in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
doubtful.  
The second finding leading from the earlier one above of the thesis observed 
a disjuncture between theory and practice in the formulation of capital 
structure. While the mainstream capital structure theories emphasise tax-
based considerations, practitioners emphasised very different factors. Priory 
factors for practitioners were access to capital (ability to raise and source 
capital), derisking of projects to be able to source capital, the capacity of 
capital contributions by equity participants, government and state institution 
facilitation, and other factors that were combined including political risk, 
bonding contractors, and regulatory prescriptions. Access to capital and 
derisking of projects emerged as the two most important determinants of 
capital structure. As a result leverage is significantly lower than the 
approximately 70% anticipated in project finance academic literature. This 
finding is significant in understanding how capital structure is actually arrived 
at in practice in project finance transactions in the Sub-Saharan region, and 
what the most highly placed considerations are. It further extends our 
understanding of capital structure formulation in developing markets. The 
findings suggest that agency theory is a superior predictor and offers a more 
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accurate explanatory model of capital structure determination than the 
mainstream capital structure theories. 
The third finding discounted the importance of shareholder and manager 
agency cost considerations in the determination of capital structure in the 
mainstream capital structure theories. The thesis found sponsor/manager 
agency costs to be substantially addressed by a conflation of personnel in the 
sponsor consortium and executive management team of the project company, 
and the formations of strong alliances between sponsors and management. 
These mechanisms reduced the use of debt as disciplinary tool, monitoring 
costs, and information asymmetry, in project and infrastructure transactions. 
In summary capital structure formulation is an outcome of an ecosystem that 
encompasses the project and the context in which it is undertaken. This 
ecosystem changes and evolves, and as a result requires responsiveness in 
capital structure decision making, as opposed to inflexible and mathematically 
driven theoretical approaches. 
These findings prescribe a focus on access to capital and derisking projects to 
attract greater investment capital into project finance. Regarding accessing 
more capital potential interventions include a more purposeful initiative to 
attract private equity as a source of project finance capital. While private 
equity was utilised to a limited extent, the prevalence of dedicated 
infrastructure funds and similar vehicles in Europe and North America, 
indicates this to be a potential source of significant project capital. Project 
practitioners may be able to replicate the Seacom process of raising capital 
upfront by selling project capacity or outputs. This has high potential 
applicability to lower risk projects with predictable revenue streams such as 
the Kalkbult project and those in the REIPPP. The high priority of derisking a 
project suggests a greater emphasis on brownfield ventures, as these would 
face lower barriers to reaching financial close. Greater domestic capital could 
be attracted to project finance by designing and distributing retail investment 
instruments that enable lower investment amounts, and tapping into non-
institutional capital providers. The latter measure could also reduce the 
reliance of projects on dollar denominated capital that exposes them to 
foreign exchange risk. Debt issuances could have a blended component of 
dollar and local currency funding, with domestic currency increasing over time 
as capital markets develop. Related tariffs could then also be structured to 
reflect the weightings of the currencies proportions. The cases and findings 
also demonstrated the importance of non-monetary capital in the form of land 
and other endowments to inject equity capital into a project. Non-monetary 
equity contributions can play an important role in capitalising projects in 
Southern Africa due to extensive non-monetary resources being 
underexploited. 
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Measures that can be implemented to derisk capital providers investment 
exposure is for project developers to offer capital subscription options that 
address the different risk appetites and parameters of potential funders. This 
extends beyond notions of traditional equity, mezzanine finance, working 
capital facilities etc. The costs of hedging against foreign exchange and 
currency repatriation risk can be reduced if dedicated wholesale markets on a 
national or regional basis are established. Establishing such facilities that can 
be accessed by infrastructure practitioners in the project conceptualisation 
stage, and the receipt of a commitment equivalent to a term sheet, could 
contribute to much more favourable capital structure arrangements. Finally 
the facilitation activities conducted by small and medium sized countries may 
be more efficiently performed if housed in a single multilateral organisation 
that could extract economies of scale.  
Findings on stakeholder dynamics 
The first finding on stakeholder dynamics was to understand the reasons why 
government and state institutions play an inordinately large role in the 7 
cases, and the strategic alliances between sponsors and state institutions that 
characterise 6 of the 7 projects. In addition to the importance of state 
institutions as contributors of monetary and non-monetary equity, regulatory 
power, and other facilitation, governments were observed as having high 
importance and wielding a wide range of resources. Consequently in 
conjunction with the sponsor/manager alliance state institutions are the most 
significant contributor to project progression. The attraction arising from the 
states array of resources results in project sponsors and managers preferring 
to execute ventures in alliances with the state, as opposed to local 
communities. These alliances have the potential to result in predatory actions 
against communities, environmental breaches, and other socially regressive 
outcomes, because community organisations are poorly organised, lack 
resources, are of low importance, and consequently a low priority for 
engagement. The implications arising from the findings of the stakeholder 
dynamics suggest more robust measures to protect the interests of 
community and environmental organisations due to their limited resources, 
and vulnerability to project sponsors, managers, and state institutions. In 
addition project practitioners need to factor into their risk mitigators the 
contestation that occurs in state institutions, as this can cause major project 
disruption. 
Overall contribution to portfolio of project finance case studies 
This thesis makes a significant contribution to the number, depth, and quality 
of case studies on infrastructure and project finance in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The literature review yielded only two case studies of an acceptable standard 
both concluded in the 1990s. These two cases were drafted by an offsite 
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North American researcher. This paper adds seven more cases to the number 
of project and infrastructure case studies drafted in Africa. Further this thesis 
modernises and brings up to date the literature on project finance on the 
continent by incorporating cases that became operational as recently as 2013. 
Having been drafted by an African researcher with access to key project 
finance practitioners and extensive commercial exposure to the SADC region, 
it is submitted that this work is more deeply rooted and relevant to the actual 
reality in Southern Africa, including documenting more accurately the motives 
and thoughts of the various actors party to these ventures who were 
interviewed.  
Previous case studies in Southern Africa have made very limited reference to 
the stakeholder and sustainability implications that accompany large-scale 
projects. Each of the case studies conducted makes an assessment and 
analysis of the stakeholder and sustainability implications of the case. As a 
result proposals for embedding greater sustainability into future project 
finance ventures have been made that can be replicated in central, eastern 
and western parts of the continent. These proposals differ from generic 
interventions in western countries due to divergent contextual settings unique 
to South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 
9.3 Limitations of the study 
The study was characterised by several limitations. The first of these is the 
fact that the case studies conducted related to only three countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa. No case studies were performed covering West Africa, East 
Africa, or Central Africa. As a result the research output is primarily applicable 
to the three designated countries limiting the external validity of the findings 
beyond South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. On account of the fact 
that in combination these three countries reflect the varying socio-economic 
and political conditions of many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the findings 
can be applied to the broader continent only by inference. The second 
limitation relates to the fact that the case studies selected all span a period 
post 1994. This limitation is due to the limited number of project and 
infrastructure finance transactions in the selected countries due to largely 
political constraints such as international isolation, economic sanctions and 
civil war. A third limitation relates to the researcher not being permitted access 
to certain transaction documentation that was not in the public domain and 
which the sponsors deemed confidential due to proprietary and other 
competitiveness concerns. While this was generally supplemented from 
alternative sources, some key data points may have been omitted on account 
of this limited access. Further, as respondents participated in the semi-
structured interviews on a voluntary basis, they may have withheld information 
that they believed to be proprietary in nature in response to the interview 
 330 
questions. The final limitation relates to the respondent profiles. While the 
study interviewed a range of different and independent respondents for each 
case, the constraint of time and resources meant the most well placed 
respondents were selected and interviewed, with less well placed 
respondents who would contribute less insight were purposefully omitted. The 
final limitation relates to a potential bias on the part of the researcher. By 
doing detailed investigations and write ups of each projects prior to the semi-
structured interviews the researcher may have unknowingly adopted certain 
biases in the questions posed and how they were posed. It is submitted that 
this potential limitation is far outweighed by the value derived from the 
qualitative questions posed as a result of having a thorough knowledge of the 
underlying cases. 
9.4 Recommendations for further research 
Extended research in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The most pressing recommendation in further studies is for researchers to 
conduct similar case studies in other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa beyond 
Southern Africa. In addition to the core areas of capital structure, governance, 
risk management, and sustainability upon which this thesis was premised, 
further study could add on the role of capital markets, and the institutional 
arrangements that impact on selected jurisdictions. Specifically these should 
cover East Africa, West Africa, and Central Africa encompassing key 
economic communities and hubs. Research papers in this respect could be 
framed as follows: 
 An investigation into the qualitative characteristics of large infrastructure 
and project finance ventures in the East African Community between 1980 
and 2015. 
Alternatively the above research could be formulated based on the six pillars 
that have arisen from the NPIF model. Research papers in this respect would 
be framed as follows: 
 An enquiry into the qualitative characteristics of large infrastructure and 
project finance ventures in the Economic Community of West African 
States between 1980 and 2015 using the six pillars of the ‘Normative 
Project and Infrastructure Finance’ model.  
This larger geographical footprint would facilitate the capturing of specific 
country nuances including Francophone and Lusophone countries and legal 
systems, and divergent political and sovereign risk considerations.  
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Capital markets and project and infrastructure finance 
Noting the critical role of developed capital markets in project and 
infrastructure finance, additional research is required to econometrically 
model how capital markets contribute to infrastructure formation. Research 
papers in this respect could be framed as follows: 
 Developing an econometric model calculating the restraining effect of 
under developed capital markets to the commissioning of large-scale 
project and commercial infrastructure ventures: An Assessment of Nigeria. 
 
 Developing an econometric model calculating the restraining effect of 
under developed capital markets to the commissioning of large scale 
project and commercial infrastructure ventures, and the concomitant effect 
on economic development: An Assessment of Mozambique.  
 
  Prospects for an alternative project funding model using infrastructure 
bonds in South Africa. 
Longitudinal research 
Further research is also required on projects commencing early on in the 
conceptual stage through to commercialisation. This is particularly relevant as 
research on projects typically occur at a set point in time. Earlier events may 
be diluted as institutional memory erodes due to personnel departures, while 
future events understandably cannot be incorporated. Longitudinal research 
of this nature will give a more accurate, nuanced and pointed view and 
assessment on how project and infrastructure finance transactions evolve 
from concept to reality, and also the challenges that are encountered and how 
these are overcome. Such research could be done in stages by multiple 
researchers over a number of decades and could culminate in rich and 
detailed project insight. By way of example using the Gautrain research in this 
respect could be framed as follows: 
 A longitudinal study of the Gautrain capital structure, governance 
arrangements, risk management and sustainability imperatives from 
conceptualisation, feasibility, commissioning, operations, and expansion 
between 1995 and 2025: A paper illuminating how projects unfold in the 
dynamic socio-economic and political context of South Africa. 
Reaching financial close 
Another area of potential research would be to investigate projects that reach 
an advanced conceptual stage yet fail to reach financial closure and the 
reasons for these early miscarriages. Research of this nature could be 
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conducted with the co-operation of DFIs and commercial banks that vet 
projects applying for funding and have databases that can be interrogated in 
this respect. Such research could be framed as follows: 
 An investigation into the reasons and differentiating characteristics 
between project finance ventures that reach financial closure and 
commissioning, and projects that fail to reach financial closure: A South 
Africa Analysis from 1994 to 2015. 
Politically sensitive state projects 
A fifth recommendation is research on politically sensitive projects such as the 
Medupi Power Station and the Sanral E Tolls that would be extremely difficult 
if not impossible to conduct currently as input from key officials and 
institutions may not be forthcoming. Research on these two projects could be 
frames as follows: 
An enquiry into the construction, engineering, financial and political 
challenges in the commissioning of Medupi Power Station. Mistakes made 
and lessons learnt. Such research could be framed as follows: 
 Establishing the practicality and viability of applying the ‘user pay principle’ 
in funding urban highways in South Africa: A Case Study of the Sanral E 
Tolling Project in Gauteng. 
 
 An investigation into the impact on national budgets where state resources 
are required to underwrite infrastructure projects: Implications of 
expenditure on the PBMR and Gautrain on South African fiscal allocations 
between 1995 and 2015. 
Econometric modelling of project finance 
The sixth recommendation for research is a comparison of the key metrics in 
project finance and infrastructure transactions across major geographies. 
Specifically this research would interrogate a database of project finance 
transactions over a period of time comparing Africa, with Asia, Europe, North 
America, and South America. The key metrics would include the debt pricing, 
debt to equity ratios, currency denomination, sectoral spread, insurance 
characteristics, facilitation measures by sponsors, the legal system 
underpinning the transaction, the level of participation of international and 
regional development finance institutions, and the participation of international 
developers. The latter would give valuable insight on an international basis as 
to the differentiating characteristics of project and infrastructure finance 
globally, and if performed over an extended period of time e.g. 30 years, could 
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highlight how these transactions have evolved over time. This research could 
be framed as follows: 
 A comparison of project finance between Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, 
Europe, North America, and South America. 
The effective implementation of sustainability principles 
The seventh recommendation for research relates to sustainability provisions 
in project and infrastructure finance and how these can be more rigorously 
applied. This research could include an enquiry as to the efficacy of the 
existing mechanisms to encourage and enforce sustainability initiatives, 
together with potential new interventions. The research could be framed as 
follows: 
 Determining the driving forces between project developers practicing 
sound sustainability practices versus project developers breaching 
sustainability prescriptions: A review of four case studies in Mozambique.  
 
 Addressing imbalanced power relations between project developers and 
local communities in Zimbabwe: Interventions for more equitable 
negotiation terms and contractual arrangements.  
 
 The consequences of divergent sustainability laws and regulations in 
Southern Africa on corporate compliance with sustainability provisions. 
The role of national, provincial and local government in infrastructure 
development: practice vs. theory 
The eighth and final recommendation for research is an enquiry as to the role 
of different spheres of government, namely national, provincial/state, and 
municipal in enabling infrastructure commissioning and investment. This 
research could include the interaction between the different spheres required 
to enable investment, the financial resources available to each sphere, and 
the types of investment more optimally executed by each sphere.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A-1.1:  Typical Contract Structure of a Project Finance Deal (Gatti, 2008) 
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Appendix A-1.2:  Risk Reflections in a Project Finance Deal (Farrel, 2003) 
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